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ABSTRACT
During the administration of former President Barack Obama, United States
foreign policy increased its focus on international development instability that threatened
U.S. national security. In 2010, President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive 6,
which declared that international development is a vital U.S. national interest. This was a
watershed moment for not just how the United States views its national interests, but in
which resources should be dedicated to protect them. In 2017, the U.S. Department of
Defense has security assistance relationships with 155 countries. These countries
represent a wide range of international development challenges.
This research examines the recipient state context where United States military
resources were contributed in the interest of reducing political development fragility.
Ten case studies have been selected for qualitative comparative analysis to determine the
context setting conditions under which political development fragility is reduced after
receiving U.S. military assistance. This study finds reduction to political fragility occurs
when the recipient state exhibits specific characteristics prior to the dedication of United
States military resources. The findings suggest that the use of international development
assessment tools for legitimacy and effectiveness of recipient state security sector
apparatus structures prior to donation of military assistance will increase potential
success outcomes.
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION
In 2010, former President Barack H. Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive
6, which declared that international development is a vital U.S. national security interest.
This was a watershed moment, not just with respect to how the United States views its
national interests, but also on which resources should be dedicated to protect them.
Historically, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has had the lead responsibility for
protecting vital United States national interests. However, during the 20th and early 21st
centuries, the nature of national security, how it is defined and how it is protected, has
evolved substantially. Up until the proverbial end game of the Cold War from 19891991, national security was viewed primarily in terms of military power. When the Cold
War concluded, policymakers, practitioners, and academics recognized that military
power by itself is inadequate to guarantee national security. As a result, development
concepts gained prominence as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
introduced the concept of Human Security. For a variety of reasons, this concept did not
affect the U.S. national security lexicon significantly until Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on
the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia on
September 11, 2001. Subsequent U.S. national security strategies gradually elevated the
relevance and importance of international development to the security of the United
States. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy declares
The United States must tailor our approaches to the different regions of the world
to protect U.S. national interests. We require integrated strategies that
appreciate the nature and magnitude of threats, the intensity of competitions, and
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the promise of available opportunities, all in the context of local political,
economic, social, and historical realities.

This declaration by the administration of President Donald J. Trump affirms the
policy by his predecessor by acknowledging that local development realities must be
considered as the United States protects its national interests. However, the body of
knowledge on the correlation of military assistance proffered by a foreign state with
recipient state development is inadequate.
Military assistance is a substantial and often controversial portion of the U.S.
federal budget. In Fiscal Year 2015 alone, the United States budgeted $9,242, 981,185
for traditional and non-traditional military assistance given to more than 155 states (U.S.
Agency for International Development, 2015 Green Book). Nearly 68% of this funding
was allocated for traditional military assistance, while the remainder was allocated to the
use of U.S. Department of Defense resources for humanitarian and categorically nonmilitary development programs. In many cases, the same U.S. Department of Defense
organizations delivered the assistance, but received separate sources of funding that
depended on how the assistance was categorized. From a traditional perspective, the
U.S. Government is providing sales of weapons systems through grants or leases to
countries designated by the U.S. President. From a non-traditional military assistance
perspective, the U.S. Department of Defense is advising local law enforcement
organizations, building aircraft runways, providing medical care, and responding to
disaster crisis management. Research by McNerney et al. (2014) reveals that it is the
lower cost military assistance activities such as training and advising that are the most
22

effective in reducing recipient state developmental fragility. Such findings are logical
when considering that the nature of international conflict is now characterized more by
internal societal tensions than state-on-state warfare. In mid-2017, for example, the
Center for Systemic Peace recognized 27 countries experiencing major armed conflict.
All of these conflicts were characterized as societal wars. In a majority of these states,
policy executives used internal military resources to mitigate the violence because state
law enforcement resources were either overwhelmed or nonexistent. This presents a
challenge for the United States on how best to provide military assistance. Since the
Civil War, the United States has specifically kept military resources removed from
internal violence control. If states in which there are U.S. national interests are using
military resources to remedy internal security concerns, how best should the U.S. provide
military assistance?
1.1 Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is to test the theory of military assistance for
mitigation of recipient state developmental weakness for mutual benefit. Specifically, it
explores the context conditions under which recipient states of U.S. military assistance
experience a reduction of political development fragility. This research also examines
recipient state foreign policy outcomes that are influenced by political development
fragility.
This dissertation uses a modified version of the definition of military assistance
articulated by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in its 2015 Green
Book Summary of U.S. Foreign Assistance Loans and Obligations. In the USAID
document, Military Assistance is defined as “foreign aid for programs primarily for the
23

benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially
enhances military capability.” The USAID definition of military assistance excludes
humanitarian and non-military development programs funded by the U.S. Department of
Defense; these programs are categorized as ‘economic assistance.’ The difference in this
dissertation is that rather than keeping humanitarian and non-military development
programs separate, they are considered together qualitatively to gain a more holistic
appreciation for the evolving definition of aspects of the recipient state security apparatus
that may be considered to receive assistance from the United States Department of
Defense.
1.2 Problem Statement
The use of military assistance for mitigation of international development
challenges that threaten donation states is controversial. There are risks associated with
the use of this foreign policy tool for purposes beyond fighting and winning wars.
However, since the definition of national security has evolved, so must the tools
associated with the defense of national security. When the U.S. Presidential
Administration of Barack Obama chose to prioritize mitigation of international
development fragility in Presidential Policy Directive 10, it did so without a clear view
on which resources should be dedicated to solving development fragility that threatens
the security of the United States. This dissertation is an attempt to contribute useful
knowledge that can inform U.S. policy makers considering further use of U.S.
Department of Defense resources for mitigation of recipient state political development
fragility.
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1.3 Specification of Research Questions
This study specifically focuses on political development, which is defined as the
process through which states create legitimate and effective institutions that deliver
governance services to a pertinent population. With this purpose in mind, the research
questions for this dissertation are as follows: First, to what extent, if any, is there a
relationship between the U.S. provision of military assistance for recipient state political
development and recipient state foreign policy outcomes? Second, under what
conditions, if any, does American military assistance influence the political development
process in recipient states?
1.4 Specification of Hypotheses
In response to the research questions, the dissertation presents and assesses the
following four hypotheses. First, U.S. military assistance reduces fragility in states with
high legitimacy of the existing political order among the relevant state population.
Second, U.S. military assistance reduces fragility in states with a low security sector
apparatus institutional effectiveness. Third, U.S. military assistance reduces fragility in
states with a high security sector apparatus legitimacy. Fourth, U.S. military assistance
does not reduce fragility in states without a cooperative relationship between the United
States and recipient state executive leaders.
1.5 Background and Context
This dissertation examines the connection, if any, between the US DoD provision
of military assistance activities and development of the recipient state security sector
apparatus. Focus is placed on the security sector apparatus portion of political
development because it is the state political institution with the authority to use force.
25

Thus, recipient state security sector apparatus is defined using the definition from
Presidential Policy Directive 23, U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy, dated April
2013, which provides the following definition:
The security sector is composed of those institutions—to include partner
governments and international organizations—that have the authority to use force
to protect both the state and its citizens at home or abroad, to maintain
international peace and security, and to enforce the law and provide oversight of
those organizations and forces. It includes both military and civilian
organizations and personnel operating at the international, regional, national,
and sub-national levels. Security sector actors include state security and law
enforcement providers, governmental security and justice management and
oversight bodies, civil society, institutions responsible for border management,
customs and civil emergencies, and non-state justice and security providers.

The provision of U.S. military assistance as a prioritized U.S. policy action began
in 1961 with the creation of the Foreign Assistance Act. Since that time, the number of
states receiving assistance has grown to 155 in 2017. There is a wide array of political,
social, and economic development represented by these 155 states. Not all partners are
equal in their capacity to support or receive international security endeavors because the
continuum of security capacity is wide among the world’s sovereign states. In addition,
the contemporary international security environment is increasingly being defined by
asymmetric threats that challenge traditional assumptions about how best to allocate
military capacity to protect national security. When Al Qaeda committed its terrorist
26

attacks against the United States on September 11th, 2001, American national security
policymakers struggled not only to define the root causes of the asymmetric threats but
also how to counter them. Shortly after the attacks, policymakers, scholars and security
practitioners declared that one of the most significant threats to the security of both the
United States and to the international community could be expected to emanate from
fragile, failing, and failed states, (Crocker, 2003, Fukuyama, 2004, Rice and Patrick,
2008, Gates, 2010, Patrick, 2011).
Analysis of causes of fragility and the progression towards reduction of these
conditions is addressed academically by the scholarly discipline known as international
development. The scope of international development scholarship has grown
dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The major growth began after the United
Nations (UN) published the first Human Development Index in 1990. In 1994, the UN
Development Program (UNDP) introduced a modernized approach to human security.
This definition moved away from the traditional military approach to national security
through territorial integrity and protection of sovereignty and placed greater emphasis on
comprehensive factors that threaten life, survival, and the well- being of individuals.
This approach gained greater traction among U.S. foreign and security policymakers after
the attacks by Al Qaeda on the United States in 2001. Al Qaeda had thrived in
Afghanistan, a state that was unable to gain control of its territory and where human
security conditions were very low.
Since the Al Qaeda attacks in 2001, the United States has invested in the study of
the root causes of conflicts that have international consequences.

A result of this effort

is that the U.S. Department of Defense is playing a more significant role in stabilization
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efforts in the internal conflicts of other states. This is no small task. In 2013, the United
States Fund for Peace Fragile State Index identified 150 of 178 states as being in
positions of developmental weakness. Among that group, the index categorized four as
failed states and 14 as critically weak states.
1.6 Research Design and Organizational Structure
To address the research questions, the dissertation qualitatively examines 10 case
studies through in depth individual and comparative analysis. The case countries each
have received U.S. military assistance for five years or longer between the years of 1990
and 2012, as derived from the U.S. Agency for International Development summary of
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants from July 1, 1945 to September 30, 2012. The case
studies are selected from five primary regions of the world: 1) Russia/Eurasia (Romania
and Ukraine), 2) Latin America (Colombia and Honduras), 3) the Asia Pacific (Indonesia
and Philippines), 4) Sub-Saharan Africa (Liberia and Kenya), and 5) the Middle East
(Jordan and Yemen). Two cases are selected from each of the five regions. A
requirement for each of the ten is that each must have received at least five consecutive
years of military assistance from the United States between the years of 1990 and 2012.
The qualitative analysis of these cases covers data up to 2018. This range is selected to
allow at least a five-year lag time between year of military assistance and measurement of
the political development. Among the groups meeting the minimal criteria, an example
was chosen from each of the five regions to represent a case in which state fragility
decreased after U.S. military assistance and a case in which state fragility did not improve
after U.S. military assistance. Determination of case studies that met these criteria was
achieved by using the 2015 Fragile States Index sponsored by the U.S. Fund for Peace.
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The dissertation consists of 10 chapters. The first three chapters are organized to
introduce the topic and specify the research questions and hypotheses, review the relevant
literature and note the dissertation’s contributions to that literature, and detail the research
methodology. Next, five separate chapters are dedicated to qualitative analysis on
variables from the international development and foreign policy bodies of knowledge.
Chapters 4 through 8 examine the case studies through foreign policy lens and political
development frameworks, with associated methodology and variables for each
perspective. The emphasis within these chapters is on the relationship of the U.S. to the
recipient state during the years studied, the relevant character of the U.S. military
assistance and associated recipient state political development. Each of the case study
chapters examines two case studies within one of the five regions studied. Each case
study chapter concludes with a cross case comparison for that region. Next, Chapter 9
presents a comparative analysis of the case studies. The primary emphasis within the
data examination in this chapter is on the relationship between recipient state political
development and U.S. foreign policy.

Chapter 10 presents the study conclusions and

ends with U.S. military assistance recommendations for U.S. security policy makers.

29

CHAPTER II -LITERATURE REVIEW
Relevant literature for this study is drawn from the foreign policy, international
development, state political institutional development, and human security knowledge
communities. This chapter begins with an overview of the theories and key theorists that
drive the creation of the hypotheses for this dissertation. This discussion is then followed
by four subsections to address the key literature that shapes the selection of variables and
the framework for the study.
To begin, analysis of the use of military resources to protect national security is
most readily associated with the realist school of international relations and foreign
policy. Realism is concerned with the process through which states seek to ensure their
survival in an anarchic world. At its core, realism acknowledges the ever-present
potential for conflict in a condition of anarchy. Classical realism also acknowledges the
fundamental role of the state in shaping the interactions in the international system. The
nature of state interaction within the international system has evolved significantly over
the past 70 years. When classical realist scholar Hans Morgenthau published his original
work entitled Politics Among Nations in 1948, the state of telecommunications and
transportation was characterized by written communications and ship-based movement
across oceans. In 1975, Kenneth Waltz articulated his theory on neorealism by focusing
on how states posture themselves systemically in response to the relative power of their
neighbors and the region at large. Today the Internet enables communications between
millions of people in a matter of seconds. People can travel by air in a tiny fraction of the
time required in 1948. These dynamics have empowered non-state groups that were not
considered power players just 20 years ago. States must posture themselves to respond
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to these irregular threats. Application of traditional state-on-state military combatant
forces is inadequate.
A result of the changing nature of the international threat environment is that
international relations scholars have reexamined the utility of traditional theories. Today,
a more contemporary view of how domestic politics affects international relations is
found in neoclassical realism.

Neoclassical realists assume that the international system

guides state foreign policy, but they focus specifically on the nature of the state as an
intervening variable. In particular, neoclassical realism examines the circumstances
under which states will emulate successful military institutions, governing practices, and
technologies of more powerful states (Taliaferro et al, p. 196, 2009).
The attacks by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 were a vivid reminder to U.S.
security policymakers that the nature of the external threats is not clear and that military
structures, however formidable, that were formed to meet the threats of the 21st century
may need to be reformulated. As U.S. policy has prioritized global development as a
U.S. national interest, it is important to examine how best the military instrument of
power can contribute to the achievement of this objective.
For this study, hypotheses are derived from the neoclassical realist school of
thought. Focus is placed on appropriate international security postures for challenges
related to development pathologies in another state. To create these hypotheses, relevant
literature has been examined in four categories: 1) U.S. Foreign Policy and International
Development, 2) Political Development and Weak States, 3) History of Military
Assistance, and 4) U.S. Military Assistance, Political Development and Social Conflict
Theory.
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2.1 Neoclassical Realism, U.S. Foreign Policy, and International Development
Ripsman et al (2016) describe four categories of intervening variables that have
relevance to the provision of military assistance in support of foreign policy. They are: 1)
leader images, 2) strategic culture, 3) state-society relations, and 4) domestic institutions.
These variables are linked to three domestic processes that potentially distort national
foreign policy responses to international stimuli: perception, decision-making, and policy
implementation. The four clusters of intervening variables all have a direct bearing on
one or more of these processes. Perception is affected not only by international factors,
but also by leader images and strategic culture. Both decision-making and policy
implementation are conditioned domestically by strategic culture, state-society relations,
and domestic political institutions. State-society relations are defined by Ripsman et al
(2016) as the character of interactions between the central institutions of the state and
various economic or societal groups. Effective state-society relations can affect the
processes and mechanisms to resolve state-society differences and disputes. Theories of
foreign policy that address the relevance of internal variables to external relations have
more explanatory power in the contemporary international security environment because
the overwhelming majority of ongoing conflicts in the world are internal. According to
the Center for Systemic Peace 2017 Global Report, only one conflict in the world in 2016
is a state-on-state dynamic. All others derive from a combination of civil wars,
insurgencies, severely fragile governance structures and transnational criminal groups.
This is an appropriate framework for this dissertation for many reasons. To
begin, classical realism is predicated on the need by states to ensure their survival in an
anarchic world. Militaries are created for the express purpose of ensuring the survival of
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the state. The neoclassical interpretation of realism is most appropriate because it goes
beyond a sole focus on external threats to state security. It acknowledges the domestic
component of national security, an aspect that has been lacking in previous realist
interpretations.
Evolution of a state’s military and its connection to internal political institutions is
not new. Janowitz (1964) asserts that the military, with its symbols of authority and
force, are part of the apparatus of a legitimate government. Janowitz validated this
hypothesis through an analysis of the role of military establishments in Latin America
that sought to direct and arbitrate sociopolitical change as it was developing in the 1960s
and 70s. Janowitz highlighted the pivotal role of the capacity of the institutions of
fledgling governments that orchestrated the security sector. Today, the political
institutions that control the security sector are no less critical to long term development.
In many ways, globalization has made the relative capacity of the security sector a make
or break parameter for the overall development health of new states.
U.S. policy interest in foreign alliances and international engagement is relatively
new. This posture is less than 100 years old, since it was not until after World War II that
the United States began to accept its new role as a world leader (Jordan et al., 2009).
World War II ushered in a new role for the United States in world affairs. It also gave
rise to a new role for the American military institution broadly and branches therein
specifically. Prior to World War II, the U.S. military was rarely involved with foreign
policy. This bureaucratic separation from the other U.S. executive agencies changed as
the nature of warfare evolved. The memory of the destruction of nuclear weapons
combined with the clash of political, economic, and social ideologies between the United
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States and the Soviet Union drove a more nuanced type of warfare during the Cold War
era. Neither side wanted to rush into an exponentially more deadly conventional war.
This new environment demanded more frequent communications between the
Departments of War, Navy, and State. As a result, the U.S. National Security Act of
1947 was created to revolutionize the relationship between the military services,
Congress and other executive branch departments by creating mandatory consultation
among the three.

The 1940s and 1950s witnessed a dramatic growth in global efforts to

find opportunities to align with like-minded states. In many ways, this led to an arms
race, since military technology was regarded as the key evidence of a state’s ability to
defend itself. In the bi-polar Cold War environment, both sides sought to increase their
spheres of influence through the provision of military assistance to client states and
opposition movements and/or rebel groups in the developing world in exchange for
ideological loyalty.
Thus, cooperation during the Cold War was most readily associated with military
power and alliances that emphasized the military instrument of national power.
Recognizing that unchecked distribution of military resources was not without risk,
American policymakers passed the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961 to place more
government regulation on the rapidly expanding nature of military assistance
relationships with partner states. In 1961, nearly half of all U.S. foreign aid was military
in nature. Expansion of military assistance halted abruptly when the Cold War came to a
conclusion with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the reunification of
Germany in October 1990 and the implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
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The years leading up to the end of the Cold War also coincided with newer
approaches among the international development community on the definition of security
and how best to create it. In 1990, the first Human Development Report was published
by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to assess the member states of the
United Nations and expand the interpretation of the Human Development Index.
Creation of this index required synthesis of hundreds of indicators and thousands of data
points. It also required a more structured approach to definition of and analysis of human
security. Concepts such as health and life expectancy and years of schooling were added
to the traditional view of development that is based primarily on real income per capita.
As a result, in 1994, the UNDP introduced an expanded human security concept. This
expanded concept moved away from the traditional focus on military defense from
threats to territorial integrity and state sovereignty to factors that affect life survival,
human dignity, and the well-being of all individuals considered to be citizens of a given
state. The clusters of data assessed by the UNDP centered on seven concepts: 1)
economic security, 2) food security, 3) health security, 4) environmental security, 5)
personal security, 6) community, and 7) political security.
The United States began to incorporate the more contemporary approach to
international security through its creation of the doctrinal concept known as “Military
Operations Other Than War.” This approach was not fully embraced by U.S. executive
leadership in the decade following the end of the Cold War, so resources and meaningful
analysis by the U.S. policymakers were severely lacking in creating an understanding of
the changes to the international system that could benefit from tailored uses of military
resources. An example of the failed U.S. approach to these types of missions occurred in
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Somalia from 1992 to 1994. American policymakers underestimated the severity of the
lack of political development under extreme drought and poverty conditions. Warring
tribal leaders used well-intentioned American offers of aid as leverage for expanding
their own political power. As the situation degraded into further chaos, the United States,
in conjunction with the United Nations, attempted to democratize a heavily Muslim
society that distrusted the foreign intentions. This ended tragically, with the deaths of 18
United States Special Forces personnel, one of whom had his dead and mutilated body
paraded through a jubilant crown in Mogadishu. General Mohamed Farrah Aided created
a videotape of the massacre and distributed it to an increasingly connected global
audience. The American public was horrified at the extent of the violence and demanded
an end to United States participation in wars that appeared to be of no specific United
States national interest. As a result, the U.S. decreased its involvement in efforts that
came to be known as nation/state-building because the American public could see no
specific national interest in intervening in other state’s civil wars.
Retraction from foreign civil wars did not last long. American attitudes about
involvement in this type of conflict changed dramatically shortly after the turn of the
century because the terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda against America on September 11, 2001
were earth shaking to the American view of its own security. A discovery by the
congressionally appointed investigation committee was that internal and external
intelligence organizations were not communicating in an effective manner to protect the
U.S. homeland against current threats. As a result, the Department of Homeland Security
was created in 2002 to bridge the gap between continental U.S. based law enforcement
and crisis management organizations and the Department of Defense. This sense of
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vulnerability after the September 11th attacks inspired renewed focus on the root causes
of conflict around the world in places that could threaten the security of the United States.
In 2010, the Barack Obama Administration issued a Presidential Policy Directive on
Global Development declaring that development is indispensable in the forward defense
of America’s interests. In particular, the directive places an emphasis on economic
growth and responsible governance, which is the realm of political development.
2.2 Political Development and Weak States
The process of political development has gained renewed emphasis in academic
and policy realms. Political development studies date back to 1968, when Huntington
presented groundbreaking arguments on the potential for political decay to occur when
states went through the modernization process. Huntington (1968, p. 22) argues “highly
developed political systems have procedures to minimize, if not eliminate, the role of
violence in the system and are able to restrict to explicitly defined channels the influence
of wealth in the system.” Without basic order, no other types of economic or social
development can occur in a meaningful and sustainable fashion. Thus, focus on the path
towards political development must precede any efforts to evolve economic and social
development. Societies must progress through tribal and clan orientation to higher states
of development in which communities of people are not necessarily connected ethnically
or relationally. These political transitions can be highly volatile as disparate groups fight
to exert influence over and control others. Huntington was one of the first researchers to
explain the highly volatile nature of the transition to political maturity. His observations
were particularly relevant after the wave of decolonization in the 1960s and became
relevant again when the Cold War ended and the former Soviet states gained
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independence. There were numerous examples of states adapting poorly to the new
requirements for increased participation by recently empowered constituents. Huntington
describes these situations as evidence of a process of political decay that can occur as
segments of society fight for influence in the political structure. When political decay
sets in, states are frequently vulnerable to backsliding instead of moving forward during
the modernization process. In this manner, Huntington asserts that political development
is slow when compared to the more rapid pace of economic development. These
arguments have challenged economists to look beyond economic aid as the sole answer
to persistent poverty.
In 1973, the U.S. based, but privately funded, Freedom House began publishing
global trends in freedom and the condition of political rights and civil liberties around the
world. This organization based its assessments on a combination of on-the-ground
research, consultations with local contacts, and information from news articles,
nongovernmental organizations, governments and a variety of other sources for
assessments of now 210 countries and territories.
Research such as that produced by Huntington and the Freedom House prompted
more in depth analysis on definitions for political stability. Ake (1975) defines political
stability as a condition in which the members of society restrict themselves to the
behavior patterns that fall within the limits imposed by political role expectations. In
democracies and autocracies, those roles are understood and supported by law, whether
that law is publicly debated and legitimately approved or imposed by an autocrat.
Significant challenges occur when a society is transformed, willingly or unwillingly,
away from time-tested normal behaviors that have been associated with autocracies or
38

democracies. When a society begins to evolve from an autocracy to a multi-party
construct, violence is not uncommon. We see evidence of this transition all over Africa
over the past thirty years, where many countries have had state leaders foment civil wars
when their presidential terms were coming to an end. Likewise, if a previously free
society is forced by a charismatic leader to abandon previously accepted democratic
norms in favor of autocratic trends; this transformation can also be problematic.
Evidence of this kind of turmoil was seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the rise of
Slobodan Milosevich after the breakup of Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s.
Fukuyama (2014) updated Huntington’s seminal works with his study of political
order and political decay. Fukuyama focuses on the role of institutions as the common
thread that serves as a background condition for all political life. Fukuyama (2014, p. 7)
asserts that development necessarily centers on the process by which political institutions
emerge, evolve, and eventually decay. He asserts that there are challenges as societies
move from tribal or clan orientation to urban populations where legitimate rule of law can
help or hurt the overall development trajectory. Fukuyama (2014) outlines six essential
political elements of development: 1) economic growth, 2) social mobilization, 3)
ideas/legitimacy, 4) the state, 5) rule of law, and 6) democracy. To moderate these six
political elements of development, Fukuyama asserts that there are three critical political
institutions. They are: 1) state, 2) rule of law, and 3) accountability. Fukuyama argues
that security sector organizations are critical for the state to generate sufficient power to
defend itself externally and internally (Fukuyama, 2014, p. 37). He argues that changes
in political institutions must be understood in the context of economic growth, social
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mobilization, and the power of ideas concerning justice and legitimacy (Fukuyama, 2014,
p. 40).
While emphasis on the political institutions that drive governance structures is
relatively new in international development scholarship, examination of a well-defined
military institution in developing states is not. Janowitz (1965) examines the important
task of finding a format for civil-military relations that is appropriate to the social
structure of states that are in early stages of independent existence or are undergoing
exponential levels of economic growth. Janowitz (1965, p. xii) recognizes that military
institutions and their leaders have a life apart from civil society, but the trend in modern
society, in both developed and developing nations, is toward greater penetration of the
military into the civilian. Importantly, his research establishes that the military, with its
symbols of authority and force, is part of the apparatus of a legitimate government
(Janowitz, 1965, p. xiii). He directs this assumption to the condition in which leaders of
developing states have political choices on the relative balance of coercion versus
persuasion that will be used in efforts to modernize and effect societal change (Janowitz,
1965, p. xiii).
There has been a proliferation of studies that address the contribution of politics
to developmental progress. Leftwich (2000), Kahl (2006), North et al. (2009) and
Marshall and Cole (2011) examine a variety of political, social, and economic reasons
why countries in the developing world have been persistently poor and live in conditions
of weakness or failure. A common thread through these studies is that a lack of political
stability and functional political institutions can obstruct improvements to social and
economic indicators. Additionally, they all assert that globalization has limited ability to
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lift societies out of poverty when state political institutions are corrupt or unavailable.
For example, Leftwich (2000) argues for the primacy of politics in development. He
claims that the central and dominant variable determining not only the conception and
shape of development, but developmental success or failure in all human societies, is
politics. Leftwich (2000, p. 4) defines politics as “all of the activities of conflict,
cooperation, and negotiation involved in the use, production and distribution of resources,
whether material or ideal, whether at local, national or international levels, or whether in
the private or public domains.” There is no question in his definition that a top concern
of politics is the problem of violence constraint and conflict management. This is the
domain of security structures, military and non-military. Kahl (2006, p. 39) argues that
functional capacity for binding rule making depends on a combination of coercive power,
administrative capacity, and legitimacy of authority (Kahl, 2006, p. 39).
Lack of violence control can be detrimental to social order that evolves as an
economy grows or stagnates. North et al. (2009) address the problem of violence
constraint and social order. Specifically, this study examines the effects of unconstrained
violence by privileged political elite individuals on a nation’s economic growth. As
societies move toward states of higher economic growth, the authors assert that it is the
existence of open access by all members of that society to political and economic
institutions that enables a nation to prosper and grow more equitably. The existence of
this open access society also serves as a foil to many of the root causes of violence in
societies that have not yet achieved an open access posture. Often it is the lack of
effective political institutions that inhibit equal access because corruption and cronyism is
still tolerated, to the detriment of the marginalized segments of the population. This
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process has been referred to as ‘immiserating growth,’ where a nation’s overall GNP is
growing, but more people are becoming poorer, rather than wealthier, since only a few
privileged individuals are reaping the benefits. When this type of decay occurs, there are
often social shocks that provoke violence by the underserved groups of the population.
To create variables for the study of the control of violence and its impact on the
affected society, Marshall and Cole (2011) use societal-systems analysis to examine the
interconnectedness of three fundamental dimensions of societal-systems: governance,
conflict, and development.

Figure 1. Societal-System Triad
Source: Marshall and Cole (2011)
Marshall and Cole’s societal-system triad model depicts how the conditions,
characteristics, qualities, and prospects of the three fundamental dimensions of the
societal system critically affect the other two. This is an important framework for the
study of military assistance because it simplifies a complex process to three basic
parameters—governance, conflict, and development. Marshall and Cole argue that
performance evaluation of a societal-system must track conditions in all the key
dimensions with a view toward both effectiveness and legitimacy. This model assesses
the degree to which a government can perform basic essential tasks and is viewed as
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legitimate by the population that it governs. Essentially, Marshall and Cole (2011) assert
that effective and legitimate governance structures prevent conflict and promote
development.
In focusing on the importance of governance, Marshall and Cole (2011) also find
that the global trend in major armed conflict is not centered on interstate warfare, but
rather on intrastate, or what they call societal warfare. Society is an inherently social
term that refers to a group of people that live together in an organized manner with
mutually agreed upon norms. Without agreement on norms and rules of interaction, the
society suffers. Marshall and Cole (2011) argue that societal warfare has overtaken
interstate warfare as the most common form of global conflict, with interstate warfare
decreasing by over sixty percent since peaking in the mid-1980s and falling by the end of
2010 to its lowest level since 1961. Their comparison between the two types of warfare
is depicted below:

Figure 2 Global Trends in Warfare
Source: Marshall and Cole (2017)
Marshall and Cole (2011) explain the persistence of societal warfare as a function
of the degree to which affected countries are in the midst of a transition to democracy, or
a more legitimate form of governance. These transitions can be unsettling for the
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affected populations, particularly when the society is recovering from a civil war.
Though some countries try to implement a staged transition to democracy, demands from
emerging political groups often threaten that transition because regimes are immature in
their ability to fully institutionalize the reforms desired by these groups. The response is
too often a return to violence because opportunist leaders may take unfair advantage of
their access to the military instrument of power as a tool to control the population.
Others may simply lose control of their ability to effectively govern during the transition.
Marshal and Cole (2011) label these transitioning regimes “anocracies.” They find that
anocracies are highly unstable, with over fifty percent experiencing regime change within
five years and over seventy percent doing so within ten years. Additionally, they find
that anocracies are also much more vulnerable to new outbreaks of armed societal
conflict. Anocracies are about six times more likely than democracies and two and onehalf times as likely as autocracies to experience new outbreaks of societal wars (Marshall
and Cole, 2011, 12). They are four times more likely than democracies to experience
coup plots and about one and one-half times more vulnerable to coups than autocracies
(Marshall and Cole, 2011, p. 13). These findings have important significance for
researchers and policy makers looking for ways to channel pre-emptive support to
vulnerable populations where conficts over governance may have international security
ramifications.
The graph below was created by the Center for Systemic Peace to show the
evolution of democracies, anocracies and autocracies over the past 75 years.
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Figure 3 Global Trends in Governance 1946-2015
Source: Marshall and Cole (2017), Center for Systemic Peace
The nature of the governance structure influences the character of the military
institution. As a core instrument of national power, the military institution is closely tied
to the character of the national leadership. In states with democratically selected leaders,
it is more likely that the military instrument will be a reflection of the national preference
for legitimate institutions. By contrast, when a nation is governed autocratically, the
military institution is more likely to reflect the leadership preferences of the autocrat.
Thus, it is essential to study the nature of a regime to determine how best to provide
military assistance.
2.3 History of Military Assistance
The concept of military assistance has undergone significant transformations over
the past 100 years. The best way to describe the changes is through a review of the most
significant time periods for military assistance and the relevant literature from that
perspective. For the purposes of this study, five periods are relevant. They are: 1) PreIndustrial Revolution, 2) Industrial Revolution, 3) Post World War II and the Cold War,
4) Post-Cold War, and 5) Post 9/11.
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1)Pre-Industrial Revolution
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, warfare was vastly different from the state in
which it exists today. Weapons were rudimentary and reach was limited most often to
neighboring countries accessible by foot. The concept of sovereign nations was also
new, having only been advanced in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia. Before this
treaty, wars were fought mainly for religious or ideological differences and there were no
real defined boundaries between civilizations. The Treaty of Westphalia freed societies
from the oppressive and unresponsive rule by leaders from afar. It introduced the
concept of sovereign nation states that had the right to choose their own leadership and to
raise armies to defend themselves. From this point on, national armies were created to
defend themselves from external invasion. These armies were formal, defined by
uniforms and the state of weaponry at the time, which was a mix of swords, arrows, and
eventually cannons. Military assistance during this time frame was based on alliance
theory, or teaming with other nations to prevent external invasion. National security was
defined primarily by relative military power.
2) Industrial Revolution
Warfare became dramatically more destructive during the Industrial Revolution.
Inventions such as the railroad, the steamship, high-powered rifles, and the telegraph
transformed the reach and lethality of conflict. These changes began in England in the
middle of the 18th century and really took root throughout the 19th century. The War of
1812 energized the U.S. participation in the Industrial Revolution. After this conflict,
U.S. policymakers realized that the U.S. was too dependent on foreign goods. This set
off a greater investment in an internal rail system for moving goods and also grew the
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U.S. enterprise for manufacturing. Military assistance as a definable phenomenon began
at the beginning of the 19th century in 1815 (Stoker, 2008). The growth of transportation
and the technology of weapons gave states more opportunity to share.
3) Post World War II and the Cold War
Military assistance expanded significantly after the end of World War II. There
were several reasons for this expansion. First, the United States had firmly established
itself as a global industrial and military superpower. It had successfully extended its
military reach in both the European and Pacific theaters. When the war ended, the United
States embarked upon a rebuilding plan for both Germany and Japan. The effort in
Germany was the largest postwar reconstruction project attempted in American history.
It was known as the Marshall Plan, named after General George Marshall, who
promulgated the plan when delivering the Harvard University Commencement Address
in June 1947. This effort included the creation of United States military bases and an
associated growth in defense relationships with several other Western European states.
The relationship with Russia soured as the communist ideology took root, in direct
opposition to the liberal democratic style favored by the United States. The tension
between the two ideologies and their patron nations, the United States and Russia’s
successor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), led to the Cold War. The
Cold War drove a race by these two superpowers to influence the rest of the world. In
the early years of the Cold War, U.S. efforts focused on transfer of American arms from
stockpiles and surplus war materials. The concept of sending advisors began in the late
1940s with the creation of the Greece-Turkey Aid Act of March 1947. This act was part
of what became known as the Truman Doctrine. In March 1947, President Harry S.
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Truman appeared before Congress to argue that the United States must help other nations
to maintain their political institutions and national integrity when threatened by other
states intending to overthrow existing governments and institute totalitarian regimes
(Jordan et al., 2009). This doctrine represented a major change from the traditional U.S.
preference of minimal involvement in international affairs (Jordan et al., 2009). By 1949,
the U.S. had positioned more than 527 American armed forces personnel in Greece and
over 400 in Turkey to conduct military advising and planning. This was the part of the
Truman Doctrine that set the stage for the United States approach to collective security.
A European alliance began with the establishment of the Brussels Treaty of 1948
between France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. This
relationship was formalized as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through
the Treaty of Washington in 1949.
Scholars have taken differing views on military assistance in accordance with the
prevailing views of international security. For example, Lemnitzer (1950) asserts “the
primary objectives (of U.S. military assistance) are to strengthen the defensive military
capabilities of nations friendly to the United States in order that they may improve their
ability to resist external aggression.” The military assistance program at that time was
focused on filling “urgent needs of the existing Armed Forces of the recipient countries”
through transfer of equipment and training on how to use that equipment. The intent was
to empower the newly created Mutual Defense Act of 1949. Lemnitzer added that a
second objective was “to strengthen the internal security of these nations.” In 1950, U.S.
policy took a very limited view of internal security compared to how it is viewed today.
Lemnitzer used the Marshall plan as his measuring stick for the degree to which U.S.
48

assistance was successful in its uses of the military to stabilize and rebuild West
Germany. However, Lemnitzer asserts that effective administration and implementation
of the Military Assistance Program for the Marshall Plan required coordination of
political, economic, and military policies that relied on sparse knowledge of development
economics.
Successful engagement through the Marshall Plan in Europe spurred the U.S. to
create new policies to extend foreign aid elsewhere. In the late 1950s, U.S. foreign aid
policy was expanded beyond an exclusive support of our allies to also include the
support of friendly, but non-allied nations. Four new missions were added: internal
security, counterinsurgency, civic action, and nation building (Jordan et al, 2009).
Though the United States continued the policy of supporting national leaders who
supported the United States positions on containment and forward defense, the newer
concepts when combined with the use of military assistance were not well studied or
understood. There were significant growing pains, particularly as the new programs
occasionally propped up ruthless dictators or empowered military driven coups.
The literature on military assistance became fairly critical beginning in the mid1960s. Rowe (1974) questioned the stated objectives for U.S. military assistance to lowincome societies. In particular, he questioned the objectives for improved external and
internal security, along with a U.S. preference for elite stability in nations friendly to U.S.
policy. He asserts that the optimism expressed by both officials and non-officials about
the extent that “contact with American attitudes toward civil-military relationships would
reduce the incidence of militarism and military intervention against civilian rule” was
overestimated and not supported by data. He created correlation charts on the existence
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of coups in conjunction with the receipt of U.S. military assistance that was calibrated
based on recipient nation GNP and population. A significant finding of his study is that
the great majority of the less developed countries did not have regimes that were capable
of fully controlling their military. He argues that when these countries become recipients
of U.S. money, equipment and training for their military forces, it enhanced the
likelihood of regime instability based on successful and unsuccessful coup attempts.
Third, he finds that for less developed countries already under military rule the provision
of military aid by the United States solidified the control of those military leaders. Most
significantly, he finds that U.S. military assistance appeared to be a contributing factor in
undermining civilian elements and increasing the incidence of praetorianism in the less
developed regions of the world. At the time, there was very little education by U.S.
military assistance teams to receiving state militaries on the importance of civilian-led
governments. Additionally, there was inadequate understanding by U.S. military
assistance teams on how some partner states did not have the same constitutional
preference as did the United States for a clear line of separation between military
structures and internal law enforcement institutions.
4) Post- Cold War Era
Essentially, the Cold War ended in 1989-90 when the Soviet economy imploded
and the political will to continue the same communist system disintegrated. The United
States and much of the world interpreted the end of the Cold War as a victory for
democracy and free market economics. As a result, the United States embarked on a
series of assistance efforts known as nation-building and military operations other than
war.
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Unfortunately, policy makers underestimated the critical role played by receiving
nation political structures in distributing well-intentioned aid efforts. The globalized
telecommunications explosion in the early 1990s illuminated the limited efficacy of
military assistance by televising the results to an increasingly robust world public
audience. Failed assistance efforts in Somalia in 1992-93 and Rwanda in April 1994
reminded the world that solving long-standing root causes of conflict could not be
accomplished by short term, though well meaning, delivery of aid packages by
foreigners. In Somalia, the United States attempted to mitigate severe suffering from
extended drought and internal warfare. As the Cold War had just come to an end,
American policymakers were optimistic about the attraction of its governance values and
by its ability to create security. The American contingent of military aid grew to include
efforts to democratize the Somali population in Mogadishu at a time when warring tribes
were vying for power. The backdrop for this tension was a strong Muslim religious
foundation that did not readily lend itself to Western secular value systems. These two
conditions combined with an African fear of imperialistic or colonial intent from an
outside power to create a severe resistance that resulted in the downing of two American
helicopters and the desecration of American soldiers as their bodies were dragged
through the streets of Mogadishu amid cheering crowds in October 1993. This tragedy
was filmed and delivered to a shocked American public, which then demanded a swift
end to what was thought to be state building where no US interests were involved.
Not long after the American failure in Mogadishu, warring tribes in Rwanda in
1993-94 were growing increasingly combative over control of Rwandan state politics.
The tension attracted the attention of the United Nations, which dispatched a small
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contingent of peacekeepers headed by a Canadian general. This small group of
foreigners proved to be no match for the scope and severity of the internal intent of the
Hutus to eliminate the Tutsis. So great was the commitment of Rwandan Hutus to their
genocidal goals that they created death lists which not only included ethnic Tutsis, but
also moderate Hutus and all foreign peacekeepers. In April 1994, the United Nations
peacekeepers escaped death, but more than 800,000 mostly Tutsi men, women, and
children, along with the moderate Hutus were viciously slaughtered via machetes and
fires by their fellow countrymen.
These two tragic examples spurred an increased focus on the impact and centers
of gravity for third party interventions (Regan, 2002). Many senior political leaders in
the United States began to publicly disdain American attempts at nation/state-building
through military assistance. In 1996, US Senator Patrick Leahy introduced legislation
that was passed to require all foreign recipients of military assistance to be vetted prior to
entry into US programs for violations of human rights. US Congress members
recognized the dangers of training known violators of human rights. Led by Patrick
Leahy in 1996, the Congress passed an Amendment to the Foreign Operations Act to
prohibit the delivery of assistance to foreign militaries known to have committed human
rights violations. In response, in 1997 the US State Department required comprehensive
human rights vetting of all military units in receipt of US aid. In 1999 and 2002, Mott
published comprehensive studies of the operational and empirical results of military
assistance during the Cold War, with a focus on the achievement of US interests as the
dependent variable. In these studies Mott argued that the key independent variable for
each partner nation was the donor-recipient relationship.
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He treated military assistance

as a foreign policy tool, but acknowledged that there were “collateral effects” of military
assistance on partner nation political and economic development that should be studied
separately. Urgency to understand these effects became more prominent after the attacks
by Al Qaeda against the United States on September 11, 2001.
5) Post- 9/11 Era
Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 were
ground shaking for the American public and its political leaders with respect to
perceptions of national security threats. The attacks resulted in the deaths of nearly
3,000 people, destroyed major landmarks in New York City, and reverberated through
the US economy in the weeks and months afterward. The US wanted retribution for the
devastation, but it was unclear on where to deliver it. Paradoxically, the attacks
emanated from Afghanistan, but were not connected to a formally defined sovereign
nation. At that time, Afghanistan had no functioning central government and was in the
grips of the Taliban. Afghanistan was recognized as a state by only three other states in
the world--Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates. The United States
accused the Taliban of harboring Al Qaeda and once the Taliban refused to turn over bin
Laden to Washington, the George W. Bush administration retaliated against the Taliban
with the full force of American military power. The Taliban was removed from power
in under three months in the fall of 2001 through the conduct of Operation Enduring
Freedom, but the political development issues in Afghanistan persisted.
Evidence of the US policy adjustments in light of the newer view of the
importance of state fragility to US national interests can be found in the publication of
Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (FID), 17 August 2018. JP 3-22 was
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“prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to set forth
joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United
States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with
governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners.” FID is defined by JP-3-22 as “the participation by civilian
agencies and military forces of a government or international organization in any of the
programs or activities taken by a host nation government to free and protect its society
from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, violent extremism, terrorism, and other threats
to its security.” A key distinguishing element of this update from the April 2004
publication is that the annex on internal defense and development has been elevated to
separate chapter status, which signifies the importance of this concept to the effective
collaboration of US Armed Forces with host nation counterparts. The document reminds
practitioners that internal security development requires a strategy that will meet the
needs of vulnerable groups of people in the host population, since ultimately, “the true
nature of the threat to the government lies in the adversary’s political strength rather than
military power” (JP-3-22, p. II-1). Clearly, U.S. military practitioners will benefit from
opportunities to increase understanding of how political development progresses.
2.4 U.S. Military Assistance, Development, and Social Conflict
Though there was evidence of a need to study political development and
conditions for decay, it wasn’t until after September 11, 2001 that this scholarship
received U.S. foreign policy attention. Before the attacks on September 11th, US
international development aid policy was largely focused on aspects of economic growth
through infusions of funding intended to generate jobs and profits for stabilizing national
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governments in regions of US national interest. In the wake of the attacks on September
11, 2001, democratic governance and political development took on a more prominent
role in U.S. foreign aid policy and the associated resources.

For example, in 2002 the

United States National Security Strategy elevated development to be on par with defense
and diplomacy as a foreign policy priority.

This policy priority manifested itself in

numerous guidance documents within the United States Department of Defense (DoD),
as evidenced in US DoD Quadrennial Defense Review [2006,] United States DoD
Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction Operations [2005,] United States Government, Joint Publication 3-22,
Foreign Internal Defense [2010, Updated in 2018] and DoD Directive 5205.82, Defense
Institution Building [2016]. In 2005, the United States Department of Defense issued
Directive 3000.05 to assign stability operations as “a core United States military mission
that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support, with priority
comparable to combat operations.” This directive defines stability operations as:
[Activities that are] conducted to help establish order that advances United States
interests and values. The immediate goal is to provide the local populace with
security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term
goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for security essential services, a
viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil
society.
This directive was expanded and clarified with United States DoD Directive 5205.82
(2016), which codified policy to direct DoD organizations to prepare, when authorized by
law, to
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Promote principles vital to the establishment of defense institutions that are
effective, accountable, transparent, and responsive to national political systems,
especially regarding good governance, oversight of security forces, respect for
human rights, and the rule of law. Defense Institution Building (DIB) should
contribute to the establishment or strengthening of democratic governance of
defense and security forces.

The public outcry after the Al Qaeda attacks on America on 9/11 prompted
American policymakers to place a premium on the creation of a response posture to
preempt or prevent similar future attacks. As described in the previous section, this
emphasis is in stark contrast to the limited engagement posture of the 1990s. Americans
wanted to be safe from future terrorist attacks, but were unsure about how the military
capacity should be engaged against an enemy that emanated from non-state based
sources. The initial reaction by policymakers was to increase the funding for military
distribution of development aid in locations deemed to be at risk for harboring potential
terrorists or other possible threats to the United States. From 2002 to 2005, the
Department of Defense share of US official development assistance increased from 5.6
percent to 21.7 percent (Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance, 2008, p. vi).
US military assistance is increasingly being proffered under the umbrella foreign
policy term known as the 3Ds—Defense, Diplomacy, and Development. This concept
became a policy when the Barack Obama Administration released Presidential Policy
Directive 6 in 2010 to officially elevate development to be on par with diplomacy and
defense and key elements of US foreign policy. Soon afterwards, the U.S. Department of
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State released a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) to
institutionalize the formal relationship between the Department of State and the US
Agency for International Development (USAID). The intent of the Department of State
QDDR was 1) to identify major global and operational trends that constitute threats or
opportunities and 2) to delineate priorities and reforms to ensure US civilian institutions
are in the strongest position to shape and respond to a rapidly changing world. The
QDDR was followed by a new USAID policy framework to specify the resources that
would be dedicated to addressing the opportunities identified. An outcome of this
document is that USAID must publish Country Development Cooperation Strategies to
acknowledge the unique nature of every development context and to design a way
forward for the various agencies that must synthesize to enact the development priorities.
Beginning in 2018, these documents are now published as Integrated Country Strategies
as a mechanism to more deliberately reflect the U.S. interagency collaboration to meet
U.S. foreign policy objectives for that country.
The 3D concept was updated in 2013 under the policy term “Security Sector
Assistance.” The White House released this Presidential Policy Directive to provide a
framework to the US interagency to organize Security Sector Assistance efforts toward
national priorities. In particular, this directive defines Security Assistance core missions
as those that support US interests, strengthen collective security arrangements, sustain
partner capacity to address common challenges, and promote universal values such as
respect for human rights and the rule of law (The White House, Fact Sheet: United
States Security Sector Assistance Policy, April 5, 2013). Notably, this guidance has an
emphasis on collective security and universal values. The policy defines the security
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sector as “those institutions—to include partner governments and international
organizations—that have the authority to use force to protect the state and its citizens at
home or abroad, to maintain international peace and security, and to enforce the law and
provide oversight of those organizations and forces.” It includes both military and
civilian organizations such as state security and law enforcement providers, governmental
security and justice management and oversight bodies, civil society, institutions
responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies, and non-state justice
and security providers.
The White House policy for Security Sector Assistance places heavy emphasis on
what has become known as the “preventive hypothesis,” which postulates that the right
resources applied in advance can serve to prevent future crises. To test this hypothesis,
McNerney et al. (2014) completed a study commissioned by the RAND Corporation and
concluded that US military assistance can be positively correlated with a reduction in
partner state fragility. These authors conducted the first comprehensive empirical
analysis of the “preventive hypothesis” as it applies to US security cooperation
endeavors. Their study uses the United States policy term of Security Cooperation as the
umbrella reference to the more specific term of military assistance. Their definition of
security cooperation is “activities undertaken by the United States government to
encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve
security sector objectives” (McNerney et al, 2014). The study asks whether there is a
correlation between US military assistance and a reduction in state fragility. They used
statistical analysis to assess military assistance data and state fragility scores for 107
countries in 1991-2008 by developing country-year observations. They normalized
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expenditures across countries by using Security Cooperation per capita and by logging
the data. Additionally, they used statistical methods to control for the diversity of
countries and other factors that would affect fragility over time independent of Security
Cooperation. Lastly, because Security Cooperation does not produce instant results, they
assessed its correlation with partner fragility five years after Security Cooperation was
provided. They find that after controlling for a variety of factors, military assistance can
be positively correlated with a reduction in partner state fragility. In particular,
McNerney et al (2014) find that increases in funding do not increase the strength of the
correlation. Instead, the correlation effect is concentrated on the low end of funding
efforts that are associated with training operations. Additionally, the authors find that
the correlation is stronger in more democratic states and in states with stronger
institutions. In especially fragile states, they find only a weak or no correlation of
military assistance with fragility decrease. McNerney et al. (2014) also conducted case
studies on a dozen countries to gain a more nuanced understanding of the impact of
military assistance in these countries. They selected Colombia, Jordan, Philippines,
Georgia, Yemen, Honduras, Guatemala, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Armenia, Mali and
Niger. An important outcome of this analysis is that while the quantitative analysis did
find a positive correlation between military assistance and state fragility, the specific
nature of the correlation hinges on the composition of the country military assistance
program and on the issues affecting the state’s fragility (McNerney et al., 2014, p. 83).
Furthermore, McNerney et al. find that reduction in state fragility is highly correlated
with provision of nonmaterial aid such as education, law enforcement and
counternarcotics aid. Their research finds that provision of material aid, such as sales of
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costly weapons systems, though it forms most of US military assistance, is not correlated
with reducing fragility in recipient countries. Finally they find that the correlation is
weakest in countries that are most at risk for state failure and greatest in those where
instability and state failure are highly unlikely. This study is ground-breaking in its
ability to quantitatively measure the effects of US military assistance.
Despite the evolution of improved opportunities for quantitative analysis of
development indicators, some variables remain heavily rooted in the specific context in
which the development occurs. In political development, the creation of a secure
environment for exercise of state power is a complex process that is closely tied to social
processes (Fukuyama, 2008; Collier, 2007; Dobbins et al., 2005, Nalbandov, 2014). It is
the social processes and structure that effectively empowers stable political rulers who
are able to control the use of violence within the state (Lasswell and Kaplan (1950).
Bangura (2000) argues that the creation of stable environments for the pursuit of a rule of
law should be the first step when dealing with failing states, but it can only be done in a
process that recognizes and respects existing social structures. Dismantling ineffective
political structures in developing nations often creates new problems. Host nation
leadership and populations must support the need for governance changes. If the affected
population does not support the change, there will be insufficient political will to make
the full transformation. Without social cohesion, political legitimacy of any new
governance structures will suffer.
The data from McNerney et al. (2014) suggests that US education and training
can bring about social change within recipient state military structures that reduces state
development fragility. Promotion of social change is a form of constructivism. One of
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the most well-known constructivists is Alexander Wendt. Wendt (1999) asserts that the
value of the theory of constructivism is that it can be used to dissect the critical role of
identity in shaping political action and on the mutually constitutive relationship between
agents and structures. This theory has important relevance to military assistance where
the intent is to promote certain socially driven institutional dynamics. Thus, if military
assistance is proffered to culturally like-minded groups of people, the chances of
promoting social or political action are increased. Conversely, if the recipient state is
significantly different culturally, the chances of promoting social or political action can
be expected to be lower. Furthermore, social change is also impacted by the historical
relationship between the recipient and the change promoter. Suny (2000) asserts that
constructivist trajectories depend on the historical context of the relationship between the
change advocate and the change recipient. If the relationship is generally viewed in a
positive light through the historical lens, political action acquires legitimacy.
Analysis of the social processes has important ramifications for US military
assistance policymakers. Despite the preference for rapid resolution of the development
environments that threaten US national security, Lasswell and Kaplan’s (1950) timeless
assessment warns that there is risk associated with trying to make governance changes
too quickly.

They predict that when an environment in which power is being asserted is

fragmented or has an erratic tempo, the individuals affected react with frustration and
often violence. Consequently, it is easy to see how conflict occurs not only with the lack
of a rule of law, but also when the host society feels threatened by the number of changes
being instituted to the structure of their daily lives. This scholarship of more than 60
years old still holds true today. Societies in conflict need socially acceptable means of
61

resolving tensions. Thus, this research postulates that when military assistance is applied
in a manner that deliberately takes into account social legitimacy, there is a higher
likelihood that the changes will take root and lead to long-term reduction of political
development fragility.
2.5 Contribution
The expected contribution of this dissertation is that it will add new knowledge to
the academic debate on how US military assistance affects security sector institutions in
the context of political development in recipient states. In addition, it is anticipated that
the assessment of the provision of US military assistance from 2002-2016 will enable
more robust policy debate on how best to utilize the military resources of the United
States in operations short of war in a manner that will best protect American national
security. Creation of more nuanced knowledge of the specific ability of U.S. military
assistance to support U.S. national interests is urgent, as amplified in the 2018 National
Defense Strategy. This document declares that robust alliances are essential and that the
U.S. defense establishment must defend allies from military aggression and bolster
partners against coercion while fairly sharing responsibility for common defense. Such
an action requires an understanding of the defense context for those states and an
awareness of how best to share responsibilities.
There is a dearth of research that examines the effect of U.S. military assistance on
recipient states. The only other study with a similar objective is McNerney et al. (2014),
which assesses U.S. Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool. The innovation in this
dissertation over the McNerney et al. (2014) study is that this research specifically
examines the impact of US military assistance on security sector fragility, rather than just
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the impact on state fragility as a whole. This study follows the recommendation by
Fukuyama (2014) to assess the state in its ability to secure itself internally and externally
as an enabling factor to political development. This dissertation also examines an equal
number of case studies within five U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands, rather than a
random number as done in the McNerney et al. (2014) study. Ultimately, the intent of
this study is to gain insight on how U.S. military assistance can be correlated, if at all,
with recipient state progress on political development.
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CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY
Based on the previous chapter covering the relevant literature, analysis of U.S.
military assistance and its relationship with recipient state political development fragility
requires a multi-disciplinary approach to assess the research question. The academic
disciplines selected for this study are political development and foreign policy. The
primary research question being examined by this study is whether or not there is a
relationship between U.S. military assistance and recipient state political development,
and ultimately, on the foreign policy decisions pursued by those states. In depth
qualitative analysis is appropriate because there is a wide variation in not just the types of
military assistance offered by the United States, but also in the situations in which the
assistance is received by the pertinent state security sector apparatus.
3.1 Selected Theories, Key Definitions and Frameworks for Analysis
The theory of political development selected for this study is institutional
development. Institutions are the frameworks, bureaucratic structures, and associated
resources that shape political interactions within the state. This study focuses on the
institutions that are charged with the provision of physical security for the state. These
institutions are referred to in scholarly and policy documents as the security sector.
Selection of the political development variables that apply to the security sector apparatus
is based on the model presented in Fukuyama, 2014, which focuses on political order.
Fukuyama, 2014, asserts that the study of development “necessarily centers on the
process by which political institutions emerge, evolve, and eventually decay.” He also
asserts that the background conditions for all political life center on institutions. These
structures are “stable, valued, and recurring patterns of behavior that persist beyond the
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tenure of individual leaders (Fukuyama, 2014, p.6). Furthermore, Fukuyama asserts that
“until there is a single, central source of authority that exercises a legitimate monopoly of
force in that country, there will not be citizen security or the conditions for individuals to
flourish” (Fukuyama, 2014, p. 6). Theoretically, it is the state’s Security Sector
institutions that are responsible for exercising a legitimate monopoly of force within
official boundaries. The Security Sector may also be referred to as the Security
Apparatus. This is the term used by the U.S. Fund for Peace in its annual Fragile State
Index. For clarity, this dissertation uses the definition of the Security Sector as set forth
in the U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy statement released by the White House on
April 5, 2013. That definition is:
The security sector is composed of those institutions—to include partner
governments and international organizations- that have the authority to use force
to protect both the state and its citizens at home or abroad, to maintain
international peace and security, and to enforce the law and provide oversight of
those organizations and forces. It includes both military and civilian
organizations and personnel operating at the international, regional, national,
and sub-national levels. Security sector actors include state security and law
enforcement providers, governmental security and justice management and
oversight bodies, civil society, institutions responsible for border management,
customs and civil emergencies, and non-state justice and security providers.
(White House, 2013)
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The theory of foreign policy selected for this study is neoclassical realism. The
neoclassical realist concept of foreign policy recognizes the intervening role of the
internal characteristics in determining selected foreign policy choices by executives.
Taliaferro et al. (2009, p. 38) posit that neoclassical realism is also useful in examining
the circumstances under which states will emulate successful military institutions,
governing practices, and technologies of more powerful states. In 2016, Ripsman et al.
expanded that line of reasoning to identify four clusters of intervening variables that
influence state foreign policy: leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations, and
domestic institutions.
Taliaferro et al. (2009) recommend qualitative research for assessing hypotheses
relating to neoclassical realism. Qualitative analysis provides the narratives that validate
and condition the search for causal mechanisms that inform the complex process of
military assistance as it affects, or does not affect, recipient state development. The most
commonly pursued method for qualitative analysis is the case study. George and Bennett
(2005) assert that these studies are comprised of well-defined aspects of a historical
episode that the investigator selects to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal
mechanisms in the unique context of individual cases.

These authors also argue that the

strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is to combine within-case
analysis with cross-case comparisons. For this research, case studies are compared and
contrasted to examine context conditions for reducing political development with regard
to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the recipient state security sector apparatus after
receiving U.S. military assistance.
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3.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis
This study examines ten case study countries that received U.S. military
assistance. Data is examined through a process tracing methodology, as recommended
by Bennett (2010, p. 208). In process tracing, there is an examination of the “diagnostic”
pieces of evidence within selected cases that contribute to supporting or overturning
alternative explanatory hypotheses. The central concern is with sequences and
mechanisms in the unfolding of hypothesized causal processes.
3.2.1 Selection of Case Studies
Since the 9/11 attacks and the connection of the attacks to conditions of state
failure, there has been a proliferation of useful qualifying and quantifying databases for
comparative political analysis. One of the most prominent tools is the Fragile States
Index (FSI) that is updated annually by the U.S. Fund for Peace. The FSI was first
released in 2005 and is used throughout the policymaking and academic communities to
assess state fragility. The index is calculated using proprietary software, called the
Conflict Assessment Tool (CAST), which uses algorithms to cull thousands of news
items daily for information relevant to the indicators. The results are then triangulated
with qualitative and quantitative information before a final comparison to vital statistics
produced elsewhere. The Fund for Peace then assigns categories such as “very high
alert,” “warning,” or “sustainable security.”
The case study countries for this research are selected for three reasons.

The

first is that each country has received U.S. military assistance for a period of at least five
years between 2002 and 2012. The number of five years is selected based on the finding
by McNerney et al (2014) that U.S. military assistance provided for a minimum of five
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years is statistically significant with regard to a relationship between US military
assistance and the reduction of development fragility in receiving states. Military
Assistance is defined for this study as the provision of weapons systems, peace-keeping
/peace-building forces, or advice to existing security institutions in the host country. The
second characteristic is that the country experienced substantial political turmoil between
2002 and 2018, as evidenced by the Polity IV political stability indicators. The third
characteristic is that each geographic region has two examples—one of decreased state
fragility and one of either no change or increased state fragility. The assessments
published by the 2015 U.S. Fund for Peace State Fragility Index are used to determine
degrees of change.
In order to examine conflict in a range of different geographic regions and
cultures, two countries have been selected from Europe, two from Latin America, two
from the Asia Pacific, two from sub-Saharan Africa, and two from the Middle East.
Emphasis is placed on military assistance for foreign training purposes for two reasons.
First, military training operations are intended specifically to create constructive effects
that move trainees toward the stated foreign policy goals of improving military
professionalism, civil-military relations, respect for human rights, and institutional reform
in the security sector (U.S. Foreign Military Training & DoD Engagement Activities of
Interest Report, U.S. Department of State web site). Second, McNerney et al. (2014)
find that statistically relevant decreases in fragility are associated with training and not
with levels of funding for military weapons technology. These case studies represent
diverse examples of how the U.S. provides military assistance and thus provide ample
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evidence to accomplish cross case analysis after an in depth examination of individual
circumstances.
Top recipients of U.S. military assistance for the years between 2002 and 2012 in
each of the five Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) were reviewed to see which
countries experienced reductions in fragility in Security Apparatus (SA), as measured by
the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index. Cost data was derived from the Fact Book
compiled by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Annualized data for
development fragility was derived from the U.S. Institute for Peace Failed/Fragile States
Indexes. Comparison was made between the Index reading in 2006 and then again in
2015. Higher numbers indicate higher fragility. Reduction of the numbers indicates
reduction in fragility.
Two states from each United States Geographic Combatant Command (GCC)
were selected. One state from each GCC is selected because FSI data for the Security
Apparatus (SA) indicate a reduction in fragility after receiving five years of military
assistance from the United States. The other state is selected because FSI data for the
Security Apparatus indicate a degradation in Security Apparatus fragility. The FSI
assessment scale presents assessment numbers for each variable between 1 and 10, with
the low side of the scale indicating less fragility and the high side of the scale indicating
more fragility.
The associated table for these decisions is shown below:
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Table 1 Comparison of Selected Case Study Country Security Apparatus in 2006 and
2015
Geographic Combatant Command/State

2006 SA

2015 SA

U.S. European Command/Romania

3.5

2.5(-1.0)

U.S. European Command/Ukraine

3

7.9(+4.9)

U.S. Southern Command/Colombia

9

7.3(-1.7)

U.S. Southern Command/Honduras

6

6.7(+.7)

U.S. Pacific Command/Indonesia

7.5

6.2(-1.3)

U.S. Pacific Command/Philippines

7.0

9.1(+2.1)

U.S. Africa Command/Liberia

7.3

6.9(-.4)

U.S. Africa Command/Kenya

7.0

8.4(+1.4)

U.S. Central Command/Jordan

6.8

5.5(-1.3)

U.S. Central Command/Yemen

9

10(+1)

** Note that these calculations are not based on the exact numbers assigned by the Fund
for Peace, but on the evidence of a reduction trend or not of fragility in the Security
Apparatus.
According to the U.S. Agency for International Development database titled,
“U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations,” between 1994
and 2016, each of the ten states named above received at least five years or more of U.S.
military assistance and at some point in that time existed in the top 25% of all states
receiving U.S. military assistance. States chosen for the analysis are not necessarily the
most stable in the region, nor are they the ones of the most significant U.S. national
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interest. However, they did show evidence of a reduction in fragility to state legitimacy
and to the state security apparatus, which are two key variables when assessing status of
political development.
The qualitative data of the dissertation is broken down into five separate chapters
for five U.S. geographic combatant commands. Each of these chapters presents two case
studies, then conducts cross-case analysis between those cases to illuminate the
conditions of development that appear to be most beneficial or resistant to the provision
of US military assistance to address recipient state political development objectives.
Process tracing is recommended by Campbell (2004, p. 119) as an effective
method to determine whether ideas matter in institutional change. Campbell asserts that
process tracing is a descriptive method that focuses on explaining how ideas have
affected decision-making and institutional change in single cases. Campbell claims that
by using this technique we can tell plausible stories about how programs must fit into
existing cognitive and normative constraints, and if they do not, then they are not likely
to be effective. This is a valid approach for assessing the political development impact of
military assistance for the particular reason that prior to the 2010 release of Presidential
Policy Directive(PPD)- 6 development in foreign states was not a U.S. national security
policy imperative. The concepts in PPD-6 are relatively new, which is why
policymakers, scholars, and practitioners are still creating cognitive frameworks to
integrate the tools of development, diplomacy and defense.
George and Bennett (2005) assert that a difficulty with evaluating case studies is
the need for in-depth understanding of the complexity of the case and the range of data
available for studying it. This knowledge requires an understanding of the existence of
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varying interpretations offered by different scholars. U.S. military assistance and the
context in which it is provided is certainly subject to many different interpretations.
Perspectives range from those of the U.S. foreign and security policymakers, recipient
state foreign and security policymakers, the military members providing and accepting
the assistance, academic analysts, think tank analysts, and NGOs in both the international
and single state realm. As a result, it is imperative that data be gathered from as many
sources as possible, and an explicit recognition of the potential for biased reporting or
analysis with respect to the later in particular. Consequently, the information for this
dissertation is derived from a combination of U.S. policy documents, historical data,
political stability indicator statistics from U.S. and international sources, selected current
news articles, official documents from the case study countries, surveys to U.S.
government officials, when possible, who were directly involved in the provision of U.S.
military assistance for at least six month in selected case study states, and U.S. security
assistance program and funding data.
Ultimately, this study focuses on the context conditions that enable successful or
unsuccessful reduction of political development fragility in states that receive U.S.
military assistance. To begin the analysis, the dissertation assesses the relationship of
each case study country with the United States. To determine the context of political
development in the case study country, four measures of political stability are
employed—state political order, legitimacy of security force apparatus, character of the
political violence/dissent and effectiveness of the security sector apparatus. To show
changes over time, the data is examined between 2002 and 2019.
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3.2.2 Qualitative Analysis Variables
The 2010 U.S. Presidential Policy Decision 6 decreed that global development is
a U.S. national interest. This dissertation focuses on the conditions under which states
that received U.S. military assistance experienced a reduction to political development
fragility.
3.2.2.1 Dependent Variable
The primary dependent variable for this study is the political development of
recipient states of U.S. military assistance. To measure political development as an
outcome variable, focus is placed on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the security
sector in recipient states of U.S. military assistance. U.S. military assistance is a tool of
U.S. foreign policy. Foreign policy is typically measured qualitatively (Ripsman et al,
2009).
3.2.2.2 Independent Conditional Variables
Selected conditional variables are: 1) U.S. National Interest and Relationship
between the U.S. and the Recipient State of U.S. Security Assistance, 2) Recipient State
Political Order, 3) Legitimacy of Recipient State Security Structures, 4) Character of
Recipient State Political Dissent, 5) Effectiveness/Capacity of Recipient State Security
Structures, 6) Specific U.S. Military Assistance, and 7) Recipient State Foreign Policy.
Each of the independent conditional variables is described below:
3.2.2.2.1 U.S. National Interest and Relationship between the U.S. and the Recipient
State of U.S. Military Assistance
This variable describes the relationship between the U.S. and the recipient state.
It considers the relative priority that the U.S. has placed on its relationship with a
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particular state, along with the history of the relationship and the receptivity of the
recipient state to military assistance dispensed by the U.S. This information is derived
from a combination of the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International
Development 2014-2017 Strategic Plan, the U.S. Geographic Combatant Command
Posture Statements, Congressional Research Reports as prepared for the Congress by US
foreign policy analysts, the Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS)
developed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for each
of the selected ten case study countries, and the specific military assistance policy
objectives specified by the U.S. Department of State in its report on Foreign Military
Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2014-2015. This last report is
published annually and it covers U.S. policy goals for military training and DoD
Engagement by country. It is hypothesized that the relationship between the U.S. and the
recipient state will shape the degree to which military assistance is either offered or
accepted. This hypothesis is supported by Cooley (2008), who finds that recipient states
of U.S. military assistance, particularly those who host U.S. military bases, are influenced
in their political development patterns by the U.S. presence. Cooley (2008, p. 56) finds
that patterns of contesting or depoliticizing the issue of U.S. bases were heavily
influenced by periods of democratic transition or consolidation in the base hosts. In
particular, the U.S. base’s association with the regimes of high-profile authoritarian
figures led to a decrease in the contractual legitimacy of the U.S. presence with the local
population. Thus, for this study, foreign policy executives of the selected countries are
assumed to have accepted the military assistance from the United States willingly.
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3.2.2.2.2 Recipient State Political Order
This variable describes the type of political order evident in the partner state of
interest. This study focuses on the politics of national security sector management.
There is no uniform agreement within the literature on how to measure political
development. Huntington (1968) asserts that political development can be measured by
assessing the levels of institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. In
particular, Huntington (1968) posits that institutionalization of any political system can
be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations
and procedures.

A critical component for management of the security sector in each

country is the regime type. Thus, this variable is broken down into two sections—A)
Executive Government and B) Security Sector Apparatus. The Security Sector is defined
as institutions that have the authority to use force to protect both the state and its citizens
at home or abroad to maintain international peace and security, and to enforce the law
and provide oversight of those organizations and forces. It includes both military and
civilian organizations and personnel. Actors include state security and law enforcement
providers, governmental security and justice management and oversight bodies, civil
society, institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies,
and non-state justice and security providers. This definition is derived from the U.S.
Security Sector Assistance Policy Fact Sheet published by The White House on March
21, 2014. For each of the two sections, there is a discussion on structure, leadership, and
culture. It is hypothesized that U.S. military assistance is more effective in promoting
political development in states that are democratic, culturally similar to the United States
and have a similar organization of the security apparatus structures. To focus on the
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trajectory of political development in the states studied, data sets for this variable are
collected from U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,
Freedom House Country Reports, Transparency International Country Reports, Amnesty
International Country Reports, Polity IV Project Country Reports, USAID Country
Development Cooperation Strategies, and World Bank Governance Matters Country
Reports.
3.2.2.2.3 Legitimacy of Recipient State Security Structures
This variable describes the legitimacy of the security structures in the eyes of the
partner nation population. Blocksome (2013) asserts that the capability and legitimacy of
internal security forces influences the level of sub-state political violence. This variable
is measured by comparing readings of the U.S. Fund for Peace Fragile States Index, the
Center for Systemic Peace Polity IV Project indicators, the World Bank Governance
Indicators, Transparency International Country Reports and Freedom House Crossroads
Reports. The Freedom House Crossroads Reports are an independent evaluation of state
rule of law, transparency, anti-corruption efforts, democratic practices, and respect for
fundamental civil rights as a comprehensive comparative survey of the state of political
rights and civil liberties. In 2004 there were 30 states included in this survey. Of the ten
case studies in this research, Indonesia, Kenya, Yemen, Ukraine, and Jordan have
separate crossroads reports. It is hypothesized that contribution of U.S. military assistance
when a partner state has legitimate security structures will be positively correlated with
an improvement in recipient state political development.
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3.2.2.2.4 Character of Recipient State Political Dissent
This variable describes the presence of ongoing internal warfare or excessive
violence. Kaufmann (2006) establishes the critical role of political stability and the
absence of violence as pivotal to improving governance. Effective governance is well
established in the literature as an essential element of political development (Collier
(2008), North et al. (2009), Goldstone et al. (2010), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), and
Fukuyama (2014)). Values established by the Polity IV Project, Amnesty International
Country Reports, and the Governance Matters database are used to measure the extent
and intensity of the warfare. It is hypothesized that there is a minimum level of existing
political stability when U.S. military assistance is applied in order to facilitate beneficial
increases in political development. This follows the McNerney et al. (2014) finding that
U.S. military assistance is not statistically significant for reducing state fragility for states
that are in conditions of civil war. This qualitative variable examines in detail the nature
of the political dissent.
3.2.2.2.5 Effectiveness of the State Security Sector Apparatus
This variable describes the capability and effectiveness of the security sector in
the recipient state of U.S. military assistance. Capability and effectiveness are assessed
from two perspectives—1) from the perspective of the recipient state as its goals are
enumerated in published national security documents, 2) from the perspective of U.S.
national security policymakers, and 3) from the perspective of regional security
organizations, where applicable (i.e. NATO or the UN). The framework is patterned
after research accomplished by Janowitz (1964, 1977) and Huntington (1968). Janowitz
(1977) offered a structure for comparative analysis of the military institutions in
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developing nations. Janowitz (1964, p. 84) asserts that an initial step in the comparative
analysis of the military in the political development of new states is to examine the
historical and economic factors that fashioned the specific military establishments.
Janowitz claims that effective historical background involves two crucial aspects:
differences in cultural-geographical area and variation in the natural history of the armed
forces (Janowitz, 1964, p. 85). He argues that the armed forces of developing states can
be grouped into three vast cultural-geographical regions which reflect pervasive political
and underlying social structural differences: South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East
and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa (Janowitz, 1965, p. 85). These broad culturalgeographic areas are still relevant and useful for research today. In this study, the
existence of these three cultural-geographic areas is considered in the selection of the
case studies. Though two examples are chosen from within each of the U.S. geographic
combatant commands, care is given to examining cases that fall within the three areas
described by Janowitz (1965), where applicable. This variable is measured by comparing
readings of the U.S. Fund for Peace Fragile States Index, the Center for Systemic Peace
Polity IV Project indicators, the World Bank Governance Indicators, U.S. Department of
State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Amnesty International Official
Reports, the U.N. Human Development Indicators along with document analysis and
interviews with military personnel who served in the case study countries for a minimum
of six months and were specifically responsible for the delivery of U.S. security
cooperation capacities.
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3.2.2.2.6 Specific Military Assistance Provided
This variable describes the nature of the military assistance provided by the
United States to the partner state. Each of the 10 case studies explores three aspects of
the US Military Assistance provided to that state: a) Brief history, b) General scope of
the military assistance provided, 3) Challenges and Outcomes between the years of 1990
and 2016, 4) Connection to US Foreign Policy. Based on McNerney et al. (2014), it is
hypothesized that U.S. military assistance is correlated with an increase in partner state
political development when the conditions of political will to change, cultural similarity
to the U.S., and a popular political will to cooperate with the U.S. are present. The
difference between this study and the McNerney et al. (2014) study is that the McNerney
study focused on a reduction in fragility at large, with no granular research into the
elements of political, social, and economic development that are affected by U.S. military
assistance. Additionally, it is hypothesized that U.S. military assistance to partner states
without the political will to change, cultural similarity to the U.S., and a popular political
will to cooperate with the U.S. will not be correlated with an increase in partner state
political development. Data for this variable is drawn from historical records and current
policy documents from official sources on specific states, where available. Additionally,
data is gathered from the US Department of State Foreign Military Training Web site,
which provides internet access to US policy, expenditures, and program goals by country
and year beginning in 1999. These reports are presented pursuant to the requirements of
two U.S. laws; the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act. The U.S.
military assistance variable for this dissertation is assessed according to the degree to
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which the assistance offered falls into four broad categories: 1) Conflict intervention, 2)
Humanitarian Assistance, 3) Training and Education and 4) Sale of military coercive
capabilities. Details on these categories are:
a. Conflict Intervention: both manpower and material resources are
provided to the recipient state in conditions of wartime assistance where
the assistance is willingly requested and received.
b. Humanitarian Assistance: both manpower and material resources are
provided to the recipient state in conditions of natural disaster where the
assistance is willingly requested and received.
c. Training and Education: Training or education is offered to recipient
states security sector apparatus and willingly utilized in support of U.S.
foreign policy goals. This education is offered to recipient state military
and internal security sector apparatus such as border protection, airfield
and airspace management and essential medical services.
d. Sale of military coercive capabilities: Material resources are either sold
or provided as a grant to states in support of mutual foreign policy goals.
3.2.2.2.7 Recipient State Foreign Policy Outcome
This variable is assessed by the following questions: Is the recipient state able and
willing to collaborate in coalition operations with the United States? Does the recipient
state use the assistance to mitigate or counter internal conflicts that are a threat to the
U.S.? Does that recipient state use the assistance for both internal conflict purposes and
also to export security capacities as part of a coalition? Does the recipient state use the
assistance to gain better control of threats that are not an immediate issue, but could
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potentially become one for the U.S.? This research compares outcomes with necessary
conditions. Is there a reduction in the security apparatus fragility that enables the foreign
policy executive to mobilize resources in support of goals that bolster U.S. security in
accordance with neoclassical realist premises for the importance of domestic institutional
strength (Ripsman et al, 2016)?
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) has been selected to determine causally
relevant commonalities among the case studies examined. Ragin (2008) argues that QCA
makes it possible for researchers to unravel the conditions and contexts that enable or
disable specific connections between selected variables. Thus, each pair of case studies
is followed with by fuzzy set analysis using the U.S. Fund for Peace characteristics for
assessing State Legitimacy and Security Apparatus Effectiveness as they affect state
fragility. Details on the questions that were considered to ascertain levels of Legitimacy
of the State and Effectiveness of the Security Sector Apparatus are included as
Appendixes A and B. To represent the assigned values for each of the pertinent
questions, the following charts are used for each case:
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Table 2 Sample Format-- Evidence of Legitimacy of the State in (name of case study
country)
________________________________________________________________________
Strong

General

Ambiguous

Adherence Adherence

General lack
of adherence

Strong lack
of adherence

________________________________________________________________________
Confidence in Political Process
Political Opposition
Transparency
Openness & Fairness of Political Process
Political Violence

Table 3 Sample Format--Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness in (name of
case study country)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Strong

General

Adherence Adherence

Ambiguous

General lack

Strong lack

of Adherence

of Adherence

_______________________________________________________________________
Monopoly of the Use of Force
Relationship Between Security & Citizenry

Measurement of data for both State Legitimacy and Security Sector Effectiveness
is accomplished in the year 2015.
Chapters 4 through 8 are dedicated to qualitative analysis of the ten case studies.
Chapter 9 synthesizes the data gathered in Chapters 4 through 8 to accomplish
comparative analysis of the ten cases.
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CHAPTER IV – UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND EUROPE
The case studies begin with a focus on Europe, the region of the world with which
the United States has the longest and most comprehensive relationship. In the aftermath
of the Allied victory over Germany, Italy and Japan during World War II, U.S. European
Command was established in 1952 to institutionalize the U.S. long-term interest in
European security. Since 1952, U.S. EUCOM has participated in or provided support to
more than 200 named operations. These missions range from preserving peace during the
Cold War to more evolved uses of military capacities for humanitarian and natural
disaster relief efforts and more contemporary approaches to countering terrorism
stemming from multiple sources since the end of the bipolar confrontation.
The two countries that have been selected from U.S. EUCOM for the case studies
are Romania and Ukraine. Romania has progressed from a violent totalitarian
dictatorship under the umbrella of the Soviet Union during the Cold War to become one
of the most motivated nascent democracies since 1989. This motivation and the
associated progress enabled it to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
2004.
After Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11,
2001, Washington deliberately embraced the need for like-minded partner states willing
and able to collaborate to address the threat of global terrorism. As the region of the
world with the largest number of capable and willing partner states, the largest regional
recipient of these partner-building efforts was Europe. American foreign policy
continues to prioritize delivery of U.S. military assistance to states that collaborate with
Washington in multinational security endeavors.
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At present, there are 51 countries included in the region administratively known
as U.S. European Command. Twenty-seven of the 51 states are considered to be partners
with the United States. While the United Nations is the largest international government
organization involved with conflict mitigation, the next largest is NATO, which was
created on April 4, 1949 as a bulwark for European nations against Soviet aggression.
Initially, twelve countries joined. In March 2019, there are twenty-nine members and
twenty-seven of them are European states. The most recent addition to this group is
Montenegro, which was admitted to NATO in 2017. NATO has been a powerful force
for membership country modernizations, not only in military capabilities, but in requiring
prospective members to achieve higher political development standards as conditions of
membership.
Two examples of how U.S. EUCOM has worked to create military-to-military
partnerships in the European Area of Responsibility are the Joint Contact Team Program
(JCTP) and the State Partner Program (SPP). U.S. European Command created the JCTP
in 1992 to promote subordination to civilian leadership, respect for human rights, and the
creation of a defensively oriented military posture. The SPP was created in 1993 to pair
U.S. states with former Soviet Republics and newly independent nations of Eastern
Europe. A unique quality about the American contribution to the SPP is that it is
composed of U.S. National Guard and Reserve military personnel. The National Guard
has a dual federal and state mission, which makes it an ideal vehicle to demonstrate
effective democratic institutions, promote democratic values and share best practices to
help partner countries achieve their national security goals. Furthermore, the unique
civil-military nature of the National Guard allows SPP participants to engage in a wide
84

range of Security Cooperation activities such as: Disaster Preparedness, Humanitarian
Assistance, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear Preparedness, Cyber Operations, Reserve Component Reform, Counterdrug
Mission Preparation, Border/Port Security, and Public/Private Partnerships (U.S.
EUCOM, State Partner Program, Public Web Site, 2017). Assignment of the mission
was given to the National Guard because these citizen soldiers were less likely to provoke
Russia than perhaps active forces might have been perceived.
In 1993, JCTP engagements were created for both Romania and Ukraine. Shortly
after the JCTP was instituted, both Romania and Ukraine were also added to the State
Partner Program (SPP). Romania was paired with Alabama and Ukraine was paired with
California. The majority of the military assistance work with Romania and Ukraine
following the end of the Cold War was accomplished either through the use of the JCTP
and SPP or by inviting military members of these states to attend schools in the United
States.
The 2017 Fragile States Index assesses the region encompassed by the U.S.
European Command (USEUCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) to be home to the
largest number of sustainably developed countries in the world. This index assesses
states to be sustainably developed at best, or in three types of developing conditions—
stable, warning, or alert. Alert indicates that a country has the highest number of
vulnerabilities to crises as they work to transition into higher states of development. Of
the 48 independent states in Europe, 12 are among the top 15 world states considered by
the index to be sustainably developed. Beyond this number, seventeen more European
states among thirty-eight world states are assessed as stable, very stable, or highly stable.
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In terms of developmental vulnerability, Europe has a relatively low risk factor when
compared to the other major regions of the world.
The two case studies selected for focus on the context in which U.S. military
assistance is provided to the European region and the relationship with political
development are Romania and Ukraine. These two states both emerged from under the
Soviet umbrella after the end of the Cold War, but have followed distinctly different
political development paths since that time and have levels of conflict that reflect the
maturity of the political development trajectory. In terms of developmental fragility,
Romania is rated by the 2015 Fragile States Index as 132nd of 178 states, with 178 being
the most stable. By contrast, Ukraine also emerged from under the Soviet umbrella, but
has not achieved a similar path of development. While Romania has increased its
governance stability, Ukraine has devolved to the point that it was unable to prevent
Russia from annexing the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 through various irregular warfare
tactics. As a result, the 2015 Fragile States Index rated Ukraine as 84 of 178 states. This
index not only declares Ukraine to be in a condition of warning, but it is also the most
worsened country of the 178 countries assessed in terms of sustainable security.
Furthermore, in 2016, the United Nations (UN) Human Development Index (HDI)
reported that in 2014 Ukraine was number 4 of the top ten states in the world
experiencing battle related deaths, with 4,352 reported. Both states have received
significant military assistance from the United States, but the outcome has been markedly
different.
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4.1 Romania

Figure 4 Map of Romania
Source: CIA World Fact Book, accessed online 12 June 2017.

4.1.1 Orientation
Romania is the largest and most populous country in the Balkan region of South
Eastern Europe. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
Population Division estimates that the population for Romania is just under 20 million
people (2015), placing it in the top third of most populated countries in the world. The
official language is Romanian. The predominant ethnic group is Romanian, comprising
nearly 83% of the population. The prevalent religion is Eastern Orthodox, which is the
identified religion of nearly 82% of the population. The map above shows how Romania
is situated geographically in relation to its European and Eurasian neighbors. It is
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bordered by Moldova, Ukraine, Hungary, Serbia, and Bulgaria. It also has 225
kilometers of coastline on the Black Sea.
Romania was rated by the 2016 UN Human Development Report as 50 of 188,
with a GNI per capita of $19,428 and listed in the Very High Human Development
category. Life expectancy is 74.8. Expected years of schooling is 14.7, with a mean
years of schooling as 10.8.
4.1.2 U.S. National Interest and Relationship with Romania
A. Pre-Cold War History
Romania has a history of relations with the United States that dates back to 1880,
shortly after Romania received independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. Upon
its release from the Ottoman Empire, Romania worked to carve out a unique identity for
itself that recognized its precarious central geographic location in a volatile region.
According to the U.S. Department of State public web site, Washington and Bucharest
severed diplomatic ties following Romania’s declaring war on the United States in 1941
after officially joining the Axis powers during World War II in November 1940, but
reestablished them in 1947 following the dissolution of the Axis powers in 1945.
B. Cold War History
Relations remained strained during the Cold War era while Romania was under
communist leadership, as imposed by the Soviet Union. However, as the Soviet Union
expanded its size and reach, its ability to individually control each state diminished. One
result of the weakened control is that Romania worked to carve out an identity separate
from that of the Soviet Union. This action was similar to the path pursued by
Yugoslavia when it became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961.
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Yugoslavian leaders hosted the first conference of 25 heads of states declaring
themselves to have full permanent sovereignty over all economic activities and as having
the right to adopt the social system that is deemed most appropriate for its own
development. This action enabled Yugoslavia to leverage ties with states outside of
Eastern Europe to pursue de-centralization from Moscow oversight and to adopt a less
repressive form of government as compared to the other East European communist states.
The roots of the disintegration of the Soviet Union from 1989-1991 began during
the Cold War when Romania became the first Soviet bloc country to establish
independent trading ties with Europe. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej became General
Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party in 1945. Dej succeeded in persuading
Soviet leadership in Moscow to remove all forces from Romania in 1958 and to remove
direct supervision of Romanian foreign intelligence in 1964 (Gallagher, 2005). The lack
of embedded Soviet forces and no borders with the Soviet Union made it easier for the
Romanian leadership to establish some independence from Soviet central control. In
1963, Romania’s communist leaders informed the John F. Kennedy administration that
they condemned the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba in the fall of 1962 and would
not assist the Warsaw Pact in any Soviet-provoked war with the United States (Queen,
2006, p. 2). This action yielded benefits for Romania. In 1973, Romania obtained
preferential trading status from the European Economic Community and in 1975 was
awarded Most Favored Nation trading status by the United States, the only Soviet state to
enjoy such privileges (Gallagher, 2005).
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C. Post-Cold War History
When the Cold War ended in 1991, the United States acted quickly to promote the
growth of democratic governance institutions in Central and Eastern Europe in the states
that had been newly released from under the Soviet Union structure. The
Congressionally approved frameworks for assistance to this region were passed in 1989
and 1992. The two acts passed in these two years were known as the Support for East
European Democracy (SEED) and Freedom Support Act (FSA), respectively. Seventeen
countries in Eastern Europe were identified to receive SEED assistance. The SEED was
intended to support governments with democratic and economic reforms to facilitate
integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. By
comparison, the FSA was intended to enable Eurasian and Central Asian countries to
become stable, prosperous, free-market, pluralistic democracies that were capable of
responding to the transnational threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and narcotics trafficking.
The United States and Romania deepened relations following the establishment of
the SEED by increasing cooperation on shared goals including trade relations, defense
reform, transnational crime and non-proliferation. In 1993, the United States began
providing military assistance to Romania when U.S. European Command launched the
Joint Contact Team Program as a means to specifically focus on security concerns
alongside the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe.
Efforts to join NATO began in earnest with the 1996 election of President Emil
Constantinescu, who worked to ensure civilian control of a military that was among the
largest in Eastern Europe. In addition to Poland, Romania was seen as having the only
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army in Eastern Europe able to play a full role in NATO (Gallagher, 2005, p. 159). In
1997, President William J. Clinton and Constantinescu declared a “Strategic Partnership”
between the United States and Romania. This agreement was intended to create
enhanced mechanisms of political and military consultations in order to improve mutual
security. Additionally, Romanian authorities set goals to create conditions that would
earn membership into both NATO and the European Union (EU). This agreement led to
increased collaboration, military assistance, and cultural exchanges, but Romania’s first
bid to join NATO was refused in 1997 due to a lack of required institutional strength.
Though the United States was one of the dissenting voters at Romania’s denial of
accession to NATO, US President Clinton visited Romania shortly after the vote on 11
July 1997 and declared “the door to NATO is open, will stay open, and we will help you
pass through it” (Romanian ProTV, 2013).
Opportunities to gain favor for their NATO bid gained new credence when NATO
requested use of Romanian airspace and facilities during the aerial campaign against
Serbia to force President Slobodan Milosevic to halt ethnic cleansing in March 1999.
Both the Romanian government and its citizens were enthusiastic supporters of their
participation in the campaign. On 22 April 1999, the Romanian Parliament approved
NATO’s demand for unlimited use of Romanian airspace. Romanian policymakers were
eager to advance the top government foreign policy goal of entering NATO during the
next round of enlargement.
D. Post-September 11, 2001
The terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda on the United States on September 11, 2001
focused U.S. policy on international terrorism and it galvanized U.S. citizen support for
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efforts to build a network of allies to counter global terrorism. These attacks also
triggered the NATO Article 5 mechanism in the original charter that required member
states to respond militarily to an attack on a fellow member state. Though Romania was
not yet part of NATO at that time, the attacks by Al Qaeda prompted Bucharest to
express its willingness to collaborate with the United States against the perpetrators in
order to facilitate another bid to join the alliance.
In the wake of the September 11th attacks, the declared U.S. national interest in
the relationship with Romania in the 2002 US National Security Strategy was to
“promote the continued development of a democratically oriented Romania at peace with
its neighbors and respectful of human rights.” In particular, U.S. assistance was intended
to “support Romanian efforts in political, economic, and military reform.” SEED funds
for FY2002 were to ‘assist Romania to combat cross-border crime and foster regional
linkages by supporting the newly established regional anti-crime center in Bucharest.’
4.1.3 Political Order
4.1.3.1. Executive Government
4.1.3.1.1. Structure
The Romanian government is classified by the CIA World Fact Book as a ‘semipresidential republic.’ This means that there is an elected president, but he is not the head
of government. There is a president and a prime minister. Both executives exercise
power, but the nature of the power is determined by the Constitution. In Romania, the
President is the Head of State and the representative for Romania in international
relations, but the Prime Minister is the head of the Romanian government.
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4.1.3.1.2. Leadership
In 1967, Romania became a communist dictatorship following President Nicolae
Ceaucescu’s rise to power. He ruled Romania as a totalitarian dictatorship. Ceausescu
rose to power in the late 1960s as a zealous nationalist intent on establishing Romania’s
autonomy from the Soviet Union.

However, his goal was not to move more towards the

democratic preferences of the West. Instead, the Ceausescu regime became known for its
ruthless and consistently totalitarian identity. Western ideological news and media were
not permitted into Romania, nor was exposure allowed among the party elites. Gallagher
argues that Romania under Ceausescu possessed more attributes of a totalitarian
dictatorship than any of the other East European party states (Gallagher, 2005, p. 70).
Despite his disdain for Western political freedoms, Ceausescu pursued integration
with Western democracies to access economic opportunities and technologies not
available to Soviet states. In 1972, Romania joined the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1973, Romania obtained preferential trading status from the
European Economic Community (EEC) and in 1975 was awarded Most Favored Nation
trading status by the United States, the only Soviet bloc state with such a privilege
(Gallagher, 2005, p. 58).

It has been argued that the Soviet Union allowed this

integration because it knew that Romania under Ceausescu would not turn from
Marxism-Leninism. Additionally, Romanian operatives were gathering western
technology intelligence and working to create a Romanian manufacturing capacity, which
could benefit the region at large. A stifling factor for this intent was that Ceausescu did
not allow the peasant working class to show initiative or take action in any way that was
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contrary to rigidly controlled state economic policies. Dissidents were promptly jailed or
removed from the community.
Through his totalitarian ruthlessness, Ceausescu created many enemies. In 1989,
he and his wife were executed by firing squad after a military tribunal found them guilty
of crimes against the state that included genocide and undermining the national economy.
Upon the demise of the Ceausescu’s, Romanian officials began work immediately to
transition to a more democratic style of government.
One of the leaders of the uprising was Mr. Ion Iliescu, a political insider who
spoke publicly in the days before the Ceausescu execution. He and several other insiders,
including the Deputy Minister of Defense, Gen. Victor Stanculescu, formed the National
Salvation Front (FSN) to coalesce the opposition that had brought down the Ceausescu’s.
The group advocated revolutionary change, but did not put forth an alternate agenda that
would fundamentally reform the communist governance system. The newly formed FSN
Council included army officers, students, intellectuals, and many previous political
insiders. Though the council grew after the execution, power remained in the hands of
Ion Iliescu as the FSN chairman and interim President of the Republic (Gallagher, 2005).
Between the years of 1990 and 2016, Romania conducted 8 legislative elections
in the years 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2014. An election was held
in 1989 and according to Freedom House statistics, 86.2% of the electorate voted. While
the existence of the well-attended election was a step forward, the winner of the election
was Mr. Ion Iliescu, a former Communist Party leader. For the next six years he ran the
Romanian government with policies that were not much different from the policies under

94

Ceausescu. A pivot point for Romania came when Iliescu stepped down peacefully after
his 1996 electoral defeat.
The transition of Soviet oriented governance structures and elite mentality
encountered obstacles, but Romanian civil society and the government exerted political
will to adapt and overcome the barriers. The desire of Romanian leaders to join the
European Union was certainly a motivational factor. An example of this desire is when
President Traian Basescu appointed a commission in 2006 to examine and document
Romania’s communist dictatorial past as an effort to learn from it and prevent a
recurrence (Tismaneanu, 2008). Romania joined the EU as a full member on January 1st,
2007.
Romanian membership in the EU has had its challenges. In 2010, Romania had
hoped to join the passport-free Schengen zone, but abandoned that effort in 2015. In
October 2015, Prime Minister Victor Ponta asked that Romania’s bid for admission to the
Schengen Zone be removed from the agenda for the session of the European Council for
Justice and Home Affairs, as it “was clear that the decision will not be a favorable one”
(Chiriac, 2015). As required by the EU, the Romanian government made efforts to clamp
down on corruption in customs on the Serbian and Ukrainian borders. This effort led to
high-level arrests, including Prime Minister Ponta, who stepped down less than a month
later due to corruption charges against himself. That same year, the EU published a
progress report for Romania in its creation of viable rule of law and reduction of
corruption and noted good cooperation on the part of Romanian authorities to allow the
reviewers to access required information. The first EU Post Programme Surveillance
Report on Romania following its admission to the EU was in October 2015. The second
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report was accomplished in May 2017. The May 2017 report assesses the risk of loans
from the EU to Romania not being paid in full to be very low.
4.1.3.1.3. Culture
Romania is a post-communist state that existed under the Soviet umbrella until the
Cold War ended. Romania has made strong, but challenged strides toward representative
democracy as its political order. It has a history for democratic ideals that predate its
time while under the Soviet umbrella. Hitchens (1992) asserts that Western Europe
exerted a decisive influence on Romanian political institutions that date back to the mid19th century because the intellectual and political elite traveled regularly to Western states
such as France and Germany for higher education. This exposure also served to stymy
the growth of collectivism in Romania after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917.
Instead, collectivism was outlawed in 1924 and the full membership of the Romanian
Communist Party never exceeded the highpoint of 5,000 members in 1936 (Hitchens
(1992). Romanians already had a culture that valued individual aspirations, rather than
subjugation to a collectivist mass. There was a recognizable preference among the
peasants to have land of their own and to be devoted to religion and local traditions.
Hitchens (1992) asserts that Communism was followed only mechanically in Romania
after incorporation by occupation authorities under the Soviet umbrella.
As a result of both the overthrow of Ceausescu and the end of the Cold War,
Romanian citizens, along with a majority of the former Soviet satellite states, looked
forward to an end to the repressive era of communism. The Pew Global Attitudes
research project conducted from 1991 to 2009 found that in 1991 that overwhelming
majorities of populations in the region thought that democracy and capitalism would be
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good for the region. As a result, Romania’s policies moved deliberately to align with
Western democratic norms. Additionally, Romania’s pursuit of accession to the
European Union (EU) had a significant role in moving it towards greater inclusivity in its
governance institutions.
4.1.3.2. Security Sector Apparatus
4.1.3.2.1. Structure
Romania has a Constitution that was adopted on 21 November 1991. It was
approved by referendum and effective 8 December 1991. Amendments can be initiated
by the president of Romania through a proposal by the government by at least one-fourth
of deputies or senator in Parliament or by petition of eligible voters representing at least
one half of Romania’s counties (CIA World Factbook). There is universal suffrage.
Minimum voting age is 18. Romania has local police, a national police and a military.
The national police, known as the Jandarmeria Romana is a military police force tasked
with high-risk and specialized law enforcement duties. It is one of the two main police
forces in Romania, both having jurisdiction over the civilian population.
4.1.3.2.2. Leadership
The President is the Commander in Chief of the military. The national police
force is subordinated to the Ministry of Administration and Interior and does not have
responsibility for policing the Romanian Armed Forces.
4.1.3.2.3. Culture
Romania has a historic preference for the maintenance of a large standing army
that is a direct result of its proximity to past adversaries (Isenberg, 2006). Until the end
of the Cold War, Romanian leaders kept internal security structures separate from the
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military. During the Ceausescu regime, internal security ‘Securitate’ consisted of all
police forces, intelligence capacities, and executive security. Officials in the Securitate
all had military ranks, but were intentionally separate from the Army.
Historians of Romania are not surprised about the adaptation of Romanian
security structures to the requirements of the NATO Alliance. Romanians have long
viewed the military as one of the pillars of the state, so policymakers have usually tried to
enhance the credibility of its own government by aligning the Romanian military with the
standard of its great power allies whenever possible (Isenberg, 2006). This policy has
generally been supported by the population.
4.1.4 Legitimacy of the Security Sector Apparatus
The Romanian military has enjoyed institutional respect from the Romanian
population. This respect dates back to its role as a principle force in establishing
independence from Russian and Ottoman rule. With their central location as Europe
endured World Wars I and II, hundreds of thousands of Romanian military members died
defending their country, earning them appreciation as a principled guarantor of security
by the Romanian population (Queen, 2006). The Romanian armed forces carried this
mantle forward as it sided with the civilian populace against Ceausescu’s “Securitate”
during the 1989 revolution. Thus, as the military shifted gears after the Cold War, many
of these respected, trained and skilled personnel easily integrated with the civilian
populace.
In 2010, the Amnesty International Report on Romania described the proceedings
from a Romanian Senate investigation into the Romanian government’s alleged
involvement in U.S.-led renditions (unlawful transfers of terrorist suspects between
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countries) and a secret detention program. Specifically, the report covered government
surveys that demonstrated widespread discrimination against Roma by the majority
population. The report noted several cases of forced evictions of Roma (Amnesty
International Annual Report: Romania 2010).
Also in 2010, 80% of Romanians believed that the political parties were corrupt,
according to the Transparency International National Integrity System Report published
in 2012. Furthermore, in that same year the European Commission expressed serious
concerns over respect for the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary in
Romania (Amnesty International Romania Report, 2013, p. 2).
However, overall perceptions of corruption in the public sector in Romania
improved between 2004 and 2016. In 2004, Romania was rated as 87th of 149 countries
in level of perceived corruption, placing it in the 58th percentile. In 2016, the
Transparency International Global Corruption Perception Index rated Romania as 57th of
176 countries assessed, placing it in the 32nd percentile. By this standard, the perception
of corruption of public sector institutions has improved in Romania.
4.1.5 Character of the Political Dissent
In spite of the violent nature of the end of the Romanian dictatorship at the end of
the Cold War, Romania has had a relatively low incidence of political violence since the
revolution in the fall and winter of 1989. However, the low level of violence does not
mean that there has been no controversy or occasional violence, as described in the
previous section. On the contrary, the habits formed during more than 40 years of
communism did not fade easily. The transition has had many obstacles as institutions
and strategic culture needed to adapt to the democratic processes required for Romania to
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be integrated into both the EU and NATO. A key factor in moving through these
difficulties has been a recognizable societal political will to change habits that were
previously not conducive to the democratic process.
An example of this will to change came when Emil Constantinescu came to
power during the Presidential election of 1996, which was the last year of the second
term served by Ion Iliescu. President Constantinescu announced a full-scale offensive
against corruption on 7 January 1997. He was wary of the moral danger and possible
subversion of democratic values that could be caused by unchecked corruption rooted in
parasitic and exploitative capitalism (Gallagher, 2005).
A reduction in the extent of political dissent in Romania can be found in the data
presented by the 2015 Fund for Peace State Fragility Index. The Romania Country Data
and Trends indicates that Romania has progressively decreased its overall fragility along
twelve separate indicators between the years of 2005 and 2015. However, four of the
twelve indicators had recognizable obstacles that inform the general character of the
political dissent in Romania. Those four indicators are: 1) Group Grievance, 2) Human
Flight and Brain Drain, 3) Security Apparatus, and 4) Fractionalized Elites. Between
2009 and 2013, the Romania Security Apparatus increased slightly, but the trend since
2013 has been a reduction of that fragility to a level less fragile than it was in 2005.
As evidence of the events contributing to the indicators described above, the 2010
annual report published by Amnesty International is helpful. The report describes three
key events for 2010: 1) a political crisis triggered by a government attempt to reform the
pension system, 2) the creation of a new Civil and Criminal Code to reconcile and define
‘aggravating circumstances’ in cases of crimes perpetrated with discriminatory intent,
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and 3) strong opposition by local Non-Government Organizations on the use of
information gained through torture as evidence in criminal proceedings.
Similarly, in 2011, the Transparency International Romania organization
published required documentation on necessary monitoring mandated by the European
Commission of Cooperation and Verification for its performance in fighting corruption.
This assessment analyzed the National Integrity System structure in accordance with
European Union specifications to determine vulnerabilities to corruption within the
country’s institutions. This report covered data from 2008 to 2011. Data included key
informant interviews, verification of the findings and additional documentation review.
A key finding of this report is that the foundations of the Romanian integrity system, its
political, social, economic, and cultural profile is shaped by the communist heritage and
by the difficult and slow transition to the democratic process (Cospanaru, 2011, p. 10).
Cospanaru finds that while the politics and political parties are formally democratic, there
are still entrenched patronage networks that impede full civil society involvement.
Consequently, there is a vestigial socio-cultural tradition of low civic involvement in
public policy decision making. Unfortunately, the transition of the economy to
capitalism and privatized investment left some sectors of the economy in a high risk
condition for exposure to corruption.
Romanian political dissent in 2012 confirmed the Amnesty International and
Transparency International findings because the government fell twice. The main source
of the unrest appeared to be connected to government directed austerity measures.
President Basescu appointed Victor Ponta as interim Prime Minister. In July of that same
year, the Romanian parliament suspended the President following allegations that he had
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breached the Constitution, but the suspension was later invalidated, so the President
remained in office.
To exacerbate the stress of the executive government volatility in 2012, Romanian
internal security structures were not prepared for the increase on challenges to the rule of
law. In January 2012, Romanian citizens protested state directed austerity measures that
would reform health care by privatizing hospitals. The police reacted and were recorded
by media sources using excessive force against seemingly peaceful demonstrators who
were not offering any resistance (Amnesty International Romania Report, May 23, 2013).
However, these protests indicated an empowered populace intent on uncovering
corruption and attempts to hold the government accountable. Plavsic (2017) asserts that
public protests have had impressive results in bringing about change in Romania.
Between the years of 2012 and 2017, Romanian protesters brought about the demise of
one government for its crushing austerity policy and another for its severe corruption.
Plavsic (2017) asserts that Romanian citizens have become accustomed to pursuing their
political goals on the streets rather than at the ballot box.
4.1.6 Effectiveness of the Security Sector Apparatus
The Romanian security sector has made significant strides forward since the end
of the Cold War. In particular, Romania succeeded in reforming and reconfiguring the
security structures while implementing deliberate democratic oversight. Both the
Romanian government and external observers attribute a significant portion of the
modernization of its national security institutions to the requirements for integration with
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. To review the steps pursued by the Romanian
government, it helps to review the basic requirements for entry into NATO.
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Current published requirements for entry into NATO that have remained unchanged
are:
1) A functioning democratic political system based on a market economy
2) The fair treatment of minority populations
3) A commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts
4) The ability and willingness to make a military contribution to NATO operations
5) A commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures
(NATO public web site, “Enlargement,” accessed 3 November 2017.)
Though the Romanian bid for accession to both NATO and the European Union
succeeded in 2004 and 2007 respectively, authorities noted economic and social
inequalities that have persisted and are still being remedied.

For example, in 2010,

Amnesty International published a report on its findings that there was widespread
prejudice against Roma people among the majority Romanian population. Authors found
that the Roma minority continued to experience discrimination in access to education,
health care and housing, including lack of secure tenure on land claims. Additionally,
European Union accession processes identified issues with Romania’s commitment to the
rule of law and also to its willingness to crack down on organized crime and illegal
immigration (Katsikas, 2014). Since accession to NATO in 2004, Romania has made
progress in reducing the security structure fragility, as indicated by the Fund for Peace
State Fragility Index in 2016.

This index shows that though Romania has had

challenges to its Security Apparatus between the years of 2006 and 2016, the trend since
2012 has been a reduction of fragility in the security apparatus.
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Beyond the investments in its internal security sector effectiveness, Romania also
has invested efforts to improve the ability of its military forces to integrate with partner
state militaries. This desire was made known as soon as the Cold War ended when it
joined the NATO Partnership for Peace in 1992. As part of this organization, Romania
committed 200 troops to the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR).
4.1.7 Specific U.S. Military Assistance
a) Brief History: Following the establishment of the 1997 Strategic Partnership
between the United States and Romania, in 1999 the specific foreign policy goal for the
U.S. military assistance was to help Romania contribute to stability in Southeast Europe.
Romania made progress on that goal by establishing a strong, efficient civilian control of
its security structures. These actions enabled Romania to gain a cooperative relationship
with NATO through an active participation in the Partnership for Peace program in order
to strengthen its NATO candidacy. To recognize Romania’s NATO aspirations, the
United States significantly increased FY2001 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to assist
Romania in completing the reforms specified under their NATO Membership Action
Plan (MAP) and adopted in a codified reform plan by the Romanian Ministry of Defense.
To help Romania implement NATO integration efforts, the United States committed to
the provision of advice and assistance on how to downsize the Romanian military while
professionalizing the remaining members. This was no small undertaking because in
2001 Romania had the largest standing force of all NATO aspirants that were former
Soviet satellite states (US Department of State Foreign Military Training 2001).
b) Scope of U.S. Military Assistance: $11.5 million was set aside in FY 2002
to promote both the continued improvement in the professionalism of Romania’s Non104

Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps and the English language education of its military.
This funding also gave the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) the opportunity to continue its
program of training Romanian NCOs, focusing its training on Senior NCOs. In addition,
per the Department of State 2002 record of Foreign Military Assistance to Romania, U.S.
military assistance funds supported the continuation of contractor assistance in defense
reform initiatives, upgrades to the logistics management system, communications
equipment and infrastructure upgrades, and a modeling and simulation center. The
FY2002 International Military Education and Training (IMET) program exposed the new
generation of the Romanian military to professional military education, while at the same
time educating both military and civilians on defense resource management.
The Government of Romania actively sought to expose as many officers as
possible to U.S. military training and to make good use of graduates in their follow-on
assignments (Queen, 2006). This led to Romania’s qualification in FY 2002 to receive
grant Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
Additionally, the U.S. charter to assist Romania included the provision of advice on
creation of a modern Non-Commissioned Officer Corps to work with and be
interoperable with NATO. It also included advice and assistance on how to downsize
and further professionalize the Romanian military.
Furthermore, the transfer of U.S. Excess Defense Articles (EDA) assisted
Romania in meeting defense requirements, enacting defense reforms, and furthering
defense and NATO interoperability. Romania developed a system to control the export
of sensitive goods and technologies. In 2002, U.S. funding focused heavily on
establishing adequate legal and regulatory infrastructure procedures that met security
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requirements. Emphasis was placed on providing basic equipment while ensuring that
defense officials were adequately trained on security enforcement protocols.
Subsequently, Romania’s troop contributions to NATO increased steadily after its
accession to the alliance in 2004. Additionally, the size of Romania’s armed forces
dropped from 217,400 in 1999 to 76,000 in 2007 (Hillison, 2014).
American aid to Romania in Fiscal Year 2006 included nearly $17 million in
security and law enforcement assistance. In addition to the provision of financial
assistance to the Romanian security sector, the United States established a training base
inside of Romania to further solidify the American commitment to bolstering Romanian
security. Romania responded to these investments by demonstrating its new capacities
not only within its own borders, but in its ability to contribute forces to multinational
security efforts outside of its borders. As a result, Romania received a significant
increase in training and equipment funding from the United States in 2012 in recognition
of its continued contribution of stabilization forces in Afghanistan.
Romanian officers received education and training on subjects such as
amphibious warfare, field artillery, infantry, topographic analysis, military police, civilmilitary relations, defense resource and security assistance management, logistics, and
the English language. Additionally, Romanian officers attended American naval staff,
army and air war colleges, while civilian defense officials received U. S. funding to
attend training at the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany to explore of the
complexities of civil-military relations in the developing democracies in Central Europe
and the Newly Independent States.
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The Romanian military grew in institutional and material capacity as a result of
assistance from the United States. An example of the expanded capacity is Romania’s
purchase of C-130s from the United States to enable Romania’s participation in
multinational operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other locations since the collaboration
grew following the end of the Cold War.
In 2005, U.S. and Romanian soldiers partnered with local community members in
Tulcea County, Romania to renovate four primary schools. Additionally, a 14-person
bilateral U.S. and Romanian military medical team joined up to conduct humanitarian
civil assistance missions in the Nicolae Balcescu village. The team consisted of 11 U.S.
military and three Romanian service members who worked with local medical
professionals and civil leaders to provide medical, dental, and optometry screenings and
health education to people of all ages living in the rural villages (Polk, US EUCOM,
2011).
In 2009, U.S. Army personnel trained 25 Romanian military personnel at Mihail
Kogalniceanu, Romania, in reverse osmosis water purification in an effort to build
interoperability capabilities and develop a relationship (Thompson, USEUCOM, 2011).
There is also an airbase at Mihael Kogalniceanu that serves as an important multifunctional hub for U.S. forces. In 2011, US Marines and soldiers provided the
Romanian army with a familiarization course on the capabilities of the Raven-B, an
unmanned aerial vehicle that extends aerial reconnaissance capabilities. (Lyman, US
EUCOM, 2011).
U.S. military assistance to Romania has enabled greater participation by Romania
in NATO. In July 2016, the US-funded Aegis Ashore facility in Romania became
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operational and transferred to NATO operational control (USEUCOM Posture Statement,
2017). Romania contributes to NATO through its Joint National Training Center in
Cincu, Romania. Nearly $23M in U.S. European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) funding
enabled substantial renovations and improvements to the facilities at this center through
the construction of a massive nonstandard live-fire range for tanks, a sniper range and
ammunition storage area (Judson, July 14, 2017). Per U.S. European Command, the ERI
was designed by the U.S. Congress to reassure European allies and to deter an aggressive
and unpredictable Russia.
4.1.8 Romania Foreign Policy
Romania was formally accepted into the NATO alliance in 2004. Since then,
Romania has repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to that membership role. Shortly
after its accession to NATO, the U.S. and Romania signed a Defense Cooperation
Agreement. The agreement established several joint use facilities in multiple cities in
Romania. The relationship continued to grow, as evidenced by Romania’s willingness to
send troops, equipment, and other assistance in NATO operations in Kosovo, Iraq, Libya,
and Afghanistan. Upon attaining membership in NATO, Romania’s contribution to the
Stabilization Force in Kosovo (KFOR) grew to 226 in 2004, but averaged 180 soldiers
per year between 2004 and 2008 (Hillison, 2014). Romania also made a significant
contribution to the coalition forces during U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), where
from 2004 to 2007 Romania deployed over 760 troops (Hillison, 2014).

Similarly,

Romania supported NATO operations in Afghanistan with nearly 2000 soldiers deployed
in 2011 and over 1,000 troops per year since 2004 (Hillison, 2014). Romania’s
participation in Afghanistan was distinguished among fellow NATO contributors as one
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of the few NATO countries able to employ its own strategic airlift assets and also by its
willingness to send troops to the more dangerous southern provinces of Afghanistan
(Zabul) with no national caveats (Hillison, 2014).
In 2006, Prime Minister Calin Popuescu-Tariceanu proposed withdrawing
Romanian troops from Iraq in response to rising costs and falling public support.
However, Romanian President Basescu, as commander in chief, rejected this proposal as
“unacceptable,” stressing that Romania must respect its international commitments
(Radio Free Europe, June 29, 2006). To codify this commitment within Romanian
internal policy, federal authorities declared in their 2007 National Security Strategy that
strategic partnership with the United States must be considered as a strategic defense
opportunity.
The relationship continued to grow. In 2011, the United States and Romania
issued the “Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century between the
United States of America and Romania.” In this agreement, the two countries identified
key areas for enhanced cooperation, focusing on our political-military relationship, lawenforcement cooperation, trade and investment opportunities, and energy security.

An

example of Romania’s support for mutual security goals is that Romania hosts
components of the U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense that is now
operational and was adopted to meet objectives outlined for NATO’s ballistic missile
defense at the Warsaw NATO Summit in July 2016.
4.1.9 Conclusion
U.S. military assistance in Romania is a successful example of the allocation of
resources towards Romanian political development in the security sector apparatus.
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When Romania emerged from under the Soviet umbrella in 1989, it was in a state of
fragile security development, but its relationship with the U.S. was deliberate from the
beginning. In addition, the Romanian security sector has consistently remained
legitimate in the eyes of the Romanian population. Its government was steadily growing
more resilient as Romania pursued institutional goals laid out by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Challenges in the
Romanian security sector apparatus included aging Soviet era equipment and
accompanying attitudes about civil military relations. These conditions, however, were
easier to address with U.S. military assistance because the Romanian government
welcomed U.S. assistance and the Romanian security sector was reasonably legitimate in
the eyes of the population. As a result, the fragility of the Romanian security sector
apparatus decreased by 29% from 2006 to earn a rating of 2.5 by the Fragile States index
in 2015. According to this index, a rating of 2.5 means that the condition in 2015 was
between the index of 3, which meant that “security is in the hands of government but
cases of the use of violent force are reported,” and 2, which meant that “security is under
government control with strong civilian oversight and rare cases of violent force are
reported.”
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Table 4 Evidence of Legitimacy of the State in Romania

Strong

General

Ambiguous

Adherence Adherence

General lack
of adherence

Strong lack
of adherence

________________________________________________________________________
Confidence in Political Process

X

Political Opposition

X

Transparency

X

Openness & Fairness of Political Process

X

Political Violence

X

U.S. military assistance was contributed in an environment of evolving
Romanian state legitimacy. Following the removal of Nicolae Ceaucescu as the
autocratic dictator in 1989, Romanian citizens prioritized the creation of an environment
that supported democratic ideals. The involvement by the military was facilitated by the
historic regard by Romanian citizens for the military as protectors of the people. There
never really had been any form of praetorian guard.
One aspect of the Romanian security structure that citizens and government alike
agreed was on the importance of cooperation with the U.S. Thus, when the Ceaucescu
government was deposed, the cooperation with the U.S. not only continued, but it grew.
A unique quality of the cooperation between the U.S. and Romania during the Cold War
was that in 1975, Romania was awarded Most Favored Nation trading status, a distinction
enjoyed by no other Soviet bloc state.
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Romania’s transition from communism was marked by a political will to change.
After the fall of the Ceaucescu regime, Mr Ion Iliescu, a political insider, and Gen Victor
Stanculescu, the Deputy Minister of Defense, collaborated to create a National Salvation
Front (FSN) political action group consisting of army officers, students, intellectuals, and
previous political insiders. This group acted quickly to create elections that would unite
the Romanian people. According to Freedom House statistics, 86.2 % of the electorate
came out to vote. Mr Illiescu was elected, but his policies did not differ substantially
from the Communist era. Evidence of change came about in 1996 when Mr Iliescu
stepped down peacefully after his electoral defeat. When President Emil Constantinescu
came to power he announced a full scale offensive against corruption on 7 January 1997.
Further evidence of society’s will to change was exhibited when President Basescu
appointed a commission in 2006 to examine and document Romania’s dictatorial past as
an effort to learn from it and prevent a recurrence.
Romania has vigorously pursued membership in NATO and has worked to
demonstrate adherence to standards of institutional legitimacy. Evidence of this
commitment can be seen in Romania’s participation in attendance at U.S. military
schools. A key component of U.S. military indoctrination is to receive education on the
principle value of civilian control of the military and professionalization of the military
force.
American military aid to Romania in 2006 included almost $17 million in security
and law enforcement assistance. Together, the countries are working to bolster capability
and legitimacy of the holistic security sector.
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Table 5 Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness in Romania
Strong

General

Ambiguous

Adherence Adherence

General lack

Strong lack

of Adherence

of Adherence

_______________________________________________________________________
Monopoly of the Use of Force

X

Relationship Between Security & Citizenry

X

Romania is a successful example of a state that has worked to create a legitimate
monopoly of the use of force by its security sector apparatus. There is no evidence of
insurgents or terrorism within Romanian borders.
4.2 Ukraine

Figure 5 Map of Ukraine
Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Fact book
2017
4.2.1 Orientation
Ukraine is also an Eastern European state that had existed under the Soviet
umbrella and has been a recipient of United States military assistance. In contrast to
Romania, Ukraine is experiencing a negative trend in its political development. Ukraine
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is bordered by the Black Sea, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and
Moldova. In area it is the 46th largest state in the world. The United Nations Department
of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division estimates that the population of
Ukraine is just under 45 million people (2015), placing it in the top 25% of most
populated countries in the world. Ukrainian is the official national language, but Russian
is spoken regionally by nearly 30% of the population. The designation of Russian as a
“regional language” allows it to be spoken officially in the courts, schools, and other
government institutions in the specific relevant region, or oblast, as Ukraine refers to an
individual administrative region.
According to the 2016 United Nations (UN) Human Development Index (HDI),
Ukraine is number 85, with GNI per capita in 2011 of $7,361 per capita. Expected years
of schooling in 2015 was 15.3. Mean years of schooling in 2015 was 11.3. Life
expectancy was 71.1. Ukraine is rated by the 2015 United Nations Human Development Index
to be 81 of 188 states, placing it in the high human development category for life expectancy,
education, and economic capacity.

4.2.2 U.S. National Interest and Relationship with Ukraine
The relationship between the United States and Ukraine is newer than the one
with Romania because diplomatic relations did not start until after Ukraine received
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. For a number of reasons, the relationship
is also much less comprehensive. The most significant U.S. national interest at stake in a
relationship with Ukraine is that the state straddles the region between Russia and the
East and Central European NATO members. Since its independence, U.S. policy toward
Ukraine is centered on “realizing and strengthening a democratic, prosperous, and secure
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Ukraine (that is) more closely integrated into Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures.” (U.S.
Department of State Fact Sheet, September 6, 2016).
The United States has allocated resources since the end of the Cold War to
support Ukraine’s efforts to reform and increase its cooperation and integration with the
European Union, but these efforts have met with mixed success. Efforts by Ukraine to
join both the EU and NATO have encountered a variety of challenges, not the least of
which is objection from Russia. In addition, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s,
Ukraine has struggled to leave behind its communist legacy and adopt a new political
identity that is legitimate in the eyes of the Ukraine population.
The nature of U.S. support to Ukraine evolved significantly after Russia’s efforts
to annex Crimea in March 2014. In 2015, the U.S. Department of State declared that
Russia’s occupation of Crimea represented the most serious challenge facing the United
States since the end of the Cold War (U.S. Dept. of State, Romanowski, June 16, 2015, p.
4). To meet that challenge, the United States committed $471M to three core objectives
in its relationship with Ukraine. Those three objectives were: 1) Advancing and
consolidating economic, anti-corruption and energy reforms, 2) Supporting national
unity, political confidence-building and special status in the east, and 3) Reforming and
building the capacity of the security sector (U.S. Dept. of State, Romanowski, June 16,
2015, p. 3). In particular, the United States is helping Ukraine deepen the capacity of its
law enforcement by enabling expansion of a patrol-policing program to improve border
services alongside military forces in a manner that will enable more efficient and
effective accomplishment of military duties to preserve Ukraine’s territorial integrity
(U.S. Dept. of State, Romanowski, June 16, 2015, p. 3). The U.S. Department of State
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announced in 2015 its collaboration with the U.S. Department of Defense in the creation
of a U.S. EUCOM-led joint commission with Ukraine to better understand Ukraine’s
defense needs and build a strong foundation for sustainable reform to help Ukraine’s
forces better address today’s challenges and prepare for tomorrow. Furthermore, U.S.
President Barack H. Obama announced, and Congress funded, a $1 billion European
Reassurance Initiative in 2015 to enhance our defense posture in Europe and bolster the
defense capacities of Allies and partners, such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
In his 2017 U.S. EUCOM Posture Statement to Congress, U.S. EUCOM
Commander General Curtis Scaparotti highlighted the consequences of continued
tensions in Eastern Ukraine since the Russian aggression in Crimea. Gen. Scaparotti
asserted that Russia controlled the battle tempo by directing Russian-separatist forces to
target civilian infrastructure and threaten and intimidate Organization of Security and
Cooperation Europe monitors in order to increase pressure on the Ukrainian government.
Scaparotti argued that Russian-led separatist forces committed the majority of ceasefire
violations despite attempts by the OSCE to broker a lasting ceasefire. This conflict
continues and no resolution is in sight.
In his statement to the U.S. Committee on Armed Services on March 23, 2017,
Scaparrotti described the support that is being provided by his command for Defense
Institution Building in Ukraine. He asserted the EUCOM sponsored Defense Reform
Advisory Board in Ukraine is helping to bring about both political and military reform as
the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Armed Forces transition from centralized
Soviet-style systems and concepts towards a Euro-Atlantic model. He also asserted that
the U.S. State Department funding contributions to the Joint Multinational Training
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Group Ukraine, in which U.S. EUCOM together with forces from Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, the United Kingdom, and Canada is effectively training, advising and equipping
Ukraine security forces in a manner that is enabling Ukraine to build its capacity to
defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
4.2.3 Political Order
4.2.3.1. Executive Government
4.2.3.1.1. Structure

The introduction of democratic politics in Ukraine began in 1989 when citizens
went to the polls to elect the Congress of People’s Deputies as directed by Mikhail
Gorbachev as part of the glasnost philosophy. These early elections were not free and
fair by western standards, as one third of the seats were reserved for the Communist Party
and other all-Union organizations, the authorities still controlled the media, and
registration committees weeded out undesirable candidates (Yekelchyk, 2007, p. 183).
In 2017, the Ukrainian government functions as a semi-presidential republic. The
elected president is the head of state and the prime minister is nominated by the president,
but confirmed by the legislative branch, which is known as the Verkhovna Rada. The
Verhkovna is a unicameral 450 seat body in which 225 members are directly elected in
single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote and 225 are directly elected in a single
nationwide constituency by proportional representation vote (CIA World Factbook). The
Cabinet of Ministers is nominated by the Prime Minister and approved by the Verhkovna
Rada. The President is directly elected by absolute majority popular vote for a five year
term with an option for one additional five year term. Legislative members are elected
for five year terms. There is also a judicial branch known as the Supreme Court of
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Ukraine. There are 95 judges organized into civil, criminal, commercial, and
administrative chambers, and a military panel (CIA World Factbook 2017).
4.2.3.1.2 Leadership
The first Ukrainian presidential election was held in March of 1990. Mr. Leonid
Kravchuk, a former communist bureaucrat and member of the Ukrainian Politburo, was
elected. He also was the acting speaker of the Verkhovna Rada at the time of the
election. As Ukraine’s first president, he was tasked to distribute economic and industrial
resources that had been directed by the Soviet Union. This election was evidence of the
first signs of an independent civil society in Ukraine (Kuzio, 2000).
The next presidential election was held in 1994, on 26 June and 10 July in two
rounds of voting, Leonid Kuchma replaced Mr. Kravchuk, and economic reform was at
the forefront for presidential issue focus. At that time, Ukraine’s GDP had still not
recovered to its pre-1990 levels. Kuchma took office with the outward intent to attract
foreign investment, but the institutional culture still did not enable free flow of ideas.
Ukraine was not known for its free media.
In 1999, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was invited by
the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Ukraine to establish an Election
Observation Mission on 15 September ahead of the presidential election scheduled for 31
October 1999 and 14 November 1999. Numerous irregularities were recorded, with
supervised voting and people being allowed multiple opportunities to vote. Mr. Kuchma
was reelected. Nalbandov (2014) argues that the eventual failure of Kuchma’s regime is
largely considered as the main root cause for the Orange Revolution in 2005.
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The presidential election held on October 31 and November 21 through two
rounds of voting in 2004 was particularly controversial, with pro-western Viktor
Yushchenko pitted against Viktor Yanukovych. Mr Yanukovych had served as Prime
Minister for Mr. Kuchma and was supported by pro-Russian voters from eastern Ukraine.
Though independent exit polls predicted a win by Mr. Yushchenko, the Central Election
Committee declared a victory by Mr. Yanukovych. This sparked mass protests that
required a third round of voting to confirm victory by Mr. Yushchenko. Mr. Yushchenko
ended up being pressured to appoint Mr. Yanukovych as his Prime Minister in 2006.
Four years later Mr. Yanukovych was elected president in 2010. Mr. Yanukovych
embarked on a reversal of pro-Europe integration policy.
4.2.3.1.3 Culture
Existing only since 1991, Ukraine as a separate sovereign state is a relatively new
concept. To make creation of a singular national concept even more complicated,
Nalbandov (2014) asserts that the current geographic divide in the Ukrainian society into
a pro-European west and pro-Russian east was born of centuries of interactions that
reinforced a separation. At its most basic level, Ukraine is the historical core of the
Eastern Slavic identity around which the Russian empire would grow. In the 15th and
16th centuries, present day Ukraine was included in the powerful Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth. A group known as the Cossacks led the country. The Cossacks asked
Moscovia, which is modern Russia, to accept them under its umbrella for protection after
defeat by the Polish army in 1651 (Nalbandov, 2014, p. 46). The protection arrangement
didn’t last long. Moscovia subordinated the region and the period of the Russian empire
began in 1721. The Russian Empire existed from 1721 to 1917. In 1917, the Bolshevik
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Revolution paved the way for the creation of the Soviet Union. Ukraine existed briefly as
an independent state from 1918 to 1920, but it was brought into the Soviet Union in 1920
and remained there until independence in 1989.
Thus, the region has a history of controversy over its political identity. As
Europe’s second largest country after Russia, Ukraine has been in the middle of very
powerful and influential civilizations, so dissent among those competing for power has
been a common occurrence. In the last two hundred years, Ukraine existed between the
oppressive Russian Empire that became the Soviet Union and the vibrant democratic
transformation of its neighbors to the west. The current country still has a large minority
population of ethnic Russians that account for nearly 17 percent of the Ukrainian
population. The majority of these people live in the south and east of Ukraine.
According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project study on the End of Communism
in 2009, Ukraine respondents approved of the change to democracy in 1991 by 72%. In
2009, the number changed by 30%, with the largest loss of confidence in democracy of
all the nations surveyed. Similarly, Ukraine respondents in the same study indicated in
1991 that they approved the change to capitalism by 52%. In 2009, that number dropped
by 36%, making it the state with the lowest approval rate for capitalism among the former
Soviet Union states. Furthermore, 72% of Ukraine respondents in 2009 felt that the
economic situation was worse at that time than the economy had been under communism.
Another indicator in this study was that in 2009, only 30% of Ukraine respondents felt
that a civilian controlled military was very important. On another note—46% of Ukraine
respondents rated Russia’s influence on Ukraine in 2009 as a good thing.
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In December 1991, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian people
voted overwhelmingly in favor of their republic’s independence. However, the country
was ill-prepared to make the procedural and cultural transition. Yekelchyk (2007, p. 178)
asserts that the Soviet legacy of nation building played a major role in the political
processes of the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, the Soviet Union had begun
the process of creating republican parliaments, governments, newspapers in national
languages, academies of science, and historical museums. These were used as tools of
political expression for the communist regime. Furthermore, political power in Ukraine
was traditionally not in the parties, but in entrenched elites in the large industrial cities in
Eastern Ukraine.
Nalbandov (2014, p. 72) asserts that a peculiar nature of Ukrainian political
culture is that there is an extremely low popular understanding of democratic institutions
and their purposes. Nalbandov (2014) attributes this to a persistent preference in
Ukrainian government for political revenge towards rivals. As evidence, Nalbandov
highlights the most notorious cases of the imprisonment in 2011 of Yulia Tymoshenko,
first woman appointed by President President Yushchenko and co-leader in the Orange
Revolution and also imprisonment in 2011 of Yuri Lutsenko, co-leader of the revolution
and former Minister of Interior. Both were charged with corruption, but pardoned in
2013.
Mr. Petro Poroshenko rose to the office of Ukrainian President on June 7, 2014.
Prior to that time, Mr. Poroshenko served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2008 to
2011 and as the Minister of Trade and Economic Development in 2012. In 2016,
President Poroshenko was unable to control activities and discipline of the security
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sector. According to the UN Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights Report on
Ukraine, 2016, p. 17, killing of dissidents has become a widespread phenomenon in
Ukraine since January 2014. The report finds a persistent pattern of violations and
abuses of human rights in Ukraine. Furthermore, OHCHR observed an apparent lack of
motivation by Ukrainian authorities to investigate some cases, particularly when the
concerns were allegedly committed by Ukrainian military and law enforcement forces.
4.2.3.2 Security Sector Apparatus
4.2.3.2.1 Structure
Ukraine has both a military and a police force capacity to address external and
internal defense requirements, respectively. There are three primary military branches—
the ground forces, the naval forces and the air forces. The military service age is 20-27
years and there is mandatory conscription for a period of 18 months for all citizens (CIA
Fact book 2017).
There are two principal security agencies in Ukraine that share formal
responsibility for internal security: the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), which
oversees domestic security and law enforcement, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
which administers the various police forces. The SBU reports directly to the president
and is also responsible for internal intelligence and protecting state security (U.S.
Department of State Human Rights Report, 2015). In 2004, the U.S. Department of State
asserts that the Ukrainian armed forces largely remained outside of politics and civilian
authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces. However, there
were also observations that year of human rights abuses committed by security forces. In
2008, the U.S. Department of State observed in its annual Human Rights Report that
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Ukrainian law established civilian control of the army and law-enforcement agencies.
The report recognized provisions in the Ukrainian policy for parliament to conduct
investigations and public hearings into national security and defense issues (U.S. Dept of
State Human Rights Report, 2008). In 2015, the U.S. State Department annual Human
Rights Report recorded change—though the authors observed that Ukrainian civilian
authorities generally maintained effective control over security forces, there was a
recognition that authorities did not have control over security forces in the eastern part of
the country controlled by Russian-backed separatists and in Russian-occupied Crimea.
The structure of the Ukrainian security sector beyond the military and police has
been in transition, particularly since the level of protests rose in early 2014. These
uprisings grew in connection with the contentious election of the pro-European
integration policy leanings of Mr. Petro Poroshenko upon his election to the presidency in
August 2014. When Mr Poroshenko was elected to the presidency, there was already
evidence of politically motivated private security actors proliferated in parallel with
operations by the Ukrainian government (Sheldon, 2017).

Sheldon (2017) asserts that

the volunteer militias have noticeably undermined the formal security structures of the
Ukrainian government.
4.2.3.2.2 Leadership
The Ukrainian Minister of Defense is subordinate to the Ukrainian President.
Since 2014, the leadership of security sector units in Ukraine appear to have found it
increasingly difficult to stay out of the political arena with regard to the pro-Europe or
pro-Russia security agenda. Sheldon (2017) finds that political and military power have
become inseparable within units assigned to monitor the conflict in Eastern Ukraine,
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since many battalion commanders are also career politicians or even members of
parliament.
4.2.3.2.3 Culture
Ukraine has developed a cultural preference for self-defense security forces that
appears to be connected to the rise of political instability. Across Ukraine, particularly in
the Eastern part, there are numerous private security actors. Sheldon (2017) asserts that
the proliferation of self-defense units has accelerated due to an increasing distrust by the
population of the government. A factor that bolsters not only the participation in these
units, but also their legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, is that volunteerism as
an institution is second in trust by the population only to the church (Sheldon, 2017).
4.2.4 Legitimacy of the Security Sector Apparatus
As indicated by the irregular evolution of Ukrainian security sector forces, there is
a legitimacy fragility that threatens any action that does not specifically recognize the
extent of the legitimacy weakness in the eyes of the Ukrainian population. Two factors,
in particular, have played a significant role in diminishing the relative weakness of the
Ukrainian security sector. These two factors are the failure of the Orange Revolution to
bring about changes to the government that inspired the revolution and also the
increasing lack of accountability for recorded abuses and improprieties on the part of
Ukrainian government military and police forces.
One of the fundamental reasons for the Orange Revolution in 2004/2005 was that
Ukrainian citizens were tired of continued egregious corruption on the part of
government officials. These protests were not successful. In 2016, the Transparency
International Global Corruption Perceptions Index rated Ukraine as 131 of 176 countries
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assessed. The European country with the highest score for lack of corruption was
Denmark, with a rating of 90, while Ukraine was given a score of 29. A score of 100 is
considered very clean, with a relative lack of corruption, while a score of zero is
considered to be highly corrupt. Thus, the political masters who must manage the
security sector are rated independently by Transparency International as being in the
bottom quarter of the world population for perception of corruption.
Next, there is extensive reporting of the abuses committed by Ukrainian
authorities. In 2016, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UNOHCR) Mission in Ukraine released a report detailing the observations of a
team on the ground in Eastern Ukraine. They found that the armed conflict in certain
districts of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine has been deteriorating since midApril 2014 in large part due to an inflow of foreign fighters and weapons from the
Russian Federation. The UNOHCR mission also found that former Ukrainian service
men and even active members on leave account for the majority of violations of the right
to life in Ukraine in the two years since the conflict began in 2014. The OHCHR Mission
estimated that between mid-2014 and 31 May 2016, at least 9,404 people, of which up to
2,000 are civilians, had been killed as a result of the conflict. As an indictment of the
Ukrainian security sector, they reported that the vast majority of civilian casualties,
recorded on the territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine and on those
controlled by armed groups, were caused by the indiscriminate shelling of residential
areas, in violation of the international humanitarian law principle of distinction. Even
worse, OHCHR recorded executions of members of Ukrainian forces and elements of
armed groups who had surrendered, in addition to a considerable number of alleged
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summary executions and killings of civilians who were not taking part in hostilities.
OHCHR also found acts of arbitrary deprivation of life allegedly committed by elements
of Ukrainian armed forces and law enforcement. The report even goes as far as to
suggest that all killings in the context of the conflict in eastern Ukraine described in the
report were carried out by, or at the behest of, or with the acquiescence of members of the
armed groups or elements of the Ukrainian military or law enforcement. OHCHR also
considered that some of the executions or killings would not have occurred had those
bearing responsibility not failed to prevent them. The report alleges that there had been
no accountability for the vast majority of alleged summary executions and killings
committed in the conflict zone.
4.2.5 Nature of Political Dissent
4.2.5.1 Ambiguity about Crimea Identity
Despite the international concern for Russian incursion in Crimea, the Crimean
region has a history of efforts to carve out special consideration for its community
preferences. In January 1991, party conservatives in Crimea organized a referendum that
resulted in a 93 percent vote in favor of restoring the Crimean autonomous republic
within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Yekelchyk, 2007, p. 187).

Furthermore,

the Russian interest in Crimea dates back to 1954, when Soviet Premier Khruschev
transferred it from Russia to the Ukrainian Republic as a token of the two people’s
eternal friendship. Russia must have been confident in the long term nature of the
friendship, since the Crimea had been a base for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Thus, it has
historical military significance for Russia.
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On Feb 14, 2014, Russia invaded Ukrainian Crimea on the grounds that it was a
rightfully Russian territory. By Feb 27, Russia seized the Crimean peninsula. On March
16, the Crimean authorities held a referendum. 96.77 % of the voters wanted annexation
to Russia. By March 2014, there were thousands of pro-Russian protesters in Crimea.
Soon afterward, Crimean authorities held a referendum in which the voters
overwhelmingly selected annexation by Russia. This action was followed in August
2014 when the new Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, declared that Ukraine would
pursue the needed reforms to gain membership in NATO. Thus, efforts by Ukraine to
join both the EU and NATO have encountered a variety of challenges, not the least of
which is objection from Russia and possible divisions within the Ukrainian public over the degree
to which Russia represents their interests. Russia has issued a series of demands, including
guarantees of neutrality, rights for Russian speakers, and federalization to give individual regions
greater autonomy.

4.2.5.2 Contraction of the Ukrainian Economy
The next significant contributor to political dissent in Ukraine was the
ineffectiveness of the efforts to move from centralized management to a market economy
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Between 1990 and 1991, the Ukraine
economy contracted 27% while attempts were made to liberalize the communist system.
Ukrainian citizens saw their standard of life degrade considerably when the Cold War
ended. During the early to mid-1990s, an estimated three quarters of Ukrainians lived
below the poverty level (Yekelchyk, 2007). As individual income decreased,
government resources were less available to provide state welfare or public health
systems so the average life expectancy and birth rate both plunged and the country’s
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population declined rapidly from a high of 52 million in 1989 to 48.5 during the 2001
census (Yekelchyk, 2007, p. 198).
The extent of the suffering was made worse by the increase of migrants from
Ukraine moving to other countries in search of a better life. While average Ukrainians
lacked public services, the Ukrainian elite were relatively unscathed. There was a large
group of Ukrainians suffering economically, but there was no institutionalized way for
this group to demand change from a government that exhibited little to no visible will to
change from habits learned during the Soviet era.
According to the U.S. Agency for International Development Country
Development Strategy for Ukraine, the 2008 global economic crisis hit Ukraine
particularly deeply. This strategy asserted that had the International Monetary Fund not
negotiated one of the largest stand-by arrangements in its history ($16.8billion) in
November 2008, Ukraine would have faced widespread loan defaults and a collapse of its
social services. This report also asserted that even with the loan, official GDP declined
15% in 2009, industrial production fell by 22%, and the currency devalued by 60%,
making Ukraine the second worst performing economy in the world that year. Even
more unsettling to Ukrainian citizens, in 2010 the official GDP remained below its pre1991 level, which left the country far behind their more rapidly developing neighbors to
the west such as Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.
4.2.5.3 Orange Revolution
As described above, the promise of capitalism and a market economy did not
deliver for Ukrainians as had been hoped following the end of the Cold War. As
individual income plummeted and government corruption continued unabated, the
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Ukraine public took to the streets in 2004 to demand changes from the government. For
several weeks at the end of 2004, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians from every walk
of life wore orange vests to register their collective frustration through protests in Kiev’s
Independence Square. The protests began shortly after the second round of results from
the controversial Presidential election were released. Evidence of mismanagement
manifested itself in actions by government officials “correcting” data from the electoral
districts, intimidating voters, ballot box stuffing, and payments for independent pollsters
to publish specific information (Yekelchyk, 2007, p. 216).
4.2.5.4 Government Collapse
Ukraine emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union after the Cold War with
early indications that democratic governance structures would become the preferred style
of governance. However, Ukraine has not adapted well to a transition to multiparty
governance. Ukraine is undergoing a transformation of its political identity.

This

transformation has been painful for the Ukrainian public. In 2004, the Freedom House
Crossroads Ukraine Report found that democratic reforms were being reversed, as
evident in issues with civil liberties, deficits in rule of law and rampant corruption. These
tensions continued well into the next decade.
In late 2013, the Ukrainian government announced that it no longer intended to
pursue a pro-European trajectory. Once again, protestors gathered in Kiev at
Independence Square. These crowds rivaled the size of the groups assembled in 2004,
but police forces violently sought to disperse them. Demonstrations gave way to rioting
by January 2014. As a result, then President Yanukovych signed a series of laws
restricting rights to protest, but that only further inflamed the protesters. The clashes
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were so violent that protesters succeeded in occupying the justice ministry in Kiev.
Parliament was driven to repeal the anti-protest measures signed by Yanukovych. As the
government crumbled, Prime Minister Mykola Azarov resigned on 27 January 2014
when the Ukrainian parliament issued a vote of no confidence that would have effectively
stripped him of his powers. The government became increasingly desperate to give an
appearance of control. In February 2014, the Yanukovych government increased the
level of violence to subdue the protestors, killing 108 protestors and 13 law enforcement
officers while the semblance of a rule of law evaporated. Soon afterwards, parliament
approved a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the Interior Ministry police forces and
ordered the military forces to withdraw from Kiev and return to home bases. Protestors
were then unrestrained so they began occupying government buildings, which forced
President Yanukovych and many of his supporters to flee.
Shortly after the Yanukovych regime departed Ukraine for refuge in Russia,
parliament assembled with leaders from the opposition party to address the grievances
and reform the government. To legitimize their actions, Yanukovych was formally
deposed by the Ukrainian parliament on February 22, 2014 for abandoning his duties. In
particular, parliament acted decisively to restore many of the democratic provisions of the
2004 constitution that had been removed by the Yanukovych government (Morelli,
2017). On February 27, 2014, the Ukrainian parliament approved a new interim
government that would be headed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk, a former prime minister, who
would serve until a new presidential election could be held on May 25, 2014.
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4.2.5.5 External Response by Russia
The collapse of the pro-Russia government in Ukraine did not sit well in Moscow.
The Kremlin even denounced the new government as an illegal coup. The action was
made more distasteful to Russia by the continued presence of the large Russian Black Sea
Fleet in Crimea. While Ukrainian protests were empowering a new government with
pro-Europe integration intentions, Russia was motivated to protect its security interests.
On February 14, 2014, heavily armed Russian speaking forces began seizing airports and
other key installations throughout Crimea. Russian President Vladimir Putin distanced
Russia from the incursion early on by claiming that the military operations were the work
of local Crimean self-defense forces or possibly volunteers from Russia. However, soon
after the seizures, Moscow announced it was annexing Crimea and making it a permanent
part of Russia. Ukraine was left with no other choice but to direct its military against the
separatists.
4.2.5.6 Disagreement about NATO Membership
Ukraine has had a painful decision path over whether or not to join NATO. When
the Cold War ended, Ukraine had initially declared in its first Military Doctrine published
in 1993 that it would refrain from membership in military blocs (Simon, 2009).
However, it changed that vector when in February 1994 it became the first
Commonwealth of Independent States member to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace. In
December 1995, Ukraine deployed troops to NATO’s Bosnia Implementation Force as a
show of commitment. Ukraine first officially stated its intention to join the NATO
alliance at the Reykjavik NATO-Ukraine Foreign Ministers session in May 2002 (Simon,
2009). By June of 2004, President Leonid Kuchma evolved the Ukraine Military
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Doctrine to portray NATO as the basis for the European Security System and pledged his
intent to pursue Europe-Atlantic integration.
Ukraine encountered obstacles in its pursuit of NATO membership when the
NATO review committee expressed concerns about the status of Ukraine’s democratic
development. As a result, President Kuchma issued a new decree in July 2004 that
Ukraine would no longer pursue NATO membership. This new policy was short-lived.
The disturbance created by the Orange Revolution in fall 2004 prompted President
Yushchenko to return Ukraine to a pro-NATO integration stance. This effort was weakly
pursued. Instead, by March 2006, integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions,
particularly into NATO, became an increasingly divisive issue for the country. Public
opinion polls in early 2007 indicated that nearly two-thirds of Ukrainians believed NATO
was fomenting insecurity and did not support Ukraine joining the Alliance (Simon, 2009,
p. 3).
4.2.6 Effectiveness of the Security Sector Apparatus
Ukraine has been in a constant position of disadvantage with regard to its army
ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Three conditions have contributed the
most instability to the creation of ineffectiveness in the security sector. To begin, the
most significant challenge for Ukraine at independence was the lack of an immediately
available manpower and material military structure. With 47 million people in the early
1990s, Ukraine was by far the largest of the former Soviet or Warsaw Pact states not to
have inherited its own armed forces from the predecessor communist regime (Simon,
2009, p. 5). No other former Soviet or Warsaw Pact state was as closely aligned with the
core Russian security structures as was Ukraine. This made Ukraine’s efforts to create
132

independence that much more difficult. For example, the security sector in Ukraine had
been required to function primarily through the use of the Russian language prior to
independence. The transition throughout the country to Ukrainian has been contentious,
particularly in the eastern regions where much of Ukraine’s industry is also concentrated.
A second challenge is in the instability of the public administration structure that
is responsible for creating and enforcing the rule of law under which the security sector
must operate. In 2010, a U.S. Embassy in Ukraine Democratic Governance Assessment
found that public administration was on the whole neither accountable nor effective
(Ukraine CDCS, 2012). It found a lack of consequences for not following established
procedures. Next, the strategy asserts that laws passed were poorly implemented and
court rulings not enforced. This report declares that the governance problem was not
limited to just the national government, it also prevailed in government at the local level,
which had been directly connected to a major loss in confidence by the Ukraine public on
the ability of the Ukraine government to meet their needs. In many respects, the
combination of unclear rules with no way to enforce them made lawlessness and chaos
unavoidable and perhaps even inevitable.
Third, the Ukrainian military has faced continuous conflict in its eastern regions
since spring 2014. This conflict pitted an unprepared Ukrainian security sector structure
against a much better trained and equipped Russian force. In 2016, the Ukrainian
military was still in the midst of transition from the Cold War based Soviet structures. As
evidence, Russian and pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine used heavy armor and
electronic-warfare systems that Ukraine struggled to counter, which lead to significant
defeats (Holcomb, 2016). Additionally, as recently as 2014, Ukraine used Soviet
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generation aviation to counter advances by more modern Russian defense technology.
As a result, Ukraine’s air forces suffered heavy losses during the initial four months of
intensive air operations, losing 18 aircraft and helicopters, mostly to man-portable air
defense systems and heavier anti-aircraft installations (Holcomb, 2016).

Ukrainian

forces were no longer capable of projecting air superiority over their own territory.
Similarly, the Ukrainian Navy was wholly ineffective in deflecting the Russian capture of
Crimea. Multiple high profile defections of Ukrainian navy leaders at the time of the
incursion directly contributed to the loss of at least 51 ships to Russia (Holcomb, 2016).
Ukraine was forced to build another port at a time when their fragile economy was ill
equipped to support such a large expense.
4.2.7 Specific U.S. Military Assistance Provided
The first delivery of American military assistance to Ukraine occurred in1994.
The support grew slowly in the first few years but increased substantially with the sales
of equipment in 1998. According to the State Department, in 2000, the United States
trained 451 Ukrainian military and civilian security officials. The areas of concentration
for military readiness included legal training, English language instruction, supply officer
training, classes in civil-military relations and defense resources management, military
engineering and military police instruction, and military air traffic control training.
Ukrainian military members also received specialized officer training in courses for
signal officers and field artillery captains, along with opportunities to attend air and naval
command and staff colleges, air and army war colleges and the US Marines amphibious
warfare school. Civilian security officials received education on managing and
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administering military establishments and budgets, promoting civilian control of the
military, and maintaining effective military justice systems and military codes of conduct.
General Scaparrotti asserts that U.S. EUCOM, working through the Multinational
Joint Commission, has developed Ukraine’s institutional training capability so that
Ukraine can create a NATO-interoperable armed force. In particular, EUCOM is training
both Ukraine conventional and special operations units, along with advising Ukraine on
defense reform priorities (US EUCOM Public web site, accessed 5 June 2017).
One helpful vehicle for advancing U.S. national interests was the NATO-Ukraine
Charter established in 1997. Under this charter, Ukraine contributed valuable assistance
in the Kosovo Force peacekeeping mission in the U.S. sector. It was also a valued
participant in the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2003, it was active
in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) and was a contributing member to the so-called
‘War on Terrorism.’
According to the US Department of State Foreign Military Training policy goals
in 2003, ‘the U.S. goals for engaging Ukraine’s military include strengthening civilian
control, military reform, and an increasing integration of Ukraine into the security
institutions of the larger Euro-Atlantic community. Areas of concentration include
military legal training, English language instruction, supply officer training, classes in
civil-military relations and defense resources management, military engineering and
military police instruction, and military airfield operations. Ukrainians also received
specialized officer training in courses for signal officers, adjutant general and chemical
corps captains. In addition, top Ukrainians officer were trained at the Air and Naval
Command and Staff Colleges, Air and Army War Colleges, and the National Defense
135

University. The Expanded IMET program trained Ukrainian military and civilian
officials, including civilian personnel from non-defense ministries and the legislative
branch who work on military-related issues. E-IMET training focuses on managing and
administering military establishments and budgets, promoting civilian control of the
military, and creating and maintaining effective military justice systems and codes of
conduct. Funds contributed for these goals were intended to augment Ukraine’s ability to
participate alongside NATO forces in crisis response operations, in NATO Partnership
for Peace exercises and other activities.
The U.S. military assistance to Ukraine progressed gradually from institution
building to equipment integration activities. In 2011, the U.S. Air National Guard sent
140 members with U.S. F-16C military aircraft to participate with Ukraine in a U.S.
EUCOM sponsored military exchange event titled SAFE SKIES 2011 (U.S. EUCOM,
Mutti, 2011). The event took nearly two years to plan. The U.S. guardsmen flew into
Mirgorod Air Base, which until July 2011 had only been used by MIG-29s and SU-27s
(U.S. EUCOM, Mutti, 2011). Poland also participated in the event. The intent was to
promote and enhance multi-national cooperation that would safeguard airspace security
in anticipation of the 2012 Winter Olympics.
U.S. military assistance for Ukraine has grown substantially since the Russian
incursion in the spring of 2014. However, this growth has occurred with careful
recognition that while there is a need to help bolster security capacity, the assistance must
not empower a war making capacity that would antagonize Russia. Thus, the U.S.
military assistance to Ukraine consisted of non-lethal aid in the form of 300,000 ‘MealsReady-To-Eat.’ The cost of the meals, fuel and transportation was approximately $3M
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and was authorized by the U.S. Defense Secretary’s Emergency and Extraordinary
Expense funds. According to the U.S. EUCOM public affairs announcement in March
2014, the U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine
worked closely with Ukrainian authorities to provide the assistance.
In October of 2014, senior representatives from Ukraine’s General Staff and U.S.
European Command met in Kyiv, Ukraine to create a Ukraine-U.S. Joint Commission.
The intent of the commission is to enable deliberative, constructive dialogue to build an
achievable, sustainable engagement plan to institute fundamental reform, build capacity,
grow capacity, and develop a transformed Ukrainian Armed Forces (U.S. EUCOM Media
Operations Division, 21 October, 2014). According to the public affairs announcement,
the Joint Commission is a new construct to conduct bilateral U.S.-Ukraine military
assistance. It is intended to develop near, mid and long term goals that are validated by
both U.S. and Ukraine authorities. The cross-functional bi-lateral staff teamed to review
and make recommendations for the improvement and growth of the following areas:
Medical, Logistics, Institution Building, Maritime, Ground Forces, Special Operations,
Communications, Information, and Border Security (U.S. EUCOM Media Operations
Division, 21 October 2014).
Examples of the assistance that have been delivered since the 2014 agreement
include the creation of a leadership course for Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and
Combat Casualty Medical Care training. The 55-day NCO leadership course known as
Junior Leader Academy Training (JLAT) is led by U.S. and Canadian instructors and is
conducted at the Combat Training Center near Yavoriv, Ukraine. Course instructors are
part of the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, which is an international
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coalition dedicated to building professionalism within the Ukrainian army and building
Ukraine’s training capacity. The JLAT is designed to mold Ukrainian NCOs into better
leaders. According to the U.S. EUCOM public affairs announcement (Christopher, May
25, 2017), the U.S. and Canadian JLAT instructors do not evaluate the Ukrainian soldiers
based on their tactics, but rather on their critical thinking skills and their ability to lead
troops.
To improve the Ukrainian army’s ability to save lives on the battlefield, the U.S.
Oklahoma Army National Guard worked alongside the Ukrainian army to create a
combat first aid course. In Feb, 2017, the Ukrainian army took over the curriculum from
the U.S. advisor and is now capable of leading it themselves (U.S. EUCOM, Jones, Feb,
2017). This training has been critical for the Ukrainian army, which has lost nearly 3,000
people in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine since it began in 2014 (U.S. EUCOM, Jones,
Feb, 2017). In order to reduce the casualties, the Ukrainian army has worked with
Canadian and American trainers to create the knowledge and confidence to treat soldiers
at the point of injury in the conflict zone. According to the public affairs announcement,
soldiers are learning how to apply tourniquets, pressure bandages and improvised field
dressings, while also learning how to evacuate a casualty while under fire and how to
clear a casualty’s airway, when necessary.

Specialist Cody Yancey, an American medic

assigned to the training mission, asserts that casualty care was not a priority for Ukrainian
troops prior to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine (U.S. EUCOM, Jones, Feb, 2017).
However, as the casualties mounted, it became clear that a shift in training focus was
needed. In addition to the NCO Leader training, this training is also part of the Joint
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Multinational Training Group-Ukraine’s mission at the International Peacekeeping and
Security Center, near Yavoriv, Ukraine.
Financially, the Eastern Ukraine crisis has prompted a considerable investment by
the United States. Approximately $266M has been invested into the security sector to
deliver 130 High Mobility Multipurpose Vehicles, 150 thermal and night vision devices,
over 300 secure ratios, 5 Explosive Ordnance Disposal robots, and 20 counter-mortar
radars (Pyatt, 2015).
The U.S. has also collaborated with Ukrainian government leaders to promote
improved civil and military relations. On July 19th and 20th of 2017, fifteen senior
leaders from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and General Staff, as well as two
Ukrainian parliamentarians, traveled to the George C. Marshall European Center for a
sixth seminar in a series of executive-level meetings to improve defense reform in that
nation (Brooks, 2017). The primary purpose of this seminar was to increase
communications and cooperation between the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and
Parliament. The agenda included discussions on key reform challenges between the
military and parliament and examining ways to propose and adopt solutions for
improving cooperation. Deputy Speaker of Parliament Oksana Syroyid, a Marshall
Center Alumnus, has been an active participant in each of the six senior leader seminars.
She said defense reforms are difficult because of a lack of trust between the military and
parliament (Brooks, 2017). The George C. Marshall Center has become known for
creating seminars to provide a venue to build trust and find solutions. “I think that the
impact of this seminar and the others is enormous. Reform takes time and effort,” said
Syroyid (Brooks, 2017).
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4.2.8 Ukraine Foreign Policy
Ukraine has made challenged strides to establish its independence from its Cold
War identification with the Soviet Union. In the early 2000s, Ukraine was actively
pursuing greater integration with its European neighbors to the west. This included a
closer relationship with the United States, but one that doesn’t entirely abandon its
Russian heritage. Maintaining this balance has proven difficult. The relationship with
the United States grew beginning in 1991, but suffered in parallel with the difficulties for
the Ukrainian government to establish a functional and prosperous democracy.
There are internal and external security objectives in which the United States and
Ukraine are collaborating. That collaboration has taken different forms since the
declaration of independence from the Soviet Union and those forms have not proceeded
in a linear fashion. Internally, U.S. Government programs help Ukraine through joint
efforts to promote military reform and modernization, counter transnational threats,
reduce weapons stockpiles, and construct a shelter for the destroyed Chornobyl nuclear
power plant (U.S. Department of State, Ukraine Fact Sheet, 2012). Externally, the U.S. –
Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership was created on December 19, 2008 to affirm
that the United States and Ukraine share a vital interest in a strong, independent and
democratic Ukraine. The Charter also declared that deepening Ukraine’s integration into
Euro-Atlantic institutions is a mutual priority. Most significantly for defense and
security cooperation, the charter emphasized the importance of the guidance put forth by
the April 3, 2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration of the NATO North Atlantic Council
and the April 4, 2008 Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, which
affirmed that Ukraine will become a member of NATO. Though that charter was
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supported by the Ukrainian leaders at the time of the signing, relative support from
subsequent executive leadership in Ukraine has changed for a variety of reasons.
Ukraine is clearly at a cross roads on how best to chart its course going forward
with regard to foreign policy. Western and Central Ukraine largely prefers a deeper
integration with Europe, but the industrialized and powerful east prefers integration with
Russia. Russia traditionally has been one of the largest foreign investors in Ukraine. In
2010, the Pew Research Center published a study by Kathleen Holzwart Sprehe showing
that 51% of Ukrainian citizens opposed their country’s admission to NATO and only
28% of respondents favored such a move.

In spite of this internal dissension, the new

Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, declared in 2014 that Ukraine would pursue the
needed reforms to gain membership in NATO, which incited Russia and contributed to
the ongoing conflict in Crimea. In 2016, in his annual address to lay out foreign policy
priorities to the XII Meeting of the heads of the diplomatic missions in Ukraine abroad,
President Poroshenko emphasized cooperation with NATO member states, consolidation
of international support in countering Russian aggression in Ukraine, enhancement of the
sanctions pressure towards Russia from the partner’s side, release of the Ukrainian
political prisoners in occupied Crimea, and cooperation with the European Union on
defense and economic concerns (Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2016, p. 15).
The Ukrainian military has participated in various exercises over its nearly three
decade relationship with the United States, including Rapid Trident, Sea Breeze and
Immediate Response, it hosted U.S. Navy ship visits; participated in numerous
conferences and seminars; and joined U.S. forces in a variety of operations including
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Kosovo Forces and Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom (US EUCOM public web
site, accessed 30 November 2017).
In September of 2014 following months of intense fighting in Eastern Ukraine, a
diplomatic process was officially begun by Ukraine, Russia, Western Europe and the
United States in an international effort to facilitate peace in the region. The effort was
solidified in Minsk, the capital of Belarus, in February of 2015. The agreement directed
Russia to end military engagement in the region through a ceasefire in the Donbas and to
withdraw troops and heavy weapons. Ukraine also committed to the ceasefire, as well as
to a constitutional reform that would guarantee special status for the Donbas in an attempt
to create a more lasting political solution. Beyond the Minsk agreement, the United
States, Germany and France applied sanctions to their trade with Russia in an effort to
motivate Russia to comply with the terms discussed at Minsk.

In May 2017, neither

Ukraine nor Russia have shown visible commitment to the terms of the Minsk agreement.
4.2.9 Conclusion
U.S. military assistance in Ukraine is an unsuccessful example of the allocation of
resources towards Ukrainian political development in the security sector apparatus.
When Ukraine emerged from under the Soviet umbrella in 1991, it was in an especially
uncertain period of political transition. Ukraine had never existed as a separate sovereign
political entity and Soviet style communism had not succeeded in assuring political
continuity of the state. Ukrainian citizens looked to democracy as a means to remedy
governance fragility, but movement towards a government that categorically separates it
from Russia has been difficult. As the historic seat of the Russian capital city, the social
connection to Russia is undeniable. As a result, the security sector apparatus has never
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been fully legitimate in the eyes of the entire population because commitment to the
Ukrainian government is divided. This condition is exacerbated by the high levels of
literacy and large middle class within Ukraine. Economic opportunities have plummeted
since the transition to free market capitalism. GDP per capita has progressively
decreased. Ukrainians are skeptical of how a commitment to NATO would remedy the
situation. Divided loyalties have exacerbated the challenges being experienced in eastern
Ukraine since 2014.
Between 2006 and 2015, the fragility of the Ukrainian security sector increased
by 160%. The nature of this fragility is tied to the political challenges of the Government
of Ukraine to unite populations of the eastern and western parts of the state. Western
Ukrainians are more likely to support a move to join NATO, while Eastern Ukrainians
are less amenable to such a move. These attitudes reduce the degree to which U.S.
military assistance has an opportunity to remedy the political development of the
Ukrainian security sector apparatus.
Table 6 Evidence of Legitimacy of the State in Ukraine
Strong

General

Adherence Adherence

Ambiguous

General lack
of adherence

Strong lack
of adherence

________________________________________________________________________
Confidence in Political Process

X

Political Opposition

X

Transparency

X

Openness & Fairness of Political Process

X

Political Violence

X
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Ukraine has deteriorated significantly in legitimacy of the state between 2006 to
2015. All measures of legitimacy of the state in Ukraine named above were in a
condition of strong lack of adherence to stability factors. Ukrainian citizens are in no
position to have confidence in the political process as long as Crimea remains under
Russian control and the Eastern provinces remain embroiled in heavy conflict where
Ukrainian military members have been implicated as contributors to the fighting.

Table 7 Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness in Ukraine
Strong

General

Adherence Adherence

Ambiguous

General lack

Strong lack

of Adherence

of Adherence

_______________________________________________________________________
Monopoly of the Use of Force

X

Relationship Between Security & Citizenry

X

The Ukrainian government does not have a monopoly of the use of force, nor
does it have a good relationship between the security sector apparatus and the citizenry.
This distrust is most evident in the prevalence of citizen lead militia self-protection
groups. It is further amplified by studies published by Amnesty International on the
nature of the fighting in the Donbas region and the questionable participation by current
or former Ukrainian military members.
4.3 Cross Case Comparison
The cases of U.S. military assistance to Romania and Ukraine and their different
political development trajectories reveal significant context differences that must be
considered in advance by U.S. national security policy makers that intend to influence
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development outcomes. To begin, these states show how internal political dissent can
play a pivotal role in enabling or disabling potential outcomes from U.S. military
assistance. Both states began deliberate public military cooperation with the U.S. after
the Cold War with the Joint Contact Team Program and the State Partner Program in
1992 and 1993. They both were emerging from under the Soviet umbrella and began
receiving advice on civil military relations, democratic governance, military reform, and
had opportunities to send their officers to the United States to learn more about American
military institutional development. Additionally, both state governance structures are
categorized as semi-presidential republics.
However, the political context for each of the two countries differed in important
ways that have prevented forward progress in political development measurements that
inevitably affected that state’s security sector apparatus. At its core, a state’s security
sector apparatus must be deployed and sustained in a manner that follows a legitimate
constitutional structure by a government that reflects the will of the people. Romania and
Ukraine differed dramatically in the quality in which the government policies reflected
the will of the people. At the most fundamental level, the two states varied in the degree
to which there was a pre-established and legitimate national identity about which the
majority of the population agreed. Romania began its path into democracy united against
the tyranny represented by the Ceausescu government. It was popular will that brought
down that dictatorship and popular will that continues to sustain the Romanian
democracy going forward. By contrast, Ukraine emerged from under the Soviet Union at
a disadvantage because Russia and Ukraine were so closely tied. Ukraine did not inherit
its own army and had to create its own. Ukraine began with an aversion to military
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partnership, but it still hosted the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea. Though less than
20% of the population is considered to be ethnically Russian, a majority of official
business in Ukraine continued in the Russian language well after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union. Thus, through shared culture and the continued existence of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, Ukraine was tethered to Russia.
Second, the two states differed significantly in the degree to which the citizens of
that state agreed on military cooperation with the United States. Every Romanian leader
since the end of the Cold War has expressed a commitment toward a pro-Europe
orientation. This tendency even began during the Cold War under the Ceausescu regime
as it worked to establish independence from the Soviet Union. Romanian presidents have
uniformly committed to joining the NATO alliance and have enjoyed the support of their
population. Romanians have never protested to be removed from consideration for the
NATO alliance. Instead, they have protested to force the Romanian leadership to remove
the continued corruption within the public political institutions that were counter to the
entry requirements for admission to NATO. Thus, it has been in favor of U.S.
collaboration with Romania, as that state’s citizens agree with the entry requirement
goals set by NATO.
By contrast, Ukraine political development has suffered extensively from the
disagreement by its population on whether or not to have a pro-Europe/NATO or proRussia orientation. To a certain extent, the chronic poor economic situation has
exacerbated the tensions felt by the population over how to align externally. Ukraine has
never recovered the economic stability it had before the end of the Cold War. In 2016,
the CIA World Fact Book reported that the Gross Domestic Product per capita is $8,300,
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placing it 147th of 230 national economies measured. This level is in spite of the fact that
Ukraine is considered by the United Nations Human Development Index to have high
human development for life expectancy, education, and economic capacity. Clearly,
there is a management problem and Ukrainians are frustrated. Many Ukrainians are not
convinced that alignment with Europe will improve their situation. These divided
loyalties are reflected in the continued fighting in Crimea, where nearly 10,000 people
have died since 2014. Amnesty International has teams in the area that document
fighting by local civilians, local law enforcement, government officials, military
personnel on leave, and pro-Russian separatists who are not following a rule of law or
any laws of armed conflict on how to treat combatants.
Thus, there have been very different opportunities for U.S. military assistance to
successfully facilitate recipient state political development goals. When Romania
emerged from the Soviet Union, it immediately embraced a relationship with the United
States. Though it had habits of government corruption and Soviet era military
equipment, it had a persistent political will on the part of its population to make the
changes needed to advance the country forward politically in a manner that would benefit
both Romania as a state and towards its ability to contribute externally in multinational
security endeavors. By contrast, Ukraine has suffered from a fractured national identity
that makes both its own political development and its ability to collaborate in
multinational security efforts disadvantaged at best and impossible at worst.
The comparison of U.S. military assistance to Romania and Ukraine and its
associated relationship with recipient state political development yields useful insight for
policy planners. To begin, the Romanian state security sector apparatus retained
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legitimacy throughout the provision of U.S. military assistance. By contrast, the
Ukrainian state security sector apparatus exhibited evidence of progressively worsened
legitimacy in the eyes of the state population, particularly as the legitimacy of the state
diminished. Ukrainian state legitimacy suffered severe setbacks beginning with the
Orange Revolution and continuing with the loss of Crimea and the civil conflict in
western Ukraine. Both states suffered from a lack of security sector apparatus
effectiveness as aging Soviet era technology needed to be replaced. However, the
relative legitimacy of the Romanian state as compared to embattled Ukraine made the
environment for contribution of U.S. military assistance more conducive for productive
improvement of the state security sector.
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CHAPTER V – UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND AND LATIN AMERICA
The second set of case studies is located in the region of the world designated by
U.S. policymakers as U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). This command was
established in 1963 and covers 34 countries in Central and South America, a region
academically known as Latin America. As a fellow occupant of the Western
Hemisphere, Latin America is the closest major geographic region to the United States.
The U.S. State Department has a range of policy priorities for engaging with Latin
America. These focus areas are: 1) Peacekeeping, 2) Maritime Security and
Transnational Threats, 3) Border Security and Transnational Threats, 4) Adherence to
Norms of Human Rights, 5) Military Professionalization, 6) Institutional and Security
Sector Reform, 7) Strategic Bilateral and Regional Relations, and 8) Civilian Control of
the Military. For more than 50 years, the predominant security challenges in Latin
America have been associated with illicit trafficking and organized crime. The high
level of violence associated with these security challenges has a complex interconnection
with U.S. security, particularly since the bulk of narcotics demand is from the United
States. In the early years of USSOUTHCOM, the mission involved defending the Panama
Canal, contingency planning for Cold War activities, and the administration of U.S.
military assistance programs in the region. These military assistance programs included
civic-action projects with partner nation personnel to accelerate regional development.
The end of the Cold War brought a number of expanded missions such as counter-drug
operations and humanitarian assistance.
U.S. defense policy recognizes the comprehensive nature of the security
challenges in the region, as reflected in the vision statement of USSOUTHCOM.
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According to the USSOUTHCOM web site, “the vision of the command is that it is a
joint military command supporting U.S. national security objectives throughout the
Western Hemisphere in cooperation with domestic and international partners, in order to
foster security, ensure stability, and promote prosperity throughout Central and South
America, the Caribbean and the global community. The priorities for USSOUTHCOM
are: 1) Countering Transnational Organized Crime, 2) Counterterrorism, 3) Building
Partner Capacity, 4) Contingency Response, and 5) Detainee Operations.” In his 2017
Posture Statement, USSOUTHCOM Commander Admiral Kidd declared that
transregional and transnational threats are the principal threat to regional security and
stability, with networks that operate unconstrained by legal and geographic boundaries,
unimpeded by morality, and fueled by enormous profits. He describes organizations that
are globally integrated enterprises with worldwide reach and profit margins that rival the
largest companies in the U.S. economy. According to a study by the Organization of
American States published in 2013, the United States alone is responsible for 47% of the
global retail revenues for illicit narcotics that are estimated to be nearly $320 billion per
year. As a result, criminal organizations are relentless and sophisticated in their pursuit
of ways to benefit from the massive profit potential associated with the U.S. share of the
global market. There is potential for terrorist organizations to exploit the criminal
capabilities associated with illicit narcotics trafficking, so U.S. strategists have prioritized
efforts to improve the capability of partner nations in the region to investigate, interdict,
and dismantle the networks that could threaten the U.S.
The two countries selected for examples of the effects of U.S. military assistance
are Colombia and Honduras. Though both countries are still in fragile states of
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development, the delivery of military assistance and its associated effects are illustrative
of the conditions under which military assistance is more successful in its intended
objectives for the reduction of political development fragility.
5.1 Colombia

Figure 6 Map of Colombia
Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Fact book,
2017
5.1.1 Orientation
Colombia has existed in its current form since 1830, when Gran Colombia broke
up into Venezuela, Equador, and present day Colombia. It borders the Caribbean Sea,
Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, the Pacific Ocean, and Panama. The United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division estimates that the
population of Colombia is just over 48 million people, placing it in the top 25% of most
populated states in the world. The official language is Spanish. Nearly 80% of the
population has identified Catholicism as their religion.
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Colombia is a middle-income country and one of the oldest democracies in Latin
America. It was rated by the 2016 U.N. Human Development Report as 95th of 188
states assessed, with a Gross National Income Per Capita of $12,762 and listed in the
High Human Development category for life expectancy, education, and economic
capacity. Life expectancy is 74.2. Expected years of schooling is 13.6, with a mean
years of schooling as 7.6. Adult literacy rate is 94.7 % of the population over 15 years
old. Among Latin American countries, Colombia has a relatively high state of human
development. Within Latin America, the only other country categorized by the United
Nations as having very high human development is Chile, which is ranked as 42nd of 188
nations.
5.1.2 U.S. National Interest and Relationship with Colombia
The U.S. relationship with Colombia began in 1822, when diplomatic relations
were established following the independence of Colombia as a colony from Spain in 1810.
The relationship has grown beyond diplomatic engagement to the inclusion of substantial
foreign assistance. According to the U.S.A.I.D. 2015 Green Book, between 1946 and 2015,
the U.S. appropriated $14.168 Billion in economic and military assistance for Colombia.
Engagement between the two countries was energized beginning in the 1970s when
U.S. President Richard Nixon coined the phrase “war on drugs” to combat an alarming
growth of illegal narcotics entering the United States. Initially, the U.S. response to the
problem was to increase law enforcement in the United States and to dedicate resources to
interdict the substances before they entered the United States. The types of illegal
substances grew from marijuana to cocaine and heroin. As the U.S. demand for these
substances grew, traffickers took extreme measures to maintain control of what became a
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multi-billion dollar market. By the mid-1980s, the U.S. began using military resources to
intercept small aircraft and boats used by the Colombian narcotraffickers to transport the
illegal goods. By the mid-1990s, 90 percent of the cocaine and about 50 percent of the
heroin came to the United States from Colombia, so curbing the trafficking opportunity
became a top U.S. national security interest (Frechette, 2007).

Cocaine and heroin

trafficking was so profitable that two major cartels, the Cali, and then the Medellin, grew
as criminal enterprises to serve the demand that emanated primarily from the United States.
Through deliberate engagement, security cooperation between the U.S. and Colombia
strengthened beginning in the mid-1990s during Colombian president Samper’s term in
office from 1994-1998 and continued to expand during each succeeding Colombian
president’s terms. According to former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia (1994-1997) Myles
Frechette, U.S.-Colombia cooperation at the ministerial level, particularly with the Armed
Forces and the National Police, strengthened to such a level that the combined capability
successfully brought down several Cali cartel kingpins in 1995 (Frechette, 2007, p. 10).
In 1998, the stage was set for negotiation of the program of U.S. support to Colombia
known as Plan Colombia. The intent of this plan was to assist Colombia in reestablishing
government control over more of its territory to combat drug trafficking, terrorist activities,
and reduce poverty (Beittel, 2012). Between 2002 and 2012, the US Congress appropriated
more than $8B in assistance to carry out this plan (Beittel, 2012).
One challenge to the U.S. provision of military assistance to Colombia was the
acknowledged historic widespread commission of human rights violations by the
Colombian security sector apparatus against both combatants and civilians at the locations
of conflict. These violations gained the interest of the International Non-Government
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Organization Amnesty International, which published a report in 1996 to describe a
deepening human rights crisis in Colombia. According to this report, at least 2500 people
were victims of politically motivated killings in 1995 alone. Torture was widespread and
more than 150 people “disappeared.” The report alleged that the vast majority of the
victims continued to be non-combatant civilians targeted for their real or perceived political
allegiances. The report claimed that tens of thousands of people were internally displaced
from their homes, swelling the ranks of the estimated 600,000 displaced by political
violence between 1986 and 1996 (Amnesty International, AMR 23/02/96).

To further

complicate the discovery of these violations, Amnesty International also found evidence
that human rights violations by the Colombian military were committed while using
weapons provided by the United States (Amnesty International, 2004).

This information

was provided to U.S. policymakers as the U.S. was expanding its assistance to the
Colombian military and its National Police in order to combat drug trafficking to raise a
flag on the risks of providing unrestricted military aid. Consequently, U.S. Senator Patrick
Leahy introduced legislation in 1997 to prevent units found to be in the commission of
human rights violations from receiving U.S. aid. This stipulation was added to the Plan
Colombia assistance package when it began in 2000.
In 2010, U.S. policy evolved from the original strategy for Plan Colombia to better
serve the government of Colombia’s efforts to reestablish control over more of its territory.
The updated policy was designated the Colombian Strategic Development Initiative
(CDSI) and it included assistance to combat not just drug trafficking, but also to address
root causes of poverty and potential nexus opportunities for terrorists in the region. These
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efforts dovetailed with Colombia’s National Consolidation Plan (PNC), as evidenced by
the public announcements below:
“The U.S. government supports Colombian efforts to transition from conflict towards
peace by working in the most conflictive and neglected rural areas of Colombia, where
violence, the lack of government presence, and the absence of licit economic
opportunities have historically converged” (U.S. Embassy in Colombia public web
site, 2 January 2018).
“U.S. programs support the government of Colombia’s efforts to strengthen its
democratic institutions, promote respect for human rights and the rule of law, foster
socio-economic development, address immediate humanitarian needs, and end the
threats to democracy posed by narcotics trafficking and terrorism.” (U.S. Embassy in
Colombia public web site, 2 January 2018).
A result of this focus is that U.S. programs provide support for reintegration of excombatants, promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law.
The Colombian government affirms that the impact by Plan Colombia has been
successful in meeting its goals. According to the Colombian diplomatic mission to the
United States, “From every perspective, Plan Colombia has been a joint success.”
Colombia attributes improvements in its military and police force professionalization,
increased capacity in its public sector, and stronger democratic institutions to its “balanced
alliance” between itself and the United States in which the long-standing relationship is
built on “mutual respect, cooperation, and common goals.” (Colombia Embassy to the
United States public web site, accessed 20 March 2018).
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Perception of this successful trajectory was echoed by the 2011 U.S. State
Department Fact Sheet on the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CDSI), which
reports that under this strategy the estimated cocaine production potential in Colombia was
reduced from 700 metric tons in 2001 to 270 in 2009, a 61 percent decrease. This reduction,
however, has not been sustainable. In 2016, exports of cocaine destined for the United
States market were estimated to exceed 900 metric tons, the highest level ever recorded
(Beittel, 2017).

This increase has been recognized by the U.S. Southern Command

(SOUTHCOM) Commander in his 2017 annual posture statement to the U.S. Congress.
5.1.3 Political Order
5.1.3.1 Executive Government
5.1.3.1.1 Structure
Colombia is considered to be a presidential republic. It received independence
from Spain in 1810, but has existed as the Republic of Colombia since 1886. Its first
Constitution was published in 1886. Since the creation of the Republic of Colombia,
there have been three branches of the Colombian government, the Executive, the
Legislative, and the Judicial, but the preference from the start was for a strong executive
branch. At the beginning of the Republic of Colombia, the executive had control over
160 state enterprises, including the banking sector, electricity, and petroleum
(Constitutionnet, 2018). However, this system of far reaching and uncompromising
control did not stand unchallenged for very long. In 1917 a period of violence known as
‘La Violencia’ began and lasted for forty years through 1957 when an amendment was
adopted to create a more inclusive government and formally end the fighting. The
amendment was designed to create mandatory bipartisanship in the government by
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rotating the office of the president between the two major political parties and mandating
equal numbers of delegates for the two parties in the Congress. This amendment created
a system known as the Frente Nacional (National Front). It remained in effect until 1986,
when it was dissolved. A consequence of the system was the creation of a rigid
bipartisanship that excluded anyone who was not a liberal or a conservative, or more
specifically, a wealthy landowner. The 1886 constitution remained in force until it was
superseded by a major overhaul in 1991. The new constitution came about in order to
modernize the political institutions to encourage greater participation in the democratic
process, strengthen the rule of law in order to diffuse political violence, and to secure
human rights by establishing mechanisms for the protection of these rights
(Constitutionnet, 2018). The 1991 Constitution has been amended several times. The
legislative branch is bicameral. It consists of a Senate and a Chamber of Representatives.
Senators and representatives are elected for four-year terms.

The President of Colombia

is both the head of government and the head of state. The president is directly elected by
absolute majority vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 4 year term. Beginning in 2018,
Colombian presidents may only serve one term.
5.1.3.1.2 Leadership
Colombia has had 29 presidents since 1886. Since 1991, there have been five
presidents. Cesar Gaviria presided over approval of the constitution that was adopted in
1991. Full implementation of the new constitution was a gradual process. In 1994,
Ernesto Samper was elected following his promise to the voters to reduce political
violence and improve respect for human rights among government internal and external
security forces. In 1998, Andres Pastrana was elected. His presidency was distinguished
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by the expansion of cooperation with the United States and the creation of Plan Colombia
in 2001. In 2002, independent candidate Alvaro Uribe was elected following his
assurances to the voters that he would take a hard line against the paramilitaries and
restore government control in territories dominated by the guerillas. Evidence of Uribe’s
actions is reported by Amnesty International:
“To take immediate decisive action against the FARC, three days after assuming
office, on 11 August 2002, President Uribe declared a “State of Internal
Commotion” and on 9 September 2002 issued Decree 2002 to begin the dramatic
transformation of the Colombian security structure. His declaration of these
conditions granted significant additional powers to the military, including the
right to restrict freedom of movement and residence, prevent radio and television
from transmitting “sensitive” information, restrict meetings and demonstrations,
intercept communications subject to judicial authorization, and carry out
preventive detentions without judicial order. On 25 November 2002, the
Colombian Constitutional Court declared that parts of the Decree
unconstitutional and on 29 April 2003, the state of emergency and the decree
were revoked. The government followed with legislation to grant judicial police
powers to the armed forces that would allow them to detain, search homes, and
intercept communications without judicial authorization. The bill was approved
by the Colombian Congress on 10 December 2003. It has since been revised
several times.” (Amnesty International, 2004).
President Uribe served for two four-year terms and made significant strides in
reversing Colombia’s security decline, earning him high levels of popular support among
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Colombian citizens and bolstering the level of collaboration between the United States
and Colombia. Former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Miles Frechette (2007) asserts that
Uribe’s leadership ushered in the greatest level of counterdrug cooperation ever achieved
between the two countries.

Uribe also implemented a “democratic security” policy to

combine counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts to more decisively assert state
control over the entire Colombian national territory. This policy called on a network of
more than one million civilian collaborators and informants who would be paid to
provide information about insurgents. Additionally, the policy initiated the creation of
community based militias for self-protection. Furthermore, Uribe began a transformation
of the authorities of the military to give them a range of police powers. Uribe was the
first Colombian president to be reelected after his first term by direct vote since 1892,
gaining support from over 62% of voters.
In 2010, Juan Manuel Santos was elected to the Colombian presidency with the
continuing mandate from the electorate to achieve peace. Beginning in 2012, the Santos
Administration engaged in intense, formal peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), recognized as the largest of Colombia’s rebel groups. In
November 2016, a peace accord was approved by the Colombian congress. Negotiations
began with the second largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), in
February 2017. As of August, 2018, there is still no bilateral agreement on ceasefire
consensus protocols.
Colombians elected a new congress in March 2018 and a new president in June
2018. The new president is Ivan Duque, who assumed office on August 7, 2018. He is
considered to be a popular far-right politician. During this election, voters moved beyond
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an overriding focus on peace at all costs as the key electoral issue. Instead, polls taken in
the year leading up to the elections revealed that corruption, citizen security, health care,
unemployment, poverty, and, increasingly, concerns about a growing flood of refugees
from the neighboring conflict in Venezuela were bigger concerns (CRS, 12 July 2018).
Colombians are demanding greater responsiveness from their government in the
provision of public services.
5.1.3.1.3 Culture
Despite a persistent internal conflict that many analysts categorize as one of the
longest running civil wars in the world, Colombia has a history of preference for
democratic political norms dating back to when it received independence from Spain in
1819. The first evidence of attempts at representative governance emerged in the late
19th century when Colombia began proceedings to create and implement a Constitution, a
concept that was not well known across other Latin American countries. However, it was
not until the late 1960s that Colombia became known as one of the first Latin American
countries to be considered a liberal democracy. At that time, the other two Latin
American states regarded as democracies were Costa Rica and Venezuela.
The process of creating an inclusive political order in Colombia has been painful
for its citizens. A summary of the nature of the accompanying dissent and conflict as
Colombia has developed politically is addressed in section 5.1.5.
5.1.3.2 Security Sector Apparatus
5.1.3.2.1 Structure
Colombia has both a separate military and a National Police. The Colombian
National Police Force was created in 1891. From the beginning, the National Police had
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a political element. According to GlobalSecurity.org, the national police acted as a
Liberal counterbalance to the Conservative dominant influence within the Colombian
military. The National Police was administratively under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Government until the 1950s, when it was moved under the Ministry of National
Defense. In 1962, the National Police gained administrative and operational control over
the separate police forces that had been maintained in Colombia’s 32 administrative
departments. The Colombian National Police handles basic law enforcement, but its
major responsibilities span from handling common crime to narcotics interdiction, some
counterinsurgency work, participation in civic action in rural areas, and riot control in the
country’s urban centers (GlobalSecurity.org, 2018).
The Ministry of Defense is responsible for both internal security and external
defense, so it oversees the armed forces and the National Police. In 1999, the
Administrative Department of Security (DAS), reported directly to the president, but was
directed by a law enforcement professional (US Department of State Human Rights
Report, 1999). Since its inception, the DAS had broad intelligence gathering, law
enforcement, and investigative authority. The transition of the direct control of the DAS
from the president to the Minister of Defense occurred between 1999 and 2003. In 2003,
the security force apparatus consisted of armed state law enforcement, investigative and
military authorities, including the National Police, Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines,
Coast Guard, the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), and the Prosecutor
General’s Technical Corps of Investigators. The DAS existed under the Ministry of
Defense until 2012, when it was eliminated by President Santos.
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According to Non-Government Organization Providing for Peacekeeping, the
Colombia armed forces is the 16th largest in the world. Colombia spends 3.6% of its
GDP on defense, which, by total dollar equivalent value is ranked as 22nd in the world.
Colombia maintains a separate army, navy and air force.
5.1.3.2.2 Leadership
Leadership of the Colombian security sector has been a function of both formal
appointment and cultural preference. Between the creation of the National Front in 1957
that ended La Violencia and the new constitution in 1991, the Colombian defense
minister was appointed from among the general officers in the army.
5.1.3.2.3 Culture
Former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Myles Frechette (2007) asserts that the
history of military coups directly contributed to the preference by Colombian elites to
maintain a small, and therefore weak, military. Colombia’s armed forces seized power
from civilians three times in the nation’s history: in 1830, 1854, and 1953 (Hanratty and
Meditz, 1988).

The coup in 1953 began a period of military rule that lasted until 1958,

when the Liberal and Conservative parties agreed to a form of coalition government,
known as the National Front.
Ospina Ovalle (2011) argues that the internal struggle in Colombia has been the
most important issue facing policymakers during the last few decades. As a result, the
fighting has required continuous involvement by the Colombian armed forces. Ospina
Ovalle (2011) asserts that the level of violence has required that the mission of the armed
forces be expanded to not only include counterinsurgency and nation building, but to be
first responders to major natural emergencies and disasters.
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This runs counter to the Cold War years when military officers in Latin America
became dictators and de facto rulers. Ospina Ovalle (2011) argues that such practices have
been replaced by democracies willing to strengthen civilian control and development of
civil society. In particular, he asserts that political control over militaries has tightened.
5.1.4 Legitimacy of the Security Sector Apparatus
The legitimacy of the Colombian military has ebbed and flowed for a variety of
reasons. At the beginning of the period known as La Violencia in Colombia, the military
role was expanded to include a greater role in public order. Unfortunately, there was a
praetorian element to these changes as the ruling Conservative party increasingly used the
military to strike out against its Liberal enemies (Aviles, 2001). The armed forces were
used in a counterinsurgency model specifically to undermine effective challenges to the
National Front, which amplified the acrimony in the partisanship that defined this period
of governance in Colombia.
Colombian security sector leaders have struggled to overcome the accusations of
widespread human rights abuses, particularly since the extent of alleged abuses became
very public in the late 1990s. At that time, the U.S. was negotiating Plan Colombia with
the Colombian government to make progress in reducing narcotrafficking. By 2004,
International Non-Government Organization Amnesty International published an
extensive report on alleged abuses committed in the Colombian department of Arauca.
The intent was to investigate human rights controversies dating to 1998. Not only was
the existence of human rights abuses by security sector apparatus forces exposed, but the
use of weapons supplied by the United States was also publicized. In particular, the
report delved into a 1998 incident in Santo Domingo in which 17 civilians, including six
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children, were killed after a U.S. funded helicopter piloted by the Colombian Air Force
bombed the village of Santo Domingo using U.S. munitions. According to the report, the
Colombian Air Force unit had been receiving U.S. assistance for a decade. Evidence
from the incident was reviewed by both Colombian experts and the U.S. Federal Bureau
of Investigation to confirm that U.S. made munitions were present. Reports of this nature
have required the Colombian government to take extra measures to prove that it is
educating its force on proper law enforcement and in holding violators accountable. It
also prompted a closer scrutiny by the U.S. government into the practices of state security
sector forces of recipients of U.S. munitions assistance. A result of this scrutiny was the
introduction by U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy in the late 1990s of legislation requiring
official review of the human rights records of states receiving U.S. military assistance.
The international community also was energized to focus attention on the nature of
human rights abuses in Colombia. On April 6th,1997, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights opened an office in Bogota, Colombia, to officially
monitor the progress of respect for human rights and to press the government for change.
Experts from this office traveled throughout Colombia to document abuses and to hold
regular meetings with government officials, representatives of human rights groups, and
with Colombians wishing to deliver complaints. Within the year, the group submitted its
first report to the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights with the conclusion that there
was abundant evidence in Colombia of continued joint military and paramilitary actions
that ended with human rights violations as well as a disregard for the laws of war by all
parties to the conflict. During her visit to Colombia in late 1998, High Commissioner Mary
Robinson spoke out forcefully in defense of human rights defenders and against the
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impunity for officers that continued to reign in the tribunals run by the military (Human
Rights Watch World Report 1999: Colombia: The Role of the International Community).
A consequence of the increasing violence, retribution, and impunity in Colombia
was a severe lack of respect for human rights among fighters on all sides. One particularly
well known case of an abuse of human rights was associated with the 20th Brigade, an
Army intelligence unit that had been directly connected to the murder of Conservative
Party opposition leader Alvaro Gomez Hurtado and his assistant. In May 1998, the
Colombian army formally disbanded the 20th Brigade, which had a human rights record
that included the targeted killing of civilians (U.S. Department of State, Colombia Country
Report on Human Rights, 1999). During 1999, the military judiciary convicted and
sentenced 130 members of the National Police, Army and Navy for possible human rights
violations (U.S. Department of State, Colombia Country Report on Human Rights, 1999).
5.1.5 Character of the Political Dissent
Colombia has experienced more than half a century of conflict with illegal armed
groups that represent a range of grievances, capacities, and objectives. As has been the
case with many other developing economies, Colombia’s transformation from a primarily
agrarian economy to the opportunities available through the industrial revolution was
painful. This transition was reflected in the demands from workers that had relied on
livelihoods from large commercial farms. Evidence of this turmoil became most prominent
in the Liberal Party agenda in the 1930s. However, the movement became particularly
volatile when its champion was assassinated in 1948, setting off the period known as La
Violencia. Between 1946 and 1965, some 180,000 Colombians died in the battle between
the Liberals and the Conservatives. Though the intensity of the fighting tapered down after
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1965, the violence continued as the government was unable to stop the culture of retribution
and posturing by opposing groups. As a result of the increased violence and persistent
guerilla warfare in the late 1960s and well into the 1970s, the government of Colombia
began to prioritize internal order as a mission for its armed forces.
Retired Colombian General Carlos Ospina Ovalle (2011) asserts that for many
years the main characteristic of the Colombian environment was weakness of the state as
it was unable to control its own territory or provide good services to its citizens. As a
consequence, criminal behavior flourished, especially in the areas without government
presence. Ovalle (2011) argues that the most debilitating consequence of this lack of a rule
of law was that violence was increasingly the preferred method for achieving political gains
in the minds of local and national politicians.
The opportunity for unaccountable violence is a significant reason for the growth
in paramilitaries and self-defense groups in Colombia. The most well-known is the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), which was founded in 1964 and derived
from the partisan civil war between Colombia’s Liberal and Conservative political parties
during La Violencia. The membership grew from a few dozen Liberal and communist
guerillas to a height of nearly 18,000 revolutionary students and political activists in 1999
(Sanchez et al, 2005). As the FARC expanded in the late 1980s, it became a potent force
for highlighting social and economic inequalities in Colombian society. In addition to the
FARC, one other large leftist guerilla group grew within Colombian society to challenge
the government on the lack of social progress. This group was known as the Ejercito
Liberation Nacional (ELN), or National Liberation Army. It was formed about the same
time as the FARC, but as a Marxist-Leninist/Liberation Theology Movement. The ELN
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advocated for the establishment of a Christian and socialist regime that would address the
socioeconomic problems of chronic political corruption, unmitigated poverty, and lack of
political representation by a large segment of Colombian society.
Self-defense groups in Colombia were evident as early as the 1960s as a response
to the violence from the guerilla groups. Land owners organized collectively to counter
the unaccountable violence from the guerillas and narcotraffickers. The groups were
consolidated in a counterinsurgency campaign organization known as the United Self
Defense of Colombia. For the next three decades, the number of groups grew to include
more than 10,000 men scattered throughout Colombia (Sanchez et al, 2005).
As the Colombian government struggled to address the grievances levied by the
FARC and the ELN, both groups resorted to kidnapping, extortion, and other forms of
coercion to finance their operations. The government of Colombia did not have the
financial or manpower capacity to hold guerillas accountable or to prevent capture of entire
regions of Colombia. By the mid-1990s, the FARC and the ELN grew increasingly bold
in their attacks, even going so far as to attack Colombian military forces. Some observers
estimated as much as 40% of Colombian territory was controlled by the FARC forces and
that the state had no presence in 16% of Colombia’s municipalities (Beittel, 2015).
The growing strength and resolve of the paramilitaries led Colombian presidential
candidates to campaign on promises to the voters that they were best suited to address the
rampant violence. Cesar Gaviria, Ernesto Samper, Andres Pastrana, Alvaro Uribe, and
Juan Santos all professed a commitment to countering levels of violence. The most
significant effort came with President Pastrana’s negotiation of Plan Colombia with the
United States to gain billions in security cooperation resources. President Pastrana also
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negotiated with the FARC to begin a process of crop substitution with aid from the
government to offset the loss of profits that had been gained by the illicit drug cultivation.
He was the first Colombian president to officially recognize the social problems connected
to the extent of not just the drug war, but the severity of the paramilitary violence. Pastrana
opposed the U.S. policy preference for the use of herbicides to eliminate the drug crops,
but needed U.S. assistance however it could be provided.
The nature of political dissent transformed significantly in Colombia between 2003
and 2016. President Uribe began the difficult process of demobilizing the self-defense
forces in July 2003 when he negotiated a peace deal with the United Self Defense Forces
of Colombia (AUC). The terms of the deal included a full-scale demobilization of the
troops in exchange for conditional amnesties. The deal was known as the Justice and Peace
Law. The demobilization began in 2004 and lasted until August 2006. It is estimated that
more than 31,000 AUC members demobilized and turned in more than 17,000 weapons
(Beittel, 2015). President Uribe is credited with increasing the territorial reach of the state
security apparatus in a manner that helped remove the need for self-defense groups.

His

leadership was instrumental in pushing combat guerilla actions and large-scale
counterinsurgency away from the cities as the government became more capable in
securing the Colombian population. President Santos built on this momentum by making
the achievement of peace a central goal of his administration. As a result, between 2012
and 2016 the Colombian government engaged in formal peace talks with the FARC that
led to the approval of a peace accord in November 2016. The FARC was disarmed and a
Special Jurisdiction for Peace ratified, creating a transitional justice regime for judicial
proceedings against those who committed gross human rights violations and war crimes.
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The elements of the peace accord were approved by the Colombian Constitutional Court
with the requirement that they be implemented within 12 years after ratification.
5.1.6 Effectiveness of the Security Sector Apparatus
The Colombian Security Sector Apparatus experienced profound change in size,
strength and mission between 1995 and 2018. In the late 1990s, the Colombian armed
forces had suffered grievous defeats at the hands of the FARC. Between 1996 and 1998,
eight separate attacks on the armed forces were particularly destructive (Jones, 2009). To
highlight the extent of the lack of capacity in the fight against the narcotraffickers,
Colombian Defense Minister Rodrigo Lloreda met with U.S. defense secretary William
Cohen in 1998 to discuss the deficiencies in the Colombian military. During that meeting,
U.S. Secretary Cohen announced that the U.S. and Colombia were engaging in military
exchanges to help in promoting the modernization of the Colombian military to restructure
it by focusing on its mobility, its sustainability, its intelligence capabilities, and its
command and control (USIS Washington File, Transcript: Cohen and Lloreda on U.S.Colombia Agreement, 2 December 1998). During this meeting both Cohen and Lloreda
stressed that U.S. military assistance to Colombia was related to the fight against drug
trafficking and not to the Colombian government’s struggle against armed insurgent
groups. To increase its ability to fight the narcotraffickers and eradicate illicit crops,
Colombia requested help from the U.S. to create a special army unit that would fight
alongside the national police. Defense Minister Lloreda outlined during that meeting a few
of the deficiencies of the Colombian military in meeting its goals to fight the
narcotraffickers.

The modernization effort focused on technical skills, intelligence

capacities, and improving operations by increasing the professionalism of the Colombian
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combat units in problem areas and increasing mobility. Furthermore, the Colombian
military planned to add 15,000 soldiers to combat areas. Lloreda mentioned that as
Colombia increased its effectiveness against the narcotraffickers it would become more
effective in dealing with the insurgents because they derive support from the
narcotraffickers. He also iterated the full commitment of the Colombian armed forces and
police to respect human rights, but emphasized that paramilitary groups continued to
blatantly disregard human rights. He appreciated the opportunity for Colombian officers
to attend the U.S. School of the Americas to learn not only defense techniques, but to be
trained on the philosophy on respect for human rights.
The second cycle of violence began in the 1980s as the cocaine trafficking industry
gained greater momentum. This violence was concentrated more in the urban areas.
Sanchez et al (2005) assert that this cycle was not caused as much by inequality, poverty,
or intolerance, but by the previous activities of illegal armed groups. Instead, they attribute
the intensity of this violence to the efficiency, or lack thereof, of justice to the drug
traffickers and to the continued activities of the illegal armed groups. As a result of their
vulnerability, landowners organized self-defense paramilitaries that united in 1997 as a
right-wing self-defense force that came to be known as the United Self Defense Forces of
Colombia, or (AUC). The AUC became known for their horrific killings and gruesome
attacks that were intended to instill fear in individuals associated with the FARC or ELN.
However, the group was publicly disbanded in 2006 in response to an increasingly
organized government outreach effort through peace negotiations.
When the 21st century began, the Colombian security sector had clearly been at a
disadvantage, not only because of the strength and resolve of the paramilitaries, but because
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of the relative lack of adequately trained counterinsurgency resources.

Between the

FARC, the ELN, and the AUC, paramilitaries had grown in total numbers from less than a
few hundred in the 1980s to nearly 30,000 people in the early 2000s.

The Colombian

security sector did not have a monopoly over the use of violence in the late 1990s. The
country had devolved into a chaos of vigilantism as anyone threatened by an armed group
sought to find other means to protect themselves while the government was incapable.
In the mid-1990s, President Samper recognized that the threat from the
paramilitaries was growing. President Samper introduced measures to encourage “rural
security cooperatives” that would provide intelligence information to the security sector
forces in the region. These organizations, or Special Services of Vigilance and Private
Security, labeled CONVIVIR, were supported by regional economic and political elites
who viewed them as essential against the struggle against subversion (Aviles, 2001, p. 45).
Within the Samper administration, Defense Minister Fernando Botero, a landowner
himself, was the leading proponent for the creation of the private self-defense capabilities.
Unfortunately, Samper’s administration was tainted by accusations and actual indictments
of government officials colluding with the drug cartels. By the end of 1995, Attorney
General Alfonso Valdivieso Sarmiento and Defense Minister Botero had both been
indicted on charges of accepting campaign contributions from the drug cartels (Aviles,
2001).
By the end of the 20th century, the Colombian security situation became
increasingly precarious. By 1999, the extent of the ELN and the FARC was estimated at
between 11,000 and 17,000 full-time combatants in nearly 1,000 of the country’s 1,085
municipalities, which was an increase of 300 municipalities compared to the previous year
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(U.S. Department of State, Colombia Country Report on Human Rights, 1999). A result
of the increasing focus on Colombia’s inability to control the violence within its territory
in a professional manner was that President Pastrana deliberately built up both the
Colombian national police and the military, not just in size, but in training to be able to
conduct law enforcement in accordance with international human rights standards.
Between 1998 and 2002, the armed forces in Colombia grew by 60% to 132,000 (Beittel,
2015).
Up until 2002, the Colombian government had treated the growth of the
paramilitaries as separate from the drug trafficking problem.

President Pastrana’s

administration had tried and failed to negotiate with the FARC, even going so far as to
relinquish control of nearly one tenth of the country to the FARC. This effectively
abandoned more than 90,000 Colombian citizens who lived there. In turn, the guerillas
expelled judicial authorities and other government representatives and administered the
region in a ruthless and totalitarian manner, recklessly violating the human rights of the
inhabitants and killing those who defied them (Frechette, 2007). Furthermore, the guerillas
turned this demilitarized zone into a safe haven to strengthen their position vis a vis the
government by using it as a logistics base and staging area for armed action against the
state; a detention center for captured soldiers, police, and kidnapped civilians; and a place
to grow illegal crops, and refine and smuggle out narcotics (Frechette, 2007, p. 13). During
this time, the size of the FARC and its level of violence continued to grow.
When Alvaro Uribe was elected he campaigned on a promise to defeat the FARC
militarily. His democratic security strategy was designed to remove the threat by a more
active involvement by the threatened citizen communities. President Uribe offered direct
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payment to citizens who gave the government information on the combatants.
Unfortunately, each informer had his or her own political sub-context, which may have led
to the deaths of people of questionable guilt (Hanson and Romero Penna, 2014).
In 2003, the Colombian security apparatus launched an invasion against the FARC
called Plan Patriota. By the end of Uribe’s second term in August 2010, the Colombian
military grew to 283,000, the national police increased to 159,000, the government
reformed its military’s command and control structures, upgraded equipment, extensively
increased training, in concert with the funding infusion from the United States under Plan
Colombia (Beittel, 2015).
Violence indicators decreased in Colombia beginning after 2006. According to the
2017 Fund for Peace Fragile States Index, Colombia experienced consistent measurable
progress in reduction of its overall fragility since 2007. The Colombian Embassy to the
United States public web site echoes this positivity, asserting that by the end of 2011,
homicides in Colombia were the lowest in 20 years, kidnapping was down 90% from its
peak in 2002, and terrorist acts declined by 69% in that same period.
The effectiveness of the Colombian Security Apparatus grew substantially between
1998 and 2016. In early 2000s, the paramilitary groups were at the height of their levels
of destructiveness because the state was unable to gain a monopoly over the use of violence
within the Colombian territory. President Pastrana recognized the need to increase security
sector capacity, but was unable to move forward without external assistance. President
Uribe expanded the scope of the effort to counter the violence by introducing the concept
of “democratic security” by involving the Colombian citizenry in more actively
collaborating to identify criminals. By 2005, kidnappings were down by 51 percent and
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murders by 13 percent (Frechette, 2007, p. 15). These decreases in violence paved the way
for demobilization of the paramilitary groups. In April 2006, the Colombian government
announced that over 30,000 paramilitary members demobilized and surrendered. This
number was recognized as the largest demobilization in Colombian history and exceeded
the highest U.S. and Colombian government estimates of paramilitary group membership
(Frechette, 2007, p. 33).
The tide began to change for the Colombian government with the initiation of Plan
Colombia and its successor activities. This plan was revolutionary because there was a
deliberate recognition by policymakers beginning with the Uribe administration that the
state should actively produce security for its population (Heilbig and Lasconjarias, 2017,
p. 6). This approach was codified in the Defense and Democratic Security Policy (Politica
de Defensa y Seguridad Democratica) aimed at unifying all different actors in a holistic
and comprehensive manner under a single “Integral Action Command,” combining all
political, economic, social and military dimensions, with a clear focus on producing
sustainable security as the first step to implement confidence measures (Heilbig and
Lasconjarias, 2017, p. 6). This was an important demonstration of political will by the
people of Colombia to address the internal security problem. Policymakers took steps to
arm and empower the armed forces and the police to regain lost territory while enabling
the safe return of governmental institutions. This process enabled return of law-abiding
citizens to the economic fabric of society, which decreased the survivalist need for
violence.

While not free from violence, the Colombian government made significant

strides in overcoming security threats while addressing the root causes of the economic
fragility that fostered the violence. Criminality steadily decreased: kidnappings declined
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by 92% since 2000, the homicide rate decreased from 381 to 24.4 per 100,000, reaching its
lowest since 1974, and the FARC is no longer considered by policymakers to be an
existential threat to the Colombian people (Helbig and Lasconjarias, 2017). In 2002-2003,
nearly 60% of the country was plagued by criminal violence. That percentage decreased
to close to 10% in 2017.
Evidence of the recent increase in Colombian security sector apparatus
effectiveness is in the increase in ability to interdict illegal narcotics. Beittel (2017) asserts
that Colombian interdiction practices are deemed some of the most effective in the world.
The graph below shows the increase in effectiveness for cocaine seizures. The Colombian
government reported seizing more than 207 metric tons (mt) of cocaine base in 2014 and a
record 362 mt in 2016 (see figure 7)

Figure 7 Colombia Potential Cocaine Production & Seizures, 2006-2016
Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy
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The figure above shows that interdiction capabilities had been increasing in 2006 and 2007,
but decreased significantly from 2008 to 2012 before beginning another cycle of
continuous improvement.
Heibig and Lasconjarias (2017) assert that the armed forces of Colombia have taken
on an important role in the country, are deeply connected to society, and are respected for
improving the security situation after more than 60 years of unrelenting internal violence.
5.1.7 Specific U.S. Military Assistance
The United States has provided military assistance to Colombia consistently since
1946. The extent of the support grew exponentially as Colombia became a major player
in illegal drug trafficking beginning in the 1980s. As the two countries joined forces, the
Medellin and Cali cartels were dismantled and hundreds of drug kingpins were extradited
to the United States. Despite these efforts, by 1999, Colombia was identified as the source
of most of the cocaine and much of the heroine consumed in the United States. According
to the U.S. State Department Foreign Military Training Record for 1999 and 2000,
Colombia was the focus of much of the U.S. government’s international drug effort and
the largest share of the training provided to the Colombian military was in direct support
of the U.S. counterdrug strategy.

Examples of the counterdrug training in Colombia

include a variety of U.S. Marine Corps and Special Operations Forces (SOF) efforts
focused on aircrew training, Colombian Marine riverine training and light infantry training
of Colombian police and military units.
Additionally, the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program added to the counternarcotics training effort by providing funding for Colombian
security force members to attend a variety of mutually beneficial courses that would
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increase not only Colombian security force professionalism, but increase understanding on
defense cooperation between the U.S. and Colombia. These courses were taught at the
Center for Hemispheric Defense in Washington D.C. and a variety of other schools within
the U.S. According to the U.S. Department of State Foreign Military Training Web Site
summary of training in 1999 and 2000, the courses included a strong emphasis on human
rights and democratic sustainment. The IMET courses also provided technical training for
Non-Commissioned and Field Grade Officers, as well as training in maintenance, logistics,
and resources management. The intent was to assist the Colombian military by increasing
its abilities to better care for and maintain U.S provided equipment in a manner that would
increase Colombia’s overarching ability to pursue its counterdrug efforts.
The majority of the U.S. funding began in the year 2000. However, as it became
clearer that the counternarcotics effort and the insurgency were deeply intertwined, in 2002
the U.S. Congress granted the State Department and the Defense Department flexibility to
use U.S. counterdrug funding for countering terrorist activities associated with the
insurgency (Beittel, 2015). A key part of Plan Colombia was to improve the mobility of
both the armed forces and the national police by providing helicopters and other aircraft.
Under Plan Colombia from the year 2000 through 2008, the U.S. provided assistance in
training, logistics, planning support and intelligence, rule of law and human rights,
alternative development efforts, assistance to internally displaced persons and refugees,
and the demobilization of illegally armed groups.
Funding for Plan Colombia declined since 2008 due to Colombia’s increasing
ability to control its own security challenges. The strategy that followed Plan Colombia
was known as the National Consolidation Plan and was formally launched in Colombia in
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2009. The intent of this plan was to take a whole of government approach that would
integrate security, development and counternarcotics efforts by consolidating state
presence in previously ungoverned or weakly governed areas. Crucially, the PNC aimed
to re-establish state control and legitimacy in strategic “consolidation zones” where illegal
groups operated through a phased approach to the holistic security and development nature
of the problem. The U.S. government began coordinating most of its assistance to the
Colombian government’s consolidation programs under a multi-agency effort called the
Colombian Strategic Development Initiative (CDSI).
In recognition of the prevalence of landmines, improvised explosive devices, and
unexploded ordnance from decades of continuous conflict in 31 of Colombia’s 32
departments, U.S. Southern Command collaborated with other elements of the U.S.
government to provide a Humanitarian Mine Action program. Under this program, U.S.
military personnel provide ‘train-the-trainer’ courses to instructors at the Colombian
military’s International Demining Training Center (CIDES), helping meet the Colombian
government’s goal by training 41 Army Platoons and 5 Marine Platoons (U.S.
SOUTHCOM Posture Statement 2017). Partners in this effort include the U.S. State
Department, the European Union, and twenty additional countries as part of the Global
Demining Initiative for Colombia. The intent of this action is to spare thousands of
additional victims, facilitate land restitution and resettlement of internally displaced
persons, and help lay a foundation for rural economic opportunity that will facilitate long
term peace.
In his 2017 U.S. Southern Command Posture Statement to the U.S. Congress,
Admiral Kurt W. Tidd asserted that U.S. military assistance is assisting Colombians to
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contain the threat posed by the National Liberation Army and criminal networks working
to take over the lucrative global cocaine market. This market derives considerable strength
from the still strong coca cultivation and production in the Andean region. U.S. military
assistance is providing training, equipment, and sustainment capacities to key specialized
units. U.S. military assistance is leveraging the U.S. Colombia Action Plan for Regional
Security (USCAP) to synchronize the delivery of counter-network capacity building efforts
to confront the effects of transnational criminal networks and drug trafficking in the region.
This program is intended to deepen the partnership between USSOUTHCOM, the State
Department, the Colombian Ministry of Defense, and the six Central American and
Caribbean recipient countries to improve interoperability against criminal networks.
Prior to 2002, the largest part of the training provided by the United States to the
Colombian military was in direct support of the U.S. counterdrug strategy. Since then,
U.S. training has broadened to reflect U.S. support to assist the Colombian military in its
unified campaign against narcotics traffickers and designated terrorist groups. These
programs dovetail with the provision of equipment acquisitions that support operational
requirements of the consolidation phase of Plan Colombia.
In 2007, through Section 1004 funding, the U.S. provided training for aviation
aircrew and aircraft repair training, maintenance of patrol craft, and light infantry training
of Colombian police and military. Section 1004 is specifically allocated to support drug
eradication and interdiction efforts. As a result of the establishment the 1004 funding,
extensive sustainment training occurred, as did increased support for training of aircraft
mechanics, crew and pilots for the assets provided to the Government of Colombia for
Counternarcotics and Counterterrorism programs (U.S. Department of State Foreign
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Military Training Annual Report for Colombia 2008). U.S. military assistance supported
the establishment of the Colombian Urban Antiterrorism Special Forces Group, a joint unit
comprised of personnel and equipment from all of Colombia’s military services that are
specifically dedicated for the state’s Counterterrorism program.
Evidence collected since the addition of the Leahy legislation to increase human rights
vetting of units receiving U.S. military assistance shows that Colombia has taken
significant strides to mitigate and minimize instances of human rights violations. U.S.
Embassy Bogota reportedly conducts more vetting than any other country, averaging
between 30,000 and 35,000 individuals and 1,400 security force units a year (Serafino,
2014). Former Ambassador Frechette asserts that beginning in President Pastrana’s term
from 1998-2002 while the U.S. Plan Colombia was initiated, human rights violations
among Colombian security forces began to diminish noticeably.
5.1.8 Colombia Foreign Policy
As the effectiveness of its security sector increased, Colombia made strides to
provide security cooperation advice and assets to its Central and South American
neighbors. Since 2007, Colombia has trained approximately 6,000 Mexican police and
judicial officials, along with similar assistance to Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica,
Panama, Paraguay, and Peru (U.S. Department of State, CDSI Fact Sheet, 2011).
Additionally, Colombia provided important medical and humanitarian relief to Haiti in the
aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake. The assistance included supplies, transport
services, and search and rescue teams.
Colombia has also sent resources in support of global security objectives. In June
of 2013, Colombia and NATO entered into an “Agreement on the Security of Information”
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that was signed between then NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander
Vershbow and Colombia’s Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon (Helbig and Lasconjarias,
2017). Ambassador Vershbow complimented Colombia by remarking that “Colombia’s
expertise in enhancing integrity in the military is precisely the kind of substantive
contribution that exemplifies the added value of cooperation” (Helbig and Lasconjarias,
2017). On the 19th of May, 2017, the NATO public web site announced that “NATO and
Colombia have concluded a partnership agreement with a view to strengthening dialogue
and cooperation to address shared security challenges. Despite geographical distance,
cooperation has been developing progressively since 2013 in a number of areas including
military education and training, maritime security, good governance, and building
integrity.”
NATO researchers Helbig and Lascojarias (2017) assert that “while curbing
insurgencies and making substantial progress in the war on drugs, Colombia has become,
over the past decades, a producer of security and a true regional security provider.” The
authors cite the Colombian contribution to the Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH) and Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNAMISIL) as prime
examples of Colombia’s commitment and capacity.

These efforts dovetail with

Colombia’s contribution of over 2,400 police and military personnel to train forces in sixty
nations, mostly with the support of the U.S. (Helbig and Lasconjarias, 2017, p. 4).
The U.S. Embassy to Colombia public web site in 2018 declares, “Thanks to
Colombia’s success in combatting crime and establishing the rule of law throughout its
territory, the nation is able to share its experience and technical expertise with other
countries that are being threatened by transnational organized crime.”
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5.1.9 Conclusion
U.S. military assistance in Colombia is a successful example of the context
conditions under which political development fragility of the security sector apparatus
was reduced. The state had been struggling to recover from a deadly civil war that lasted
more than 60 years between the Colombian government and the rural populations. In
regions where poverty was extensive and the population felt underserved by the
government, the growth of cocaine cultivation was fast, profitable, and deeply
destabilizing. When the U.S. first committed military resources in the 1980s, the main
reason was to counter the narco-trafficking dynamic that threatened the United States.
However, as the conflict wore on, it became obvious that there could be no resolution of
the problem without addressing the underlying internal political tensions. By the late
1990s, U.S. policymakers negotiated Plan Colombia with the Colombian government to
address the institutional concerns that threatened the Colombian security sector. A
priority for this policy was to identify the deficiencies in public services that threatened
internal security. As the Colombian government took steps to provide services across the
population and to improve the human rights records of the police and armed forces, the
threat from the narco traffickers began to recede because the population was less likely to
tolerate or resort to self-defense against narco trafficking activity. The most visible rebel
group in Colombia has been the FARC. Colombia has pursued a path of political
negotiation with the FARC by creating forums for airing of grievances. The plan
proceeded with some success as the active numbers of FARC members have diminished,
but the level of violence seen in Colombia has not been reduced to manageable levels.
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Between 2006 and 2015, the fragility level of the security sector in Colombia
decreased from 9 to 7.3 on the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index. A rating of 9 means
that “private militias are challenging the state or key security forces are personally loyal to
the dictator bypassing the regular armed forces.” Reduction to a rating of 7.3 means that
“security in some parts of the country is in the hands of a party other than the state that
rules without excessive use of force or praetorian guard has some independent influence.”

Table 8 Evidence of Legitimacy of the State in Colombia
Strong

General

Ambiguous

General lack

Adherence Adherence

of adherence

Strong lack
of adherence

________________________________________________________________________
Confidence in Political Process

X

Political Opposition

X

Transparency

X

Openness & Fairness of Political Process

X

Political Violence

X

Colombia has had a tough road in building up its state legitimacy as the capable
provider of physical security in Colombia. As a result of its inability to protect the
population from violence connected to the paramilitaries, self-defense groups grew from
the 1980s until nearly 2006 as citizens were not confident in the political process to
negotiate or sustain peace. Colombian presidents since 2003 have attempted to
demobilize the self-defense groups along with a demobilization and peace negotiation
process with the guerilla groups. The process has been fraught with difficulties, but there
is evidence that violence levels have been reduced. The opportunity for groups such as
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the FARC to come to the negotiating table has been a helpful force for healing, but the
process is still evolving. There is still considerable political violence as members of the
guerilla groups are skeptical of the new political process.

Table 9 Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness in Colombia
Strong

General

Adherence Adherence

Ambiguous

General lack

Strong lack

of Adherence

of Adherence

_______________________________________________________________________
Monopoly of the Use of Force

X

Relationship Between Security & Citizenry

X

The evolution of the Colombian state legitimacy and accompanying assistance
from the United States to the Colombian security sector apparatus have been helpful in
creating a monopoly of the use of force in Colombia. However, the process in creating
the monopoly of the use of force is not complete, as evidenced by the continuing levels of
violence and security sector apparatus fragility. Similarly, the decreasing levels of
violence caused by the guerillas is improving the relationship between the citizens and
the security force apparatus as evidenced by the willingness of the leaders of the selfdefense groups to demobilize and come to the negotiating table beginning in 2004.
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5.2 Honduras

Figure 8 Map of Honduras
Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook
2017

5.2.1 Orientation

Honduras received independence from Spain in 1821. It borders the Caribbean
Sea, Guatemala, El Salvador, the Pacific Ocean, and Nicaragua. The United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division estimates that the
population of Honduras is just under 9 million people, placing it at the 50% point for
most populated states in the world. The official language is Spanish. Honduras is rated
130 of 188 nations in the world on the 2016 UN Human Development Index. According
to this same report, the mean number of years of schooling for the average Honduran is
just over six years. In physical security terms, a distinguishing characteristic for
Honduras is that since 2007 it has had one of the world’s highest murder rates.
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5.2.2 U.S. National Interest and Relationship with Honduras
The U.S. has had diplomatic relations with Honduras dating back to the mid- 19th
century, but the ties between the two countries didn’t become closely aligned until the
1980s. A primary reason for this evolution is the growth of the extremely lucrative, but
exceptionally violent conflict generated as a result of illicit narcotics trafficking from
South America to the United States. According to the U.S. Department of State 2017
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, approximately 90 percent of the cocaine
trafficked to the United States in 2016 first transited through the Mexico/Central America
corridor. This traffic exacerbates an already fragile situation as Central American
governments struggle with widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial systems,
and high levels of unemployment and poverty.
The United States has been one of the largest bilateral aid donors to Honduras.
Between the early 1980s and 2017, the strategy for the provision of assistance has
undergone significant change and focus. There are three significant aspects of how the
U.S. has cooperated with Honduras between 1996 and 2017. They are: 1) Joint Task
Force Bravo, 2) The Presidential Political Crisis in 2009, and 3) the development focused
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America policy.
4.2.2.1 Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-Bravo)
In the 1980s, Honduras played a central role in U.S. policy in Central America
due to its willingness to serve as a staging area for U.S. military operations in Nicaragua
and El Salvador. In 1983, the U.S. established Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras to
function as a staging and coordination point for its military efforts devoted to the counter
narcotics mission. JTF-Bravo quickly became a lynchpin for the conduct of U.S. policy
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in Central America and continues in that important role as confirmed in the 2017 U.S.
SOUTHCOM Posture Statement. In 2002, the JTF-Bravo mission was revised to include
joint and interagency operations in order to support a more comprehensive whole of
government mission that is better able to address root causes of conflict rather than just
the symptoms. JTF-Bravo is one of two task forces supervised by U.S. SOUTHERN
Command. It is located at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras. There are about 500 people
permanently assigned to manage forward, all weather multi-lateral exercises in
collaboration with partner nations to support counter transnational crime, humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief efforts along with the development of partner capacities
(USSOUTHCOM public web site, 2017).
5.2.2.2 Presidential Political Crisis
In 2009, a nondemocratic transfer of power from an elected president in Honduras
prompted examination by U.S. policymakers on appropriate responses to this type of
change of government. The issue arose following a March 2009 executive decree by
Honduran President Manuel Zelaya to introduce a process that eventually could have led
to changes to the Constitution about presidential terms of office. At that time, Honduran
heads of government were only allowed to serve for one term. According to the U.S.
Congressional hearing conducted shortly after the transfer of power, the Honduran
Constitution prior to the decree specifically stated that ‘anyone who tries to alter the term
limits of the Office of the President is guilty of treason.’ President Zelaya attempted to
override this guidance and change it by executive decree just before the end of his fouryear term in office. As a result, the Honduran Supreme Court issued a mandate for his
arrest. On June 28, 2009, the Honduran military arrested President Zelaya and flew him
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to Costa Rica as an imposed exile. At no time did the military retain power or impede the
conduct of the impending presidential elections (U.S. Congress, 2009).
Upon the announcement of Zelaya’s removal, the United States and the rest of the
international community universally condemned the incident as a military coup, but the
facts surrounding the situation did not support this understanding. Soon afterward, U.S.
Southern Command minimized cooperation with the Honduran military and the U.S.
State Department suspended some non-humanitarian foreign assistance. As a show of
respect for Zelaya’s status as a democratically elected leader, the U.S. embassy provided
security and refuge for Zelaya’s family while U.S. officials met with President Zelaya in
Washington D.C. (Meyer, 2010, p. 13). U.S leaders called for the restoral of President
Zelaya to office since he was still the only democratically selected executive, but took
action to gather more information on the circumstances of Zelaya’s removal. At a
hearing convened by the U.S. Congressional Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
His Excellency Guillermo Perez Cadalso, Former Foreign Minister and Supreme Court
Justice, Republic of Honduras, declared:
The military is not in charge of Honduras. The constitutional order of Honduras
remains intact. Our Government continues to be led by a civilian executive
branch, a duly elected Congress, and our judicial branch, guided by our 1982
Constitution and the rule of law. Indeed, it was the proper application of our
constitution, the rule of law and Presidential succession that initiated the recent
events in Honduras. Many have confused the time of key events. For example,
Mr Zelaya was charged with Crimes Against the Form of Government, Treason,
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Abuse of Authority, and Usurpation of Power, and the Supreme Court ordered
him to be arrested before he was taken out of the country.
Though the U.S. never formally called Zelaya’s ouster a military coup, U.S. aid to
Honduras diminished significantly in the months afterwards. In September 2009, the
U.S. terminated $32.7 million in foreign assistance, in which just over a third was
intended for security assistance purposes that had been appropriated for that same year
(Meyer, 2010). The U.S. Congress expressed considerable interest in the circumstances
of Zelaya’s removal by sending delegations to Honduras shortly after Zelaya’s removal.
At issue was the specific U.S. code on the provision of assistance to countries in which
the elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree. To determine the
details of Zelaya’s removal, the U.S. House of Representatives directed the creation of a
report to led by the Department of State’s Legal Advisor to review the Fiscal Year 2010
appropriations act and submit a report not later than 45 days after enactment of the bill
(Meyer, 2010, p. 15).
5.2.2.3 U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America
Contemporary U.S. strategy in Honduras recognizes that the mitigation of root
causes of conflict cannot be solved by military force alone. In many ways, the violence is
symptomatic of the larger societal problems that exacerbate conditions of poverty.
Honduras has been an especially poor country for decades, with Gross National Per
Capita of $4,468 in the 2015 United Nations Human Development Index. Among its
fellow Latin American countries, Honduras was ranked second to lowest above Haiti in
the composite index world rankings. Extreme poverty and high unemployment have
plagued Honduras for decades. This societal weakness has made Honduran citizens
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highly vulnerable to the waves of crime and violence accompanying the drug transit
routes to the United States.
In 2008, American policymakers took deliberate steps to address developmental
weakness in Honduras that has relevance to the national security of the States when it
added Honduran security considerations to the Merida Initiative that had been focused
primarily on Mexico. By 2010, a separate strategy known as the Central American
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) was created specifically to address concerns beyond
Mexico into Central America. Congress appropriated nearly $1.2 billion in aid between
2008 and 2015 to provide Central American partners with equipment, training, and
technical assistance to improve narcotics interdiction and disrupt criminal networks;
strengthen the capacities of Central American law enforcement and justice sector
institutions; and support community-based crime and violence prevention efforts in the
region (Meyer, June 8, 2017, p. 4).
In 2015, the Obama Administration determined that it was in the national security
interests of the United States to dedicate resources to improving security, strengthening
governance, and promoting economic prosperity in Mexico and Central America.
However, a significant distinguishing factor with this assistance is that it became part of a
more deliberately whole of government effort that would be delivered only under the
condition that the recipient governments address a series of concerns prior to receiving
the U.S. support. In 2016, the appropriations act stipulated that 25% of the assistance for
Honduras could not be obligated until the Secretary of State certified that the Honduran
government was taking effective steps to:
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1) Inform its citizens of the dangers of the journey to the southwest border of the
United States;
2) Combat human smuggling and trafficking;
3) Improve border security; and
4) Cooperate with U.S. government agencies and other governments in the region to
facilitate the return, repatriation, and reintegration of illegal migrants arriving at
the southwestern border of the United States who do not qualify as refugees
consistent with international law (Meyer, June 8, 2017, p. 13).

The whole of government approach toward United States assistance to Honduras was
captured in the U.S. Agency for International Development Country Development
Cooperation Strategy for Honduras for 2015-2019. This document declares that the
severe state fragility in Honduras impacts U.S. security and other national interests. The
two primary objectives in this document for USAID engagement with Honduras are: 1)
Increase citizen security for vulnerable populations in urban, high crime areas, and 2)
Sustainably reduce extreme poverty for vulnerable populations in western Honduras.
5.2.3 Political Order
5.2.3.1 Government
5.2.3.1.1 Structure
Honduras is a constitutional representative democracy. It has a president and a
unicameral congress elected for 4-year terms. The current Constitution was drafted in
1982 and has been amended several times.

The Constitution establishes separation of
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powers among an executive branch led by the president, a legislative branch consisting of
a 128 seat National Congress, and a judicial branch headed by the Supreme Court.
5.2.3.1.2 Leadership
Honduras became an independent republic in 1838 and adopted its first
constitution in January 1839. Presidents of Honduras after 1900 represented one of the
two dominant political parties, the Liberal Party of Honduras and the National Party of
Honduras. Leadership by a civilian was not continuous because there were also five
separate military run governments between 1956 and 1982. At the end of the last military
run government, a new constitution was adopted to allow presidents to serve one fouryear term. That provision was changed April 2015 by the Honduran Supreme Court to
allow sitting presidents to run for a second four-year term. President Juan Orlando
Hernandez was sworn in for a second four-year term on January 27, 2018.
5.2.3.1.3 Culture
In practice, the legislative process tends to be executive driven, with the National
Congress often deferring to the Honduran president. This practice is rooted in history
and carries through to the current era.
5.2.3.2 Security Apparatus
5.2.3.2.1 Structure
The Honduran security sector includes the armed forces and a national police.
The armed forces include the army, the air force and the navy. The National Preventive
Police was placed under civilian control in 1997. The police handle public security,
counternarcotics, and border patrol duties.
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The Honduras National Police maintains internal security and reports to the
Secretariat of Security, who reports to the President. The armed forces are responsible
for external security, but they exercise domestic security responsibilities. Domestic
security responsibilities carried out by military capacities are organized under a Military
Police for Public Order (PMOP). The armed forces report to the Secretariat of Defense,
who also reports to the President. However, the PMOP conducts operations that are
approved by both civilian security and defense officials. In 2014 the government created
an interagency task force (FUSINA) to coordinate the overlapping responsibilities of the
HNP, PMOP, National Intelligence Directorate, Public Ministry, Supreme Court, and the
courts. FUSINA reports to the National Security and Defense Council, chaired by the
president and including representatives of the Supreme Court, Congress, Public Ministry,
and Secretariats of Security and Defense. The United States Honduras 2015 Human
Rights Report documented that the PMOP had approximately 3,150 personnel who were
trained on human rights.
5.2.3.2.2 Leadership
In 1998, the Honduran Government created a Ministry of Security to oversee
police operations and in recognition of the need to more closely monitor a growing
national crime rate. By November, 1999, the Honduran Government authorized the use
of joint armed forces and police patrols to address the crime problem. Also in 1999, the
National Congress ratified a constitutional amendment that established direct civilian
control over the armed forces through a civilian Minister of Defense for the first time
since 1957 (Department of State Human Rights Report, Honduras, 2000).
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In 2003, the Ministry of Public Security oversaw police operations and the police
were responsible for all public security issues. The military were authorized to support
law enforcement activities with police under presidential directive. According the U.S.
Department of State 2003 Human Rights Report for Honduras, in 2003, nearly half of all
military personnel were assigned continuously to joint patrols with the police to prevent
and combat high levels of criminal gang activity.
5.2.3.2.3 Culture
The security apparatus culture in Honduras underwent considerable change
between 1982 and 2017. Prior to the late 1990s, the police and the military existed
separately. The military traditionally was viewed as a guardian of the state and protector
of the people from a national level. This influence was most visibly seen when the
military governed Honduras for most of the period between 1963 and 1982.
5.2.4 Legitimacy of the Security Apparatus
Between 1999 and 2018 the Honduran security force apparatus evolved, but
suffered many setbacks in legitimacy to conduct the mission assigned.

In 2014, 64% of

Hondurans surveyed reported that they trusted the armed forces, but the number dropped
to 46% when asked about trust in the national police (Perez and Zechmeister, 2015).
Historical events occurring between 1999 and 2018 support the reasons behind the lack
of public trust in the security sector apparatus. In July 2000, Nongovernment
Organization Covenant House reported that 302 homeless children and street youths were
killed in “social cleansing” actions between January and May 1998 (U.S. Department of
State Human Rights Report, 2000, Honduras). The report attributed 36% of the killings
to the police and members of the military.
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In 2003, the Public Ministry was poorly staffed and equipped, often ineffective,
and subject to corruption and political influence. As a result, there was little professional
development of police forces attempting to control a burgeoning crime rate. The U.S.
State Department 2003 Human Rights Report for Honduras asserted that the police
committed most of the human rights violations at that time, in contrast to the past when
the violations were attributed to the military. Following the nondemocratic transfer of
presidential power in 2009, the homicide rate continued to grow, rising at a peak of 86.5
murders per 100,000. Though the rate has decreased since 2011, few of the perpetrators
have been held accountable. Of all the homicides committed between 2010 and 2013,
only 4% ended in convictions (Meyer, 2015).
The undemocratic transfer of power in 2009 appears to have facilitated a more
productive dialogue between the government and the Honduran society. Prior to the
incident, the two most active political parties, the PL and PN, were not competing for
policies or programs that would benefit the people, but would instead provide personal
monetary gain to the victors. This lack of concern for ordinary Hondurans progressively
weakened the ties between the people and their government to the point that they turned
to the military as a source of change. According to the U.S. Department of State 2011
Human Rights Report for Honduras, the most serious human rights problems in Honduras
included corruption within the national police force, institutional weakness of the
judiciary, and discrimination and violence against vulnerable populations. According to
the 2011 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report for Honduras, police and
government agents committed unlawful killings. The report also asserted that the
government of Honduras took important steps to strengthen respect for human rights and
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promote national reconciliation, as well as to prosecute and punish officials who
committed abuses. However, the report emphasized that corruption and impunity were
serious problems that impeded the effectiveness of the National Police.
Beginning in 2013, Mr Hernandez campaigned for the office of Honduran
president on a hard line security platform. Upon taking office in January of 2014,
President Hernandez took several steps to address the lack of legitimacy and capacity of
the Honduran security sector apparatus. He began a process to restructure both the
civilian and the military aspects of the Honduran government as they affected the security
sector apparatus. These efforts acknowledged the critical role played by the civilian
government to provide services, but also harnessed a general historic trust in the military
to clean up the domestic crime conditions. President Hernandez focused on reducing
crime and violence. He relied heavily on the military to carry out law enforcement
operations, apprehend and extradite several high-level Honduran drug traffickers, and
even allowed the military to shoot down civilian aircraft suspected of engaging in illicit
activities (Meyer, 2015). Not all of these actions resonated well with the civilian
populace. In a January 2015 referendum, opposition political parties defeated President
Hernandez’ efforts to institutionalize the use of the military police force for law
enforcement. Despite these efforts, the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report
for 2015 reported that corruption and impunity continued to be serious problems within
the security forces. Some members of the police committed crimes, including crimes
linked to local and international criminal organizations. However, progress was reported
through a revised vetting process for police recruits. The Honduran oversight offices for
the police force have increased essential checks for these recruits through criminal
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background checks, psychological evaluations, financial investigations, and toxicology
and polygraph tests. Between 2012 and 2015, the Honduran department for police
oversight claimed to have assessed 9,000 police officers, while the Honduran National
Police dismissed 1,400 officers for cause, including at least 71 who left the force between
January and September 2015 after failing polygraphs, testing positive on toxicology tests,
or engaging in serious misconduct (U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report,
Honduras, 2015).
5.2.5 Character of the Political Dissent
Since 1996, political dissent and a growing degree of associated violence in
Honduras can be attributed to two primary factors: 1) Persistent levels of extreme
poverty and 2) Growth of narcotrafficking in response to drug demand in the United
States.
Evidence of the effects of unrelenting poverty is the increase of homicides in
Honduras beginning in 2004. A significant factor in this growth is the influence of
transnational criminal gangs. One particularly notorious of these gangs is Mara
Salvatrucha, otherwise known as MS-13. Some observers assert that MS-13 is rapidly
evolving into a criminal-economic-military-political power that poses an existential threat
to the states of El Salvador and Honduras (Farah, and Babineau, 2017). It is a formidable
and determined adversary to any effort by the Honduran government to dismantle it.
Farah and Babineau (2017) assert that there are two primary reasons for MS-13s growing
success in advancing its own political goals. First, MS-13 began a strategy around 2013
to infiltrate gang members into the police and military, along with sending selected gang
members to universities to become lawyers, accountants, and masters of business
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administration, with the intent of improving the sophistication of the group to integrate
within the boundaries of the current national political climate. Next, Farah and Babineau
(2017) assert that the most transformative political step taken by MS-13 in Honduras is
the countrywide decision to stop extorting small businesses that operate in the
communities that the gang controls. Instead, the goal was to ingratiate the MS-13 cause
with the communities and thus decrease resistance. A result is that the gang has been
able to incorporate large profits from drug smuggling into further humanitarian
inducements to the communities. These provisions serve to promote and increase loyalty
to the MS-13 enterprise, particularly where the government has been unable to provide
basic public services.
Vulnerability to criminal enterprises in Honduras is exacerbated by grinding
poverty. As indicated by the chart below, in 2014, Honduras was distinguished among
Central American states as having the highest percentage of its population living in
poverty and the second highest percent of youth aged 15-24 who neither studied nor
worked.
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Figure 9 Central America Socioeconomic Indicators
Source: Meyer, 2017
The poverty rate remains high, with more than 66% of households living below
the poverty line in 2016 according to the World Bank. The World Bank also
distinguishes Honduras in 2016 as having the highest level of economic inequality among
its citizens in all of Latin America.
The prevalence of poverty and the need for government attention to the issue is
not new. Poverty was a driving force in propelling populist candidate Manuel Zelaya to
the office of Honduran president in 2004. President Zelaya focused on raising standards
of living for average Hondurans and is credited with passing legislation that raised the
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minimum wage. Though he gained approval from the beneficiaries of the rise in
minimum wage, he encountered resistance from the entrenched elites.
Violence in Honduras grew consistently beginning in 2007 and has persisted.
Following the nondemocratic transfer of presidential power in 2009, the homicide rate in
Honduras continued to grow, rising at a peak of 86.5 murders per 100,000. Though the
rate decreased since 2011, few of the perpetrators were held accountable. Of all the
homicides committed between 2010 and 2013, only 4% ended in convictions (Meyer,
2015). Drug cartels and transnational criminal gangs capitalized on this environment of
pervasive poverty and an ineffective government security sector apparatus.
Election of President Hernandez in 2014 brought hope to the population that the
Honduran government would dedicate new resources to solving the problem of poverty
and growing levels of violence. President Hernandez acknowledged the critical role
played by the civilian government to provide services, but he also harnessed the trust in
the military to clean up the domestic crime conditions.
In 2016, the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report reported that Honduras
exhibited elements of organized criminal elements, including local and transnational
gangs and narcotics traffickers, who were significant perpetrators of violent crimes and
who committed acts of murder, extortion, kidnapping, torture, human trafficking, and
intimidation of journalists, women, and human rights defenders.
5.2.6 Effectiveness of the Security Apparatus
From the late 1990s until 2017, crime has been widespread and human rights
abuses go unpunished in Honduras. Members of street gangs are killed along with
ordinary citizens, journalists and social activists, distinguishing Honduras with one of the
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highest homicide rates in the world. The chart below shows the homicide rates from
2004 to 2016.

Figure 10 Honduran Homicide Rates from 2004 to 2016
Source: Meyers, 2017
President Hernandez worked to address these problems by supplementing
ineffective law enforcement capacities with military forces. Upon taking office on
January 27, 2014, he ordered the military and the police to conduct intensive patrols of
high-crime neighborhoods in the capital city (Meyer, 2015, p. 10). In an effort to
increase government proactivity in addressing the violence, President Hernandez
established an inter-agency task force known as FUSINA (Fuerza de Seguridad
Interinstitutional) to coordinate the efforts of the intelligence agencies, public
prosecutors, and judges with the military and police structures.
In 2016, the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report for Honduras reported
that pervasive social violence persisted, but the state made visible and more effective
efforts to reduce it. This report asserted that the Honduran government took steps to
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prosecute and punish officials who committed abuses, including arresting and
prosecuting members of congress, judges, prosecutors, police officers, mayors, and other
local authorities. Additionally, the report documented that Honduran civilian authorities
arrested and investigated members of the security forces alleged to have committed
human rights abuses. However, every report on Human Rights by the U.S. State
Department on Honduras between the years of 2001 and 2016 asserted that corruption,
intimidation, and institutional weakness of the justice system led to widespread impunity,
unlawful and arbitrary killings and other criminal activities by members of the security
forces; and harsh and at times life-threatening prison conditions.
To some extent, creation of effective security force apparatus in Honduras has
been disadvantaged by unintended consequences from the collaboration between the U.S.
and the Honduran governments. According to research done by Farah and Babineau
(2017), the capacity of MS-13 has been increased as a result of Honduran government
efforts with U.S. support to build a credible police force by dismissing those suspected of
corruption and/or human rights violations. The dismissal of more than 1,000 policemen
is suspected to have pushed highly trained security individuals into service for gang
activities. Farah and Babineau (2017) find that a former policeman and several of his
friends accepted offers of employment with MS-13 that paid roughly 2.5 times what they
were making as policemen, which highlighted the state government’s relative financial
challenges.
5.2.7 Specific Military Assistance Provided
There are four primary themes for the types of military assistance provided by the
United States for Honduras between 1996 and 2016. They are: 1) Establishment of Joint
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Task Force Bravo, 2) Counternarcotics Activities, 3) Civil Military Relations, and 4)
Security Sector Apparatus Professionalization.
5.2.7.1 Establishment of Joint Task Force Bravo
Creation of a U.S. military staging point began during the 1980s at Soto Cano Air
Base, Honduras to counter Soviet influence in Central America. This engagement
continued after the end of the Cold War as Joint Task Force Bravo.
5.2.7.2 Counternarcotics Activities
During the late 1990s, the U.S. recognized the growing flow of narcotics from South
America through Central America, but it wasn’t until 2008 that U.S. foreign policy
officially recognized Honduras as a transshipment point for narcotics entering the United
States. As a result, , according to the U.S. Department of State Foreign Military Training
Summary, in 1999, the U.S. delivered training to Honduras on counternarcotics
operations, resource management, logistics, and equipment maintenance.

Additionally,

training was offered through participation in exercises with U.S. forces to provide
opportunities needed to professionalize and modernize the Honduran military while
encouraging continued cooperation with U.S. counternarcotics efforts.
In the years following 1999, annual training and education funding for Honduras
grew from just under $500k to nearly $2 million by the year 2005, indicating the growth
in emphasis on counternarcotics.
5.2.7.3 Civil Military Relations
Honduran military members participated in programs through the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) and International Military Education and Training
programs that include a wide array of education and training. The intent is to facilitate
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improvement in civil-military relations that will foster improvement in the democratic
climate and regional stability. Hondurans were given officer training at all levels, from
Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) training up to command and staff colleges. Focus
topics include civilian control of the military and principles of human rights. In 1999, a
course was also offered in concert with the transfer of a 44 ft boat under the Excess
Defense Articles program to help Hondurans plan for the logistics management and
support needed to sustain operability of the boat (US Dept of State, 1999 Foreign
Military Training Web Site, Focus on Honduras).
Funding levels for 2009 increased in the immediate aftermath of the nondemocratic
transfer of power from President Manuel Zelaya to the interim successor, the then
President of the Honduran Congress, Mr Roberto Micheletti on June 28, 2009. On
November 29, 2009, Honduras held general elections to fill nearly 3,000 positions
nationwide, including the presidency. Former President of Congress Porfirio Lobo won
the election. Soon after taking office, the Lobo government removed the Defense
Minister and senior Honduran military officials that had been linked to the nondemocratic
transfer of power and to the de facto regime, which reopened the possibility for U.S.
engagement with the Honduran military. U.S. policy specifically prioritized this
engagement “in a deliberate and focused manner to ensure that the promotion of civilian
control over an apolitical military and respect by the military for human rights and
constitutional order in Honduras” (U.S. State Department Foreign Military Training
Report, Honduras, 2009-2010).
A former Commander of the US Military Group in Honduras, Col (retired) Ken
Rodriguez asserts that that “engaging, training and advising the Honduran military was
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their core mission.” This mission, changed after the coup by the Honduran military in
June 2009. At that point, they shifted to a “primary function of advising US authorities,
civilian and military, about options and consequences, and re-engagement strategies.”
5.2.7.4 Security Apparatus Professionalization
In 2010, the U.S. foreign policy objectives for military training for Honduras included
three lines of effort; 1) Support the reorganization of the Honduran military structure to
meet new transnational threats, 2) Enhance Honduran efforts to better control its territory,
including littoral waters, and 3) Enhance Honduras’ capability to participate in
international coalition peacekeeping operations and respond to natural disasters (U.S.
Department of State Foreign Military Training Report 2010-2011). By 2014-2015, the
objectives evolved to place more specific focus on adherence to norms of human rights
and civilian control of the military. From FY2012 to FY2015, annual foreign aid
appropriations legislation included additional restrictions that required the State
Department to withhold between 20% and 35% of aid for Honduran military and police
forces until the Secretary of State could certify that certain human rights conditions were
met.”
According to the U.S. Southern Command public web site, in December of 2015,
U.S. Army South worked with U.S. agencies to conduct customs border protection
training to selected soldiers in Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras. The training was part of a
partnership which allows service members to become certified inspection agents which
streamlines the inspection process during redeployments.
The U.S. continues to provide counternarcotics military assistance to Honduras. The
relationship changed a bit when Honduras enacted an aerial intercept law when drug
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smuggling was suspected. This policy prompted a reduction in the type of information
shared and a cessation of radar intelligence. However, close support in other areas
remains. U.S. interagency advisors collaborate with selected members of the Honduran
security forces to carry out investigations into drug trafficking, while U.S. military
assistance provides equipment to the Honduran government extends the reach of the
Honduran security forces to all regions in their national territory. The assistance also
includes specialized training of the TIGRES unit of the Honduran National Police, which
as been employed as a counterdrug Special Weapons and Tactics team (Myers, 2017). A
result of cooperation between U.S. and Honduran security forces has been the
apprehension of numerous high-level drug traffickers and a dismantling of associated
criminal organizations. The Honduran government has apprehended and extradited to the
United States at least 12 Honduran narcotics traffickers since 2013 (Myers, 2017).
5.2.8 Honduras Foreign Policy
Honduras continues to support a vibrant relationship with the United States and it
contributes to regional security cooperation efforts. In cooperation with the United States
and its Central American neighbors, Honduras participates in a variety of bilateral and
multilateral exercises to build medical, engineering, counternarcotics, and disaster relief
capabilities.
The 2017 USSOUTHCOM Posture Statement praised the important capability
offered by the JTF-Bravo presence at Soto Cano Air Base by stating that it “provides our
only forward presence in Central America and allows us to efficiently support willing
regional partners, provide continuous, adaptive support to counter-network operations,
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and respond immediately to natural disasters, making it a critical asset to
USSOUTHCOM.”
5.2.9 Conclusion
U.S. military assistance in Honduras is a marginally unsuccessful example of the
allocation of resources towards Honduran political development in the security sector
apparatus, largely due to the high levels of poverty and the political power of the
transnational criminal gang Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS-13. As a willing
recipient of U.S. military assistance and the host of Soto Cano Air Base and Joint Task
Force Bravo, Honduras has not benefitted measurably in the decrease of its security
sector apparatus fragility. Instead, Honduras has suffered from exceptionally high
homicide rates that are among the highest in the world. This distinction can be traced to
high levels of poverty and an inability of the Honduran government to provide services
equably across the population. This has created a systemic vulnerability of the Honduran
population to the control of the narcotrafficking organizations, particularly in the poorest
regions. With few tradable natural resources, Honduras has suffered from one of the
highest poverty rates in Latin America. Between 2006 and 2015, the fragility of the
Honduran security sector increased from 6 to 6.75 according to the U.S. Fund for Peace
Fragile States Index. This is an increase to fragility of nearly 12%. With a rating of 6 in
2006, the state security sector was assessed by this framework as “security in a small
portion of the country is in the hands of a party other than the state, which uses sporadic
violence or praetorian guard.” By contrast, the 6.75 level is “security in some parts of the
country is in the hands of a party other than the state that rules without excessive use of
force or praetorian guard has some independent influence.” This higher level of fragility
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can be attributed to the increasing control of the narcotraffickers in the poor parts of the
country. Thus, U.S. military assistance was contributed in an environment where the
level of poverty, governance fragility, and lack of security sector legitimacy made very
little room for outside security resources to effectively reduce the level of security sector
fragility.
Table 10 Evidence of Legitimacy of the State in Honduras
Strong

General

Ambiguous

General lack

Adherence Adherence

of adherence

Strong lack
of adherence

________________________________________________________________________
Confidence in Political Process

X

Political Opposition

X

Transparency

X

Openness & Fairness of Political Process

X

Political Violence

X

The Honduran government was challenged in measures of state legitimacy. To
begin, there was not an adherence to the quality of voter confidence in the political
process because of the need for a nondemocratic transfer of power in 2009. When sitting
President Zelaya tried to override the state Constitution that limited Presidents to one
term, the military was ordered by the state judiciary to remove him from office.
However, as a show of good relations with the United States, senior executives from
Honduras came to the United States after the transfer of power to detail how and why the
process should not be viewed as a military coup. Thus, the Honduran government can be
assessed as generally adhering to the quality of transparency for government operations.
Furthermore, the process of replacing President Zelaya was widely viewed as open and
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fair. However, there continues to be political violence in the suburbs where the
government has been unable to extend state reach.
Table 11 Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness in Honduras
Strong

General

Adherence Adherence

Ambiguous

General lack

Strong lack

of Adherence

of Adherence

_______________________________________________________________________
Monopoly of the Use of Force

X

Relationship Between Security & Citizenry

X

The period between 2002 and 2016 was an increasing period of unrest for
Honduras. During that time, Honduras suffered from the highest homicide rates in the
world. Though the number of homicides per year has reduced since 2011, the Honduran
security sector apparatus has grown in fragility. In 2014, President Hernandez ordered
the Honduran military to join the police in a joint effort to reduce violence in high-crime
areas. The Honduran government has found that the issue with reduction of crime is that
it is multi-dimensional. Simply reducing the violence is not enough. The root causes of
poverty must be addressed to reduce the likelihood that young people will be tempted or
forced to join gangs. Furthermore, the Honduran government must take action to address
institutional weaknesses in its judicial system that prevents the application and
enforcement of the rule of law. In 2016, the U.S. Department of State Human Rights
Report on Honduras found that while pervasive social violence persisted, the state made
visible efforts to reduce it. However, there were still instances of corruption,
intimidation, widespread impunity, unlawful and arbitrary killings and other criminal
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activities by members of the security forces. Thus, the relationship between the citizens
and the security force apparatus in Honduras will benefit from increased attention.
5.3 Cross Case Comparison
U.S. military assistance to Colombia and Honduras was provided in different
political development climates. Colombia was under siege by the drug profit
empowered FARC. The roots of the FARC derived from an inability of the government
to provide security to citizens outside of the capital city. In turn, citizens looked
elsewhere to meet their basic needs. As the FARC became increasingly ruthless, wellresourced Colombian citizens began to organize to protect themselves. New presidential
leadership in Colombia has been able to gather political will among the Colombian
people by placing greater emphasis on the legitimacy and, most importantly, capacity, of
the security sector forces. While there had been no effective capacity of the Colombian
military to protect people outside the capital, their legitimacy in that role was diminished
in the eyes of the people who were too often at the mercy of the FARC. U.S. military
assistance in this environment enabled the Colombian government to gain support
politically from its people as it was better able to protect the people.
By contrast, Honduras had higher risk factors that made it less able to overcome
the persistent conflict environment that accompanied the narco-trafficking. To begin, its
human development capacity was much lower going into the last decade than was the
capacity of Colombia. This presents a problem with not only people finding meaningful
jobs to support their families, but also with a lack of available manpower and government
funding resources to staff and operate security organizations. Prior to the creation of the
FUSINA, the government of Honduras had not effectively prioritized the necessary
210

resources to tackle the high crime rate from a holistic perspective. For several years,
Honduras had the highest homicide rate in the world and few perpetrators were held
accountable. The majority of the population was left to fend for themselves. This
vulnerability combined with the low education rates put the average Honduran at high
risk for persecution by ruthless drug lords. This is a context in which U.S. military
assistance by itself had limited utility. The situation required engagement by the
Honduran government to harness capacities from across its state institutional structure to
identify the populations most at risk to provide targeted assistance that first created
physical security, but also provided social and economic opportunities that would give
average Hondurans better resilience in the face of the pressures from the drug cartels.
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CHAPTER VI – UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND AND THE
ASIA/PACIFIC
The region encompassed by the US Pacific Command includes about half of the
earth’s surface, stretching from the west coast of the United States to the western border
of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole and more than 50% of the world’s
population. The 36 nations that are included in the USPACOM area of responsibility are
diverse, with 3,000 different languages, seven of the world’s ten largest militaries, and
five nations allied with the U.S. through mutual defense treaties. According to its web
site, the mission of the USPACOM includes a commitment “to enhancing stability in the
Asia-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful
development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary,
fighting to win.” Additionally, USPACOM “will remain an engaged and trusted partner
committed to preserving the security, stability, and freedom upon which enduring
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region depends.”
The Asia Pacific region has undergone significant change in the past twenty years
due to rapid industrialization of the Asia economic tiger states and the specific rise of
China as a global power. The U.S. has recognized the transformative impact of this
change through the Defense Strategic Guidance released by the White House in 2012 and
known as the “Pivot to the Pacific.” There is a long history of U.S. military assistance to
the Asia Pacific region, dating back to the early part of the twentieth century. The two
countries selected as examples of the variations in the impact of U.S. military assistance
are Indonesia and the Philippines. While the two states have both endured significant
internal societal upheaval that resulted in large-scale violence, the path forward for
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political development differs considerably. This chapter explores the context conditions
under which U.S. military assistance was provided in the interest of reducing political
development fragility.
6.1 Indonesia

Figure 11 Map of Indonesia
Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Fact book 2017
6.1.1 Orientation
Indonesia is a country of many distinctions.

The United Nations Department of

Economic and Social Affairs Population Division estimates that the population of
Indonesia is just over 258 million people, making it the fifth most populous country in the
world. According to Indonesia’s National Coordinating Agency for Survey and
Mapping, the total number of islands in the archipelago is 13,466 stretched across more
than 3,000 miles, of which 922 are inhabited, making it the world’s largest country
comprised solely of islands. In 2016, Indonesia is ranked 16th in the world by the World
Bank for its Gross Domestic Product. It is considered to be the world’s largest
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predominantly Muslim democracy and the third largest democracy overall. Indonesia
became a sovereign state when it received independence from the Netherlands in
December 1949. It borders the Pacific Ocean, Papua New Guinea, the Indian Ocean, and
Malaysia. The official language is Bahasa Indonesia, but there are more than 700
languages used in Indonesia and of this number nearly 300 are used by about a million or
more people.
Indonesia has undergone dramatic transformation in its political structures during
the past two decades, moving from repressive dictatorship by a former military general
who surrounded himself with other former military members to a reform oriented
democracy that is hailed by the US Fund for Peace 2017 Fragile States Index as one of
the most improved countries in the world for overall reduction of fragility in the past ten
years.
Finally, Indonesia is identified as number 110 of 188 states on the United Nations
Human Development Index. This index places Indonesia in the medium human
development category and as number 17 of the 27 Asian states assessed. In 2018,
Indonesia is a region of vast economic wealth and potential that has posted a growth of
better than 6% annually.
6.1.2 U.S. National Interest and Relationship with Indonesia
The continued success of Indonesia is a priority for U.S. diplomatic engagement.
This relationship dates back to the early 19th century when a consular post was set up to
coordinate the U.S. trading relationship with the then-Dutch colony known as the Dutch
East Indies. At that time, relations remained on an informal level until after World War
II when the Japanese occupiers left in 1945 and the Dutch officially recognized the
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independence of Indonesia in 1949. Soon after independence, the U.S. began providing
arms and training to the Indonesian armed forces. According to the Armed Sales
Monitoring Project Client Profile on Indonesia, between 1975 and 2002, the U.S. sold
$1.25 billion dollars worth of weaponry between 1975 and 2002, trained over 7,300
Indonesian military personnel between 1950 and 1992, and allocated $399 million in
grants and loans to pay for U.S. arms. In particular, in 1975, 90% of the Indonesia
military’s arms were made in America. These arms were cited by Non Government
Organizations such as Amnesty International analysts as playing a role in the Indonesia
government’s efforts to annex East Timor in 1975 and subsequent efforts to suppress
separatist movements in 1991.

As a result, in 1992, Congress cut off further military

training for Indonesia in recognition of rampant human rights abuses among Indonesian
armed forces. In 1994, Congress banned the sale of small arms, riot gear, and other
“crowd control” technologies that could potentially be used to commit human rights
abuses. In August 1999, President Clinton decided to cut off all arms sales and any
military ties to Indonesia two weeks after the August 30, 1999 referendum in East Timor.
This action and other international pressure on Jakarta led to acceptance of international
peacekeepers.
By early 2000, the U.S. resumed relations with the Indonesian military, in large
part due to deliberate and public changes by the Wahid and Sukarnoputri presidential
administrations that followed after the fall of President Suharto. Early in his presidency,
Mr Wahid made clear his intent to decrease human rights abuses among the armed forces
and remove the military from Indonesian politics.
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Mr Wahid was removed less than a year after his election by the Indonesian
People’s Consultative Assembly and replaced by his vice president, Ms Megawati
Sukarnoputri. At issue was his compliance with state policy in the handling of public
money and his refusal to appear before a review committee (National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs, 2001). Ms Megawati took steps early on in her
administration to align her foreign policy with a partnership with the United States.
President Megawati was the first leader of a major Muslim country to visit Washington
DC after the September 11, 2001 attacks to express support for the U.S. led ‘war on
terrorism’ (Rabasa and Haseman, 2002).

In turn, the Bush administration placed

renewed attention on the reform actions taken by the Indonesian military, found that
appropriate changes had been made, and urged the reestablishment of direct aid. This
action led the Megawati government to revive the intelligence operations of the territorial
commanders and to reintegrate the armed forces into the anti-terrorism ranks of the police
to demonstrate the spirit of cooperation with the United States (Schneier, 2016, p. 211).
The relationship between the United States and Indonesia grew substantially
between President Megawati’s visit to the United States in 2001 and 2018. Vaughn
(2011) asserts that the military-to-military relationship between the U.S. and Indonesia
has been a key testament to enhanced cooperation between the two countries. President
Bush showed his support for Indonesia’s successful presidential election in 2004 by
removing restrictions on International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military
Financing, and Foreign Military Sales for Indonesia. Examples of the military
cooperation with Indonesia include the Tri-Border initiative that involved radar and
maritime operations in the Makassra Strait to monitor terrorist or pirate activity, along
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with US assistance to Indonesia’s new defense university and US assistance with the
procurement of C-130 Hercules transport aircraft (Vaughn, p. 2).
In 2010, the U.S. and Indonesia signed a Comprehensive Partnership Agreement.
This agreement covers a range of issues, including trade and investment, food security,
science and technology, educational exchanges, and military cooperation. This bilateral
agreement was signed by U.S. President Obama and Indonesian President Yudhoyono to
broaden, deepen and elevate relations between the two countries. In 2013, the U.S.
Agency for International Development published an Indonesia Country Development
Strategy for 2014-2018, entitled, “Investing in Indonesia, a stronger Indonesia advancing
national and global development.” Within this strategy, the US is pursuing four
development objectives with Indonesia. They are:
1) Democratic governance strengthened
2) Essential human services for the poorest and most vulnerable strengthened
3) Global development of mutual interest advanced
4) Collaborative achievement in science, technology, and innovation increased

In 2015, the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Indonesia was
affirmed in a joint statement as the two presidents recognized that the ties between the
two countries “are stronger than ever, dynamic, and firmly based on shared principles of
democracy and good governance, respect for human rights, and the promotion of peace,
stability, and economic well-being. The two Presidents affirmed their commitment to
further strengthen their bilateral defense cooperation, and welcomed the growth in
bilateral military engagements, which stand at more than 200 activities annually. The
217

Presidents welcomed the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense Cooperation of
October 26, 2015, between the Indonesian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department
of Defense. The two Presidents underscored their commitment to deepen collaboration
on areas such as: maritime cooperation, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, defense joint research and development, countering transnational threats,
and military professionalization. The two Presidents also affirmed their interest in
exploring and consulting on new activities to advance cooperation in the areas of codevelopment and co-production of defense equipment, cooperative logistics, and
maritime security.” This commitment was reaffirmed on April 20, 2017, when U.S. Vice
President Michael Pence communicated to Indonesian President Widodo that “The
United States is proud to be one of Indonesia’s oldest and most engaged defense partners.
And under President Trump we are firmly committed to continuing to collaborate on the
security of both of our peoples. A stronger defense partnership will serve us well as we
confront the various security threats and challenges that we now face. And of course, one
of the greatest threats we face is the rise and spread of terrorism.”
6.1.3 Political Order
6.1.3.1 Government
6.1.3.1.1 Structure
Indonesia is classified by the 2017 CIA World Factbook as a presidential
republic. There are 31 provinces, 1 autonomous (Aceh), 1 special region (Yogyakarta),
and 1 national capital district (Jakarta Raya). There are 33 electoral districts and ten
recognized political parties. The territory that defines Indonesia grew over a period of
nearly three hundred years while under the influence of the Dutch, first as a trading post
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and then as a colony through its recognized independence in 1949. It existed under
Japanese occupation from 1942-1945 during War II, but was relinquished upon the
Japanese surrender in 1945.
The island nation has undergone dramatic transformation of its political structures
since the beginning of the 21st century. It has moved from repressive dictatorship by a
former military general accustomed to a deep involvement of the military in Indonesian
politics to a reform oriented democracy seeking to extricate the military from Indonesian
politics. The complexity of these structural changes is rooted in Indonesian history since
1945 and is reflected in how the government is organized. Three key themes that have
influenced the structure of the Indonesian government structure are 1) creation of a
cohesive national geographic identity, 2) determination of the role of religion in national
government, and 3) agreement on the role for the military in politics.
Following World War II, Indonesian leaders, though still existing officially as a
Dutch protectorate, created a national Constitution in 1945. Indonesian political leaders
could not agree on the degree to which the document should reflect a deliberate
requirement for Muslims to uphold sharia principles of justice. Unable to broker a
compromise, President Sukarno created a new direction for the country that he called
‘Guided Democracy,’ which became more of a semi-authoritarian rule than a true
democracy. Under Sukarno’s leadership, his Guided Democracy took on an increasingly
anti-Western, pro-Soviet, and Chinese bent (Schneier, 2016).
By the late 1950s, the Indonesian government struggled with how best to
orchestrate the security apparatus to oversee such a far ranging geographic territory.
Defense Minister Nasution proposed a doctrine of ‘dwifungsi,’ or dual function, for a
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civil-military structure that could manage the Indonesian archipelago. General Nasution
recognized that Indonesia’s unique geographic, demographic, and financial limitations
precluded a centrally located military with concentrated technical capacities. Instead, he
envisioned that the country would rely on decentralized units distributed among the local
population to collect intelligence and broker disputes among adversaries (Schneier, 2016,
p. 184). The units were placed alongside the hierarchy of the civilian administration so
that every military command had a civilian counterpart. Consequently, the military
became an influential political and economic player in local affairs, even in areas that
were not under martial law (Schneier, 2016, p. 184).
The institutions of the state have transformed since major changes were made to
the constitution in 2001. The original constitution was approved in 1945. This mandate
gave the legislature the authority to select the chief executive. It also concentrated
political power under the office of the president. In November 2001, this process was
changed to enable competitive selection of the chief executive by popular vote. The first
presidential election was held in July 2004.
The Indonesian legislature is unicameral, with a House of Representatives that is
known as the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). It has 560 seats that are
proportionally elected. One of the first political acts by the legislature occurred after the
departure of President Suharto. In 1999, the assembly imposed a two-term limit on the
offices of the President and the Vice President.
The President of Indonesia is the Chief of State and the Head of Government.
The President also appoints the Cabinet. The President and Vice President are elected by
direct vote by absolute majority for 5-year terms, with the possibility of a second term.
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Since 1998, Indonesia has three successful direct Presidential elections that are
considered by the international community to be largely free and fair.
6.1.3.1.2 Leadership
Indonesian government has undergone a transformation since the creation of the
first constitution in 1945. The Freedom House 2015 Report assesses Indonesia as a
‘partly free’ electoral democracy with a 2 on a scale of 1 to 7 with one being the best for
political rights and a 4 for civil liberties. This is a dramatic transformation for a country
that in 1998 was a one party state under long term autocratic regime.
Evidence of the political will by the Indonesian people to effect change in
governance came about with the election of President Abdurrahman Wahid in 1999. One
of the first changes made by President Wahid was the appointment of a civilian defense
minister with a reputation as an academic. A deliberate effort was made to remove the
military from political leadership posts in the government. President Wahid also tackled
the perception of military immunity from human rights abuses. Dozens of military
officers at all ranks were placed in review. Mr Wahid made the high profile decision to
suspend the armed forces chief, General Wiranto, for human rights abuses in East Timor.
On July 9th, 2014, Mr Jokowi Widodo was elected as the seventh president of
Indonesia. His party is known as Indonesia’s Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). The
Lowy Institute for International Policy hails the election ceremony as the first peaceful
transfer of power between two popularly elected leaders in the world’s third largest
democracy. President Jokowi was elected based on a platform of domestic reform. He is
the former mayor of the mid-sized city of Surakarta in Central Java, where he built a
consensus for a series of good government reforms that attracted nationwide attention.
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He ran a successful bid for the presidency against retired Lt Gen Prabowo Subianto.
President Jokowi is the first president of Indonesia who does not come from a military
background.
6.1.3.1.2 Culture
Indonesia is one of 47 countries in the world in which the people of the Muslim
faith are in the majority. Indonesia is considered to be one of a small group of those
countries that has had relative success with its efforts in promoting democratization.
Indonesia is one of three countries—the other two are Pakistan and Bangladesh—that are
home to nearly two thirds of the worlds followers of Islam (Schneier, 2016). Socially,
Indonesia is distinguished as home to the world’s largest population of Muslims.
Estimates place 86% of Indonesians as Muslim. However, the practice of Islam in
Indonesia is a moderate form, which gives Indonesia the potential to act as a
counterbalance to the violent forms seen in the Middle East. This does not preclude the
existence of radical Islamists and terrorist cells within Indonesia.
6.1.3.2 Security Apparatus
6.1.3.2.1 Structure
Indonesia has both a military and a national police. The Indonesian Army is
undergoing a process of change. It is moving from a role dominated by internal security
during the Suharto era to a new vision of how the Indonesian government views its
security in comprehensive terms that also include economic and social terms. In 1999,
the national police was separated from the army and given the lead role for internal
security. New missions include a return to support of UN peacekeeping operations, focus
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on preparation for and response to natural disasters, maritime security, border security,
and resource protection.
In 2008, the Indonesian government published its first Defense White Paper.
According to the forward by Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryachudu in the 2015 edition,
the Defense White Paper is a guideline for the national defense and “is expected to meet
the challenges and needs of stakeholders and the public who are required to understand
the national defense policy.” Furthermore, the White Paper “is distributed to establish
defense cooperation with other countries in order to build mutual trust, equality, and
respect.” This 150-page document is ambitious in scope, giving an overview of
expectations for modernization of military power in which the military power may not be
the best tool to solve problems. It describes the range of threats facing Indonesia by
analyzing both inter and intra-state conflicts. There is a chapter dedicated to how the
state defense posture is divided up into military and non-military aspects.

There is also

a chapter dedicated to elaboration of nine defense agenda priorities. The nine priorities
are as follows:
-

Bringing back the roles of the country in protecting all the people and
providing security to all citizens of Indonesia.

-

Accelerating the involvement of the Government in building clean
governance, effective, democratic, and reliable government.

-

Building Indonesia from the periphery to strengthen these areas and villages
within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

-

Rejecting the concept of weak state by reforming law enforcement system that
is free of corruption, dignified and reliable.
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-

Improving the quality of Indonesian human life.

-

Improving people’s productivity and competitiveness in the international
market.

-

Achieving economic independence by accelerating the strategic sectors of the
domestic economy.

-

Conducting a revolution on nation character.

-

Strengthening diversity and social restoration.
o 2015 Indonesian Defense White Paper, page 39.

The U.S. Department of State 2016 Indonesia Human Rights Report observed that
Indonesian law is specific in requiring the National Police to be responsible for internal
security. Conversely, the Indonesian National Armed Forces is responsible for external
security and the specific requirement to defend Indonesian national sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Only on request and with authorization by the president may the
military provide operational support to the police in matters of counterterrorism or in
resolving communal conflicts. The president appoints the national police chief, but the
appointment is subject to confirmation by the House of Representatives.
6.1.3.2.2 Leadership
In 2000, Indonesia’s 275,000 member armed force was placed under a civilian
defense minister for the first time in 40 years (U.S. Department of State 1999 Human
Rights Report). Additionally, the 175,000 member national police force was separated
formally in 2000 from the armed forces and given primary responsibility for internal
security, but remained under the supervision of the Minister of Defense.
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6.3.1.3.2.3 Culture
Indonesia has a long history of a unified approach to national defense. Sidwell
(1995, p. 2) asserts that the historic relationship between the Indonesian military, the state
and society is best described by a term known as Sishankamrata, or Universal People’s
Defense. According to this doctrine, the people of Indonesia will spontaneously rise up
against any threat to the independence and sovereignty of the nation and fight with the
military to overcome that threat. In essence, the armed forces and the Indonesian people
are partners for the defense of the nation.
In 2000, Indonesia’s 500,000-member military had a recognized “dual function”
role in Indonesian society, involving itself in virtually every aspect of the nation’s
political and business life. As evidence of its political role, the Indonesian military had
an allotment of seats in Parliament and in certain top civil-service posts. In the civilian
business sector, the Indonesian military had been involved in a vast array of commercial
ventures, from construction firms to pharmaceutical companies and textile production
(Chandrasekaran, 2000).
A unique aspect to how the military views its public defense role is in how it
resists efforts to formalize incorporation of moral values into the national defense.
Rabasa and Haseman (2002) assert that Indonesian National Military (Tentara Nasional
Indonesia, or TNI) views itself as the repository of the values embodied in the nation’s
secular ideology which is known as Pancasila since its formal introduction in the
constitution in 1945. In this role, the military is charged with both physical protection of
the Indonesian territorial integrity and also as guardian of the national unity. In
particular, Rabasa and Haseman (2002) argue that the Indonesian military has historically
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been distrustful of political Islam because it threatens the national vision of a unified
multicultural Indonesia.
Since 1945, the Indonesian military has been a force for the people. The TNI
fought against the Dutch for independence, it was instrumental in defeating a communist
insurgency in 1948, and it has continually been upheld by Indonesian leaders as being
uniquely defined and differentiated from other national militaries. In 1958, Army chief
of staff Abdul Haris Nasution argued that the Indonesian armed forces were neither “a
tool of civilian society” as in Western countries, nor a “military regime” that dominates
the state, but a force of the people, working with other forces of the people (Rabasa and
Haseman, p. 10). This laid the groundwork for Suharto and his military regime to assume
power in 1966, when a policy known as ‘dwifungsi’ became official policy. Under this
policy, military officers were required to take an active part in politics to ensure stability
and central control. This policy evolved through another policy known as the “New
Paradigm” in 2000 to draw the military away from internal security and shift the mission
to national police that would be augmented by the military only when directed by the
president. Upon transfer of this mission, a focus was placed by the Indonesian
government on the need to improve training, equipment, and manpower assigned to the
national police. In recognition of the limitations, in 2001, the Indonesian government
passed legislation that assigned four internal security missions to the TNI—operations
against separatists, insurgent forces, drug trafficking, and smuggling.
In addition to a loss of responsibility for internal security missions, the Indonesian
government has taken steps to remove mandated positions for the army in the Indonesian
parliament. In addition, in 2004, a law was passed that ordered the military to give up its
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business interests by 2009. In 2009, a presidential executive order was passed requiring
transfer of all remaining military enterprises to the government. Shneier (2016) argues
that there were residual entrepreneurial activities conducted by the Indonesian military
because of chronic underfunding. This deficiency was addressed when the Yudhoyono
government approved a 30 percent increase in 2013 to overcome more than a decade of
flat funding for armed forces.
6.1.4 Legitimacy of the Security Sector Apparatus
The Indonesian security sector for physical security consists of both police and
military structures. As described earlier, the military in Indonesia has historically
served, and continues to serve, in a much larger official role than is seen in the United
States.
The legitimacy of the Indonesian security sector must be viewed from both a
historical and a cultural perspective. Upon its creation as a sovereign state in 1945 to the
present, Indonesia has had distinct security challenges that have required a uniquely
conceptualized approach to managing those challenges. As an island nation consisting
of over 13,000 islands where just over 1,000 are inhabited, the physical security
challenge is immense. Added to the geographical distribution, there is also a wide array
of ethnic groups. Until the occupation by the Dutch, the islands had existed separately in
at least ten major and over 300 minor ethnic sub-groupings. It was the collective need to
oppose the Dutch colonization that even generated the concept of a united Indonesia.
The concept of the military as protector of the people, the national identity, and
the physical security of the territory is still in place, but is morphing with increased
attention on civil-military relations. According to the U.S. Department of State 2004
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Indonesia Human Rights Report, the civilian defense minister oversaw the military but in
practice exercised only limited control over TNI policy and operations. This report
described how the military and the police continued to wield significant political
influence as well as economic power through businesses operated by security force
members, their proxies, and foundations. From a rule of law perspective, the security
forces showed greater willingness to hold accountable human rights violators within their
ranks, as evidenced by hundreds of court martial proceedings that year for military
members and the dismissal or disciplinary actions for dozens of police officers.
The U.S. Department of State 2004 Human Rights Report also documented that
the types of disciplinary actions being given within the Indonesian military involved lowlevel officers and sometimes mid-level officers who committed lesser crimes, such as
beatings, but in some cases the punishments did not match the crime. In 2004, the most
serious human rights violations were observed in areas of separatist conflict. In these
regions, security force members murdered, tortured, raped, beat, and arbitrarily detained
civilians and members of separatist movements, especially in Aceh and to a lesser extent
in Papua. Notably, the report also found that retired and active duty military members
known to have committed serious human rights violations occupied or were promoted to
senior positions within the Government of Indonesia or within the TNI.
In 2012, while participating in an open forum with the U.S.-Indonesia Society,
former defense minister Professor Dr. Juwono Sudarsono began his speech by reminding
the audience that the Indonesian army, navy and air force military officers form “a very
important component to nation building and democracy building in Indonesia.”
Furthermore, he argued that as part of democracy building in Indonesia, military
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education plays an essential role in strengthening the national defense system because it
helps military officers prepare the defense strategy which solidifies the essence of
democracy.
6.1.5 Character of the Political Dissent
The early history of Indonesia since its inception in 1945 was marred by
widespread acts of factional violence as efforts were made by the newly formed military
to create a unified national identity. The Pancasila doctrine put forth in the Constitution
left no room for divisiveness. Accountability included the killing of hundreds of
thousands of suspected communists in the 1960s. President Suharto’s rise to power in
1965 following unrest related to communist separatism was touted as being the ‘New
Order’ that would put an end to what had become decades of violence. On the contrary,
Schneier (2016, p. 186) argues that the first two years of Suharto’s rule produced one of
the worst periods of genocide in the twentieth century. Schneier finds that official
Indonesian government figures ranged between 78,000 and one million dead, plus
another million to one and a half million imprisoned during this period. In this official
account, many, if not most, of the murders were committed by angry citizens under the
banner of anti-communism. It is difficult to gather the full truth about who committed
the violence and under what premise because there are few to no existing resources about
this period in history. Suharto solidified his hold on power by placing active and retired
military personnel in leadership positions in every level of government, in provincial as
well as in the national legislature, and even in the Supreme Court (Schneier, 2016, p.
186). Furthermore, the Suharto government undertook an educational mission, both for
its own members and for the general public that stressed the importance of national unity
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and continued vigilance against the threats of communism, liberalism, militant Islam, and
separatism (Schneier, 2016, p. 186). This effort may have went too far in diminishing the
role of the social groups as they worked to influence the government. Suharto held on to
power for more than thirty years but was unable to enact meaningful reform that could
truly unify the diverse group of ethnic interests spread across the vast island nation. He
ruthlessly tried to suppress calls for independence by regions beyond the capital city of
Jakarta. In particular, the tensions in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya began and
continued beyond the reign of President Suharto. On December 7th of 1975, Indonesian
forces launched a massive air and sea invasion known as Operation Lotus. During this
invasion, mass killings and rapes took place, with nearly 60,000 Timorese dead by midFebruary.
Until mid-1997, Indonesia had one of the world’s fastest growing economies,
with a yearly average growth of 7.5% for the previous ten years according to World Bank
data, but Suharto’s regime began to unravel in the late 1990s, with disastrous
consequences for the economy. Political turmoil set off a series of economic crises that
only exacerbated the impact of the unrest. The value of Indonesia’s currency collapsed,
leading to rising unemployment and dire food shortages that instigated large numbers of
public demonstrations and riots. The government response was to apply force through
both the army and the police to break up the crowds and attempt to create stability.
example of the government ruthlessness occurred on May 13, 1998, when the army
violently subdued a group of demonstrators from the elite Trisakti University during
protests in Jakarta by killing four.
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An

In January 2001, the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet on Relations with
Indonesia assessed that Indonesia suffered from fragile institutions that lacked capacity to
adequately address the extent of the social service needs. At that time, 41million, or 23
percent, of its nearly 180 million person population lived below the international poverty
line of $1.25 per day and the annual per capita gross domestic product among the
population was $690. According to the 1999 U.S. Department of State Human Rights
Report, the urban poor and middle class on heavily populated Java and Bali suffered a
significant drop in living standards that was caused in part by a major shift in
employment patterns as unregulated wealth increased in connection with discoveries of
lucrative natural resources. Populations in those regions sought greater regional
autonomy from the government, while citizens in the urban centers called for political
and economic reform. The army’s response to the protests set off a wave of further
demonstrations across the country by students calling for Suharto’s resignation from
power. The unrest culminated in Suharto stepping down less than two weeks after the
Trisakti University crackdown on May 21st and handing power to his Vice President, Mr
B.J. Habibie.
Upon his ascent to the presidency, Mr Habibie received public support from the
Indonesian military, but the Parliament building remained occupied by a nationwide
student movement to enact change in the Indonesian government. The challenges faced
by Mr Habibie were formidable. In the year preceding the transfer of power, the
economy was in free fall, with months of rioting that brought about inflation, food
shortage, bankruptcies, and paralysis to the banks, driving the Indonesian currency to
devalue by more than 80 percent (Mydans, 1998). To further complicate matters,
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President Habibie began his administration with little credibility with either the key
financial institutions or the reformers. As it became clear that his intentions to reform
were sincere, the frequency and intensity of the demonstrations decreased.
Evidence of President Habibie’s openness to political change came in January of
1999, when he agreed to allow the East Timorese the opportunity to vote on secession.
Among the hundreds of populated islands in the Indonesian archipelago, East Timor was
a relative newcomer to the Indonesian sphere. East Timor had existed as a Portuguese
colony until 1975, when it was invaded and annexed by Indonesia, ostensibly as a way to
curb outwardly communist tendencies. Despite numerous resolutions from the United
Nations calling from Indonesia’s withdrawal from East Timor, the United Nations lacked
a meaningful way to enforce the resolution. The climate following the exit of the Suharto
regime provided a new window of opportunity. On June 11, 1999, the United Nations
Security Council established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNMET) to
organize and conduct a popular consultation, scheduled for August 8, 1999, to determine
the Territory’s future status. After a series of delays, the referendum occurred on August
30,, 1999. On September 4th, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced
that 78.5% of the voters rejected the proposal that East Timor remain a part of Indonesia.
Soon after the announcement, fighting broke out and hundreds of people were killed, tens
of thousands displaced and considerable damage was done to East Timor’s physical
infrastructure. The humanitarian situation was dire. East Timor was one of the poorest
societies in Asia and it had no experience in democracy. The fighting displaced 90
percent of the population, civil administration collapsed, and the local infrastructure was
devastated. Under pressure from the United States, the International Monetary Fund,
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World Bank, and countries in the region such as Australia and New Zealand, the
Indonesian government permitted the deployment of an Australian led multinational
force, the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), to quell the violence (Dobbins
et al, 2005, p. 153). The force encountered significant security challenges, including
resistance by pro-Indonesian militias and a gutted police and justice apparatus when the
Indonesian officials departed following the referendum.
Another noteworthy source of conflict since Indonesia’s independence from the
Netherlands is the Aceh Freedom Movement. The Aceh region of Indonesia had a
history of an independent sultanate prior to colonization by the Dutch. It enjoyed a
measure of special autonomy during the Dutch colonization. Adherence to the Muslim
faith in social and political life remained strong in Aceh long after Indonesia’s
independence from the Dutch. In 1976, a guerilla movement began dedicated efforts to
gain freedom for Aceh from Indonesia. This group issued a declaration to denounce the
“illegal transfer of sovereignty over our fatherland” by the old Dutch colonialists (Ross,
2005). The government responded with a combination of military force and economic
programs. Suspects were arrested and tortured; women and children were held as
hostages by the government when their husbands evaded arrest, and between August
1977 and August 1980, 30 men were shot dead in public without process, effectively
neutralizing the rebel movement by the early 1980s (Ross, 2005, p. 39). However, the
rise of Liquid Natural Gas discovery and production contributed to economic growth in
Aceh that was not distributed to benefit society. As result, the guerilla movement
reemerged in the late 1980s, targeting Indonesian police and army units. The guerrilla
movement, known as the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or Aceh Freedom Movement,
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grew bolder in mid-1990, targeting civil authorities, commercial property, suspected
government informers, and non-Aceh settlers (Ross, 2005, p. 39).
Since 1998, Indonesia has had three successful direct Presidential elections that
have been considered by the international community to be largely free and fair. The last
one was held on July 9th, 2014, in which Mr Jokowi Widodo was elected as the seventh
president of Indonesia. His party is known as Indonesia’s Democratic Party of Struggle
(PDI-P). The Lowy Institute for International Policy hails the election ceremony as the
first peaceful transfer of power between two popularly elected leaders in the world’s third
largest democracy. President Jokowi was elected based on a platform of domestic
reform. He is the former major of the mid-sized city of Surakarta in Central Java, where
he built a consensus for a series of good government reforms that attracted nationwide
attention. He ran a successful bid for the presidency against retired Lt Gen Prabowo
Subianto. President Jokowi is the first president of Indonesia who does not come from a
military background.
Schneier (2016) finds that since 2010, the country’s extraordinary fragmentation
has become more political, but less violent because the government political party system
increasingly enables representation by the diverse interests.
6.1.6 Effectiveness of the Security Sector Apparatus
The Indonesian army faces the formidable task of defending an archipelago
consisting of more than 13,000 islands, with more than 1,000 of those inhabited and a
diverse group of major cultures and ethnic subgroups. The extent of this security
challenge has required the Government of Indonesia to clearly articulate its national
defense priorities. This was first done in an openly available format in 2008, with the
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publication of Indonesia’s first National Defense White Paper. This document was
ground breaking in its articulation of not only the national concept of security and
defense, but in which resources would be dedicated to their protection.
There has been an extensive transformation in the effectiveness of the security
force apparatus as evidenced in several sources. According to the Department of State
1999 Human Rights Report, Indonesian armed forces and national police committed
numerous serious human rights abuses throughout the year. Notably, the same report
observed that significant progress occurred in 1999 to institutionalize democracy. Along
with this democratic progress, serious human rights abuses by the security force
apparatus persisted, but the number decreased. In 2000, the Indonesian military retained
broad nonmilitary powers and were not fully accountable to civilian authority.

The U.S.

Department of State Human Rights Report observed that Indonesian Security forces also
were responsible for numerous instances of indiscriminate shooting of civilians, torture,
rape, beatings and other abuse, and arbitrary detention in Jakarta, Irian Jaya, Maluku, and
elsewhere in the country. Furthermore, the report asserted that most instances of
excessive force by the military and police during the year went unpunished and the
Indonesian military tightly controlled news about conflict in East Timor.
In 2009, the relationship between the Indonesian government and its security
forces improved, but with vestiges of past allowances of military independence from
civilian authorities. According to the U.S. Department of State 2009 Indonesia Human
Rights Report, civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security
forces. However, the Indonesian Armed Forces retained a capacity to be self-financed
that challenged the integrity of this control. As democracy gained strength in the
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Indonesian governance structure, the need for this independence diminished. The 2009
Report also found that the Indonesian National Police created more effective policies for
when the use of deadly force was appropriate and it created mechanisms for holding
violators accountable. Similarly, in 2009 the Indonesian government continued
prosecutions of high-level officials for corruption.
Despite the will to tackle high-level corruption, the 2016 U.S. Department of
State Human Rights Report recorded that the presence of high-profile arrests and
convictions did not eradicate widespread corruption. On the contrary, the report found
that some elements within the Indonesian government, judiciary, and security forces
“obstructed corruption investigations and even harassed their accusers.” During 2016, the
report also found that “serious human rights violations remained a concern, with the
government “not meeting external expectations of transparent, public investigations into
some allegations of unjustified killings, torture, and abuse by security forces.”
6.1.7 Specific Military Assistance Provided
Military assistance to Indonesia in the late 1990s consisted of training to a small
group of officers, which kept the total cost of the annual assistance in those years to less
than $600k. In 2002, the Armed Sales Monitoring Project report for Indonesia asserted
that after regular International Military Education and Training (IMET) was suspended,
Indonesian troops continued to receive combat training from U.S. soldiers under the Joint
Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program. The report asserted that the units trained
included the controversial Kopassus special operations forces that had been associated
with instances of human rights violations. Furthermore, the report asserts that whether
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the U.S. trained units were present in East Timor during the pre and post referendum
violence is unclear.
In 2000, Indonesia’s defense minister, Juwono Sudarsono, said in an interview
that cooperation with the United States would help his efforts to change the Indonesian
military (Chandrasekaran, 2000). “We need all of this management training,” Mr.
Juwono said. “We are trying to become a people’s army that respects civilian control.”
Mr. Juwono said the “principle of civilian control” now is “firmly entrenched” among
soldiers. But he worried that “the substance of it still has to be worked out. Our civil
society is still very weak.”
Vaughn (2011) asserts that the military-to-military relationship between the US
and Indonesia has been a key test of enhanced cooperation. As Indonesia showed
progress on moving through its troubled past to first successful presidential election in
2004, the administration of George Bush moved to remove restrictions on International
Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, and Foreign Military Sales
for Indonesia. Examples of the military cooperation with Indonesia include the TriBorder initiative that involved radar and maritime operations in the Makassra Strait to
monitor terrorist or pirate activity, along with U.S. assistance to Indonesia’s new defense
university and U.S. assistance with the procurement of C-130 Hercules transport aircraft
(Vaughn, p. 2).
Beginning in 2005, U.S. military assistance to Indonesia expanded substantially.
Exercises such as Garuda Shield began as an opportunity for U.S. and Indonesian Armed
Forces to jointly perform community projects. In 2014, U.S. and Indonesian medical
personnel provided free medical attention to more than 350 patients during a Cooperative
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Health Engagement (CHE), held in Sumber Waru Village, Situbundo, Indonesia. The
CHE brought soldiers, nurses and doctors together from the Indonesian Armed Forces 2nd
Medical Battalion, local health centers, and two members from the US Army Reserve’s
628th Forward Surgical Team out of Fort Sam Houston, Texas to assist residents from the
Situbondo district of Indonesia.
Similarly, the U.S. and Indonesian Navies worked to build a maritime partnership
through exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) that started in
1995. In 2017, more than 500 US Sailors participated in the 22nd CARAT-Indonesia
alongside their counterparts from the Indonesian Navy, known as Tentera Nasional
Indonesia- Angkatan Laut (TNI-AL). The exercise featured complex at-sea training in
surface and anti-submarine warfare, visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) drills, mobile
dive and salvage training, a gunnery exercise, maritime patrol operations, and exchanges
between Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians. Additionally, personnel from both
nations exchanged best practices on naval tactics during a series of military seminars
ashore. Numerous civil action projects, aviation seminars, sports exchanges, military
law, and submarine warfare symposia were conducted during the shore phase of the
exercise. Indonesia has remained part of the CARAT exercise series since it began in
1995. The PACOM public affairs web site asserts that “after more than two decades of
annual training events between the armed forces, CARAT-Indonesia remains a model for
cooperation that has evolved in complexity and enables both navies to refine operations
and tactics in response to both traditional and non-traditional maritime security
challenges.”
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Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) have also been focus topics
for U.S. and Indonesian military cooperation. In 2016, the multinational military
cooperation mission titled ‘Pacific Partnership’ visited Indonesia for the 5th time.
Participating nations’ military forces from Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand,
Republic of Korea, and the United States, as well as experts from several nongovernmental organizations such as Project Hope and HOPE worldwide made up the
partnership team. The reason for the Pacific Partnership visit to Indonesia was to
strengthen ties between participating partner nations in order to improve multinational
cooperation for HADR. During the visit, Indonesian civilian and military personnel
worked with Pacific Partnership team members to accomplish disaster response training,
civil engineering projects, Women, Peace and Security seminars, subject matter
exchanges in medical procedures, and in the conduct of a live field training exercise to
improve capacity of local government and security forces to respond to an earthquake in
the West Sumatra province (U.S. PACOM public affairs).
6.1.8 Indonesia Foreign Policy
Indonesia’s foreign policy since the late 1990s has become markedly pro-United
States and also has moved toward greater emphasis on multilateral cooperation for
regional security. Following the fall of Suharto in 1999, President Megawati ushered in a
period of normalcy to Indonesian politics. She also openly expressed support for the
United States after the attacks by Al Qaeda on New York City on September 11, 2001,
making time to visit the United States and open dialogue for restoration of U.S. military
aid to Indonesia.
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Indonesia’s strategic defense policies now prioritize multilateral cooperation. In
2012, the U.S. Indonesia Cooperation on Peacekeeping Fact Sheet published by the U.S.
Embassy & consulates in Indonesia, declared that Indonesia had approximately 1,700
peacekeepers deployed in countries across the globe, including Lebanon, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and Haiti. At that time, Indonesia was among the top 20
peacekeeper contributing countries in the world. In September 2018, Indonesia is ranked
ninth of more than 130 countries contributing troops to international peacekeeping.
According to the UN, it is one of only 21 countries that contribute more than 1000 troops.
Indonesia views its participation in the U.N. peacekeeping mission as “an
important and concrete indicator of its role in contributing to the maintenance of
international peace and security”(Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 Jan 2016).
Indonesia is taking deliberate steps to increase and improve the qualities of its
peacekeepers, as evidenced by the following:
1) Establishment of a Coordinating Team for Peacekeeping Missions through
Presidential Decree Number 85 in 2011. This team includes the Coordinating
Minister for Political, Legal, and Security, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the
Minister of Defense, the Minister of Law and Human Rights, the Minister of
Finance, the National Development Planning Minister, the Cabinet Secretary,
the Army Commander, the Chief of the National Police and State Intelligence
Agency.
2) Envisioned deployment of 4,000 peacekeepers in 2019.
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3) Established the National Army Peacekeeping Training Center as a training
ground for Indonesian personnel as well as a hub for peacekeeping training
centers in the region.
According to the U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet on U.S. –Indonesia
relations, the United States contributed significant resources to support the creation of the
peacekeeping training center. Additionally, since 2006 the U.S. obligated $14.8 million
to boost Indonesian peacekeeping capacity, including approximately $8 million in Global
Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) funds to support the construction of barracks facilities
and other operational equipment at the Indonesian Peace and Security Center. GPOI also
partnered with Indonesia to host two major multinational peacekeeping exercises (Garuda
Shield 2008 and 2009).
6.1.9 Conclusion
U.S. military assistance in Indonesia is a successful example of the context
conditions under which political development fragility of the security sector apparatus is
reduced after receiving U.S. military assistance. The U.S. investment of military
assistance resources in Indonesia is just over twenty years, beginning only in the late
1990s. However, the political will of both the Indonesian government and its population
to cooperate with the U.S. while it is committed to rectifying internal security problems
has combined to make an environment where U.S. military assistance resources are more
likely to enable reduction to security sector apparatus fragility. The legitimacy of the
Indonesian security sector apparatus has grown as the government’s commitment to
provide services across the population has become more visible to the population.
Indonesia has also committed to the reduction of human rights violations in the conduct
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of security sector apparatus business, which further bolsters the legitimacy of these
actions. There has been a significant reduction of political violence in Indonesia, which
demonstrates the increased effectiveness of the security sector apparatus. This
effectiveness and national political will has led to Indonesian foreign policy actions that
are better postured to actively participate in the reduction of instability among
neighboring states.
Table 12 Evidence of Legitimacy of the State in Indonesia
Strong

General

Ambiguous

General lack

Adherence Adherence

of adherence

Strong lack
of adherence

________________________________________________________________________
Confidence in Political Process

X

Political Opposition

X

Transparency

X

Openness & Fairness of Political Process

X

Political Violence

X

The government of Indonesia has improved its representativeness, openness and
responsive relationship with its citizens. In the measures named above, four of the five
can be considered to be in general adherence by the Indonesian government. The one
measure that can be improved is transparency. This determination is based on the U.S.
Department of State 2016 Human Rights Report that found that “serious human rights
violations remained a concern” as the government was “not meeting external
expectations of transparent, public investigations into some allegations of unjustified
killings, torture, and abuse by security forces.”
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Table 13 Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness in Indonesia
Strong

General

Adherence Adherence

Ambiguous

General lack

Strong lack

of Adherence

of Adherence

_______________________________________________________________________
Monopoly of the Use of Force

X

Relationship Between Security & Citizenry

X

In an indication of institutional progress, during the period between 2002 and
2016, the Indonesian government exhibited general adherence to the principle of
monopoly of the use of force. In the 2000 U.S. Department of State Human Rights
Report for Indonesia, the authors asserted that the Indonesian military was unaccountable
for numerous cases of excessive force. However, the government of Indonesia created its
first Defense White Paper to outline how it intended to secure the state in a legitimate and
effective manner. Evidence of the commitment to the provisions of this white paper were
contained in the U.S. Department of State 2009 Human Rights Report for Indonesia,
which found that civilian authorities were effectively controlling the military forces.
That same report also found that the Indonesian National Police had created more
effective policies for when the use of deadly force was appropriate and had created
mechanisms for holding violators accountable.
Despite progress in gaining a monopoly of the use of force, the government of
Indonesia has work remaining in its relationship between the security force apparatus and
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the citizenry, as evidenced by the persistence of human rights violations by security
forces. This is an arena in which U.S. military assistance can potentially be helpful
because military education courses must cover the rule of law and respect for human
rights.
6.2 Philippines

Figure 12 Map of Philippines
Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Fact book
6.2.1 Orientation2017
The Philippines is an archipelago of over 7,000 islands in Southeastern Asia east
of Vietnam. Among those islands, most of the state is defined by three main island
groups, Luzon, the Viscayas, and Mindanao. About 94% of the state is located on 13
islands (Kahl, 2006). The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
Population Division estimates that the population of the Philippines is just under 102
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million people, placing it in the top 10% of most populated states in the world. The two
official languages are Filipino, which is based on Tagalog, and English. 83% of the
population is identified as Catholic. According to the World Bank, the GDP per capita
in 2016 is $2,951.
6.2.2 U.S. National Interest and Relationship with Philippines
The relationship between the United States and the Philippines is over one
hundred years old and spans association as a wartime adversary and colonizer from 1898
to 1934 to treaty ally beginning in 1951 and continuing to the present. In 1898, the
United States fought to overturn Spanish rule in the Philippines and other locations in the
Spanish-American War. Though the main motivator for the Spanish-American War was
to free Cuba from the yoke of the Spanish colonial rule, the first shot was fired in the
Pacific. Spain had ruled the Philippines for more than 300 years. The U.S. Asiatic Fleet
was tasked to sail to Manila upon the outbreak of hostilities

On May 1st, 1898, the U.S.

fleet sank all but one of the Spanish warfighting ships, with less than ten American
casualties. The war on land was not as easy. On June 12th, the Filipino resistance, led by
Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, issued a declaration of independence. U.S. President William
McKinley responded by sending a 12,500 man expeditionary force to complete the
reduction of Spanish Power in the Philippines and to restore order and security to the
islands while in the possession of the United States (Boot, 2002). This war ended on
December 10th, 1898, with the Treaty of Paris. The United States paid Spain $20 million
and received control of the Philippines as a colony. U.S. President McKinley issued a
proclamation announcing the U.S. goal as “benevolent assimilation” (Boot, 2002, 106).
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The invasion of the Philippines was the first effort by the United States to conquer
territory outside of its own continent. American power was growing and the industrial
revolution was in full swing. The rush for access to economic resources was underway
by the great powers at the time and the United States was in the early stages of flexing its
economic and military muscle on the global stage. Once in possession of the Philippines,
the United States was challenged on how best to manage the island nation. There was no
unifying language at the time and less than a quarter of the population was literate. The
Spanish language never took root and the geographic separation enabled diverse ethnic
groups to exist with little interaction among them. However, the United States undertook
the management responsibility with the intention of improving Filipino civic capacity. In
Manila, the U.S. army was tasked for various missions that included vaccinating the local
inhabitants, repairing roads, building schools, and restoring or creating other essential
infrastructure. These efforts, however, did not dampen the Filipino desire for
independence.
Years of bloody rebellion by the Filipinos were eventually pacified with an
American promise of self-government in 1934 with the creation of the Philippine
Commonwealth. The Philippine Commonwealth was instituted in 1935 as a deliberate
attempt to create a democratic governance system. U.S. administrators delegated
authority to Philippine land owners and the educated class. The intent was to transition
the Philippines to full independence over a period of ten years. The process was derailed
in 1941 when Japan invaded the Philippines. The Philippines did not return to selfgovernment until 1946 after the U.S. victory over Japan in World War II. One condition
for the independence of the Philippines was that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff acquire
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forty army and navy facilities, including Subic Bay Naval Station and Clark Air Base
(Cooley, 2008). This set the stage for a continued military relationship over the next
several decades.
The relationship between the United States and the Philippines strengthened after
World War II when U.S. policymakers were concerned about minimizing the influence of
communism in the region. The United States worked together with the nascent
Philippine government to counter a group of communist radicals in Central Luzon known
as the Hukbalahap, or Huks, who organized a peasant rebellion against the Japanese
occupiers and their allies among the landed elite.
The Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1951 affirming the relationship
between the governments of the United States and the Philippines in recognition that an
armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and each party agrees that it will act to meet the common dangers in
accordance with its own constitutional processes (U.S. Department of State public web
site on U.S. Collective Defense Agreements). The strategic mutual defense relationship
continued unabated until 1992, when the Philippine government voted to remove
permanent U.S. military basing on Philippine sovereign territory. In turn, the U.S. closed
Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base. Despite this removal, the two countries continued
to conduct joint military activities to bolster the AFP’s ability to respond to security
threats and to cooperate with U.S. military forces.
The relationship between the United States and the Government of the Philippines
has undergone changes that have in many ways paralleled the relative legitimacy of the
Philippine government in the eyes of its people. Not long after the Philippines received
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independence from the United States, the continued presence of the U.S. military
facilities was controversial because of the fragile nature of the fledgling government.
Cooley (2008, p. 66) argues that the volatility of the relationship between the United
States and the Philippine government was in many ways a function of postwar Philippine
democratization and its competitive, elite-driven politics. Cooley asserts that it was a
succession of Philippine leaders who leveraged the unstable political climate in order to
extract economic and political concessions from the United States to consolidate and
expand their domestic power base. Ferdinand Marcos ruled the Philippines through
martial law beginning in 1972. The period following this declaration was marked with
routine restrictions on political opponents, a decrease in freedom of the press, and human
rights abuses. Though the United States did not condone this behavior, it subordinated
these concerns out of concern for access opportunities to the Pacific Area of Operations
and in recognition of Marcos’ anticommunist credentials. President Marcos played a savy
two-level game in his relations with the United States. While Marcos maintained a
tough, pro-Philippine sovereignty domestically, he was unwavering in his outward
support for the United States as the Americans paid handsomely to sustain military bases
on Philippine territory. During the Reagan U.S. presidential administration in the 1980s,
the United States willingly raised the amount of compensation to the Philippine
government to a new five-year package for $900 million, an 80 percent increase over the
1979 accord (Cooley, 2008, p. 72).
Not long after the new financial support agreement was finalized, the Marcos
regime began to unravel. In August of 1983, opposition leader Benigno Aquino was
assassinated, setting off a wave of protests against an increasingly illegitimate Marcos
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government. Protesters called for a removal of U.S. bases and the creation of a new
constitution. In response, President Marcos called for a presidential election on February
7, 1986. He did not expect the widespread support for Benigno Aquino’s widow,
Corazon Aquino as she sought to unseat Marcos. After Marcos fraudulently claimed
victory in the election, mass demonstrations occurred throughout the Philippine capital
for 18 days. On February 25th, 1986, American helicopters airlifted Marcos from the
country that no longer would tolerate his leadership. A consequence of U.S. neutrality
with regard to the abuses by the Marcos regime was that the post-Marcos climate featured
an intense nationalism and extensive anti-Americanism among the Filipino public.
Upon removal of President Marcos, interim President Corazon Aquino appointed
a committee to draft a new constitution and submit it directly for a national referendum.
An outcome of this new constitution was that two specific clauses were added that
influenced the future of U.S. basing in the Philippines. The first requirement was that
nuclear weapons would be prohibited from being stationed on the Philippines and that the
U.S. Military Bases Agreement would not be extended beyond its current 1991 expiration
date without specific ratification by the Philippine Senate, and, if requested by the
Philippine Congress, an additional popular referendum (Cooley, 2008, p. 80). In
September 1991, the Philippine Senate voted against extending the U.S. military presence
for another ten years and by the end of 1992, the U.S. military fully relinquished its
permanent presence in the Philippines.
The relationship gained renewed prominence in the early 21st century after the
terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11th, 2001. The George W. Bush
Administration proclaimed the Philippines, with its ongoing Muslim insurgency and
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Islamist terrorist networks, as a front-line state in the global war on terrorism. This
partnership was codified when the United States designated the Philippines as a Major
Non-NATO Ally on October 6, 2003, after President Gloria Macpagal-Arroyo announced
Manila’s support for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq to punish supporters of the September
11th attacks. Since this declaration, U.S. forces have cooperated with Philippine forces to
jointly counter terrorist threats by Islamist groups in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago
in the southern Philippines (Lum and Dolven, 2014). These efforts have included U.S.
military training for Philippine security forces.
Beyond joint counterterrorism efforts, the Philippines has played a key role in the
U.S. foreign policy priorities in the Asia Pacific at large for other security reasons.
Maritime territorial disputes between China and several other claimants in the South
China Sea have intensified and the Philippines is a party to the dispute. In 2011, U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Albert F.
del Rosario signed the “Manila Declaration,” which reaffirmed the bilateral security
relationship and called for multilateral negotiations. The United States does not take a
position on the formal resolution of the dispute but encourages a peaceful process based
on international law and multilateral engagement. When Typhoon Haiyan (known in the
Philippines as Yolanda) hit on November 8, 2013, the United States contributed $87
million in disaster aid and $59 million in private sector contributions. The United States
was a major contributor in helping the overwhelmed Philippine government infrastructure
to respond to the damage done by one of the strongest typhoons to strike land on record.
14.1 million people were affected, with more than 4.1 million displaced, 6,201 deaths,
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more than 1,785 missing, and nearly 5.6 million people required food assistance (Lum
and Margesson, Feb 10, 2014).
In 2014, the United States and the Philippines held discussions on a framework
for an increased non-persistent U.S. military presence in the Philippines. In March 2014,
the two states held the fourth Bilateral Strategic Dialogue in which they discussed
continuing recovery efforts from the typhoon, enhanced defense cooperation, economic
ties, U.S. foreign aid programs, and other issues. On April 28, 2014, as President Obama
visited the Philippines in conjunction with visits to three other states, the two states
announced the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). It is a ten-year
renewable arrangement that enables increased U.S. military presence in the Philippines
on a rotational basis.
In recognition of its status as a key partner for the U.S. strategic balancing to
Asia, the Philippines is distinguished as one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid.
In 2011, the Government of the United States and the Government of the Philippines
entered into a Partnership for Growth (PFG) to address underlying constraints to
development and growth in the Philippines. In preparing for the PFG, American
assessment teams identified insufficient public revenues for investment and services,
weak governance, and pervasive corruption as obstacles that would need to be addressed
(USAID, Philippines CDCS, 2013). The PFG in the Philippines supports growth nationwide and requires support from approximately 15 U.S. Government departments and
agencies and other international partners such as the Asia Development Bank and the
World Bank. The U.S. has designated the USAID Country Development Strategy in the
Philippines as a Tier 1 Performance Management Focus Mission—one of only 11 such
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Missions worldwide and the only one in East Asia (Lum and Dolven, 2014). Tier 1
signifies that the aid under this strategy is the agency’s highest priority and will be held to
the highest performance standards. The USAID goal for its collaboration with the
Philippines is that in partnership with the Government of the Philippines and in concert
with other U.S. Government agencies, donors and actors, the Philippines will emerge as a
more stable, prosperous and well governed nation. In this regard, the three key
development objectives are: 1) Broad-based and inclusive growth accelerated and
sustained, 2) Peace and stability in conflicted areas in Mindanao improved, and 3)
Environmental resilience improved (USAID Philippines CDCS, 2013)
To complicate the progress described above, on 20 October 2016, new Philippine
President Rodrigo R. Duterte boldly declared to his Chinese hosts in Beijing, “Your
honours, I announce my separation from the United States” (Teehankee, 2016).
6.2.3 Political Order
6.2.3.1 Executive Government
6.2.3.1.1 Structure
The Philippines is a multiparty, constitutional republic with a bicameral
legislature. The current constitution was drafted in October of 1986 and ratified in
February of 1987. Presidents are selected by direct popular election. There have been
thirteen Philippine presidents since 1946 when the Philippines became a sovereign
republic. The last one, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, was elected in May, 2016.
Philippine Presidents may serve for one six-year term.
The legislature is bicameral, with a House of Representatives and a Senate. The
House of Representatives has 286 seats; 229 are directly elected; 57 are allotted to party252

lists according to proportional representation. There are four political parties represented
in the House of Representatives and three in the Senate. The Senate has 24 seats that are
directly elected. The most recent legislative election was in 2013.
6.2.3.1.2 Leadership
The prevailing politics of the last three presidents of the Philippines have played a
significant role in the political development of the country. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
served as president from 2001 to 2010. She is the daughter of Diosdado P. Macpagal, who
was president of the Philippines from 1961 to 1965. Macpagal Arroyo began her political
career when President Corazon Aquino appointed her as undersecretary of trade and
industry in 1986. She ran for a seat in the Senate in 1992 and was reelected in 1995 by a
record 16 million votes. In 1998, she was elected to the office of vice president in 1998 to
serve alongside Joseph Estrada. Following a corruption scandal surrounding President
Estrada, Macpagal Arroyo assumed the office of the presidency on January 20, 2001. She
is known for bringing an academic and administrative structure to the Philippine
presidency, applying skills gained from her doctorate in economics from the University of
the Philippines.
In 2010, Benigno Aquino III, son of former President Corazon Aquino and former
senator, was elected by a large margin. A major platform for his election was the
resolution of rampant corruption. He also was known for greater sensitivity to political
and economic grievances, with less emphasis on eradicating Muslim and communist
insurgencies through military means (Lum and Dolven, 2014).
In 2016, Rodrigo Duterte was elected amidst a popular call for change. One of
the major changes was to renounce ties with the United States and pursue greater
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autonomy from what some Filipinos still perceive as U.S. imperialism. President Duterte
grew up in Mindanao, the region of the Philippines with one of the most violent histories
of insurgency. Teehankee (2016, p. 69) argues that Duterte has repudiated the liberal
reformist narrative of the Aquino regimes and that his so-called “Pivot to China” is “a
dramatic reversal of his predecessor’s strong anti-China and rapidly pro-America foreign
policy position.”
6.2.3.1.3 Culture
The Philippines has a vibrant, but challenged, democratic culture. Citizens
generally can exercise political and civil rights with few restrictions. There is freedom of
expression, freedom of the press, and religious liberties. However, there continues to be
patterns of patronage and cronyism that are difficult to break. While the legislature is
established to balance against a powerful executive, it has not had great success in
articulating and carrying out broad policy programs. Lum and Dolven (2014) assert that
political parties and groupings tend to be tenuous and shifting, driven more by individual
personalities and interests than by unifying ideologies, policy platforms, and goals. The
U.S. State Philippines 2013 Human Rights Report echoes this observation by asserting
that dynastic political families continued to monopolize elective offices at the national
and local level.
6.2.3.2 Security Sector Apparatus
6.2.3.2.1 Structure
The Department of National Defense directs the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) has authority
over the civilian Philippine National Police (PNP). The AFP, which has primary
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responsibility for anti-insurgency operations, also is responsible for traditional law
enforcement efforts, including the pursuit of kidnappers, a chronic criminal problem.
The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
6.2.3.2.2 Leadership
According to the US Department of State 2016 Human Rights report, civilian
authorities did not maintain effective control over the Philippine National Police (PNP),
which did not have a civilian head of the Internal Affairs Service from 2008 to December
2016. There were no reports that civilian control over other security forces was inadequate.
6.2.3.2.3 Culture
There is a pervasive lack of political will to hold government security force
violators of human rights abuses accountable. The annual U.S. Department of State
Human Rights reports shed considerable light on the culture of the Philippine government
regarding the security sector apparatus, as described below.
In 1999, the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report on the Philippines
observed that members of the security services were responsible for extrajudicial killings,
torture, disappearances, arbitrary arrest, and detention, and other physical abuse of
suspects and detainees. Furthermore, this document also recorded that the Philippine
Government’s Commission on Human Rights (CHR), established by the 1987
Constitution, described the Philippine National Police (PNP) as the leading abuser of
human rights, followed by the Communist New People’s Army (NPA), and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). It also argued that the Government took few effective
steps to stop military and police abuses.
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The US Department of State 2002 Human Rights Report affirmed the arguments
made in 1999, stating that the CHR again described the PNP as the worst abuser of
human rights. The 2002 report asserted that “police and local government leaders at
times appeared to sanction extrajudicial killings and vigilantism as expedient means of
fighting crime and terrorism.” This report also observed that the Philippine courts and
the police failed to address adequately complaints of victims’ families concerning
disappearances when government forces were suspected.
The 2005 Human Rights Report from the US Department of State asserted that
civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of security forces, but some
elements continued to commit human rights abuses. The most significant observations in
this report were a pervasive weakness in the rule of law, official impunity, and the wide
disparity between rich and poor contributed to cynicism about official justice. Again, the
CHR described the PNP as the worst abuser of human rights. In 2005, the CHR
investigated 381 complaints of unlawful killings, compared to 307 complaints in 2004.
The number of killings included those committed by antigovernment insurgents, but the
CHR “suspected the PNP of the majority of human rights violations that it investigated
during the year.” This report described how security forces sometimes resorted to the
summary execution of suspects because they were unavoidable in the exchange of fire
between suspects and law enforcement.
The 2008 Human Rights Report by the US Department of State continued to
assert that arbitrary, unlawful and extrajudicial killings by elements of the security
services and political killings, including killings of journalists, by a variety of actors were
major problems. However, the report also described how reforms were being undertaken
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as a result of increased domestic and international scrutiny and the number of killings and
disappearances were decreasing dramatically. The CHR continued to suspect personnel
from the PNP and the AFP in a number of killings of leftist activists operating in rural
areas. To investigate the nature of the abuses, the allegations of summary executions by
government security forces were referred to the nongovernment organization “Task Force
Detainees of the Philippines”. One significant mitigation action by the Government of
the Philippines reported in this 2008 Human Rights Report was that during this year the
PNP expanded human rights training and set up a network of 1,636 human rights desk
offices at the national, regional, provincial, and municipal levels. There was little change
five years later. The 2013 Human Rights Report by the US Department of State claimed
that the most significant human rights problems continued to be extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances undertaken by security forces.
The 2016 Human Rights Report by the U.S. Department of State focused more on
civilian control of the security sector apparatus. In particular, this report asserted that
civilian authorities did not maintain effective control over the Philippine National Police
(PNP) because there was no civilian head of the Internal Affairs Service from 2008 until
December 2016. However, the report did mention that there were no reports that civilian
control over other security forces was inadequate. A new dynamic that appeared in this
report is that since July 2016 police and unknown vigilantes killed more than 6,000
suspected drug dealers and users as the government pursued a policy aimed at eliminating
illegal drug activity in the country by the end of the year. The report observed that
extrajudicial killings had been the chief human rights concern for many years and that
they increased sharply throughout 2016. Furthermore, this report asserted that there was
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a weak and overburdened criminal justice system. Authors found the evidence for this
assessment in slow court procedures, weak prosecutions, and poor cooperation between
police and investigators.
6.2.4 Legitimacy of the Security Sector Apparatus
Efforts to establish legitimacy of the Philippine security sector apparatus are found
in the official published national security guidance. The most recent National Security
Policy was published by the National Government of the Republic of the Philippines in
2011. Signed by then President Benigno Aquino III, the goal of this policy is “to provide
the overarching framework that shall promote the people’s welfare and for the posterity of
our nation.” The policy announces that there are four key elements that will promote this
objective: 1) good governance, 2) delivery of basic services, 3) reconstruction and
sustainable development, and 4) security sector reforms. As a national goal, the policy
declares that “the security sector shall assist in creating the enabling environment to win
the hearts and minds of those with valid grievances and retain the allegiance of the rest of
the citizenry.” Thus, the policy is ambitious in promoting a comprehensive approach to
security that goes well beyond physical security of the territory of the Philippines.
However, achievement of these goals is challenged by colonial history, culture of the
Philippine police, lack of security sector apparatus capacity and the political will of the
current executive administration.
When Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, he had to build a powerful
coercive apparatus to ensure adherence. His government increased military spending
tenfold between 1972 and 1977 and the percentage of the national budget devoted to the
armed forces nearly doubled to 22.6 percent by 1977 (Kahl, 2006, p. 101). Similarly, the
258

size of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) grew from 53,000 in 1971 to over
100,000 by the mid-1970s and to more than 150,000 by 1979 (Kahl, 2006, p. 101). To
solidify executive control by Marcos, the police force was integrated into the national
security apparatus. Finally, an additional security force was established at the local level
known as Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF). The mission for these units was to
organize, train, and equip thousands of civilians and to provide local security at the town
level throughout the Philippines. Unfortunately, these units were comprised of part-time
soldiers and vigilantes who were poorly trained, armed, and controlled (Kahl, 2006, p.
102).
In the mid-1990s, the communist movement experienced a revival of its armed
membership (Cruz de Castro, 2010). Cruz de Castro argues that the reason why the
communist movement resurfaced is because it had a unique ability to recruit and
consolidate its armed presence as a separate state within a state that could impose its own
brand of peace, order, and social justice in the remote areas where the government control
was weak or almost non-existent (Cruz de Castro, 2010, p. 159). As a result of the growth
of the communist insurgency, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an Executive
Order in 2001 to create “A Coordinative and Integrative System for Internal Security.”
This order led to policies that committed the entire government towards the elimination of
the root causes of insurgencies and neutralizing the insurgents, which clearly indicated a
political will to implement reforms that would deter recruitment for these organizations by
rendering them less appealing.
Attempts to neutralize the insurgency were not effective. The Administration of
Benigno Aquino published policy to prioritize security sector reform after his election in
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2010, but the policy did not take root. In 2014, Amnesty International published a report
on Police Torture in the Philippines as part of its global campaign to “Stop Torture.”
Authors of the report wrote, “The Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment (ill-treatment) of common criminal suspects in the Philippines by the
police—one of the world’s smallest forces per population—is under-reported and almost
undocumented. Seldom talked about, it is the country’s dark, open secret.” Per this report,
the Philippine government passed an Anti-Torture Act (ATA) in 2009 to recognize torture
as a separate crime and to provide a number of important guarantees to aid torture survivors
seeking redress. However, the report asserts that torture continues unabated nearly five
years after the approval of the ATA and that the majority of the violators are police officers.
The negative environment continues to deteriorate under the Duterte administration. Since
President Duterte took office in June 2016, nongovernmental organizations and media
outlets estimate that more than 12,000 people have been killed in the Duterte government’s
campaign to rid Philippine society of illegal drug use and trafficking (Kine, 2017). The
Human Rights Watch organization research asserts that the majority of the deaths are
among poor Filipino urban dwellers and constitute extrajudicial executions by police and
their agents.
6.2.5 Character of the Political Dissent
Political dissent in the Philippines stems from a number of historical political,
social and economic challenges. Not long after receiving independence from the United
States in 1946, the Philippine government tried to implement labor and agrarian reforms
in response to pressure from the Huks, a rebellion group. This group of aggrieved
Filipinos continued the rebellion after the Japanese departed and for the next several
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decades. Kahl (2006) argues that the growth of the communist insurgency in the
Philippines derived strength from the tremendous demographic and environmental stress
that had begun to reverberate throughout Filipino society in the late 1960s. In particular,
population growth was exceptionally rapid in the Philippines during the 20th century due
to exceedingly high total fertility rate and a declining mortality rate. The population
grew from only 7.6 million in 1903 to 19.2 million in 1948. By 1990 the population was
at 60.6 million and in 2016 it is 110 million, which is nearly 15 times the number of
inhabitants in 1903.
A communist insurgency erupted after Ferdinand Marcos was elected to the office
of the President of the Philippines. In September 1972, Marcos declared martial law,
simultaneously abolishing Congress, habeas corpus, free elections, free speech, and free
press. Shortly afterward, Marcos implemented a full scale dictatorship and arrested more
than 60,000 political opponents (Kahl, 2006, p. 71). From this point on, the Philippine
state deteriorated rapidly in its authority and ability to govern. The state weakness
manifested itself in four ways: 1) the administrative capacity declined significantly, 2) the
coercive power of the state declined, despite vast increases to the military budget, 3) the
combination of demographic and environmental stress (DES) and overall economic
decline eventually crushed the legitimacy of the Marcos regime, and 4) the combination
of DES, the economic crisis, and the growing insurgency caused the cohesion of the state
to erode, especially within the military and between military leaders and Marcos (Kahl,
2006, pp 100-103).
The time period during which the violence became particularly intense was after
Marcos declared martial law. The combination of the huge security structure and its poor
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training and oversight was particularly vicious in the eyes of an increasingly insecure
general population as these forces committed gross human rights violations. In particular,
the military adopted harsh strategies to cut off the guerillas from the civilian population by
the use of summary executions and forced migrations. The perception grew among the
poor that the AFP was an army of occupation rather and a neutral provider of law and order
(Kahl, 2006, p. 108). In turn, the lack of security from the government caused the poor to
flock to the communist led insurgency, further fueling the cycle of violence.
The presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was plagued by political unrest
starting only months after she took office in 2001. Macapagal Arroyo rose to the
presidency after Joseph Estrada was removed amid charges of corruption. Estrada’s
supporters did not back down. Nearly 20,000 stormed the presidential palace, prompting
Macapagal Arroyo to declare a “state of rebellion” that lasted five days. The unrest
continued into Macapagal Arroyo’s presidency. In 2003, disaffected members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines seized a Manila apartment building and demanded her
resignation. This attempted coup was suppressed peacefully, but the tension with the
military continued. In 2006, another military coup was attempted and blocked, but
Macapagal Arroyo declared a countrywide state of emergency. During the weeklong state
of emergency, military personnel were confined to their military posts to keep them from
joining protests against the administration by Macapagal Arroyo (Alfano, 2006).
Considering the often violent nature of Filipino politics, it is not uncommon for
Filipino politicians to employ armed security services. An example of this violence
occurred in November 2009, when 57 family members and media workers were murdered
as they traveled in a convoy to file for the candidacy of Ismail Mangudadatu for the
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governorship of the Maguindanao province (western Mindanao)(Lum and Dolven 2014).
A rival clan in that region that had been aligned with the Macapagal Arroyo administration
was implicated in the massacre.
The USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategy for 2013-2019 asserts
that prosperity and stability in the Philippines are undermined by armed conflict
throughout the country and the threat of international terrorism. This strategy pinpoints
the bulk of the conflict to be in Mindanao—the Philippine’s largest, and potentially most
economically productive region. The name of the major ethnic group in Mindanao is
Moro and the core group is centered on the region known as Bangsamoro. The Moros
have a long standing tension with the central government because there is a perception
that the region has been intentionally marginalized for investment and is targeted for
Christian settlement as a way to weaken Muslim influence. Nearly a third of the total
population on Mindanao is Muslim and several provinces on the island have a majority
Muslim population. The total population of Muslims in the Philippines is estimated to be
less than 5%.
A consequence of the grievances by the people of Mindanao was the creation of
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1973 and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) in 1977. An agreement was set up by the central government of the
Philippines and the MNLF in 1996 to grant the Bangsamoro region a degree of
governance autonomy. This autonomy did not prove as fruitful for the Moros as
originally envisioned, which contributed to a resurgence of the violence by the Moros
against the government. The MILF was created to redefine the parameters of the
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governance arrangement. Since 1997, the government of the Philippines has attempted to
negotiate with the MILF, but with little success.
In 2012, President Aquino worked to establish a peace framework for
reconciliation in Mindanao, when he signed a framework peace agreement between his
government and the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front). The agreement included a
transition process, wealth and power sharing, and disarmament of the rebels. Full
acceptance of the arrangement by the insurgent groups did not happen as quickly as was
hoped. Throughout the summer of 2013, the Bangsamoro Freedom Fighters (BFF), an
MILF splinter group, carried out sporadic attacks on civilian and military targets. In
response, the government killed 80 BFF troops as a warning to the others. Another
example of the continued unrest occurred later than year when MNLF founder Nur
Misuari threated to declare independence for several regions in western Mindanao and
the Sulu Archipelago. In September 2013, he led insurgents to challenge government
troops in Zamboanga city and nearby villages, taking nearly 300 hostages in the process
and resulting in the deaths of more than 100 people from both sides.
The final peace accord, known as the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro,
was signed on March 27, 2014. The intent is to grant a substantial increase of political
autonomy to Muslim areas in Mindanao Island and to the Sulu Archipelago, recognized
to be the largest sub-region in the Philippines. This arrangement is ambitious because the
region remains economically poor and prone to sporadic armed attacks, small-scale
bombings and kidnappings by Islamist and communist groups. Unfortunately, the
persistence of violence discourages investment and continues to drain government
resources.
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6.2.6 Effectiveness of the Security Sector Apparatus
The security sector apparatus of the Philippines has an extended and continuing
challenge with both quantity and quality of available security sector resources. As an
island nation with geographically distributed major land masses separated by seas, the
Filipino society has yet to create clear rules of law that are enforceable. Among the
systemic weaknesses in creating an effective security sector is that according to Amnesty
International in a 2014 report on police violence in the Philippines, the police force is one
of the world’s smallest with relation to the population that it is tasked to protect. This
report was promulgated by Amnesty International to examine the legal framework
prohibiting torture and other ill-treatment in the Philippines as a means of measuring the
compliance by the Philippines in the tenets of its international treaties.
The Amnesty International (AI) report asserts that torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment of common criminal suspects by the police is
underreported and almost undocumented. The AI (2014) report also asserts that
“detainees in custody by the police have been subjected to a variety of methods of torture
including; electric shocks; systematic beatings, punching and kicking; striking with
wooden batons or metal bars; burning with cigarettes; waterboarding; near-asphyxiation
with plastic bags; forcing detainees to assume stressful bodily positions; being stripped
naked and their genitalia tied to a string with was pulled by police officers; and
threatening with death if they refuse to cooperate.” Finally, the report argues that no one
is known to have been convicted of torture in a Philippine court, so perpetrators act with
virtual impunity.
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The U.S. Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs 2018 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume 1
report on the Philippines reports that systemic poverty, public corruption, and porous
national borders create an environment where drug trafficking is very lucrative, with a
relatively low risk of successful interdiction or prosecution. The report asserts that
transnational organized criminal organizations have established operational elements
throughout the urban areas of the Philippines. Furthermore, the report argues that the
Philippines is a regional transit route for drug trafficking and remains a destination for
diverted chemicals used in the production of methamphetamine due to weak chemical
controls and a lack of port security. From an institutional development perspective, the
report claims that Philippine law enforcement and justice sector agencies lack sufficient
resources, personnel, and effective tools to identify, investigate, and prosecute members
of transnational drug trafficking organizations. For example, restrictions imposed by the
Anti-Wiretapping Act of 1965 continued to bar the use of judicially authorized
interception of criminal communications, among several other legal constraints.
On the positive side, the Philippines is a state party to various international
treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN
Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In 2009, the Philippine
government passed an Anti-Torture Act to recognize torture as a separate crime and
provided a number of important guarantees to aid torture survivors seeking redress.
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6.2.7 Specific U.S. Military Assistance
U.S. military support to the Philippines dates back to 1898 following
decolonization. In the 1940s, American military assistance to the Philippines increased as
the U.S. pressured the Philippine government to implement reforms in the disputed Spratly
Islands chain in the South China Sea. In 1947, a U.S. Military Assistance Agreement was
formally drafted to create the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) to advise
and assist with the train and equip military mission requirements of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP). From this point on until 1992, the U.S. Government granted the
AFP substantial support for training and technical assistance in an amount that made up a
considerable portion of the Filipino annual defense budget (U.S. Embassy in Philippines
Fact Sheet on Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group). However, the relationship changed
in 1992 when the Government of the Philippines demanded closure to U.S. military basing.
These closures significantly reduced the level of bilateral engagement activities, reflecting
the associated attitude of the population of the Philippines.
Al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001
prompted a re-engagement by the Government of the Philippines with Washington and a
reinstatement of military-to-military interaction. However, the renewed partnership came
with restrictions. To clarify the relationship, a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was
created to require that the U.S. military forces assume a non-combat role and do not
establish a permanent base of operations on Philippine soil.

Within this framework,

military assistance to the Philippines increased by reinvigorating a robust exercise schedule
and it increased Foreign Military Financing. These actions enabled the Philippines to
receive U.S. defense technologies through grant funded purchasing.
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Since 2002, the U.S. has provided non-combat assistance to the A.F.P. through the
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines—rotating approximately 600 U.S.
military personnel. Philippine-U.S. counterterrorism efforts, along with development aid,
have helped to significantly reduce the size and strength of Abu Sayyaf Group, a violent,
Philippines-based Islamist organizations that has acted as a bridge between southeast
terrorist networks and Muslim separatist insurgencies such as the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (Lum, 2012, p. 2). One of the most significant current relationships between the two
countries is an annual exercise known as Balikataan (shoulder to shoulder in Tagalog).
This exercise contains a significant humanitarian component in addition to training for
combat rescue and the evacuation and care of casualties, defusing and disposing of bombs,
maritime security exercises, disaster relief, and joint force management. U.S. military
members provide a range of services that include medical and veterinary care, construction,
refurbishment, and supply of schools and clinics, and they strengthen communities by
building a flood-wall (Lum, 2012, p. 15).
A key objective of U.S. military assistance is to enable the A.F.P. to transition
from an inward focus on domestic threats to the creation of a capacity to defend against
external security concerns. In particular, U.S. military assistance focuses on the
establishment of a credible security presence and awareness in the maritime domain.
However, the assistance comes with conditions. Between 2008 and 2013, the U.S.
Congress placed restrictions upon a portion of Foreign Military Financing to the
Philippines (withholding $2 million to $3 million annually) in order to encourage human
rights improvements related to extra-judicial killings by members of the A.F.P. (Lum and
Dolven, 2014).
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In 2014, the disastrous impact of Typhoon Haiyan on the Philippines prompted
the U.S. to send extensive military resources to aid in the relief and recovery effort. At
its peak, 66 U.S. military aircraft and 12 naval vessels were involved in relief efforts and
nearly 1,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed directly to the disaster areas (Lum
and Margesson, 2014). These resources also included the US George Washington naval
task force and elements of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit from Okinawa. The
mission was known as Operation Damayan. All efforts were coordinated by the U.S.
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance with the Government of the Philippines and in
cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). U.S. military members
cleared roads, transported aid workers, distributed 2,495 tons of relief supplies, and
evacuated over 21,000 people (Lum and Margesson, 2014).
On April 28, 2014, then Secretary of National Defense Voltaire Gazmin and U.S.
Ambassador to the Philippines Philip Goldberg signed an agreement known as the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) to expand U.S. support to the
Philippines. DeCastro (2016) argues that the E.D.C.A. has boosted the qualitative nature
of the A.F.P. Prior to the agreement, DeCastro (2016) argues that the A.F.P. had a small
and obsolete naval force and an almost non-existent air force, so it gains meaningful
capacity from regular visits of U.S. forces that conduct military training as well as
provide humanitarian and disaster response operations. The E.D.C.A. has enabled U.S.
construction of vital military facilities, infrastructure upgrades (such as hangers, air
defense surveillance radar systems, ground based air defense systems, and naval
operating bases). Furthermore, the storage and prepositioning of defense equipment in
agreed locations can lower the cost of the force and training modernization programs
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because the buildings and equipment can be shared and utilized jointly by U.S. and
A.F.P. personnel (De Castro, 2016). Additionally, the Philippines Air Force fighter pilots
can train with their American counterparts at the five bases that are included in the
E.D.C.A. Under the E.D.C.A., these bases will receive maintenance and facility
upgrades by the United States in a manner that benefits both countries.
6.2.8 Philippines Foreign Policy
The creation of the E.D.C.A. in 2014 was more than a bilateral agreement
between the U.S. and the Philippines. DeCastro (2016) asserts that the signing of the
E.D.C.A. sent a strong diplomatic signal to Beijing that it would have to take account of
an American military presence in the Philippines if it chose to unilaterally change the
status quo in the South China Sea. The South China Sea is surrounded by controversy as
the surrounding states argue over who has primary rights to regions thought to have
untapped petroleum resources under the sea basin. However, the E.D.C.A. has been no
guarantee of a strengthened relationship between the United States and the Philippines.
On the contrary, Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte has been vocally anti-United
States. Tehankee (2016) argues that Duterte’s anti-U.S. stance can be traced to his
history as a Mindanaoan, where citizens have been critical of the central Philippine
government for decades. Observers have labeled Duterte’s foreign policy as a “Pivot to
China.” Tehankee (2016) asserts that this policy is a dramatic reversal of his
predecessor’s strong anti-China and aggressively pro-U.S. foreign policy position.
6.2.9 Conclusion
U.S. military assistance in the Philippines is a marginally unsuccessful example of
efforts designed to reduce political development fragility. History between the two
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countries dates back nearly one hundred years, but this association has proven more
troublesome than helpful in facilitating development in the security sector in the past
twenty years. Instead, the Filipino population rebelled against the U.S. presence in the
early 1990s, prompting a withdrawal of any permanent U.S. presence and the closure of
Clark Air Base and the port at Subic Bay. The withdrawal was connected to the
perceived illegitimacy of the Government of the Philippines. However, the relationship
was renewed as the Philippine government perceived a threat from China in the early part
of the twenty first century over claims to the allegedly oil rich Spratley Island reefs in the
South China Sea. The security treaty cooperation was reinvigorated between the U.S.
and the Philippines in 2014, but extensive limits were placed on the type and duration of
any U.S. military presence. Upon election of Rodrigo Duterte in June 2016, the security
cooperation relationship between the U.S. and the Philippines diminished even further
because president Duterte elected to align his government more deliberately with the
government of China.
According to the U.S. Fund for Peace Fragile States Index, the security apparatus
fragility in the Philippines rose by nearly 30% between 2006 to 2015, from a rating of 7
in 2006 to a rating of 9.1 in 2015. A rating of 7 means that “security in some parts of the
country is in the hands of a party other than the state that rules without excessive use of
force or praetorian guard has some independent influence.” By contrast, the more fragile
rating of 9.1 means that “private militias are challenging the state or key security forces
are personally loyal to the dictator bypassing the regular armed forces.”
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Table 14 Evidence of Legitimacy of the State in Philippines
Strong

General

Ambiguous

General lack

Adherence Adherence

of adherence

Strong lack
of adherence

________________________________________________________________________
Confidence in Political Process

X

Political Opposition

X

Transparency

X

Openness & Fairness of Political Process

X

Political Violence

X

Table 15 Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness in Philippines
Strong

General

Ambiguous

Adherence Adherence

General lack

Strong lack

of Adherence

of Adherence

_______________________________________________________________________
Monopoly of the Use of Force

X

Relationship Between Security & Citizenry

X

The Government of the Philippines does not have a monopoly of the use of force
within its borders nor does it have a productive relationship between the security force
apparatus and the citizenry. President Duterte has taken strong steps to crack down on
narco trafficking and he has distanced his government with the United States. The 2014
report by Amnesty International on police violence in the Philippines observed that the
police force is one of the smallest in the world with relation to the population that it is
tasked to protect. As the marginalized groups of the population struggle to protect
themselves from Islamic terrorism and narco trafficking, the situation in the Philippines
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has gotten increasingly worse, as evidenced by the high fragility rating of 9.1 for its
security force apparatus.
6.3 Cross Case Comparison
The two paths exhibited by Indonesia and the Philippines in their relative political
stability and absence of terrorism are very similar. They are both on the low end of
political stability and their ability to deter violence and terrorism. In addition, both
countries are emerging from periods during the late twentieth century during which their
country suffered under the brutal rule by repressive dictators. However, the two
countries had different political contexts into which they invited U.S. military assistance.
In particular, they differ in the historical view by each of the countries towards how it
used their security sector capacities in either the military or the police to uphold the
sitting governance. In the Philippines, the security sector was used to ruthlessly suppress
opposition to the Marcos government. By contrast, the approach under the Suharto
regime in Indonesia differed because the security sector was not uniformly used as a
Praetorian Guard. Instead, it followed a policy known as ‘dwi fungsi’, in which the
military was seen as protectors of the people. The Indonesian security forces were by no
means innocent bystanders to the repression of Suharto regime, though. President
Suharto directed a violent suppression of the revolt efforts in East Timor that left the
Indonesian military with a history of human rights abuse.
Both countries continue to exhibit a high incidence of violence that stems from
social pressures. In these environments, U.S. military assistance should be carefully
considered alongside the organizations tasked with internal security and governance
reform.
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Prior to the Duterte administration, U.S. assistance to the Philippines focused on
combatting corruption, strengthening the judiciary, improving fiscal policies and
promoting broad-based economic growth, among other objectives. Strengthening the
security sector apparatus was not a deliberate goal until the creation of the E.D.C.A. in
2014, but this momentum was slowed upon the election of President Duterte in June
2016.
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CHAPTER VII – UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AND AFRICA
The U.S. Africa Command (US AFRICOM) was created on October 1, 2008,
making it the newest of the U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands. According to its
public web site, U.S. AFRICOM is responsible to the US Secretary of Defense for
military operations with African nations, the African Union, and African regional
security organizations. As a full spectrum combatant Command, U.S. AFRICOM is
responsible for all U.S. Department of Defense operations, exercises, and security
cooperation on the African continent, its island nations, and surrounding waters. The
mission of U.S. AFRICOM is, in concert with interagency and international partners, to
build defense capabilities, respond to crises, and to deter and defeat transnational threats
in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and
prosperity.
The U.S. AFRICOM mission is rooted in the U.S. security policy position that a
strong relationship with Africa is necessary to address security challenges that link
terrorist criminal networks from Africa to Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and
North and South America. The structure of U.S. AFRICOM recognizes that Africa is
home to eight of the world’s 15 fastest growing economies and rich natural resources that
are only recently beginning to be developed. In regions of new development,
institutional strength in Africa is still relatively weak. According to the U.S. Fund for
Peace 2015 Fragile States Index, twenty-six of the world’s weakest thirty-eight states are
in Africa. This represents half of Africa’s 54 states, with a landmass that covers nearly
three times the size of the United States and has more than a billion inhabitants.
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A key aspect of the AFRICOM organization is that it is part of a diverse team
from across the U.S. government structure that is postured to respond to the unique
security needs of Africa. This team includes four senior U.S. Department of State
diplomats and more than 30 personnel from more than 30 government departments and
agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Agency for
International Development. This reflects recognition that security in Africa depends on a
clear understanding of the importance of internal security and the development factors
that influence internal security.
The two African countries selected for this study are Liberia and Kenya. Liberia
is selected as an example of a recipient state of U.S. military assistance that has reduced
its political development fragility in significant qualitative and quantitative measures
since it began receiving assistance following the end of its 14-year civil war in 2003.
Among the many states and organizations requested by the United Nations and the
Government of Liberia to reestablish security, the United States was selected to lead the
effort to rebuild the Liberian army. Between 1999 and 2014, Liberia consistently
improved in both legitimacy and effectiveness of its security and political development
measurements conducted by the Center for System Peace Polity IV Project data. In 2006,
the Fund for Peace Failed States Index rated Liberia as the 11th most fragile state in the
world. In 2014, the same index, renamed as the Fragile States Index, rated Liberia as the
24th most fragile state in the world. By comparison, Kenya was ranked by this index in
2006 as the 33rd most fragile state in the world. In 2014, Kenya was ranked as the 18th
most fragile state, higher in fragility than Liberia.
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7.1 Liberia

Figure 13 Map of Liberia
Source: CIA World Fact book 2017
7.1.1 Orientation
Liberia became a functioning republic in 1847. It is located in western Africa,
bordering the Atlantic Ocean, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Cote D’Ivoire. The United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division estimates that
the population of Liberia is just under five million people, placing it in the lower third of
most populated states in the world (2015). The official language is English, but it is
spoken by about 20% of the population. About 20 additional ethnic group languages are
spoken, but few of them can be written or used in correspondence. The prevalent religion
is Christian, practiced by nearly 86% of the population, while 12% of the population is
identified as Muslim. Liberia has a particularly young population, with the median age
being 18 years old and making it the 211th youngest state in the world. Additionally, the
life expectancy in Liberia is 59 years old, which is the 202nd lowest in the world.
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Liberia is emerging from a brutal 14-year civil war that ended in 2003. This
conflict claimed an estimated 250,000 Liberian lives and destroyed any functioning
government infrastructure. The United Nations Mission to Liberia (UNMIL) was
activated to provide security and administration upon the completion of a Comprehensive
Peace Agreement in 2003. As indication of positive change and measurable reductions
in state fragility, the UNMIL was deactivated in 2018.
7.1.2 U.S. National Interest and Relationship with Liberia
Liberia has a long historical relationship with the United States because the origin
of Liberia dates back to its establishment by Washington as a destination for freed slaves
beginning in 1821. Since its inception, Liberia has relied on support from the United
States and has largely mirrored its institutional structures, where existent, on those to
which its Americo-Liberians were exposed. According to the current U.S. Embassy in
Liberia public web site, “The U.S. Embassy helps coordinate American efforts to help
Liberia to rebuild their country. Since the signing of Liberia’s peace agreement, known
as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in 2003, the U.S. has provided nearly
two billion dollars to help Liberians to rebuild their country.” In September, 2017,
Liberian President Ellen John Sirleaf declared that the United States had rescued her
country from a ruinous war and an outbreak of a terrifying, deadly disease (Strasser,
2017).
In accordance with the CPA following the Liberian civil war, the United States
was given responsibility to raise an Army in Liberia as the country sought to formally
conclude its 14-year civil war. The mission of this Army was envisioned to protect the
borders and coasts and to maintain internal security. $285M was dedicated by the U.S.
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Department of State via the contractor Dyncorps to create a 2,000 person strong Army
that was qualitatively capable of doing the draft mission. The first $28 million was
allocated in 2005 to begin the baseline work to build the Army. The highest cost came in
2008, when the United States allocated $92 million towards the ongoing work effort. In
2008, the Government of Liberia created its first National Security Strategy. In 2011,
that document was modified to better emphasize the concept of Human Security as a
matter of National Security Strategy. The total U.S. Military Assistance investment in
the Liberian effort has scaled back considerably since 2013. In 2015, the allocation was
$6.2 million, with $3.3 million for peacekeeping operations, $2.5 million for Foreign
Military Financing, and $.4 million for International Military Education and Training.
According to the U.S. State Department Foreign Military Training Report for Fiscal
Years 2016 and 2017 Joint Report to Congress, Volume I, the United States allocated less
than $1 million each year towards designated training objectives in Liberia. Those
objectives are: 1) Military Professionalization, 2) Adherence to Norms of Human Rights,
3) Civilian Control of the Military, 4) Maritime Security and Transnational Threats, and
5) Institutional and Security Sector Reform.
As the lead agency for U.S. international development, the U.S. Agency for
International Development is the U.S. government organization best positioned to
characterize the extent of the development challenges facing Liberia and to organize the
best response that will meet mutual goals. According to the U.S. Liberia Country
Development Cooperation Strategy for 2013-2018, the strategic goal by the end of this
period is to strengthen Liberian institutions that are positioned to drive inclusive
economic growth and poverty reduction. The four development objectives to enable this
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goal are: 1) more effective, accountable, and inclusive governance, 2) sustained, marketdriven economic growth to reduce poverty, 3) improved health status of Liberians, and 4)
better educated Liberians. Each objective assumes that Liberia will be able to maintain
and continue to improve civil peace and security throughout its territory.
Assistance from the international community has also strengthened Liberia.

In

accordance with the published peacebuilding plan on 20 March 2017, the transfer of
security responsibilities from UNMIL to the Government of Liberia was completed on 20
June 2016. According to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) public web
site, the United Nations Mission in Liberia successfully completed its mandate on 30
March 2018.
7.1.3 Political Order
7.1.3.1 Government
7.1.3.1.1 Structure
Liberia is a constitutional republic with a bicameral national assembly. Though
Liberia emerged in 2003 from a devastating 14-year civil war, its current constitution
continues to be rooted in the tenets of the 1984 constitution that was formally adopted in
1986. This system provides for a political and legal system that is substantially modeled
on the approach of the United States. There are, however, differences. For example,
federalism is not present in the Liberian system. Liberia’s government consists of three
branches that exercise separate powers and authorities; a bicameral legislature, which
consists of a 64-member House and a 30-member Senate; a presidentially led executive
branch that controls multiple line ministries and several independent agencies; and a
judiciary (Cook, 2010). The President and House members are each elected to six-year
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terms, and Senators serve nine-year terms, except in cases of irregular vacancies of
elected positions. Presidents may serve up to two terms. There are two Senate seats per
county. The candidate receiving the most votes is designated as the Senior Senator,
serves a nine year term, and the candidate with the second highest number of votes is
designated as the Junior Senator and serves a six-year term.
To help restore peace after the civil war, the United Nations Mission to Liberia
(UNMIL) led the administration of the Liberian elections in 2005 and 2011. Increasing
stability and institutional strength has enabled transition of responsibility back to the
Liberians. The October 2017 presidential election was the first to be fully administered
by the Liberian National Election Committee, with some technical and significant
financial support from the U.N. Development Program, the European Union, and the U.S.
government (Claes and von Borzyskowski, 2018). As a demonstration of their
commitment to peace, 20 of Liberia’s 22 registered political parties signed a declaration
in four months before the election before the Economic Community of West Africa State
heads of state assembly to commit themselves to the use of mediation or legal means if
any disagreements should occur in connection with the election (Parley, 2017).
7.1.3.1.2 Leadership
Charles Taylor was elected to the office of Liberian president in 1997 following
the first civil war. Unfortunately, his leadership was ineffective in bringing about a
peaceful conclusion to the fighting that had begun in 1989. As a result, the civil war
recommenced in 1999 and continued through 2003. Since formal end of the civil war in
September 2003, there have been three competitive elections for the office of the
presidency. The most recent presidential election was held in 2017. When the war
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ended in 2003, the president at that time, Taylor, was accused of war crimes and crimes
against humanity and subsequently extradited to Nigeria for asylum. Upon the
completion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2003, Vice President Moses Blah
was appointed as interim president until an election could be completed. The first
ensuing election occurred in 2005. Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson, a Harvard educated former
Liberian Finance Minister and official to the United Nations and World Bank, won by
59% and became Africa’s first elected woman president. President Sirleaf took
immediate and deliberate steps to place Liberia on a path to healing the many deep
fissures in the virtually nonexistent public institutional structures.
The leadership by President Sirleaf was credited as formidable and effective.
Recognizing the painful memories of division during the civil war, she pursued a
‘government of inclusion,’ in which was an ambitious reconstruction agenda aimed at
political stability and economic recovery. Her five major pillars for focus were:
Security, Economic Revitalization, Basic Services and Infrastructure, and Good
Governance.
Drawing on her experience as a World Bank official, President Sirleaf announced
an audit of the transitional government structure, dismissed all political appointees that
had been appointed during that time period, and laid off the entire staff of the Finance
Ministry, pending a screening of employees’ qualifications and level of probity (Cook,
2010, p. 12). In 2011, President Sirleaf won a Nobel Peace Prize for her role in bringing
peace to Liberia and for her specific focus on defending the rights of women.
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7.1.3.1.3 Culture
Liberia began in 1822 as a settlement location for slaves freed from the United
States. When Liberians arrived from the United States, they brought with them ideas
from the United States about how government should function. These attitudes continue
to shape the political culture in Liberia, as seen by the strong resemblance of the Liberian
constitution to major defining values about political culture in the United States.
However, there are unique defining cultural features. For example, there is a
societal preference for strong executive leadership in Liberia. This cultural tradition
combined with the general newness of the Liberian legislature in the post-war
environment enables sitting executives to dominate the national policy agenda. Cook
(2010) asserts that most bills in Liberia are originated by the executive branch and passed
with presidential priorities intact because the relative influence from the other two
branches is nonconsequential. Furthermore, Cook finds that Liberian presidents “have
wielded exceptional, sometimes extra-constitutional powers and closely controlled the
legal system, the security forces, and the economy, as well as headed majority ruling
parties” (Cook, 2010, p. 34).
7.1.3.2 Security Apparatus
7.1.3.2.1 Structure
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was activated in October 2003,
serving as a multidimensional peacekeeping operation until the completion of its mandate
on 30 March 2018. The team consisted of military, police, and civilian personnel and
was deployed in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution 1509 (2003) after
the signing of the August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Due to the devastation
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of the Liberian society during the civil war, the entire security sector fabric had to be
rebuilt. The United Nations led the creation of the Liberian police, security sector
governance, legislature, and new national security strategy. UNMIL transferred full
security responsibilities to the Government of Liberia on 30 June 2016 as part of a phased
drawdown of troops (UNMIL Fact Sheet). As of 1 July 2016, UNMIL’s authorized
military strength was 1,240 military personnel and 606 police. The UNMIL military
strength was about 60% of the planned full strength of the new Liberian army that was
being established by the United States, as specified in the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement.
There are two basic structures for national security in Liberia that have been in
place since before the civil war ended in 2003. External security is handled by the
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and is overseen by the Ministry of Defense, with the
President as the Commander-in-Chief. The AFL also has some domestic security
responsibilities as allocated under the Coast Guard for coastal patrol. Internal security is
handled by the Liberian National Police (LNP), which is managed by the Ministry of
Justice. The Ministry of Justice has responsibility for enforcing laws and maintaining
order. The LNP is augmented by a small group of additional specialized Liberian law
enforcement agencies, such as the Special Security Service (SSS), which is tasked to
provide executive branch and VIP close protection services. The SSS had existed under
the Taylor government. It had a reputation for brutality, so it has been undergoing a
process of restructuring and professionalization. The Liberian National Security Strategy
was created in 2008 to outline the priorities for the restructuring process.
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The United States outsourced the mission to re-build the Liberian army to the
private security contractor Dyncorps, Corporation. Dyncorps took a systematic approach
to building a force that reflected a comprehensive definition of national security that met
the unique needs of post-civil war Liberia. The decision was made to build a force of
about 2,000 initial recruits. This size was intended to reflect a compromise between “the
need to build a force that can be sustainably funded over the long-term, taking account
Liberia’s high rate of poverty and relatively small national budget” (Cook, 2010, p. 21).
The recruit pool was drawn from across Liberia to include members from diverse ethnic
groups in a way that would more accurately reflect ethno-regional balance. The selection
of the volunteer enlistees began in 2006 with the intent to screen out known human rights
abusers. Less than 20% of the applicants were accepted. Prospective recruits underwent
a vetting process administered by U.S. contractors that included reviews of selectees’
records by personnel from the U.S. embassy, UNMIL, other donor governments, and
selected representatives from Liberian civil society and government (Cook, 2010).
7.1.3.2.2 Leadership
The resignation from the presidency and departure of Charles Taylor from Liberia
on August 11, 2003 enabled the creation of a new security sector leadership structure that
could heal the state from the tragedy of the civil war. In early August the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a military intervention force
known as the Economic Community Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). This modest force
was tasked to assist Liberians in its efforts to end heavy fighting, provide humanitarian
assistance to alleviate a growing humanitarian disaster, and to monitor the attempt by the
Liberian fighters to have a cease fire beginning on June 3rd, 2003. This force was
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augmented soon after its creation by the United Nations and the United States following
the authorization of the United Nations Mission in Liberia on September 19, 2003
through the provision known as the Accra Accords. The first forces arrived on October
1st, 2003 and two weeks later the National Transitional Government of Liberia took office
on October 14th. The UN tasked 15,000 military and 1100 police peacekeepers to
demobilize and disarm about 65,000 military combatants.
7.1.3.2.3 Culture
The culture of the Liberian security sector apparatus derives from a combination
of uniquely African attributes, but also from the historical connection of the country with
the United States. This connection to the United States began with the creation of the
Liberian state, but deepened when the United States was appointed by the United Nations
to rebuild the Liberian army. Consequently, the institutional models, norms, and policy
objectives pursued by the United States have played an influential role in shaping the
Liberian army and the associated security sector apparatus.
While the Liberian perception of security is philosophically based on models from
those pursued in the United States, it has evolved since the conclusion of the civil war
with a deliberate recognition of the role of poverty in exacerbating the domestic security
situation. The Government of Liberia prioritized poverty reduction in a document
entitled “Poverty Reduction Strategy.” In this document, the authors adopted the theme
“Breaking with the Past: from Conflict to Development” to rebuild the state of Liberia.
This document was intended to stabilize Liberia by connecting national security to
poverty reduction. The United States Department of State Human Rights Report for 2003
reported that an estimated 80 percent of the population lived on less than $1 per day and
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70 percent of the population was unemployed. As a result, governance documents for
Liberia center on the concept of human security.
The focus on human security required a comprehensive examination of the causes
of human insecurity. Since the security sector was seen as contributing to the collapse of
the state through its lack of professionalism and general incompetence, Liberian officials
took a gradual approach to the creation of a small, but well selected and trained army and
associated security sector apparatus. The intent was to create a small force that would be
trusted and capable of providing security for Liberian citizens.
7.1.4 Legitimacy of the Security Sector Apparatus
Analysis of the security situation in Liberia revealed that the greatest risks to
national security stemmed not from strong neighboring states, but rather from internally
driven conditions arising from failures of development and good governance (McFate,
2013). The lack of security in Liberia stemmed from violent street crime, criminal
militias, disease and poverty, armed insurrection, food insecurity, lack of access to justice
and political representation, terrorism, and a dearth of the basic necessities of life
(McFate, 2013, p. 48). The United States Department of State Human Rights Report for
2003 reported that the security forces frequently acted independently of government
authority, particularly in rural areas, where they committed numerous, and serious human
rights abuses.
In 2008, the Government of Liberia created its first National Security Strategy.
This document was ground-breaking in setting up a modified vision for how national
security would be viewed by the government. This document describes national security
in the Liberian context as,
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National security is defined as the process of ‘ensuring the protection of all of
Liberia’s citizens, its sovereignty, its culture, its territorial integrity and its
economic wellbeing.’ Implicit in this are internal and external dimensions. The
internal issues include the rule of law, harmonious ethnic and social relations and
economic wellbeing. The external issues are threats and challenges that originate
outside Liberia’s borders. This broad definition means that security goes beyond
the traditional focus on the military and the government, and focuses instead on
the people. In short, security encompasses freedom from threats, intimidation, or
other pressures, that undermine basic rights, welfare and property of the people,
the territorial integrity of the state or the functioning of the system of governance.
(Government of Liberia, Office of the President, National Security Strategy, 2008,
p. 4).

The end of the civil war was the beginning of a concerted and deliberate
opportunity establish a Liberian security sector as a force for good. Claes and
Borzyskowski (2017) find that Liberian citizens now consider the police a trustworthy
security provider. However, these authors also find that the Liberian respondents in their
research also indicate that police are rarely present to prevent election violence and do
not have the necessary resources to guarantee election security. This research is
significant because it shows a transition from a failed security sector apparatus to one in
which the people generally trust, but in which there is room for improvement. For
example, Claes and Borzysknowski (2017) find that 82 percent of their respondents think
that police officers do not protect all voters and candidates equally.
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The Armed Forces of Liberia is also making progress as a legitimate and capable
institution. Prior to the end of the civil war, the military served as a praetorian guard for
Charles Taylor from 1989-2003. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has
made a significant impact on the mitigation of follow-on violence. Over 100,000 former
combatants have been officially disarmed and demobilized, which reduces the possibility
that former warlords can readily remobilize ex-combatants into their old fighting
postures. Much progress has been made in improving Liberia’s armed forces in its ability
to contain security threats without UN assistance, as evidenced by the withdrawal of the
UNMIL on March 20, 2018.
7.1.5 Character of the Political Dissent
Liberia has a painful history of exclusionary social, political and economic
systems that it is still working to overcome. Even before the civil war, the benefits of
economic growth were only available to a small, privileged elite sector of the population.
Prior to the civil war, average income had already been declining. Between the mid1980s and the end of the civil war, GDP plummeted by 90%. The civil war destroyed
Liberia’s physical infrastructure, productive capacity, and public service delivery
systems.
Liberia has come a long way since the end of its brutal 14-year civil war that
ended in 2003. The country had been decimated and the extent of the human suffering
was deep, with all sides committing atrocities that ignored any laws of war or respect for
humanity. The fighting was characterized by widespread rape, torture, and large numbers
of child soldiers.

It was estimated that 270,000 people lost their lives, 320,000 were

long term internally displaced, and 75,000 people fled to neighboring countries. Services
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came to a halt during the 14 years, resulting in an entire generation of Liberians not
receiving basic education or health care. In 1999, the U.S. Department of State Human
Rights Report asserted that the average per capita at that time was a small fraction of the
prewar levels prior to 1990. In 1999, unemployment was estimated to be 85 percent and
only 15 percent of the population was considered to be literate. Despite the country’s
rich natural resources in iron ore, rubber, timber, diamonds, and gold, average citizens
did not benefit from productive capacity because of corrupt and extractive practices by
government officials not interested in creating infrastructure that could distribute the
wealth generating capacity of these natural resources. The U.S. State Department 1999
Human Rights Report asserted that extortion was widespread in Liberia and existed at all
levels of society.
The transformation of the Liberian economy since the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement has been dramatic. According to the World Bank, in
2003, the Liberian Gross Domestic Product lost 30%. By 2004, the economy made
progress, earning close to 3%. Between 2004 and 2013, the economy continued to
expand with GDP growth rates between 5 and 10%.
One of the most significant sources of instability in Liberia after the Accra
Accords were signed in 2003 was the large number of former fighters. In a country rife
with deep poverty and vast unemployment, nearly the entire fabric of society was
impacted by the fighting. Post-conflict polls show that 96 percent of respondents had
some direct experience of the conflict, and, of these, an astonishing 90 percent were at
one point or another displaced from their homes (McFate, 2013, p. 27). Consequently,
the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) prioritized the neutralization of the
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fighting force from the beginning. More than 101,000 ex-combatants (22% women and
10.8% children) were demobilized under a disarmament program administered by
UNMIL and the National Transitional Government of Liberia that ended in late 2004
(McFate, 2013). A key task in this demobilization process was to ensure that
demobilized fighters received opportunities to reintegrate with the Liberian society to
prevent them from returning to violent forms of protest or insurgency. In mid-March
2006, the U.N. Secretary General reported that 65,000 of 101,495 demobilized excombatants had benefitted from donor-financed reintegration and rehabilitation projects
(Cook, 2010).
Human development trends in Liberia are also improving. Following the end of
the civil war, the fledgling post-war Government of Liberia commissioned a series of
assessments by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to determine the degree to which
the Poverty Reduction Strategy was effective in meeting its goals. The third and final
formal assessment was concluded in 2012. The study determined that about two-thirds of
the planned goals for the new government were achieved. A significant goal of the
strategy was to institutionalize planning to ensure effective government services. The
IMF found that the Liberian government had taken steps to develop detailed plans, build
capacity, pass laws, build or rebuild parts of institutional and physical systems, and
rehabilitate or repair infrastructure. Evidence of the positive developments included the
sustainment of peace, continued economic growth, especially in the urban areas; poverty
declined, some physical infrastructure improved; coverage of health and education
services expanded by most measures; and some aspects of governance improved. In
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2018, the World Bank assessed the Liberian poverty rate to be at 50.5% of the
population. That rate is expected to fall to 48.6% in 2020.
From a security perspective, the changes had been marginally positive as the
crime prevention agencies struggled with organizational challenges and perceived
corruption (IMF, 2012). In the initial transition period after the civil war ended, the U.N.
forces handled almost all aspects of Liberian security management. Since that time, the
UNMIL force worked to prepare Liberian security forces to take over. In 2012, the IMF
found that 67 percent of the 94 deliverable tasks designed to enable Liberian security
forces had been completed. Full completion was achieved when the UNMIL was
deactivated in March 2018.
7.1.6 Effectiveness of the Security Sector Apparatus
The effectiveness of the Liberian Security Apparatus endured substantial
upheavals during the period between 1996 and 2018. In 1996, Liberia was in its seventh
year of the 14-year civil war. Government security forces were actively fighting against
insurgents who fought against a perceived corrupt and ineffective state governance
apparatus. The state not only lacked legitimacy to enforce a rule of law, it had no
meaningful capacity to implement a rule of law to bring about peace. There was no
respect for human rights. Extrajudicial killings were common, as was rape, torture and
the use of child soldiers. The 1999 United States Department of State Human Rights
Report for Liberia reported that government security forces were rarely held accountable
for abuses. The report described how government security personnel were involved in
the looting of 1450 tons of food intended for Sierra Leone refugees, theft of vehicles
belonging to international organizations and nongovernmental organizations and the
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personal property of foreigners and citizens. This report also asserted that prison
conditions in Liberia were harsh and at times life threatening. Victims reported being
held in water-filled holes in the ground, being injured when fires were kindled on grates
over their heads, being urinated on, and suffering beatings and sexual abuse. The judicial
system was marked by political influence, economic pressure, inefficiency, corruption, a
lack of resources, and was unable to ensure citizens’ rights to due process or a fair trial.
Additionally, in some rural areas where there was no judiciary, clan chieftains
administered criminal justice through the traditional practice of trial-by-ordeal. A
common example of trial by ordeal was that a heated metal object was placed on the
suspect’s body in an attempt to determine whether the defendant was telling the truth.
The combination of severe illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of the Liberian
security sector was a major factor in the extended nature of the civil war and a reason
why the United Nations created a Mission in Liberia in 2003 after the completion of the
Accra Accords. At the time, the Liberian Government was completely incapable of
fielding a security sector apparatus, so all services were performed by the United Nations
forces until tasks could be turned over to the Liberians.
The process of turning over security services to the Liberians took fifteen years
and was completed at the closure of the UNMIL on March 22, 2018. During those fifteen
years, the efforts to select and train personnel for both the police and the armed forces
was complex and slow going. In 2009, the United States Department of State Human
Rights Report reported that the civilian authorities of Liberia generally maintained
control over the security forces, but lapses occurred and few were held accountable.
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Public security and police authority were formally entrusted to the Liberia National
Police (LNP), who in 2009 were advised and supported by U.N. civilian police.
The LNP was gradually empowered. In 2010, the LNP was unarmed due to arms
embargos set in place by the United Nations Security Council. The exception to the
armament rule was the Liberian Police Support Unit (PSU) and Emergency Response
Unit. The intent of the PSU was to provide armed backing for regular LNP officers and
to respond to situations of public disorder. In 2010, 200 of the planned 600 officers were
available for duty (Cook, 2010, p. 31). The ERU was designed in anticipation of the exit
of the UNMIL to provide mobile Liberian capacity to respond rapidly and robustly to
critical threats to internal security or public safety. In March of 2010, the ERU was
staffed with 334 personnel (Cook, 2010, p. 32).
In early 2010, the U.S. assistance for defense sector reform entered a new phase.
Initial training of the founding units of the new Armed Forces of Liberia ended in
December 2009 because the force was deemed to have achieved operational status
following an Army Readiness Training Evaluation Program (Cook, 2010). The Liberian
Ministry of Defense assumed full formal control of the newly trained force in early 2010.
As a result, the U.S. support to the Armed Forces of Liberia shifted from a program of
contractor based training and capacity building to one centering on military to military
mentoring and advice (Cook, 2010).
The completion of the UNMIL is certainly progress for advancing the general
security of the Liberian population, but work remains to be done for the effectiveness of
the Liberian security sector apparatus in its ability to continue without external
assistance. The long-term sustainability and effectiveness of the Liberian security sector
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upon exit of the UNMIL in 2010 was fragile due to money and equipment resources. In
particular, Liberians lacked equipment and vehicles capable of reaching remote parts of
Liberia. At the time of the UNMIL termination, road conditions in Liberia across the
country were generally poor, so the transportation of security forces was dependent on
UNMIL air assets in order to deploy quickly, particularly during the rainy season (Cook,
2010, p. 31).
7.1.7 Specific U.S. Military Assistance Provided
The United States formally became involved with providing military assistance to
the state of Liberia after the United Nations (U.N.) activated a peacekeeping mission
(U.N.M.I.L.) in Liberia in late 2003. The U.N. tasked 15,000 military and 1100 police
peacekeepers to demobilize and disarm about 65,000 military combatants (U.N.M.I.L.
Factsheet, accessed 25 May 2018). At an institutional level, the Accra Accords were
created in 2003 to rebuild Liberia. Within this agreement, there was a mandate for
Security Sector Reform (SSR). The U.S. was requested by the parties to the agreement to
take a lead role to restructure and re-build the Liberian Army and the U.N. with rebuilding the police force. The U.S. Department of State was the orchestrator for this
effort. An assessment team was created from experts from the US Department of State,
the US Department of Defense, and three civilian companies with security sector
expertise. After extensive consultations with locals and an assessment of the remaining
conflict environment, the team proposed to the US embassy a restructured Armed Forces
of Liberia, with the specific mission “to defend and protect the people of Liberia and the
sovereignty of the nation against external and internal threats and to effectively respond
to humanitarian crisis” (McFate, p. 42). They proposed an armed force of 4020
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personnel, consisting of one light infantry brigade, one maritime patrol battalion, one
aerial reconnaissance company, one military police company, an AFL headquarters
company, and a military band (McFate, p. 42). The $285 million program began in 2006.
Due to competing priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan and the extent of the work required,
the U.S. opted to contract out the task to the DynCorps International Company.
Following further consultations, the requirement was reduced to a 2,000 person, allvolunteer force that could be scaled up later, as required. The reason for the reduction
was that the government of Liberia was better positioned to pay for a smaller Army and a
reason for past conflicts was the existence of unpaid soldiers (McFate, p. 44). The
program also included the construction or renovation of training facilities at three bases.
Dyncorps took a creative approach to recreating the Liberian army. Instead of
focusing on the threat from external invaders, they focused on creating a force that could
secure development. This was a different approach from the traditional view of why a
military capability was significant to national security. For Liberia, the team focused its
efforts on human security, a concept that had begun gaining prominence after the end of
the Cold War and was receiving particular scrutiny after the Al Qaeda attacks on the
United States on September 11, 2001.
To meet the Liberian security sector reform requirement, planners focused on
individual security. McFate (2013, p. 51) created the models below to depict the
variation on traditional approaches to national security as conceptualized by the human
security paradigm.
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Figure 14 Graphical Comparison of National Security & Human Security Models
Source: McFate, 2013

For Dyncorps, the human security model for security sector reform meant
including civics and literacy as a component of the basic training and education for the
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). In addition, the selection process of the AFL recruits
considered the need for an ethnically balanced force that also included women. The
reform plan also forbade the creation of Special Forces and other secretive, elite units to
neutralize risk for groups to become politicized killing machines for any simmering
animosities from the civil war (McFate, 2013, p. 51). Instead, the Liberian government
selected peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance as central military missions for the
embryonic security structure. The force structure for the new Liberian military was
designed to be strong enough to repel limited cross-border attacks, but not so strong as to
threaten Liberia’s neighbors (McFate, 2013, p. 52). The associated weaponry for this
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configuration included a well-trained motorized light infantry without heavy or expensive
equipment such as artillery, armor, or fighter planes. The AFL was officially reestablished in 2007. Initial training of the new recruits was completed in December
2009 following an Army Readiness Training Evaluation Program.

Soon after, the

Liberian Ministry of Defense assumed full formal control.
In January 2010, the newly created U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) took the
lead for U.S. support to Liberia’s defense sector reform initiatives. AFRICOM created a
task force through Marine Forces Africa to deliver a five-year mentoring and advising
program for the Armed Forces Liberia (AFL). Outcomes from this relationship included
the creation of an annual training program for all AFL members, the establishment of a
military legal center, the delivery of a five-week training program for legal staff,
establishment of equipment accountability procedures, and the conduct of an expert
infantry badge course (Cook, 2010). Another initiative was to re-activate the Liberian
Coast Guard. The U.S. Navy and Liberian engineers built a pier and boat ramp to
support U.S. Coast Guard mobile advising teams as they conducted sessions on basic
proficiency skills and small boat handling (Fidler, 2010). This action was taken to
protect Liberia’s 360 mile coast line and associated 200 nautical mile exclusive economic
zone against poaching by foreign trawlers, possible drug trafficking, piracy, and illicit
maritime dumping, in addition to the establishment of essential search and rescue
capacities (Cook, 2010).
The U.S. created several recurring assistance efforts. To baseline the effort, the
U.S. helped the Liberian Ministry of Defense to create a new national defense strategy
through the Defense Institutions Reform Initiative (DIRI), a program run by the U.S.
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Office of the Secretary of defense. These efforts directly contributed to the creation of a
Liberian National Security Strategy in 2008. Similarly, the U.S. added Liberia to the
U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program in 2009, making it the 8th African partner
country to be added to a program set up after the end of the Cold War to assist former
Soviet states. Liberia was paired with the Michigan National Guard. Furthermore, the
U.S. Navy led the creation of a U.S. Africa Partnership Station (APS) ship visit program.
Under this effort, missions included Liberian Coast Guard assistance, U.S. Marine
training for the AFL, humanitarian and development material and medical services
donations, and cultural programming. The execution of the APS includes U.S. ship visits
to ports in the region to conduct the various assigned missions through a combination of
personnel from U.S. Navy and other U.S. armed services, civilian agencies, and nongovernmental organizations that provide diverse types of maritime safety and security
training, as well as humanitarian and development assistance (Cook, 2010, p. 29).
Furthermore, the U.S. sent a police training contingent, but the size and focus
varied from year to year, but consisted of 10 to 20 officers, as well as equipment and
contractor based logistical support. This particular program was administered by the U.S.
State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau and was
intended to develop the Liberian National Police (LNP) into a credible and competent
force that respects human rights and the rule of law. The U.S. viewed the creation of a
viable police force as “a critical precursor” to eventual draw-down of the UNMIL (Cook,
2010). Within this program, training emphasized police-community relations and human
rights abuse prevention. An example of this emphasis was in the rehabilitation of the
judicial and penal systems.
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The UNMIL began scaling down in 2016. In 2016, Liberian President Sirleaf
addressed the Liberian public by thanking US AFRICOM Commander Ward by name.
President Sirleaf declared, “General Ward’s leadership at AFRICOM bought renewed
vigor to the enduring relationship between the Armed Forces of Liberia and the U.S.
Military.” His leadership directed the creation of Operation Onward Liberty in 2010,
during which dozens of U.S. military personnel deployed to Liberia on a rotating basis
over a five year period to train, mentor, and support the restricting and professional
development of the Armed Forces of Liberia. By July 2017, the U.N. Mission in Liberia
had a personnel strength of 1,590 personnel.
A more recent example of how U.S. military assistance is supporting Liberia is
through the creation of the West Africa Disaster Preparedness Initiative (WADPI) in
2015. This program was created by the U.S. AFRICOM United Assistance Transition
Disaster Preparedness Project following the West Africa Ebola Outbreak that began in
2014. The project was implemented by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping
Training Center, the National Disaster Management Organization of Ghana and the
Economic Community of West African States. The total U.S. Government assistance to
the Ebola Virus Disease disaster response in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 was
$414,620,770, with the U.S. Department of Defense portion of that being $170,200,000,
or 41% of the total (USAID, West Africa-Ebola Outbreak Fact Sheet, 2014).
7.1.8 Liberia Foreign Policy
Under the 2003 Comprehensive Peace agreement that ended the civil war, Liberia
completely disbanded its military. In collaboration with the United Nations Mission in
Liberia and associated assistance from the United States, Liberia created and formalized a
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National Security Strategy in 2008 that gives the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) the
mission to defend its territorial borders and assist in response to natural disasters.
According to the Government of Liberia’s public website, “The guiding principles
of Liberia’s foreign policy have been the maintenance of national security and the
preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country, the promotion of
peace and harmony based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
other states, and unity in the national community based on the virtue of liberal
democracy.”
7.1.9 Conclusion
U.S. military assistance in Liberia is a successful example of the context
conditions under which political development fragility is reduced. Following a brutal 14
year civil war in which tens of thousands of Liberians lost their lives and nearly the entire
population was impacted by the war, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2003 and
an associated national political will to seek peace set the country on a path for a
meaningful repair of the condition of Liberian state failure. As part of the peace
agreement, a United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established. The
agreement also tasked Washington with the re-building of the Liberian army from the
ground up. The United States chose to outsource this task initially to the Dyncorps
Corporation. Dyncorps set up a methodical and comprehensive approach to the creation
of an army that would begin with a view towards the unique security concerns facing
Liberia. The design concept of the Liberian army prioritized human security as a
unifying theme from the beginning. Internal security was addressed first, rather than
external security. This approach ran contrary to the traditional views of why a military
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force is established by a state. This approach has proven effective in Liberia, as
evidenced by an annual reduction in the fragility of the security sector apparatus
indicators. Between 2006 and 2015, the fragility of the Liberian security sector has been
reduced from 7.3 to 6.9, which is a less than one percent improvement, but the state has
not returned to a condition of civil and there have been peaceful election cycles. The
country is still fragile with its relatively low level of human development, but the creation
of physical security has set Liberia on a more firm foundation to remedy the larger issues
of social and economic insecurity.
Table 16 Evidence of Legitimacy of the State in Liberia
Strong

General

Adherence Adherence

Ambiguous

General lack
of adherence

Strong lack
of adherence

________________________________________________________________________
Confidence in Political Process

X

Political Opposition

X

Transparency

X

Openness & Fairness of Political Process

X

Political Violence

X

The government of Liberia has made tremendous strides in evolution of its
political stability since the end of the civil war in 2003. Though still a fragile state in
terms of financial resources and human capital, the state has made consistent progress in
building confidence in its political processes. It has prioritized human security in its
National Security Strategy, which enables more deliberate government focus on the
establishment of social services such as health care and education. These priorities have
benefitted the creation of its 2,000-person army. Though small in numbers, the new force
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has been better educated on the rules of conflict, military professionalism, and
relationships with the civilian led government. The most visible evidence of progress is
in the deactivation of the United Nations Mission in Liberia in 2018.
Table 17 Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness in Liberia
Strong

General

Adherence Adherence

Ambiguous

General lack

Strong lack

of Adherence

of Adherence

_______________________________________________________________________
Monopoly of the Use of Force
Relationship between Security & Citizenry

X
X

The Government of Liberia has a general lack of adherence to the concept of
monopoly over the use force, but has successfully avoided descent back into civil war
since the last major conflict ended in 2003. Poverty and scant human resources continue
to challenge Liberia. However, there is a growing relationship of trust between the
security force apparatus and the citizenry because effort is being dedicated to proper
education of security force officials on human rights and rules of engagement.
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7.2 Kenya

Figure 15 Map of Kenya
Source: CIA World Fact book 2017
7.2.1 Orientation
Kenya is situated in central eastern Africa. It borders Somalia, Ethiopia, South
Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, and the Indian Ocean. The United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs Population Division estimates that in 2016 the population of
Kenya is just over 47 million, placing it in the top 25% of most populated states in the
world. Kenya received its independence as a colony from the United Kingdom in 1963.
The two official languages are English and Kiswahili. The prevalent religions are 83%
Christian and 11% Muslim. The median age is 19.5, making it the 199th youngest
country in the world. Life expectancy at birth is 64 years old, which is the 186th lowest in
the world. A distinguishing characteristic is that 1.5 million people in Kenya live with
HIV/AIDS, making it the 8th highest in the world. Literacy rate is 78% for the total
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population over 15 years old. According to the World Bank, annual per capita gross
domestic product in 1999 was $421.43 in U.S. dollars, in 2004 it was $458.88, and in
2016 it was $1,455.36. Thus, Kenya has multiplied its economic capacity by more than
300% in under 20 years. According to the United Nations Human Development Index,
Kenya in 2015 is considered to be on the low end of the Medium Human Development
category, as number 146 of 188 countries assessed.
7.2.2 U.S. National Interest and Relationship with Kenya
The United States and Kenya have a long standing partnership that began in 1964
after Kenya received independence from the United Kingdom in 1964. The relationship
intensified after the end of the Cold War as order was breaking down in adjacent
Somalia. The two states worked even more closely after the bombing of the US embassy
in Nairobi in 1998 and again after the attacks by Al Qaeda on America on September 11,
2001, as the threat became focused on radical Islamic terrorists.
U.S. policy recognizes Kenya as an important developing partner in East Africa
and the diplomatic mission in Kenya is one of the largest in Africa. In this regard, Kenya
is a top recipient of U.S. foreign assistance in Africa. Objectives for this assistance
include activities that advance the U.S. national security and economic prosperity by
helping Kenya to strengthen its economic stability, security, health, education, rule of
law, democratic governance, and in countering violent extremism and combatting
wildlife trafficking (U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with Kenya Fact Sheet, 6
March, 2018). Kenya is viewed as an anchor state in East Africa and as a critical partner
in counterterrorism efforts in the region. Consequently, a focus program for the U.S.
mission at the embassy in Nairobi is the relations with the Somali government. The
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relationship with Somalia was never formally severed, but the U.S. Embassy in
Mogadishu was closed in 1991.
The United States formally recognized the Federal Government of Somalia on
January 17, 2013. It launched the U.S. Mission to Somalia on September 8, 2015 and
based its activities in Nairobi. The objectives for this mission are to promote political
and economic stability, prevent the use of Somalia as a safe haven for international
terrorism, and to alleviate the humanitarian crisis caused by years of conflict and
ineffective governance (U.S. Embassy in Kenya public web site, 2019).
Challenges to the relationship between the United States and Kenya have included
persistent governance and human rights challenges. In the wake of widespread political
violence after the disputed election of 2007, the United States supported Kenya’s efforts to
improve civil liberties. In the 2008-2009 U.S. Department of State summary of foreign
military training, Kenya was recognized as “the lynchpin of East African stability and
security.” Kenya’s military plays a key role in regional operations against Al Shabaab in
Somalia.
In July of 2015, U.S. President Barack H. Obama was the first sitting U.S. President
to visit the country.

Within months after President Obama’s visit to Kenya, the

Governments of Kenya and the United States began negotiation of Kenya’s participation
in the White House’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI). SGI is an initiative of President
Obama to enhance governance of security and justice institutions, foster interagency
collaboration, and strengthen the ability of partners to meet the security needs of their
citizens (U.S. Embassy in Kenya, 16 Nov 2015). Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta agreed
to participate during the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit in August of 2014 as one of a group
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of six countries in Africa and was the first to begin implementing a Joint Country Action
Plan. The Kenya SGI co-chair, National Counter Terrorism Center Director Ambassador
Martin Kimani, characterized the extensive cooperation and capacity-building activities on
border security, police human resource management, and administration of justice under
SGI as an “extremely practical expression” of the U.S.-Kenyan partnership and shared
values (U.S. Embassy in Kenya, 16 Nov 2015).
The United States recognizes the limitations of military force as an agent of change
in Africa and Kenya is a primary example. In 2018, U.S. Africa Command Commander
Thomas Waldhauser told the U.S. Congress in his annual posture statement address:
U.S. interests are best served by stable nations with effective, accountable
governments, well-trained and disciplined militaries, and growing economies.
Thus, the first strategic theme is that U.S. Africa Command activities directly
support U.S. diplomatic and development efforts in Africa. U.S. Africa Command
adheres to a “by, with, and through” posture to enable its African partners in the
degradation of international Violent Extremist Organizations, interdicting
transnational extremist and criminal activities, and to increase the capacity of
security sector institutions.

Per the 2018 U.S. Africa Command Posture Statement, the first of five primary
lines of effort for the command is focused on East Africa. This objective is to distribute
resources and operations throughout the continent to Develop Security and Stability in East
Africa. Consequently, Kenya is a key partner.

Counterterrorism assistance programs

have been established to enhance the capacity of the national military forces, security
307

agencies, counterterrorism forces, and border security forces of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya,
and national military forces participating in the Africa Union Mission in Somalia to
conduct counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda affiliates, and al-Shabaab
(U.S. Department of State Foreign Military Training Summary, 2016-2017).
7.2.3 Political Order
7.2.3.1 Government
7.2.3.1.1 Structure
The Kenyan government is a republic with three branches of government. Those
three branches are the executive branch, in which the president is the direct leader, a
bicameral parliament consisting of the Senate and the National Assembly, and a judiciary.
This structure was modified substantially by the new constitution adopted in 2010 during
the administration of Mwai Kibaki. Primary changes include the creation of a bicameral
legislature with a new Senate, an independent judiciary, and more opportunity for
representative government from across the entire Kenyan territory by decentralizing
government decisions to its 47 counties.

Prior to 2010, the Kenyan president was the

commander in chief of the armed forces and he controlled the security, the university, the
civil service, the judiciary, and provincial, district, and local governance systems (US Dept
of State Human Rights Report, 1999 and 2008).

In a country of over 41 million people

distributed over a large land mass, the lack of autonomy for some regions prevented
efficient and effective prioritization of resources. The new constitution was intended to
address the inequality.
Full implementation of the 2010 Constitutional requirements for decentralization is
still a work in progress. The complexity of the changes represent not only administrative
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reorganization, but it sets a new cultural foundation for the relationship between the
Kenyan government and the citizens. In particular, the new framework seeks to strengthen
public participation in government. The reason for this shift is that the developers of the
constitution recognized that strengthening public participation and governance were
needed to accelerate growth and address long-standing inequalities in economic
opportunities, investment and service delivery in different parts of the country. The
devolution set in motion the process for transferring significant elements of fiscal and
administrative authority from the central government to newly created structures within the
47 counties. The first election to create governments for the 47 counties occurred in 2013.
This election was significant for many reasons. To begin, it was the first election under
Kenya’s new constitution.

In this election, citizens elected a president and deputy

president, parliamentarians that included a newly established Senate, and, for the first time,
county governors and legislators.
In 2015, the Kenyan School of Government finds that the Kenyan public has high
expectations for devolution to improve service delivery, governance, and job creation, but
limited awareness of new roles and responsibilities.
7.2.3.1.2 Leadership
Kenya has had three presidents since its independence from the United Kingdom
in 1963. Daniel Arap Moi, from the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party, served
from 1963 to 2002. During the 2002 general elections, the Kenyan African National Union
(KANU) party lost the majority share of parliament in an election regarded by international
observers as free and fair. The KANU had enjoyed a majority share of the National
Assembly since 1963, when Kenya received independence from the United Kingdom. In
309

2002, the first non-KANU presidential candidate was elected.

Mr Mwai Kibaki

represented the major opposition political party, the National Rainbow Coalition (NRC)
and served from 2003 to 2013. Though Mr Kibaki was elected amidst calls to address a
growing democratic deficit and issues of corruption, he was challenged within the existing
structure to effect meaningful change. He was reelected in the 2007 elections, but the postelection violence traumatized the country so deeply that wheels were put in motion for an
entirely new Constitution. During the post-election violence, more than 1,400 people were
killed and charges were levied by the International Criminal Court for crimes against
humanity on leadership figures from candidates competing in the election. The list of
people charged by the ICC included Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, but those charges
were dismissed for lack of evidence. In 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta, of the Jubilee Coalition,
was the first Kenyan President elected under the new Constitution. President Kenyatta
attempted to tackle the problem with corruption in government. One mechanism for
change was the creation of a state Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) in
2011. A consequence of this new oversight organization is that it uncovered extensive
irregularities within the current government. As a result, President Kenyatta asked almost
a quarter of his cabinet secretaries to resign. The individuals identified took heed, which
was a step in the right direction for political transformation without violence.
The momentum from the new Constitution held for the election in 2013, but was
challenged by the presidential election in 2017. The election of 2013 was viewed by
observers as largely peaceful. The winner of this election was Uhuru Kenyatta from the
Jubilee Coalition, along with William Ruto as his Vice President, originally from the Kenya
Africa National Union. Mr Kenyatta was re-elected in 2017, but allegations of electoral
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fraud tainted the outcome. The Carter Center (March 7, 2018) asserts that “Kenya’s 2017
electoral process was marred by incidents of unrest and violence throughout the extended
electoral period, and by harsh attacks by top political leaders on electoral and judicial
authorities that seriously undermined the independence of the country’s top democratic
institutions and the rule of law.”
7.2.3.1.2 Culture
In 2010, the new constitution adopted by Kenyan leaders was an attempt to bring
government closer to the people and evolve the culture of Kenyan political processes. The
reforms mandated the election of country governors and other local officials in the 2013
elections. The process was intended to improve the responsiveness of the local government
and to tackle the problem of marginalization. Marginalization often occurred because of a
‘winner-takes-all’ mentality associated with winning elections. Branch (2012, p. 294)
asserts that ethnicity historically provided a way through which Kenyans could access and
protect scarce resources of land, jobs, and political power. The new constitution was
intended to be a mechanism to modernize that mentality by codifying new processes that
would intentionally distribute resources more equitably after each election so that one
particular group would not benefit at the expense of all others and losers would be less
included to seek redress through violence.
Branch (2012) describes the historical framework for Kenya’s politics as a hybrid
form of democracy and authoritarianism. Branch (2012) asserts that Kenyans are highly
committed to overcoming tyranny, but that old habits die hard. For example, Branch
(2012) attributes difficult political change to a culture that accepts violence as a normal
part of the political process.
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This attitude was on display during the 2007 presidential elections in which over
1,133 people died as a result of post-election violence.

A result of the tragedy was the

creation of a Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), as manifested
by the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Accord of February 28, 2008 that was
negotiated by Kofi Annan and the Panel of Eminent African Personalities (ICTJ, 2008).
Several key findings emerged from the CIPEV, which is also known as the “Waki
Commission,” named after Chairman Judge Philip Waki, of Kenya’s Court of Appeal.
Three key findings are: 1) all of the 405 deaths caused by gunshot wounds were inflicted
by the Kenyan police, 2) massive failures occurred on the part of the state security agencies,
especially the police, to anticipate and contain the violence, and 3) land grievances and the
centralization of power in the presidency were root causes of the violence.
Furthermore, international development organizations in the United States and
elsewhere have conducted political economy analyses on the drivers of insecurity in Kenya
cite a corrosive link between income inequality and political and economic interests. The
2014-2018 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Country Development
Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Kenya asserts that local political and business elite have
ruled Kenya since independence, operating through patronage politics, ethnicity, and
personal ties. The strategy argues that corruption is pervasive and entrenched at all levels
due to a complex business regulatory environment, low rule of law, and an opaque political
process and political system.
However, the strategy also asserts that Kenya has the largest and most sophisticated
economy in East Africa where the populous is young, relatively healthy and well-educated
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workforce with a strong work ethic. Kenyans are working to change outdated mentalities
towards the political process through their adoption of the new Constitution in 2010.
7.2.3.2 Security Apparatus
7.2.3.2.1 Structure
The structure of the Kenyan security sector apparatus has evolved since 1999. As
documented in the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report in 1999, beyond the
armed forces, the Kenyan security apparatus included a police Criminal Investigation
Department (CID), a National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), a National Police, an
Administration Police, and a paramilitary General Services Unit (GSU), which details
members on a rotating basis to staff the 700-man Presidential Escort. The CID investigated
criminal activity and the NSIS collected intelligence and monitored persons whom the state
considered subversive. The Kenyan National Police, Kenyan Administrative Police, and
the General Services Unit were organized under the Ministry of State for Provincial
Administration and Internal Security.

However, the NSIS reported directly to the

president. This structure continued largely intact, except for the addition of an
Antiterrorism Prevention Unit, until the changes required by the 2010 Constitution. In
accordance with the 2010 Constitution, the Kenyan national security structure now
includes three components—the armed forces, the National Intelligence Service, and the
National Police.
In 2017, the Kenyan government published a Defense White Paper to outline its
national interests and grand strategy to defend those interests. This document identifies
“political independence, integrity of national territory, and security and socio-economic
well-being” as the primary national interests to which the strategy is created. In addition,
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the Kenyan Defense White Paper asserts that “Kenya will exhaust all political means first
before resorting to the use of military means in the defense of its national interests.” This
document identifies terrorism as the number one threat to international security.
In defending Kenya’s national interests, the basic role of the Kenya Defense Force
(KDF) is to defend and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kenya. The KDF
may also deploy in support of other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster and
will report to the National Assembly when deployed under such circumstances. Similarly,
the KDF may be deployed in situations of unrest or to restore stability in areas within
Kenyan territory with the approval of the National Assembly. In recognition of the
continuing socio-economic vulnerability of a significant portion of the Kenyan society, the
KDF is dedicated on a continuing basis towards efforts that reduce or alleviate poverty.
Per the 2017 Kenyan Defense White Paper, the KDF participates in projects such as
borehole drilling, dam construction, desilting, bridge construction, and participate in the
provision of medical and veterinary services.
The KDF is organized in three main components—the Kenya Army, the Kenya Air
Force, and the Kenya Navy.
7.2.3.2.2 Leadership
Management of the Kenya security forces is divided between the Ministry of
Defence for military personnel and the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National
Government for Kenya’s civilian security apparatus.
The Kenya Ministry of Defence has its headquarters in Nairobi. Per the public
Ministry of Defence website, the Ministry is headed by the Cabinet Secretary who is
responsible to the President on matters of policy. The President serves as the Commander314

in-Chief. The Cabinet Secretary is appointed by the President and chairs the Defence
Council. The mission of the Defence Council is to control and direct the Kenya Defence
Forces (KDF).
Per the Kenya government public website, the Ministry of Interior and
Coordination of National Government was created through executive order No. 2/2013.
The responsibilities for this ministry are extensive. The mandates include: National
government coordination at counties; Internal State functions; National Cohesion and
Reconciliation Management; Government Printer; Disasters and Emergency Response
Coordination; National Disaster and Operation Centre; Policy on Training of Security
Personnel; Citizenship and Immigration Policy and Service; Border control Point
Management; Registration of Persons Services; Registration of Births and Death Services;
Management of Refugee policy; Internal Security Affairs; Drug and Narcotic Substance
Control; Security of Airstrips and Roads; Small arms and Light Weapons Management;
Kenya Prisons Service; Directorate of Criminal Investigations; Civilian oversight over
police; Management of Correctional services (Supervision, reintegration and rehabilitation
of offenders) and Control and Regulation of the Gaming Industry.
7.2.3.2.3 Culture
The culture of Kenya’s security sector reflects the troubled political path of Kenya
since it received independence from Britain in 1963. In more than six decades, Kenya has
only had four different presidents. The state does not have a long history with smooth
political change and the security sector has been configured to preserve that mindset. Prior
to the creation of the new constitution in 2010, Kenyan government was a mix of
democratization and authoritarian political order. The first president was Joseph Kenyatta,
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the leader of the newly formed Kenya Africa National Union (KANU). This party
advocated for a strong centralized government. In 1982, an amendment was passed to the
state constitution to make Kenya a de jure one party state. Until 1991, Kahl (2006) argues
that Kenya was characterized by one-party rule and excessive centralization of power. As
a result, Kenyan leaders demanded a security apparatus that assured the continuation of the
centralized power structure.
However, as the Kenyan citizenry became more mobile, better educated and had
more opportunities to see the extent of the inequalities, toleration of the Kenyan public for
the praetorian system became less guaranteed. Between 1991 and 1995 a wave of rural
ethnic violence swept over large portions of Kenya’s Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western
Provinces, killing at least 1,500 people and displacing more than 300,000 (Kahl, 2006).
The violence has often been referred to as ethnic clashes, but more recent scholarship
shows the fighting to be connected to a recognition that scarce resources were not being
distributed equally and entire populations marginalized.
7.2.4 Legitimacy of the Security Sector Apparatus
When the United States Department of State began creating its annual report on
human rights, the 1999 report for Kenya observed that the Government of Kenya generally
had a poor record in its respect for human rights. The report described the types of abuses
as security forces committing extrajudicial killings, torturing and beating detainees, using
excessive force, rape, and employing other means to abuse persons. At the time, prison
conditions were recorded as life threatening and there was a perception that the Kenyan
police arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, with no process for freedom of speech,
respect for citizen privacy, or peaceful means to change unfair government practices. In
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1999, the U.S. Department of State asserted that there were no effective police
investigations into allegations of extrajudicial killings by security forces.
In the 2008 annual Human Rights Report, the U.S. Department of State asserted
that a public perception existed in Kenya that the police often were complicit in criminal
activities.

Furthermore, the report asserted that the Kenyan police often recruited

unqualified candidates who had political connections or who paid bribes. This observation
was cited as a contributing factor to poorly conducted investigations.
The Kenyan public perception of the legitimacy of the Kenyan security apparatus
was affected by the actions taken by the United States following the attacks by Al Qaeda
on the United States in New York City on September 11, 2001. Ayinde (2010) argues that
the counterterrorism efforts by the U.S. Presidential Administration of George W. Bush
following the attacks generated its most controversial and fractious impacts on the Horn of
Africa. The reason for this animosity was connected to the actions taken by the United
States to bring the perpetrators of the attacks on September 11, 2001 to justice. Ayinde
(2010) argues that the so-called ‘war on terror’ was perceived by the Kenyan population as
a tool for the Kenyan government to create or legitimize oppressive policies toward Kenyan
Muslims who had previously felt increasingly marginalized and harassed. An example of
the Kenyan discomfort with the ‘war on terror’ was the anti-terrorism legislation
introduced by the Kenyan parliament in 2003 known as a “Suppression of Terrorism” bill.
The first bill was criticized by Amnesty International for its “vague and broad definition of
terrorism and terrorist acts or action.” Amnesty International was concerned that the
original bill would provide a legal framework for arbitrary arrests, illegal searches and
detention, and enabled a flawed judicial process. It wasn’t until 2012 that the Kenyan
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government was able to put into law an anti-terrorism bill when President Kibaki assented
to the passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 (Standard on Sunday Team, 2012).
Though the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2012 was expected to make it easier for
law enforcement officials to disrupt networks of terrorists, its implementation is still
tenuous. According to the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report for 2014, in
that year leading security officials made several public announcements threatening or
encouraging the use of lethal force by police officers. This report cited an example by the
Mombasa county commissioner, the highest ranking national government official in
Mombasa County, when he told the media in March of that year that terrorists “are not
people to be arrested since they have also killed others. If we find any of them, we will
finish them on the spot.” Deputy President William Ruto told the press in March that
terrorists “who shoot innocent people should expect to be met with similar force.”
Similarly, Amnesty International (AI) has sponsored several studies into the results of
changes mandated by the new Constitution and impact on legitimacy of the security sector
apparatus among the Kenyan citizens. In a report released in 2016/2017, AI authors
asserted that Kenyan security forces carried out enforced disappearances, extrajudicial
executions and torture with impunity. AI asserts that some abuses were committed by
security agencies in the context of counter-terror operations, others by unaccountable
police officers and other security agencies. Furthermore, study authors argue that despite
an increase in reported cases of human rights violations, meaningful investigations were
not conducted so violators were not ultimately held accountable.
The uneven application of law enforcement in Kenya draws from decades long
history. During the 1990s, the Kenyan government was unable to extend protection to
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increasingly victimized ethnic groups, which prompted the people in those groups to resort
to arming themselves and engaging in pre-emptive violence. Though the Kenyan military
and police had traditionally acted quickly to quell violence, from 1991 to 1995, this
capacity eroded due to manipulations by government officials (Kahl, 2006).

A

consequence of the changing policies from national leadership was that local level police
and judicial authorities were reluctant to arrest attackers, and those they did arrest were
frequently turned loose without any punishment (Kahl, 2006, p. 123).
This culture of impunity has been difficult to reverse. According to the U.S.
Department of State Human Rights Report for Kenya in 2014, in 2012 six Administration
Police officers were sentenced to death for the 2010 murder of seven taxi drivers in
Nairobi’s Kawangware district in the first known conviction of police officers for
killings. However, by June 2012, the court of appeal overturned the conviction, ruling
the officers had “acted in self-defense.” This report noted that NGOs condemned the
ruling as an abuse of judicial discretion in spite of significant evidence that the police
applied overwhelming and unnecessary force to quell the specific incident.
7.2.5 Character of Political Dissent
Kenya has had internal political challenges ever since it received independence
from Britain in 1963. The political violence began shortly afterwards as groups in the
Rift Valley resorted to arms to make their preferences known to a struggling fledgling
government. The region had become known as “The White Highlands” during British
rule because it contained most of Kenya’s most fertile agricultural land and was
predominantly inhabited by white settlers. The tension over ownership of this rich land
continued through the early 1990s. By mid-1991, scores of people had died in
319

connection to reform efforts related to ownership of the “White Highlands” (Kahl, 2006).
The violence proceeded unabated because each attack bred additional fear, attempts at
preemption, and retaliation. To complicate attempts to quell the violence, reports by
multiple official sources agreed that the attacks were instigated by high level politicians,
including advisors close to the president as he desperately tried to hold on to power in the
face of external pressures to democratize (Kahl, 2006). These attacks were particularly
destabilizing because perpetrators were infrequently held accountable.
This type of violence continued into the 21st century. In February 2002, political
“private armies” in Nairobi that were aligned to politicians in different parties clashed,
killing more than 20 people in one night. People who had lived together for decades
were suddenly killing each other over perceived differences on how best to govern
Kenya.
Political dissent in Kenya has been characterized by three major distinguishing
factors: 1) a demographic explosion since 1950, 2) limited opportunity to peacefully
change its government, and 3) extended unrest from state failure in neighboring Somalia.
To begin, Kenya has realized exceptional gains in its population as part of the fastest
growth in global population in human history due to reductions in infant and child morality.
In particular, Kenya’s population has grown from approximately 4 million people in 1950
to nearly 47 million in 2016. By comparison, the U.S. population in 1950 was 152 million.
In 2016, it was 323 million, which is just over a 100% growth. In contrast, Kenya’s
population has multiplied since 1950 by over 1000%. Few populations in the world have
grown as dramatically as has been seen in Kenya. Indeed, many analysts have asserted
that Kenyan politics after independence has been driven largely by its demographic
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explosion (Kahl (2006), Branch (2012)). As Kenya’s population has expanded to include
an exponentially higher number of youth, the state political leaders have been challenged
to provide adequate education, health care, and appropriate employment at the point in time
it is needed.
Second, as described in section 4.2 and 4.3, Kenya has been challenged by its
inability to peacefully change its government to meet the changing needs of its population.
In many ways, this malaise has been exacerbated by the demographic explosion described
in the previous paragraph. With a territory encompassing a large and distributed land mass,
Kenya is home to more than 32 ethnic groups, and no single group constitutes a majority
of the population. The largest group is the Kikuyus and this group accounts for just over
20% of the population, according to the East Africa Living Encyclopedia. The five largest
groups, the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba, and Kalenjin account for about 70% of the
population. The remaining 30% of the population is distributed across 25 additional ethnic
groups. Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, was a Kikuyu.
Kenya does not have a history of peaceful transfer of governance, but the creation
of the 2010 Constitution is a step in the right direction. The December 2007 presidential
election was regarded as deeply flawed by both the voters and by observers, as evidenced
by significant violence after the completion of the election. Despite significant
irregularities in the vote tabulation process and indications that voter turnout in some
areas was over 100%, the electoral commission declared Mr Mwai Kibaki the winner and
he was quickly sworn in as president (Blanchard, 2013, p. 6). Riots followed the
announcement of the election results and the outrage expressed by Kibaki challenger
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Raila Odinga turned violent in many areas. The violence quickly escalated, with more
than 1400 deaths and 500,000 people displaced in the ensuing 6 weeks of violence.
Violence was quelled following negotiations mediated under the auspices of
former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and several African former heads of state.
The result of the negotiations was a power-sharing agreement between the two major
warring political parties that was codified on February 28th, 2008. This power sharing
agreement led to the formation of a coalition government effective in April 2008, in
which Mr Kibaki would serve as president and Mr Odinga would serve in a newly
created prime minister position. Most significantly, the warring parties agreed on the
need to create a new state Constitution. The power-sharing agreement also led to the
creation of a commission of inquiry into the causes of the violence that followed the 2007
election. This commission became known as the Waki Commision after its chairman,
Justice Philip Waki. It consisted of international representatives to investigate abuses
related to the post-election violence. The final report from the Waki Commission was
provided to President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga in October 2008.
After years of extensive research and negotiations, Kenyans succeeded in the
creation of a new Constitution. This document has substantially changed the approach to
government pursued by Kenya by devolving management responsibilities to the 47
counties.
According to World Bank data, Kenya has grown economically and
demographically since 2002. In 2002, the Kenyan GDP per capita was $396 in U.S.
dollars and there were just over 33 million people living in Kenya. In 14 years, the
Kenyan GDP per capita grew to $1455 and the population grew to 48 million people.
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Thus, there was a 270% increase in GDP per capita and a 45% growth in population.
Kahl (2006) calls such situations Demographic and Economic Stress (DES). Kahl (2006,
p. 209) argues that demographic and economic stress can lead to strife by creating
various pressures on societies and states in the developing world. Kenya is a prime
example of the predictive value of Kahl’s theory.
The period between 2002 and 2016 is particularly illustrative of the importance of
the DES theory in Kenya. The Kenyan state economy was growing, but job opportunities
did not grow. According to the World Bank, the unemployment rate in Kenya in 2002
was just over 10%. That rate surged in the years between 2002 and 2008, reaching a high
of 12.1 % in 2008. In 2017, the rate decreased to 11.5%, which is still higher than the
rate in 2002. Thus, Kahl’s theory of DES is helpful in understanding the post-election
violence seen in Kenya in 2007 and early 2008 because of the impact of the rapid
demographic changes and inability or relative immaturity of the political structures to
accommodate that change. However, a constructive result of the violence was a
collective recognition for the need for institutional change through the creation of a new
constitution in 2010. The creation of the new constitution is a promising start for the
creation of a more representative governance structure for the Kenyan population.
In addition to demographic and economic stress combined with the pressures of
attempts to create representative government, beginning in 2011, Kenya endured
considerable pressure from the spillover effects of state failure in Somalia. By 2013,
Kenya was home to over a half million Somali refugees. To alleviate the stress to
Kenyan local populations, the Kenyan government set up a refugee complex in Dadaab.
The Kenyan government also launched a military offensive into southern Somalia in
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October 2011 with the stated intent of stemming the tide of threats and incursions from
the terrorist group Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab emerged as a radical youth wing of
Somalia’s now defunct Union of Islamic Courts in 2006. It imposes a strict interpretation
of the Islamic Sharia system of justice. It is recognized as a terrorist group by the United
States and the United Kingdom.
Somalia had suffered and continues to suffer from state failure created by
extended civil war that has followed Somalia’s inability to create a legitimate
government. In January 2007, the Africa Union created the Africa Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) as a regional peacekeeping structure. In recognition of the need for
Kenyan presence in the Africa Union Mission in Somalia, the U.N. Security Council
voted in February 2012 to authorize Kenya’s inclusion into the Africa Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM). This action prompted an increase of the mandated troop level from
12,000 to 17,731 and expanded the AMISOM mandate beyond Mogadishu (U.N.,
February, 2012).
East Africa has been vulnerable to both local and international terrorist groups.
Blanchard, November, 2013 asserts:
“Al Qaeda and affiliated groups like Al Shabaab have had a presence in East
Africa for more than 20 years. Reasons for the vulnerability include the region’s
porous borders, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and
judicial institutions, and pervasive corruption, combined with over two decades of
state collapse in neighboring Somalia.”
Evidence of Al Qaeda’s influence in Eastern Kenya occurred on an attack on an
upscale shopping mall perpetrated by Al Shabaab in Nairobi on September 21, 2013. Al
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Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack, which came almost two years after Kenya
launched a military offensive across its northeastern border with Somalia. The Kenyan
government’s stated aim for this action was to defend itself against the growth of terrorist
threats and incursions by Al Shabaab (Blanchard, November, 2013).
In August 2017, the U.N. Security Council issued resolution 2372 enabling the
gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security
forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security
progress in Somalia (Africa Union public web site, AMISOM Background Paper,
accessed 5 December 2018).
7.2.6 Effectiveness of the Security Sector Apparatus
Kenya has had challenges in the creation of an effective security sector apparatus.
These challenges stem from three major sources: 1) demographic and environmental
stress, 2) difficulties with peaceful transfer of power, 3) lack of security sector institutional
policies for accountability of enforcement officials, and 4) stress from violence spillover
in Somalia.
As the Kenyan population has grown since 1950, it has been difficult for the
Kenyan government to keep pace with the security needs of the larger population. The
U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report on Kenya for 2004 observed that the
Government’s human rights record continued on a poor track. The report asserted that
Kenyan security forces, particularly the police, continued to commit unlawful killings,
torture, and beat detainees, use excessive force, rape, and other- wise abuse persons. Prison
conditions remained life threatening. Police harassed and arbitrarily detained persons,
including journalists and civil society leaders.
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Four years later, the 2008 U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report asserted
that ‘impunity was a major problem--- police officers were rarely arrested and prosecuted
for criminal activities, corruption, or for using excessive force.’ However, the report did
note that the Kenyan government took some steps to curb police abuse during the year. In
September of 2007 the Ministry of Provincial Administration and Internal Security
established a police board to hear public complaints and recommend disciplinary actions,
but by year’s end the board had not heard any public complaints or issued any decisions.
The 2014 U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report asserts that the most
serious human rights problems were security forces abuses, including alleged unlawful
killings, forced disappearances, torture, and use of excessive force.

Furthermore, the

report argues that widespread impunity at all levels of government was a serious problem,
despite public statements by the president and deputy president and police and judicial
reforms. The report asserts that the Kenyan government took only limited steps to address
cases of unlawful killings by security force members.
In 2016, the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report recorded that Al
Shabaab terrorists conducted deadly attacks and guerilla-style raids on isolated
communities along the border with Somalia, targeting both security forces and civilians.
In the response effort, Kenyan security sector forces may have been a bit heavy handed in
their counter-terrorism operations. In July of that year, the Non- Government Organization
Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report documenting 34 cases of individuals who
disappeared and 11 cases of individuals found dead after allegedly being taken into custody
by security forces during counterterrorism operations in Nairobi and the country’s
northeast region between December 2013 and December 2015. According to the report,
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law enforcement authorities did not follow any meaningful processes in the investigation
of these deaths and disappearances. Furthermore, the report specifically called out the
Kenya Defense Forces in the three northeast counties bordering Somalia for human rights
abuses.
7.2.7 Specific U.S. Military Assistance
Kenya is one of the largest recipients of U.S. military assistance in Africa. Aid to
Kenya in the decade following the September 11, 2001 attacks by Al Qaeda on the United
States increasingly focused on improving Kenya’s capabilities to control its land and sea
borders and to counter terrorism. As one of the top five global recipients of the U.S. State
Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance funding, Kenya also received funding for
counterterrorism training for the Kenyan police. Beyond grant aid, Kenya utilized the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program to purchase fighter aircraft, helicopters, and Air
Force computer systems. Kenya received aid through a regional U.S. State Department
program, the Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT), with
related counterterrorism funding totaling over $10 million in Fiscal Year 2012 (Blanchard,
2013). Kenya was also identified as a major Africa recipient of the Department of Defense
(DoD) “train and equip” aid, totaling almost $80 million in 2013, as authorized under
Section 1206 of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as
amended, and Section 1207 of the Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA, as amended to support
Kenya’s role in AMISOM.
In 2013, U.S. Africa Command’s Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, based
in Djibouti, maintained a small contingent hosted at a Kenyan naval base that conducted
civil affairs projects and other security cooperation activities in Kenya (Blanchard, 2013).
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In 2014, the collaboration between the United States and Kenya on security sector
management deepened following U.S. President Obama’s participation in the U.S.-Africa
Leaders’ Summit in August of that year. At this summit, President Obama announced a
new joint effort between the United States and six African partners to improve security
sector management and partner capacity to address security threats. The effort was titled
“Security Governance Initiative (SGI).” The specific countries covered by the SGI are
Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Tunisia. Security topics addressed by the SGI
include the management of an integrated border structure that can effectively counter
terrorist threats, efficient distribution of defense sector resources, improvement of cyber
security and effort to combat cybercrime (Byrne, White House, March 2, 2016).

A

significant difference of the SGI from previous security cooperation efforts with the target
countries is that it focuses specifically on strengthening the institutions that govern the
security sector, rather than on simply providing equipment or training to the recipient
state’s security forces (Byrne, White House, March 2, 2016). This approach takes a more
holistic view of the security sector as an important component of the governance structures
that must act responsibly and accountably to the citizens of the country.

An example of

responsible change is the creation of a policy for new police officers to be hired based on
merit and qualifications, rather than on connections or ethnicity. This process helps in the
creation of police forces that will become more interested in conducting themselves in
accordance with rules rather than on changing political climates, which benefits citizens of
all ethnicities. Additionally, if militaries are required to maintain close track of supplies
they will be less likely to waste or misuse security resources. Third, the new Constitution
added a provision that requires political institutions to create budgets to project short,
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medium, and long-term costs in a manner that is transparent to the citizens. This process
reduces the opportunities for corruption and improves use of limited financial resources.
U.S. AFRICOM conducted an aviation engagement with Kenya and Uganda on
June 29, 2017 to encourage collaboration and improve partner nation capabilities in
personnel recover, medical response, and water filtration.
7.2.8 Kenya Foreign Policy
Kenya has maintained interest in participating in international affairs since its
independence from the United Kingdom. Kenya jointed the United Nations on 16
December 1963 and began participating in peacekeeping operations in 1975. Kenyan
contributions to UN peacekeeping missions increased after 1989, with Kenya entering
into more than 20 separate UN operations worldwide. Kenya contributed military
observers, staff officers, police monitors, and infantry troops. According to the UN
public web site, Kenya is the third largest African contributor of troops, after Nigeria and
Ghana. Kenyan forces have deployed for UN missions in several African countries, in
addition to participating in operations in the European Balkans and in East Timor. In
addition to the United Nations, Kenya also contributes troops to Africa Union
peacekeeping operations. In 2017, Kenya was contributing forces to the Africa Union
mission in Darfur, Sudan.
Kenya maintains an active interest in containing the threat from the Somaliabased terrorist organization Al-Shabaab. In October 2011, Kenya launched a military
offensive into Southern Somalia as a counter to a growing number of incursions into
Kenya from Al-Shabaab. Governments from the region, including that of Somalia,
expressed support for the Kenyan actions. This support grew in February 2012 when the
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U.N. Security Council authorized Kenya’s inclusion into the Africa Union Mission in
Somalia. This action raised the mandated troop level of the force from 12,000 to 17,731
and expanded the mandate of the AMISOM beyond Mogadishu to include the strategic
port of Kismayo. Kenya’s assumption of responsibility for the profitable port and source
of key revenue for Al Shabaab dealt a significant blow to Al Shabaab’s resource flow, but
operations continued. In 2014, Al-Shabaab conducted attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa
and led guerilla-style raids on isolated communities along the coast and the border with
Somalia (US Department of State Human Rights Report on Kenya, 2014). In response,
the Government of Kenya mounted a security operation against irregular migrants,
terrorists, and criminals called Operation Usalama Watch (“usalama” is Swahili for
“security”).
7.2.9 Conclusion
U.S. military assistance in Kenya is an unsuccessful example of the allocation of
resources towards Kenyan political development in the security sector apparatus.
According to the U.S. Fund for Peace Fragile States Index, between 2006 and 2015,
fragility of the Kenyan security apparatus increased by 20%. Kenya is distinguished
among its fellow East African states as relatively affluent, but economic inequality and
demographic stress has made conditions ripe for political unrest. The presidential
election of 2007 was particularly contentious, with nearly 1,300 people losing their lives
in a show of outrage over perceived election tampering. The extent of the violence in this
election revealed a need for a major re-write to the Kenyan Constitution to more
deliberately identify voting and representation rights for all Kenyans. The intent was to
try to prevent ethnic and tribal rivalries that suppressed political rights for non-elected
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groups. In this environment, no amount of U.S. military assistance could have prevented
the security problem that was tied to the Kenyan election system. Only through efforts
by Kenyans to fix their own system of governance and rights could the internal problems
be fixed. Though the elections of 2013 and 2018 were relatively peaceful, the
institutional structures that will enforce the rights laid out by the new Constitution are
still being enacted.
Table 18 Evidence of Legitimacy of the State in Kenya
Strong

General

Ambiguous

General lack

Adherence Adherence

of adherence

Strong lack
of adherence

________________________________________________________________________
Confidence in Political Process

X

Political Opposition

X

Transparency

X

Openness & Fairness of Political Process

X

Political Violence

X

Kenya has evidence of challenges in adhering to all of the five measures of
legitimacy of the state. Evidence of the lack of confidence in the political process was
visible during the aftermath of the presidential elections of 2007. Clearly, the Kenyan
citizens were not satisfied with the openness and fairness of the political process and
were driven to political violence as a means of venting that anger.
A result of the violence in 2007/2008 is the creation of the 2010 updates to the
Kenyan constitution. A key objective of this revised constitution is to create a more
representative government that will instill greater confidence in the political process.
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Table 19 Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness in Kenya
Strong

General

Ambiguous

Adherence Adherence

General lack

Strong lack

of Adherence

of Adherence

_______________________________________________________________________
Monopoly of the Use of Force
Relationship between Security & Citizenry

X
X

The Kenyan security apparatus is a relatively well-equipped capability as
compared to its fellow West African counterparts, but there room for improvement in its
relationship with its citizenry. In 2003, the Kenyan government introduced legislation to
place more deliberate focus on counter terrorism actions. Ayinde (2010) argues that the
actions were perceived by the Kenyan population as a tool for the Kenyan government to
create or legitimize oppressive policies toward Kenyan Muslims who had previously felt
increasingly marginalized. Furthermore, an Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch report in October 2017 argues that the history of violence with multi-party politics
continues to weigh heavily on Kenyan society. The article cites continued impunity for
political violence and ineffective reconciliation efforts in communities that supported the
political opposition to winners of national elections. Witnesses told researchers that the
police are “not seen as guardians of law and order, but are instead perceived as
oppressors.”
7.3 Cross Case Comparison
As shown by the World Bank Governance indicator charts above, Liberia is making
progress in containing violence over the past eighteen years, while Kenya is retracting.
The two countries have very different levels of security sector capacities on which to build
their political development. Liberia is emerging from the ground up after its tragic civil
332

war, while Kenya started with higher levels of human development and a much stronger
economic base. Liberia is an example of a country with virtually no direction to go but up
in its progression to higher states of political development. Its security structures lacked
both legitimacy and capacity. Thus, military assistance offered in this environment had
the opportunity to quickly elevate capacity. What it could not build was legitimacy and
this was built through the collaboration with the UNMIL team and a deliberate focus on
the necessary human security foundations on which a viable armed force must be built.
Conversely, Kenya started out with a much higher level of human development. Though
rated in the low human development category as number 145 of 188 nations, Kenya has
had difficulties moving its political stability forward as ethnic and political tensions persist.
By comparison, Liberia is rated as 177 of 188 in the 2015 Human Development Index.
Since the end of its civil war, the assistance of the UNMIL team has facilitated the election
of the first woman president. She has had success in coalescing the country around an
agenda of healing and reform. The addition of military assistance from the United States
through the Dyncorps contract has added to the legitimacy of her administration in the eyes
of the population by adding necessary capacity in the security sector that is based on
realistic needs of the population.
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CHAPTER VIII – UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AND THE MIDDLE
EAST
The U.S. Central Command was created in 1983. It is responsible for engagement
with 20 Middle Eastern and South Central Asian states. In his statement before the U.S.
Congressional House Appropriations Committee on March 5th, 2015, U.S. Central
Command Commander General Lloyd Austin asserted that an effective “whole of
government” approach is essential for the U.S. to protect its core national interests in the
Central Command Area of Responsibility. This is reflected in the current mission
statement below for US Central Command. According to the U.S. Central Command web
site, its mission is:
With national and international partners, U.S. Central Command promotes
cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and
non-state aggression, and supports development and, when necessary,
reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability,
and prosperity.
The statement emphasizes cooperation among nations and support for development to
meet the mission focus areas. The region includes Egypt, which is second only to Israel
in its consistent receipt of the largest amount of U.S. foreign assistance. Additionally,
this region is home to over half of the world’s proven oil reserves, making it crucial for
the global energy market.
The U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility has a complex array of
challenges to the protection of U.S. national interests. Since the Attacks by Al Qaeda on
America on September 11, 2001, the U.S. has conducted continuous combat operations in
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Iraq and Afghanistan. Though the mission in Afghanistan is transitioning from combat
operations to a train, advise, assist mission, operations in Iraq and Syria are resuming as
the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) expanded rapidly.
Many of the challenges stem from a combination of ethnic and sectarian issues that
combine with ineffective governance structures in both states. In the address to Congress
noted above, General Austin asserted that to be effective, the U.S. approach to addressing
the problems in the region must identify and engage root causes for the conflict. This
action is a challenge to U.S. instincts and preference for governance structures for several
reasons. To begin, the Middle East is a sea of reforming autocracies in various stages of
adjustment to the realities of the Arab Spring uprisings that began in 2011.
Jordan and Yemen are selected as case studies to illuminate how the U.S.
Department of Defense has provided military assistance in the period between 2002 and
the present to address the unique security challenges that characterize the CENTCOM
Area of Responsibility (AOR). Jordan is the third largest recipient of US military
assistance after Egypt and Afghanistan and Yemen is the seventh among recipient states
within the CENTCOM AOR in 2013.
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8.1 Jordan

Figure 16 Map of Jordan
Source: CIA World Fact book 2017
8.1.1 Orientation
Jordan, formally known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, became an
independent state in its contemporary form in 1946. Prior to 1946, Jordan was governed
as a semi-autonomous region by Britain following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire
in 1922. It borders Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria. The United Nations Department
of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division estimates that the population of
Jordan is just over 9 million people, placing it at about the 50% mark for most populated
states in the world (2015). The official language is Arabic, but English is widely
understood among upper and middle classes. The official count of religious preference is
97 % Muslim (CIA World Factbook). The median age is 22.3 years old, making it the
177th youngest state in the world(CIA World Factbook). Life expectancy is 74.6, making
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it the 119th ranked state in the world(CIA World Factbook). The literacy rate was
estimated in 2018 at 98.2% for the total population (CIA World Factbook).
Unemployment rate in 2016 is 35.6%, which is the 21st highest in the world (CIA World
Factbook).
8.1.2 U.S. National Interest and Relationship with Jordan
The United States and Jordan have a history of cooperation that began in 1949
and has assumed a position of significant U.S. policy focus since it was designated as a
major non-NATO ally in 1996. Jordan is viewed by the United States as having a
moderating leadership role in the CENTCOM region. U.S. foreign policy goals for
Jordan recognize it as a pivotal country for promoting regional stability and economic
development in the Middle East. Of particular significance in this relationship is Jordan’s
border with Israel and its custodial role for historic Muslim shrines in Jerusalem. Jordan
also has borders with Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, making it vulnerable to strategic
designs by powerful neighbors.
In the years since Jordan’s designation as a Non-NATO ally, the U.S. has
dedicated billions of dollars in foreign aid in recognition of Jordan’s counter terrorism
role in the region. Foreign Military Financing has been set aside to help the Jordanian
armed forces modernize and address readiness and sustainment requirements.
Additionally, International Military Education and Training programs have promoted
interoperability and regional stability through military-to-military training activities with
the United States and other countries. A series of Memorandums of Understanding
(MOUs) were signed to formalize the relationship. In the years following the attacks by
Al Qaeda on the United States on September 11, 2001, U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan
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grew by more than four times in recognition not only of Jordan’s leadership role in
international counterterrorism actions in the region, but of its vulnerability. Beginning in
2012, a group that became known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has
threatened to attack the United States. This group grew and occupied wide swaths of
territory within the fragile regions of both Iraq and Syria and has drawn as many as an
estimated 3,000 Jordanian citizens to fight for its cause (Al-Sharafat, 2019).
When the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria suspended operations in early 2012,
the need for U.S. assistance to Jordan to address spillover effects became urgent. U.S.
foreign assistance to Jordan grew rapidly, multiplying in financial value by more than
four times and implementing a 75% increase in staff to the U.S. embassy in Amman
between 2010 and 2016 (Cole et al, 2017). Since taking office in 2017, U.S. President
Donald Trump has prioritized the relationship with Jordan and its role in countering the
Islamic State group, demonstrated by his meeting with King Abdullah at least four times
(Sharp, Nov 2017). However, the decision by President Trump in December of 2017 to
relocate the U.S. embassy from Tele Aviv to Jerusalem has placed a diplomatic tension
on the relationship as King Abdullah must contend with the sensitivities of a large
percentage of the Jordanian citizenry to the nature of Palestinian rights in Jerusalem.
In a state where youth unemployment nears 27%, the U.S. shares Jordan’s
concerns about the vulnerability of segments of Jordanian society to radicalization by
violent extremist groups. Development assistance has focused on improving health
indicators, building road and water infrastructure, the creation of schools, and specific
assistance to communities hosting Syrian refugees. Military assistance is designed to
meet Jordan’s legitimate defense needs, including preservation of border integrity and
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regional stability through the provision of material and training. With few natural
resources and a small industrial base, Jordan’s economy is heavily dependent on external
aid. The infusion of resources has kept Jordan relatively well-off economically, with a
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in 2015 of $10,240 and achieving a rating of
high human development by the 2016 United Nations Human Development Index.
On February 14, 2018, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Jordanian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ayman Safadi signed a new Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan. The MOU, the third such agreement
between the U.S. and Jordan, commits the U.S. to provide $1.275 billion per year in
bilateral foreign assistance over a five-year period for a total of $6.375 billion, which is a
27% increase in the U.S. commitment to Jordan over the previous MOU (Sharp, 2018).
8.1.3 Political Order
8.1.3.1 Government
8.1.3.1.1 Structure
Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy with a designated prime minister.
The Constitution for this governance structure was formalized in 1952 and amended in
2016. There is a bicameral legislature, with a Chamber of Deputies that are
proportionally elected and 12 seats set aside for the top vote-getting women and 12
reserved for Christian or Circassian candidates and a Senate that has 75 seats that are
appointed by the King. The parliament consists of the 55-member Senate and the 104member Chamber of Deputies. While the King appoints the upper house, the lower
house is popularly elected every four years.
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King Hussein ended martial law in 1989 and legalized political parties in 1992.
Organized political activity is encouraged, but is constrained by government policy. For
example, since 1989, the Jordanian government has required protestors to request a
permit outlining where the protest will be held, the expected turnout, and the topic and
forms of protest (Tobin, 2012, p. 101). The policy subsequently resulted in disapproval
of many activities or neutralized the protest by finding ways to contain the disagreement
before its public airing. This practice has evolved somewhat since the Arab Spring began
in 2011.
The 2018 Freedom House Report rates Jordan as ‘Partly Free.’ According to this
report, political parties based on ethnicity, race, gender or religion are banned in Jordan,
but the Islamic Action Front (IAF) is tolerated. The IAF is the political arm of the
Muslim Brotherhood. IAF representation in the Jordanian political order has declined.
In the 1990s, the IAF held nearly 50% of the seats in parliament, but was only able to
command six seats in the 2007 poll. Historically, the IAF has promoted a moderate form
of political Islam, but beginning in about 2007 the platform for the IAF became more
noticeably hardline. In Jan 2011, the IAF publically stated their desire to reform the 1952
constitution which allows the king to select the prime minister. Popular demonstrations
led to the dismissal by the king of the sitting government. A 53-member National
Dialogue Committee was set up on 13 March 2011 to address public concerns. The IAF
refused to participate, but the committee proceeded and submitted recommendations to
the king in August of 2011. The recommendations led to another dismissal of the sitting
government by the king.
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8.1.3.1.2 Leadership
Prince Abdullah bin Hussein ascended to the throne as King of Jordan in 1999
following the death of his father, the late King Hussein, after a 47-year reign. The
monarchy is reserved for the prestigious Hashemite family, which claims descent from
the Prophet Muhammed. King Abdullah II was educated largely in Britain and served for
many years in the Jordanian military, reaching the rank of Major General as commander
of Jordan’s Special Operations Forces.
The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of
Ministers (Cabinet). On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months
before they are dissolved by royal decree. Yesilyurt (2014) asserts that this practice has
protected the monarchy from the negative momentum of the Arab Spring in the region by
giving an opportunity to be, or at least appear, reform oriented. Additionally, the king
appoints all judges, senior military leaders and is the commander in chief of the military.
He declares war and ratifies all treaties. The king can circumvent parliament through a
constitutional mechanism that allows provisional legislation to be issued by the Cabinet
when parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved. Jordanian citizens are prohibited
from insulting the dignity of the king and are subject to criminal penalties of one to three
years in prison for violation of the Jordanian Penal Code that was updated in 2011. This
code also prohibits abasement of public officials. Violation of this policy is punishable
by imprisonment of two weeks to six months or a fine from five to 35 dinars. Yesilyurt
(2014) argues that the institutional structure of the Jordanian Hashemite regime is unique
among other Arab monarchies and is able to neutralize negative status quo powers.
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The U.S. Agency for International Development 2013-2019 Country
Development Cooperation Strategy for Jordan asserts that the primary challenges for
Jordanian leadership include a rapidly growing population, gaps in the quality of basic
education, high unemployment, weak citizen participation in governance and politics,
water scarcity, reliance on expensive, imported energy, gender disparities, and an influx
in Syrian refugees. However, this strategy also acknowledges that Jordan is well
positioned to address these challenges in large part due to a relatively young workforce, a
government that is forward leaning in terms of policy reform, and improving health and
education indicators.
8.1.3.3 Culture
Jordan has social and demographic traits that distinguish it from its neighbors and
enable the resilience of its government. To begin, it is a heterogeneous society—about
50% of its citizens are of Palestinian descent, 30% are of East Bank heritage connected to
the Hashemite family through blood or tribal association, and 20% are of other
international origins. This not only gives the society different perspectives, but motivates
the minority ethnic Jordanians to find ways to preserve the state through pragmatism and
negotiation.
Additionally, Jordan’s heterogeneity differentiates it from the culturally
homogeneous, but conflictual societies in Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Jordanians
view these conflicts as conditions to avoid and are motivated to make effort to preserve
their relative strengths (Tobin, 2012 and Yesilyurt, 2014). Jordanians see themselves as
the ‘Nation of Security and Stability.’ Furthermore, Tobin (2012) argues that there is a
growing middle class in Jordan that is effectively bridging the gaps between different
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ethnic groups and social classes. Tobin (2012) also argues that Jordan’s growing middle
class and its ‘aspiring cosmopolitanism’ provides a newly significant form of social
organization that has protected Jordan from the large scale anti-regime protests and
revolution that happened elsewhere in the Middle East following the Arab Spring.
Despite the existence of persistent ethnic and religious tensions, economic woes, and a
lack of democratic debate over government policy, Jordan has not succumbed to the
violence occurring in other states in the region. Instead, Tobin (2012, p. 98) asserts that
new patterns of work and leisure have combined with easier access to private commercial
spaces and employment in the service sector. As a result, empowered working class
Jordanians are better postured to emulate consumption habits and patterns of the elites,
thus paving the way for new forms of social organization. Tobin (2012, p. 100) asserts
that modes for social cohesion and political and economic solidarity emerged quite
strongly during Jordan’s Arab Spring of 2011. This social cohesion has withstood the
influx of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi and Syrian refugees who arrived between 2003
and 2016.
Sharp (2017) asserts that the Jordanian monarchy has remained strong due to
several factors—a strong sense of social cohesion, strong support from both Western
powers and the Gulf Arab monarchies, an internal security apparatus that is highly
capable and recognition by human rights groups that the Jordanian penal code often
mitigates the severity of political dissent. This occurs because Jordanians must notify
government officials prior to protests. Through this process, government officials have
the opportunity to assuage the aggrieved before actual protests occur. In its political
leadership role for Jordanian citizens, the IAF is recognized as the most active promoter
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of the protests. Jordanian civil society at large has long sought opportunities to devolve
more political decision making from the hands of solely the king and into the hands of the
people.
8.1.3.2 Security Sector Apparatus
8.1.3.2.1 Structure
For more than 20 years, the Jordanian Public Security Directorate (PSD) has
controlled general police functions. In 1999, the PSD, the General Intelligence
Directorate (GID), and the military shared responsibility for maintaining internal security
and had authority to monitor the activities of persons believed to be security threats. In
2010, a gendarmerie and a Civil Defense Directorate were added to the security force
apparatus. The mission of the gendarmerie is to assist police in emergencies, provide
diplomatic security, and respond to riots, protests, and demonstrations. The Civil
Defense Directorate is responsible for public safety during natural disasters and civil
disturbances. The PSD, the Civil Defense Directorate, and the gendarmerie report to the
Minister of Interior with direct access to the king when necessary, and the Intelligence
Directorate reports directly to the king.
Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article
97, “Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are
subject to no authority other than that of the law.” Jordan has three types of courts: Civil
courts, special courts (some of which are military/state security courts), and religious
courts. The king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a palaceappointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers,
and retirements.
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8.1.3.2.2 Leadership
The king is the commander in chief of the military. He declares war and ratifies
all treaties.
8.1.3.2.3 Culture
The security apparatus for Jordan is culturally focused on the sustainment of the
regime. According to the 2010 U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report for
Jordan, there is not thoroughly disciplined.
8.1.4 Legitimacy of the Security Sector Apparatus
Considering that the historic culture of the security apparatus of Jordan is
committed to the preservation of the regime, its legitimacy is tied in many ways to the
legitimacy of the regime, as well. Topics that have challenged this legitimacy include the
regime’s position on the peace process with Israel and Palestinian rights and due process
for those accused of terrorist behavior or for public defamation of the regime,
government officials, or foreign governments with whom Jordan depends for its national
survival. A unique tension in Jordan is that with nearly 3,000 estimated Islamic State in
Syria and Iraq (ISIS) fighters originating from within Jordan, the state has the highest
number of ISIS fighters per capita in the world (Luck, 2016). The appeal to the Jordanian
public of the ISIS cause suffered a temporary setback when ISIS fighters captured and
murdered Jordanian air force pilot Lt Muath Kasesbeh. Jordanian citizens were disgusted
by the brutality of the insurgent group when it publicly burned Kasesbeh to death.
However, the anti-government sentiment continues in many parts of Jordan, particularly
in the western portions of Jordan where citizens are of Palestinian origin. In these
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regions, economic prospects are poor and sympathy for political Islam remains high
(Luck, 2016).
The US Department of State 2016 Human Rights report asserts that Jordanian
civil authorities maintain effective control over the security forces. However, the report
also documents that issues remain that challenge the legitimacy of the security sector
apparatus in Jordan-- the most significant human rights problems were citizens’ inability
to choose their ultimate governing authority; restrictions on the freedom of expression,
including detention of journalists, which limited the ability of citizens and media to
criticize government policies and officials; and mistreatment and allegations of torture by
security and government officials. Impunity remained widespread, and the government
did not take sufficiently strong steps to investigate, prosecute, or punish officials who
committed abuses. The report asserted that proceedings for investigations of security
force abuses were not transparent and information was not publicly available.
Despite its inadequacies, legitimacy of the Jordanian security sector remains high
among its citizens. In his field research in Jordan, Tobin (2012) asserts that most
Ammanis agreed that Jordan’s security apparatus was much less intrusive and alarming
than Syria’s. Tobin finds that Jordan’s secret police (mukhabarat) are not as secretive,
scary or as likely to be your neighbor as they are in Syria. The consensus in his research
was that “the Jordanian police will kick you but they will not kill you.” Tobin also finds
that Jordanian anti-riot police and intelligentsia are not likely to round up Jordanians en
mass for interrogations, torture, or execution, as has been seen in Syria. Thus, Tobin
(2012, p. 106) concludes that Amman’s middle class and aspiring cosmopolitans compare
Jordan to Syria and consider the principles of inclusiveness and peaceful coexistence,
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even in limited political form, far preferable to their perceived ruthlessness of Syria’s
internal-security apparatus.
Yesilyurt (2014, p. 184) echoes these findings by adding that the rising violence
and instability in the region simply increased the value and legitimacy of the Jordanian
regime in the eyes of the Jordanian public. Yesilyurt finds that radical Islamist
movements like Al Nusrah and ISIS/ISIL appeal to only a small minority of the Jordanian
public in certain cities. Significantly, Yesilyurt (2014, p. 184) argues that the political
factions within Jordan are divided among themselves and are unlikely to defeat the
Jordanian army, since it is seen as a strong, professional, and unitary force backing the
regime, in marked contrast to the armies seen in Iraq and Syria.
8.1.5 Character of the Political Dissent
There are three primary reasons for political dissent within Jordan since its
creation. They are: 1) sensitivity to Palestinian rights related to the creation of Israel in
1948, 2) persistent fragility of the Jordanian economy, and 3) spillover effects
specifically from the civil war in Syria that began in 2012.
To begin, Jordan has existed in its current form since 1946. It has grown amid a
sea of tensions that date back thousands of years. As a neighbor of Israel, Jordan has
fought in two major wars to define the nature of the Israeli state and the settlement of
Palestinians following the 29 November 1947 resolution by the United Nations General
Assembly that Palestine would be partitioned into three entities, a Jewish state, an Arab
state, and a separate area in Jerusalem under international jurisdiction. The creation of
the Jewish state followed the horrific tragedy known as the Holocaust in northern Europe,
during which more than 6 million persons of Jewish heritage were exterminated by a
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fascist German government led by Adolph Hitler. The challenge after the creation of the
Jewish state was that the U.N. made no provisions for execution or enforcement of the
resolution objectives. Soon after the resolution and the announcement of the Jewish state
in May 1948 that the Jewish partition would be called Israel, war broke out in the region
from among the Arab world and lasted through the end of 1948. Israel was unexpectedly
strong and resilient.
The issue of Palestinian rights continued to be a concern for neighboring Jordan
well after the end of the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948 because over half of Jordan’s
citizens are of Palestinian origin. Jordan and Israel adopted a peace treaty in 1967 that
was most recently affirmed in a 1994 bilateral peace treaty. Israel acknowledges Jordan’s
custodial role for Jerusalem’s historic Muslim shrines. One unique trait of the Jordanian
government is that it was the first state in the Middle East to provide an official role for
the Muslim Brotherhood in its political order. As an organization, the Muslim
Brotherhood began in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. It was known as the Society of
Muslim Brothers and is recognized as the first Islamist movement, or a group of people
committed to a return to traditional Muslim values as they manifest themselves in society
and government by a commitment to education and to the Shari’a. The society created
schools, clinics, social services, commercial ventures, and labor unions. As it grew, the
society become more political in nature and violence was inevitable as the leadership in
Egypt resisted the demands of the Muslim Brothers. The violence stayed mainly in
Egypt until after World War II, when it spread to Jordan and Syria, with contrasting
degrees of effectiveness in motivating state governments to change their fledgling
institutional practices. The history of the creation of Egypt dates back to over three
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thousand years before the Common Era, while Syria was created in 1920 and Jordan in
1946. Jordan was the first state in the Middle East to provide an official role for the
Muslim Brotherhood in its political order. The Islamic Action Front (IAF) was created in
Jordan in 1992 under the law of parties, No. 32, as the political arm of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Jordan (Althbutat and Ghawanmeh, 2014). The Muslim Brotherhood,
which is viewed by many states within (and beyond) the Greater Middle East as a
terrorist organization, had been active in Jordan since the creation of Jordan in 1946, but
it was not until 1992 that it became was afforded an official voice in the political process.
Althbutat and Ghawanmeh (2014) assert that the Jordanian political environment has
witnessed active partisan behavior because political awareness is widespread among the
state’s intellectuals, employees and students. From its inception, the IAF has advocated
for reform, moderation, and participation in democratic processes. More recently, the
IAF’s primary goals are to implement Islamic law and to abrogate the peace treaty with
Israel, drawing support mainly from the urban poor and the large Palestinian population
within Jordan (Althbutat and Gwanmeh, 2014, p. 182). Althbutat and Gwanmeh (2014,
p. 183) assert that the IAF has maintained a strategy of loyal opposition to the monarchy,
emphasizing reformist rather than militant tactics, and is by far the largest and bestorganized political party in the kingdom of Jordan. An additional objective of the IAF is
to counter U.S. dominance in the region, which puts it at odds with the monarchy that
receives substantial economic and military assistance from the U.S. The IAF has had a
significant presence in the Jordanian parliament since its creation in 1992, occupying as
much as 50% of the elected positions. Jordan began an early and active cooperation with
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the United States after the attacks by Al Qaeda on New York City on September 11,
2001, with mixed support from the Jordanian population.
Jordan’s exposure to the Arab Spring began on January 28, 2011 with the first of
a series of protests that occurred through mid-March. The protests drew from 3,500 to
10,000 people and occurred more than 8,000 times between 2011 and 2013 (Cole et al,
2017). Tensions had been growing with the momentum of the Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL). The Jordanian public wavered between support for the group, apathy,
or disdain for involvement by non-Arab states in the conflict. However, this sentiment
changed after the immolation of Lt Moath al Kasasbeh. Alongside a galvanized
Jordanian public, King Abdullah vowed to wage a ‘relentless’ war against the Islamic
State and ‘hit them in their own ground’ through an increased number of airstrikes into
both Syria and Iraq.
A distinguishing characteristic of the protests in Jordan is that the protesters were
drawn not just from opposition parties, but also from East Bank Hashemite Jordanians—
the king’s most loyal supporters. Though they were not calling for an end to King
Abdullah’s leadership, they demanded democratic reforms that would give more power to
the people and reduce corruption. As tensions mounted, so did the threat of violence, so
the king had no choice but to capitulate and offer reforms.
In 2016, King Abdullah II initiated reforms that are paving the way for more
political parties, including parties that formerly boycotted elections, to run candidates,
along with the creation of a process for parliament, rather than the king, to select a prime
minister. King Abdullah also responded to public calls for change by meeting with
leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and by putting $500 million into salary increases for
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government employees and subsidies for food staples and food (Tobin, 2012, p. 101). In
late February 2011, King Abdullah pledged additional governmental reforms within a
three-month timeline (Tobin, 2012, p. 101).
Analysts attribute the resilience of the Jordanian government during the
tumultuous Arab Spring to several factors that are both endogenous and exogenous to the
Jordanian political environment. First, the Jordanian public was dissuaded by the
devastation of political upheaval in neighboring countries to pursue a similar path by
recognizing their own relative comfort, politically, economically, and socially. King
Abdullah took visible action throughout the protests to appoint new Prime Ministers and
Cabinet members as an attempt to show support for the need for change. Other regional
Arab monarchies did not respond in a similar manner.
Fighting in neighboring Syria has had a significant impact on the economic and
political environment in Jordan. Since the civil war began in 2012, hundreds of
thousands of Syrian refugees have poured into Jordan, placing further stress on an already
precarious water and energy supply for the resident Jordanian population. Health
facilities and schools also felt the pressure and commodity prices have risen in
recognition of the increased demand. As a direct result of these pressures, Jordanian
authorities have amplified border security measures, expanded security force training,
and sought increased sources of intelligence to mitigate internal and external threats.
Jordan’s government has also instated subsidies for basic food, reduced fuel taxes, and
increased wages and pensions.
In close collaboration with the United States soon after the Al Qaeda attacks on
the U.S. in September of 2011, Jordan joined the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq
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and Syria (ISIS) after it captured significant swaths of territory in Iraq. Cole et al (2017)
assert that despite considerable external and internal challenges and a handful of its own
terrorist attacks within Jordan in 2015 and 2016, Jordan has remained largely stable, due
in part to U.S. support. Jordan distinguishes itself as a stable and reliable security partner
in the Middle East, even as it faces formidable challenges of its own.
8.1.6 Effectiveness of the Security Sector Apparatus
The Jordanian security apparatus has had several effectiveness challenges related
to the political dissent described above. With 624,000 registered Syrian refugees as
reported by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in March 2015, the population of
Jordan increased by 10%. To alleviate the stress on Jordanian services, authorities have
had to block refugees at the border and to forcibly deport others, particularly in the
Northern provinces. In addition, the fragility of the state economy has been tested by the
2008 global financial crisis and took a deeper turn downward when the regional unrest
began in 2011.
Sharp (2015) asserts that Jordan may not have the military capabilities to wage an
expanded and long-term counter-insurgency operation against the Islamic State without
significant Arab and Western assistance. With this assistance and through the resilience
of the monarchy, analysts assert that the Jordanian kingdom’s security services have been
able to withstand threats posed by the Islamic State organization, despite internal and
external attacks (Tobin (2012), Athbutat and Gwanmeh (2014), Sharp (2015) and Cole et
al (2017)). Furthermore, the U.S. Department of State 2016 Human Rights Report for
Jordan asserts that civilian authorities maintained effective control over the security
forces.
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8.1.7 Specific U.S. Military Assistance
The United States has provided military assistance to Jordan since 1957. In 1996,
the U.S. granted Jordan Major non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status. This made Jordan
eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, along with training and loans of
equipment for cooperative research and development. Although most U.S. assistance to
Jordan is administered by the State Department, the Department of Defense has grown its
support by the Jordanian military by expanding the types of allowable funding for
counterterrorism activities, particularly since the September 11, 2001 Attacks by Al
Qaeda on the United States. In 2003, Jordan had one of the largest International Military
Education and Training (IMET) programs in the world with the United States. Jordan
regularly sent officers to U.S. war colleges, command and staff schools, and other key
professional military education and technical courses (U.S. Department of State, Foreign
Military Training Objectives for Jordan, 2003/2004). IMET programs are designed to
reinforce democratic principles of civilian control of the military, to enhance
interoperability with U.S. forces, to promote professionalism and reinforced the
importance of a strong/cooperative relationship with the United States. U.S.-Jordanian
military cooperation is an important part of bilateral relations. U.S. military assistance is
primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain
conventional weapon systems, particularly those that specifically bolster the unique
security challenges facing Jordan.
U.S. military assistance to Jordan includes both training and equipment. In the
training realm, the U.S. is teaching Jordanians about leadership techniques at every level.
In 2010, a Non-Commissioned Officer “train the trainer” program was set up in Jordan to
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teach senior Jordanian enlisted leaders the role of the Instructor in a Contemporary
Operating Environment (Belser, 2016). Students are taught how to design, develop,
implement, and evaluate the progress of enlisted training programs.
In 2010, the U.S. Central Command began conducting an annual exercise known
as Eager Lion in order to strengthen military-to-military relationships between the U.S.,
Jordan, and other international partners. The exercise grew in size and scope as the threat
from the group known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) became more urgent.
In 2012, the U.S. established a Central Command Forward location at the King Abdullah
Special Operations Training Center near Amman specifically to address the ISIS concern.
At the beginning, the intent was to send planners and other specialists to advise, train and
otherwise support Jordanian forces to contain threats in Syria and bolster Jordan’s
defenses. The U.S. advisor team helped Jordan to set up a sensor and monitoring system
along the border and to train Jordan’s Border Security Guard. Additionally, a civilmilitary support element team was established by the U.S. DoD to support local-level
Jordanian government officials when civilian donor agencies were unable to meet
Jordanian civilian needs. For example, the U.S. team fulfilled one Jordanian governor’s
request to provide items such as refrigerators, kitchen equipment, and water storage tanks
to Jordanian officials administering deserter camps that hosted former fighters from Syria
(Cole, 2017, p. 19). In 2017, the exercise involved about 7,200 military personnel from
more than 20 states that committed to engagement in scenarios tailored for border
security, command and control, cyber defense and battlespace management (Yoke, 2017).
An objective for Eager Lion is to clarify for participants how to plan and execute joint
operations in unconventional environments and to coordinate between military troops,
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agencies, ministries, and governmental and non-governmental agencies (Yoke, 2017).
This type of coordination enables Jordan and its partners to better respond not just to
counterterrorism threat operations, but also to handle refugee displacement and
humanitarian relief operations.
Also in 2017, the US delivered two S-70 Blackhawk helicopters to Jordan,
bringing their total Blackhawk fleet up to 26 aircraft. Between 2012 and 2017, Jordan
received excess US defense articles, including two C-130 aircraft, HAWK MEI-23E
missiles, and cargo trucks.

The value of excess defense equipment transferred to Jordan

since 2009 is valued at approximately $81.69 million (Sharp, 2015). Beginning in 2015,
Jordan began receiving funding assistance through the U.S. Department of Defense 1206
program for ammunition and communication equipment. This program provided $11.6
million in security assistance for Jordan’s border guard forces. During Fiscal Years 2016
and 2017, Jordan was the top recipient of U.S. Global Train and Equip projects, receiving
a total of $585 million in assistance (GAO Study on Counterterrorism, 18-449). Through
Foreign Military Financing grants, Jordan has been able to maintain a modest fleet of F16 fighter jet aircraft for its Air Force and also to purchase Advanced Medium Range Air
to Air Missiles (Sharp, 2015, p. 13). Additionally, at the request of the Government of
Jordan, approximately 2,850 U.S. military personnel are deployed to Jordan to support
the line of effort to defeat the Islamic State group and to support Jordanian efforts to
bolster internal security while promoting regional stability (June 2017 War Powers
Resolution Report to Congress).
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8.1.8 Jordan Foreign Policy
Jordan is well aware of and an active contributor to its role in promoting peace in
the Middle East. Considering that over 62% of the Jordanian populace is ethnically
Palestinian and it maintains a peace treaty with Israel, Jordan has a unique opportunity to
contribute to regional security goals. In 2003, Jordan played a key role in support of Iraq
stability, including facilitating training for nearly 30,000 Iraqi police cadets and in
providing training for about 1,700 Iraqi military officers at Jordanian military colleges
(U.S. Dept of State Foreign Military Training Objectives, 2003/2004). Furthermore,
Jordan deployed a field hospital to Fallujah that by 2004 had treated more than 130,000
Iraqi civilians (U.S. Dept of State Foreign Military Training Objectives, 2003/2004).
Jordan has also been a strong supporter of U.S. policy in the Middle East. In
particular, King Abdullah supported the war in Afghanistan by providing an airborne
company, field hospital, de-mining unit, and a special operations battalion in support of
coalition operations.
In early 2015, Jordan began participating with the U.S. to counter the expanding
influence and violence of ISIS in an effort known as Operation Inherent Resolve, which
brought together a coalition of more than 60 countries. The Jordanian participation in
this effort was particularly controversial among the Jordanian public. However, it took
on a new momentum after ISIS publicly broadcast a video in Feb 2015 of a Jordanian
pilot it had captured and burned alive in a cage. This heinous act prompted outrage from
the king of Jordan, who vowed an “earth-shaking” response. Soon afterwards, Jordan
agreed to act as host for a train, advise, equip initiative that the U.S. and Turkey planned
to jointly implement for the “moderate Syrian opposition” (Cole, 2017, p. 19). Jordan
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also executed a long-held prisoner whom ISIS had wanted released. These actions
combined with Jordan’s increase of air strikes against ISIS targets to earn distinction by
May 2015 as the leading deliverer among all other Middle Eastern OIR coalition partners
of airstrikes targeting ISIS.
Jordan’s willingness to partner with the U.S. on goals of mutual interest prompted
the creation of a U.S.-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act of 2015. President Obama signed
this act in February 2016. It authorized expedited review of proposed arms sales to
Jordan and raise the cap on the value of sales for three years.
In 2015, Jordan distinguished itself among worldwide U.N. peacekeeping forces
as the single largest provider of civilian police personnel and fifth largest provider of
military personnel to UN peacekeeping operations worldwide.
8.1.9 Conclusion
U.S. military assistance in Jordan is a successful example of the allocation of
resources towards Jordanian political development of the security sector apparatus. As a
state with few natural resources in a neighborhood of border state unrest, Jordan depends
to a considerable extend on external assistance. Thus, the relationship between the U.S.
and Jordan has grown, particularly since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and more recently
since the Syrian civil conflict and the evolution of the Islamic State Group in Iraq and
Syria. U.S. policy has prioritized the contribution of military assistance that enables the
Government of Jordan to protect itself from neighboring state unrest. Between 2006 and
2015, fragility of the Jordanian security sector apparatus decreased by 19%.
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Table 20 Evidence of Legitimacy of the State in Jordan
Strong

General

Ambiguous

General lack

Adherence Adherence

of adherence

Strong lack
of adherence

_______________________________________________________________________
Confidence in Political Process

X

Political Opposition

X

Transparency

X

Openness & Fairness of Political Process

X

Political Violence

X

There is considerable evidence of legitimacy of the state in Jordan that follows the
variables named above. The autocratic governance structure is widely perceived by the
population as legitimate because it is open to reform. The king reserves the right to
change out his senior advisors as often as necessary to show the people that he is
sensitive to their complaints. This style resonates with the Jordanian citizens as it is
relatively peaceful in comparison to its more violence neighbors, particularly as seen in
Syria. However, there is still a preference within the Jordanian government for reducing
open criticism by the citizenry. The king can circumvent parliament through a
constitutional mechanism that allows provisional legislation to be issued by the Cabinet
when parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved. Jordanian citizens are prohibited
from insulting the dignity of the king and are subject to criminal penalties of one to three
years in prison for violation of the Jordanian Penal Code that was updated in 2011. This
code also prohibits abasement of public officials.
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Table 21 Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness in Jordan
Strong

General

Adherence Adherence

Ambiguous

General lack

Strong lack

of Adherence

of Adherence

_______________________________________________________________________
Monopoly of the Use of Force

X

Relationship Between Security & Citizenry

X

The Jordanian security sector is remarkably effective considering its proximity to
Israel and Syria. Jordan must adapt to the spillover effects from the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and it also must adapt to a large refugee flow from neighboring Syria, as well.
For its ability to keep the peace amid these conflicts, the Jordanian security sector enjoys
a relatively legitimate status among its citizens. There are pockets of dissent along the
borders with Israel and Syria, but the Jordanian government has been successful in
keeping the violence at a comparably low level. Thus, it is rated as having a strong
adherence to the trait of having a monopoly of the use of force and a general adherence
between security and citizenry.
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8.2 Yemen

Figure 17 Map of Yemen
Source: CIA World Factbook 2017
8.2.1 Orientation
The state of Yemen as it is defined in its current geographic context has existed
since 1990, when North and South Yemen were joined after existing separately. North
Yemen received independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1918, but South Yemen
existed as a British protectorate from the late 19th century until 1967. Yemen borders
Oman, Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea. The United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division estimates that
the population of Yemen is just under 27 million people, placing it among the top third of
most populated states in the world (2015). The official language is Arabic. The official
religious prevalence is Muslim.

Life expectancy at birth is 64.1 (United Nations 2016

HDI). The UN Office of the Special Adviser for Yemen estimated the unemployment
rate in 2015 to be 35%. Yemen’s Human Development ranking in the 2016 UN Human
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Development Index is 168 of 188 states assessed. Most notably, in 2018, the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that 22.2 million
people, or more than 80% of the entire population, are in need of humanitarian assistance,
more than any other single country. This level of need is exacerbated by intractable
persistent conflict and failed or nonexistent state governance institutions.
8.2.2 U.S. National Interest and Relationship with Yemen
The United States established diplomatic relations with North Yemen in 1946 and
South Yemen in 1967. In 1959 the United States Agency for International Development
began providing food, water, road, and agriculture assistance.

The relationship with the

two countries was never entirely smooth because of the Arab-Israeli conflict that was
rooted in tensions that well predated the U.S. relationship with Yemen. Regional
perceptions were generally critical of the U.S. involvement in that conflict.
Development assistance to Yemen expanded exponentially in the 1980s as the U.S.
sought to bolster its ties to critical oil regional oil suppliers. When North and South
Yemen were joined in 1990, Washington recognized the unification and entered
diplomatic relations with the new state. However, the relationship was strained because
of Yemeni support for Saddam Hussein during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Evolution of the Yemeni unified state has been volatile since the beginning. In
1994, a three-month civil war broke out following irreconcilable differences between
elites from rival clans from the north and the south. Enduring violence led to the closure
of the U.S. diplomatic mission in 1996.
On 12 October 2000, the USS COLE was attacked in the southern port of Aden,
Yemen, killing 17 and injuring 39 members of the U.S. Navy while on a routine refueling
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stop. The bombing was recognized as the first terrorist attack on a U.S. naval warship.
This attack was also significant because it demonstrated in dramatic fashion the extent of
the capabilities of Al Qaeda, an adversary group that had up until that point been
dismissed as largely inconsequential to the greater U.S. security posture.
On 14 November 2000, the U.S. Department of State announced that it was
working closely with the Government of Yemen to see that those responsible for the
attack would be brought to justice. By November 29, 2000, a guidance document was
signed between the U.S. State Department and the Yemeni government setting protocols
for questioning witnesses and suspects. FBI and Yemeni investigators proceeded with
the interviews, collecting extensive data that led to a determination that members of the
Al Qaeda terrorist network that were based on the Arabian Peninsula planned and carried
out the bombing. Most significantly, the attack demonstrated Al Qaeda’s tactical
flexibility and relatively sophisticated ability to plan and carry out effective attacks on a
vastly more capable adversary. It was also the last and most sophisticated terrorist attack
before the stunning results of the Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade Center in New
York City on September 11, 2001.
The aftermath of the September 11th attacks produced a ground-breaking shift in
how the U.S. viewed its security and on which resources should be dedicated to protect
them. Diplomatic engagement around the world, and very specifically in the Middle
East, focused on ways that the United States could collaborate with willing partners to
diffuse and prevent any similar attacks in the future. In 2002, Eleanor Hill, Director of
the Joint Inquiry Staff for the Hearing on the Intelligence Community’s Response to Past
Terrorist Attacks Against the United States from February 1993 to September 2001,
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briefed Congress that terrorists of the future could be expected to exploit permissive
environments, such as Yemen, where governments were not willing or able to crack
down on radical activity. As a result, the U.S. Embassy reopened in 2003 in the Yemeni
capital city of San’a as an attempt at greater collaboration. This effort did not diminish
the threat. In fact, the threat from Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) actually
grew from this point on because the weak Yemeni central government was unable to
prevent it. Evidence of the continued threat from AQAP to the United States was proven
between 2009 and 2012, as three separate attempts to attack airlines or infrastructure in
the United States were foiled (Sharp, 2015). One of the most sobering examples
occurred in 2009 when the Obama Administration initiated a major review of U.S. policy
toward Yemen that coincided with an Al Qaeda linked attempt to bomb an airline flight
over Detroit on Christmas Day that same year. The resulting policy update focused first
on combating AQAP in the short term, increasing development assistance to meet longterm challenges, and marshalling support for global efforts to stabilize Yemen.
Furthermore, the investigation led to a designation of AQAP in 2010 by the US
Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization of interest to the United States.
This action meant increased focus on Yemen because AQAP was recognized as operating
primarily out of Yemen.
Subsequent U.S. policy towards engagement in Yemen to counter the terrorist
threat has been controversial among U.S. policymakers. Yemen remains one of the
poorest, most developmentally fragile states in the world. This developmental weakness
does not translate to a benign impact to U.S. national security. On the contrary, in 2014,
Mathew Olsen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, declared in his hearing
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before Congress on Global Terrorist Threats, that AQAP was the terrorist group “most
likely to attempt transnational attacks against the United States.” Shortly after this
declaration, Yemen descended yet again into a full blown civil war in 2015 and the
conflict persists as of September 2018. The U.S. closed its embassy in Yemen and
suspended its development projects in 2015, but it remains engaged with the United
Nations and partners to provide humanitarian assistance.
After taking office in January 2017, policy response from U.S. President Donald
J. Trump’s Administration has been an examination of all options economically and
militarily to address the problem in Yemen. On February 27, 2018, General Joseph L.
Votel testified before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on the Posture of
the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) toward the security situation in Yemen. He
reaffirmed his statement offered the previous year that Violent Extremist Organizations
(VEOs) emanating from Yemen continue to threaten the U.S. Homeland. He told the
HASC that CENTCOM is collaborating with a Saudi Arabia led coalition to help
maintain a favorable regional balance during the devastating civil war. He said that the
CENTCOM goal is to ensure that nations in close proximity to Yemen are able to secure
their borders and safeguard their populations while negotiations lead to a cessation of
hostilities. On April 20, 2018, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of
Near East Affairs David Satterfield was joined by Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Robert Karem and Deputy Assistant Administrator at the
U.S. Agency for International Affairs Robert Jenkins to testify before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on U.S. policy toward Yemen. The three men represented a
defense, diplomacy and development approach to the U.S. foreign policy challenge.
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According to Satterfield and Karem, the Departments of State and Defense have four
main concerns in the Yemen conflict: Iran’s increasingly worrisome role and influence in
the region; the defeat of the affiliates of terrorist groups like the Islamic State and AlQaeda; the security threat of the Houthis on the Saudi border; and the overall health and
well-being of the Yemeni people (Montgomery, 2018). Together with these concerns,
Mr Jenkins emphasized the humanitarian challenges in Yemen, such as the world’s worst
cholera outbreak, widespread famine, and the erosion of infrastructure and financial
systems.
Balancing the complex tensions of developmental fragility and concurrent threats
from AQAP has not been easy. U.S. lawmakers have continuously scrutinized the degree
to which U.S. Presidential Administrations have adhered to U.S. laws regarding the
provision of security assistance, including sales or transfers of defense goods and defense
services, while upholding international human rights standards. Critics of U.S. airstrikes
in Yemen argue that targeted killings sometimes kill innocent civilians, which fuels
popular anger against the United States and bolsters the AQAP cause.
8.2.3 Political Order
8.2.3.1 Government
8.2.3.1.1 Structure
The Republic of Yemen was created on 22 May 1990 with the unification of the
(northern) Yemen Arab Republic and the (southern) People’s Democratic Republic of
Yemen. It is a republic with a constitution that provides for a president, a parliament, and
an independent judiciary. The Yemeni constitution was adopted in 1991 and amended in
1994 and 2001. It consolidates political power in the hands of the president, who wields
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broad executive authority and is empowered to appoint a vice president, a prime minister,
and the cabinet. The president can hold office for an unlimited number of terms.

The

first Parliament elected by universal adult suffrage was convened in 1993.
In 2008, the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report for Yemen reported
Yemen to be a republic whose law provides that the president be elected by popular vote
from among at least two candidates endorsed by parliament. The president appoints a
prime minister, who is the head of government. The prime minister, in consultation with
the president, selects the Cabinet, or Council of Ministers. There are provisions for a
multiparty system, but the General People’s Congress Party (GPC) dominates the
government.
Controversy over Yemeni governance structure has been a significant contributor
to the civil war that began in 2014 and in September 2018 is unresolved. Details on the
sequence of events that are affecting the Yemeni governance structure are described in
Section 8.2.5 Nature of the Political Dissent.
8.2.3.1.2 Leadership
Ali Abdallah Saleh, president of North Yemen, became the president of Yemen
when the north and south were joined in 1990. Saleh had been the leader of North
Yemen since 1978. His first Vice President for the new republic was Ali Beidh, who
represented southern Yemeni elites. A long time authoritarian, President Saleh worked to
retain his tight control over government decisions without meaningful political opposition
from the southern region. His preference for autocratic decision making led to a civil war
in 1994 between northern and southern elites that lasted for from May to July of that
year. Hurd and Noakes (1994) argue that the war stemmed from clashes between
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northern and southern elites, rather than among the ordinary Yemeni people. When the
war started, President Saleh purged his government of Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP)
officials in Sana’a who had been placed to represent the needs of southern Yemen.
President Saleh’s ability to ruthlessly quell opposition and marshal external support for
his cause enabled international support for affirmation of his presidency by the Yemeni
Parliament on 1 October 1994 and to be re-elected in 1999 and 2006.

However, the

Saleh administration was never able to provide public services beyond the capital, which
many experts assert is a direct contributor to the critically low state of political, social,
and economic development of Yemen in 2018.
President Saleh retained control of his presidency through a three-month civil war
in 1994 and beyond two separate direct presidential elections held in 1999 and 2006.
However, the “Arab Spring” brought tensions to the Yemeni populace that led to
President Saleh’s resignation in 2012. The unrest began as a student led protest against
President Saleh’s longtime rule that many believed was corrupt and ineffective in
meeting the needs of the Yemeni people. These protests inspired Saleh’s rivals from
within the political and military elite to join opposition demands for the president’s
resignation. The confrontation turned violent in mid-2011, as fighting erupted in the
Yemeni capital. Government forces were recalled from outlying provinces to protect the
regime, leaving a security vacuum in areas known to harbor extremists. The fighting
persisted for 11 months and claimed over 2,000 lives. This instability enabled AQAP to
seize control of territory in one southern province, leading to interest by the United
States, Saudi Arabia and other international community members. On November 23,
2011, President Saleh signed on to a U.S.-backed, Gulf Cooperation Council-brokered
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transition plan. After a 90-day transition period, Yemen held a presidential “election” on
21 February 2012. Only one candidate was placed on the ballot—former Vice President
Abed Rabbo Mansour al Hadi. President Saleh stepped down in 2012, when voters
elected Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi.
A stated goal for the Hadi government is to expand political participation to
excluded groups, including women, youth, and minorities. Progress stalled in 2014,
when Houthi rebels allied with forces loyal to former president Saleh, staged an armed
takeover against the government, precipitating its exile (U.S. Department of State Human
Rights Report, Yemen, 2016). A result of this insurgency was that the Houthi’s, in
cooperation with Saleh’s political party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), then
proceeded to take over many government functions and institutions in Sana’a. In August
of 2014, they announced the formation of a “Supreme Political Council,” followed by the
formation of a “National Salvation Government” in November of that year (U.S.
Department of State Human Rights Report, Yemen, 2016). President Hadi was elected to
serve a seven-year term. His Vice President, Mr Ali Mohsin Al-Ahmar, and his Prime
Minister, Mr Ahmad Obaid bin Daghir, were elected on 3 April 2016.
8.2.3.1.3 Culture
Culture of the region known as Yemen has had a marked impact on the ability of
the state to become unified. Barrett (2011) asserts that Yemen has never existed as a
cohesive political, economic, social and cultural entity. Barrett (2011) argues that it is
difficult to characterize the state as failed because there is no history of the region
currently defined as Yemen as ever being a successful unified whole. To begin, the north
is a socially conservative, largely tribal society with numerous centers of regional and
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local power that are deliberately shaped by the influence of Islamic social traditions. By
contrast, the south retains much of the socialist and secularist outlook of its Marxist past,
as well as the experience of a heavily centralized economic system (Hurd and Noakes,
1994). Furthermore, the role of women also differs between the two regions. In 1992,
President Saleh’s Council passed a personal status law which revoked a woman’s right to
sue for divorce unless she could prove abuse, but the same law permitted a man to sue for
divorce by simple repudiation (Hurd and Noakes, 1994). It also legalized polygamy and
eliminated the ex-PDRY’s ceiling on dowries. Residents in the south objected, and some
judges in the south refused to implement the law.
Despite the differences in the social norms described above, the cultural approach
to pursuit of power was similar. Hurd and Noakes (1994) argue that the long conflict
between the northern and southern governance regimes were marked by treachery and
deceit that often accompanies cut-throat political ambitions. One of the most visible
tribal rivalries stems from a group known by their Houthi family name. This family is a
historically prominent Zaydi religious clan that claims descent from the prophet
Muhammed. The family seeks to redress historical grievances committed against Zaydis,
to expand their political base in their home province of Sa’da and beyond, and to counter
Saudi Arabian “Wahhabi” or “Salafi” influence in Yemen (Sharp, 2015).
Barrett (2011) asserts that the nature of Yemeni society is rooted in ancient
political and cultural traditions that go back nearly three millennia. Barrett (2011 p. ix)
argues that Yemeni society has functioned as a “fluid equilibrium between central
authority, tribal autonomy, and differing cultural and religious allegiances that are largely
removed from the concept of a shared civil national consciousness.”
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8.2.3.2 Security Sector Apparatus
8.2.3.2.1 Structure
In 1999, the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report on Yemen reported
that the primary state security apparatus is the Political Security Organization (PSO),
which reports directly to the President and is independent of the Ministry of Interior. The
Criminal Investigative Department (CID) of the police conducts most criminal
investigations and makes most arrests. The Central Security Organization (CSO), a part
of the Ministry of Interior, maintains a paramilitary force. Significantly, the report
asserted that the Yemeni civilian authorities do not maintain effective control of the
security forces and that the members of the security forces, particularly the PSO,
committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
By 2016, the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report for Yemen reported
that the primary state security and intelligence-gathering entities, the Political Security
Organization (PSO) and the National Security Bureau (NSB), came under Houthi-Saleh
rebel control in late 2014, but their structure and operations appeared to remain the same.
The report asserted that the Hadi-led government maintained its own appointments to the
PSO and NSB in the areas under government control, similar to other dual or parallel
structures of institutions in the country.
8.2.3.2.2 Leadership
One of the first actions taken by President Hadi when he took office in 2012 was
to remove former Saleh family members from the heads of Yemen’s various security
agencies, but the military remains divided and reflective of a north and south orientation.
Instead of removing tension, the action exacerbated it. In 2014, Houthi rebels allied with
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forces loyal to Saleh staged an armed takeover of the government. The Houthis, in
cooperation with Saleh’s political party then proceeded to take over many of the
government functions in Sana’a. They announced formation of a “Supreme Political
Council,” followed by the formation of a “National Salvation Government,” but neither
body was recognized by the international community.
As a result of the turmoil, Yemeni civilian authorities do not maintain effective
control over security forces. The U.S. Department of State 2016 Human Rights Report
for Yemen asserts that the government exercised limited control over military and
security forces due to Houthi-Saleh rebel control over most of the security apparatus and
state institutions. There has also been a lack of effective mechanisms to investigate and
prosecute abuse and corruption. Furthermore, the report argues that the SSF, the Yemen
Special Operations Forces, the Presidential Guard (formerly the Republican Guard), the
NSB, and other security organs ostensibly reported to civilian authorities in the Ministry
of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and the Office of the President, but civilian control of
these agencies continued to deteriorate as rebel actors undid restructuring efforts inspired
by the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, which was a regional effort to promote
national reconciliation. The report also argues that Yemeni interest groups, including
former president Saleh’s family and other tribal and party entities expanded their
influence over government agencies, often through unofficial channels, rather than
through the formal command structure.
8.2.3.2.3 Culture
There is no cohesive culture that unifies the security apparatus in Yemen. Orkaby
(2017) asserts that the country continues to be three separate regions—the north, south
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and east, which all have unique political and security cultures. The north is the home of
the Houthi movement and has a majority Shiite Muslim population that is dominated by
powerful tribal alliances. By contrast, the south retains characteristics of its history as a
British colony from 1839 to 1967 and thereafter an Arab communist state that is
primarily Sunni Muslim, with a weak tribal structure that has been eroded by over a
century of imperial dominion and then decades of secular communist ideology (Orkaby,
2017, p. 100). Thirdly, Yemen’s eastern region, known as Hadramawt, is sparsely
populated and has existed largely independently from the rest of the region defined as
Yemen.
The most significant cultural challenge for the security apparatus in Yemen has
been the persistence of impunity for security force apparatus violations of accountability
and human rights. This challenge is documented in all annual U.S. Department of State
Human Rights reports for Yemen between 1999 and 2016.
8.2.4 Legitimacy of the Security Sector Apparatus
There has never been a legitimate security apparatus for Yemen as it was defined
in 1990. This problem has roots in the history of the region from well before 1990.
Unfortunately, the unification of north and south Yemen reinforced, rather than mitigated
the differences. Hurd and Noakes (1994) argue that the decision to keep the armed forces
of northern and southern Yemen separate has haunted the country since its creation. Not
long after unification, the Saleh Presidential Administration decided to move 15,000
southern troops to the north and 8,000 northern soldiers to the south while keeping them
under separate commands. This action served to reinforce the geographic origin of the
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forces while providing visible evidence that the new administration had reservations on
the long-term viability of the unification.
In addition to the political differences between the north and south on security
matters, the population of Yemen in both regions has historically resorted to acting
independently from government structures in assuring their own security. Prados and
Sharp (2007) assert that tribal leaders often exert more control than do central
government authorities. This theory is reflected in the 2007 U.S. Department of State
Human Rights Report on Yemen. This report describes how the internal conflict that had
begun in 2004 was unmitigated at the time of the publication of the 2007 report. In
2007, the Yemeni government used heavy force in an attempt to suppress the al-Houthi
rebels. The report asserted that Yemeni government forces were committing arbitrary
and unlawful killings, while also subjecting detainees to torture and poor conditions in
prisons. Furthermore, there was evidence of an increase in arbitrary arrest and detention,
particularly of individuals with suspected links to the al-Houthi movement. The author of
the 2007 report described increased restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, and
peaceful assembly.
Issues with the legitimacy of the Yemeni security sector apparatus have persisted.
According to the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report on Yemen for 2016, the
government exercised limited control over military and security forces. Authors of the
report attributed the lack of central government control to the Houthi-Saleh insurgent
apparatus seizure of most of the security apparatus and state institutions. Under such
conditions, it is impossible for the Yemeni government to exercise physical security of
the state.
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8.2.5 Character of the Political Dissent
Though unified in 1990, north and south Yemen have not yet attained a peaceful
coexistence. Instead, their coexistence is marred by decades of brutal civil war and a
failure of attempts by the fragile government to provide services to the Yemeni
population. Orkaby (2017) asserts that the modern state of Yemen was born in 1962,
when revolutionaries, many of whom had absorbed contemporary ideas of nationalism at
foreign universities, deposed Imam Muhammad al-Badr and created the Yemen Arab
Republic, or North Yemen. For the next 40 years, foreign-educated elites were elevated
to many of the most important positions in the new republic, serving as presidents, prime
ministers, and other influential roles. This dynamic displaced older families in the region
known as ‘sayyids’ who claimed lineage with the Prophet Mohammad. One of the most
prominent tribes to experience the disenfranchisement was the Houthi family.
Historically a poor region, hopes were high for developmental progress following
the discovery of oil in 1984. The discovery was a joint venture between Yemen’s
national oil company and a firm based in Dallas, Texas called the Hunt Oil Company. In
1984, the per capita income in Yemen was estimated to be less than $500 a year. The
location of the discovery was in northeastern Yemen, at a time when relations between
north and south Yemen were strained. North Yemeni President Saleh announced that the
oil would be used for the immediate benefit of Yemen, but would not be shared with the
Soviet-backed, Marxist Yemen to the south (Miller, 1984). Southern Yemeni leaders
were not happy with the announcement and took action to secure their own access to oil.
In the early 1990s, exploration revealed that the largest oil deposits were in southern
Yemen. This was not good news to the north. At that time, 80 percent of the estimated
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Yemeni population of 13 million lived in the northern part of the state. Hurd and Noakes
(1994) assert that the single most important factor in the break-up that occurred between
north and south Yemen shortly after the unification is the changing petroleum production
potential in the south. The south had discovered a lucrative new resource and the north
wanted to share in the benefit.
Fears by the outnumbered southerners gained traction when the multiparty
elections in 1993 produced a parliament that would consist of two thirds of politicians
representing the north. Open fighting began on May 4, 1994 between the two Yemeni
armies that had been kept under chains of command that reinforced their northern and
southern affiliations. Soon afterwards, President Saleh declared a 30-day state of
emergency. He also dismissed all southerners from the government. This action was not
as decisive as President Saleh had hoped. Though the northern army had greater numbers
of personnel, the south had greater airpower in both number of aircraft and in trained
aircrew (Hurd and Noakes, 1994). In turn, Vice President Beidh, who originated from
the south, assumed the state leadership role for the south. He declared the independence
of the southern Democratic Republic of Yemen on the day before the fourth anniversary
of unification of the north and south in 1990.
The separation of the south from the north did not last long. By the fall of 1994,
President Saleh succeeded in convincing the southerners to return to the negotiating table.
The reunion, however, remained tense and the inability of a fragile central government to
provide services across the population increased levels of poverty. To make matters
worse, the historical source of power and wealth were the clans and tribes. Those who
had money kept it, while those who lost it or did not have a way to gain it under a
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functioning governance system became markedly poorer. In 1999, the U.S. Department
of State Human Rights Report for Yemen recorded that both unemployment and national
poverty levels were over 40% for the Yemeni population. The report attributed continued
suffering to an ‘embryonic market-based economy that remains impeded by excessive
government interference and endemic corruption.’ That year the report also recorded that
the annual per capita gross national product for Yemen fell from $325 in 1997 to $260 in
1998, but rose to $275 in 1999. In 2014, the U.S. Agency for International Development
Country Development Cooperation Strategy for 2014-2016 reports that poverty is
estimated to have climbed from about 43% of the population in 2009 to almost 55% in
2012. The report asserts that almost half of the country’s population of 25 million lives
without safe water and sanitation and over 10 million people suffer from chronic hunger.
Tensions also grew in Yemen between 2000 and 2010 as Saudi Arabia waged a
forceful campaign against Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Many militants
sought refuge in Yemen, which compounded Yemen’s struggle with the terrorism
associated with weak internal governance structures. Compounding the struggle with
foreign born militants, the southern-based Houthi family led an armed revolt that began
in 2004 against the central government. The Houthis clashed with both the northern
tribes and the groups associated with Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
The internal fighting in Yemen gained new levels of lethality soon after the Arab
Spring unrest touched off in Tunisia in January of 2011. After eleven months of protests
and violence claimed over 2,000 lives, President Saleh signed on to a Gulf-Cooperation
Council brokered political transition and peace plan on November 23, 2011. The plan
required that Yemen hold a Presidential in February 2012 with one consensus candidate
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on the ballot—former Vice President Abed Rabbo Mansour al Hadi. President Hadi took
office in February after the election. The peace plan envisioned a two-year transition to
democracy and the creation of a National Dialogue Conference as a forum for airing of
grievances from across the country. The National Dialogue Conference was intended to
convene a national dialogue, redraft the Yemeni constitution, hold a constitutional
referendum, develop an electoral law, and hold parliamentary and/or presidential
elections. The United Nations backed this forum.
Unfortunately, the National Dialogue Conference fell far short of its original
intent. In January 2014, after ten months of talks, the Yemeni National Dialogue
Conference concluded without agreement between northern and southern politicians on
how to organize a new federal system of governance. In many ways, the process only
inflamed existing tensions. For example, many southerners felt disenfranchised from the
start and refused to attend the talks. A contributing factor to the animosity felt by
southerners is that President Hadi decided to appoint representatives from the south who
were not connected to the cause promoted by the Southern Movement (Salisbury, 2018,
p. 11). In addition, the Houthis opposed President Hadi’s efforts in 2014 to create six
federal regions in Yemen. This action would effectively absorb Sa’da into a region tied
to the capital, thus diminishing specific Houthi political influence. An alternative was a
two region state favored by southerners who wanted more specific access to profits to be
gained by the oil wells in the south, but northerners did not agree with this plan, either.
In September of 2014, Houthi forces captured Sana’a. In early 2015, insurgents
dissolved parliament, forced President Hadi to resign, and installed a revolutionary
committee to replace the Yemeni government (Orkaby, 2017, p. 96). By the time the
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civil war broke out in March of 2015, the tensions from all angles had taken on a militant
rhetoric, so a return to violence was practically inevitable.
When the civil war erupted again in 2015, Saudi Arabia established a coalition of
nations to engage in military operations in Yemen against the Houthi movement and the
group of insurgents who remained loyal to the deposed former President Ali Abdullah
Saleh. The Houthi-Saleh alliance unraveled in early December 2017, when Saleh was
assassinated on December 4th, dealing a significant blow to the Houthi fighting position.
Salisbury (2018, p. 12) argues that the current civil war has significantly
strengthened the bargaining power and position of the south within Yemeni politics. He
attributes this success to the opportunities early in 2015 for loosely organized southern
militias to push the alliance of the Houthi rebels and Saleh-aligned forces out of their
territories, with the support of special and conventional forces, including air power, from
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Salisbury (2018) argues that UAE officials in Yemen
have focused since 2015 on identifying, equipping and training local security forces that
they believe will help the coalition’s strategic objectives, in addition to being in broad
alignment with the UAE’s political worldview.
8.2.6 Effectiveness of the Security Sector Apparatus
As a state, Yemen has never had a fully effective security apparatus. This lack
has had a devastating impact on the functioning of the Yemeni society. Since the
creation of the unified Yemeni state in 1990, Yemen has experienced three separate civil
wars and tens of thousands of deaths.
In 1999, the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report for Yemen declared
that the civilian authorities do not maintain effective control of the security forces, with
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members of those forces committing numerous, serious human rights abuses during the
annual reporting period. The report noted instances of extrajudicial killings by some
members of the security forces. Similarly, the report found that members of the security
forces tortured and continued to arrest and detain citizens in an arbitrary manner or in
prisons not sanctioned by the Government, particularly when those citizens where known
to be oppositionists from the southern regions or otherwise associated with secessionist
activities. The 1999 report found that the Public Security Officials had broad discretion
over perceived national security issues, with evidence of routine monitoring of citizens
activities in spite of constitutional constraints. The report even asserted that the Yemeni
security officials sometimes countermanded orders from the President and the Interior
Ministry and that the Government failed to hold security officers accountable for abuses
or violations of guidance.
By 2007, the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report on Yemen recorded
a slight improvement, asserting that while civilian authorities generally maintained
effective control of the security forces, there were a few instances in which elements of
the security forces acted independently of government authority. Prados and Sharp
(2007) were not as optimistic, reporting that kidnapping and random violence were
commonplace at that time and there were an estimated 60 million firearms among a
population of less than 20 million. Prados and Sharp (2007) also argued that the lack of
capable law enforcement structures made Yemen ripe for the growth of terrorist groups.
Sharp (2015) asserts that the Yemeni military and security restructuring process
that had begun in 2012 with the National Dialogue remained incomplete. The intent had
been to unify the command structure of the armed forces, but the inability to unify the
379

leadership had manifested in front-line units often being poorly trained or poorly
equipped and wholly unprepared to counter the threat posed by AQAP. Both sides of the
political debate rely on armed non-state militias called “Popular Committees” to
overpower adversaries. These popular committees sought to control public life both
inside and out of the Yemeni capital and are not a new phenomenon in Yemen. Popular
Committees have historically been particularly effective in subverting the fragile Yemeni
government. On September 21, 2014, the Houthis deployed popular committees when
they took over Sanaa in violation of the peace and partnership agreement that was
intended to begin that same month. During that time, Houthi tribal militants fanned out
throughout the streets of Sanaa to set up checkpoints throughout the city and to station
themselves at government buildings as substitutes for official security services (AlMuslimi, 2015). By mid-January 2015, President Hadi was forced to resign. He then
called for foreign assistance, which arrived in the form of a Saudi-led military
intervention.
Sharp (2015) asserts that Yemen’s air force is woefully underequipped, with
planes that cannot fly nighttime missions due to lack of navigational instruments, Sovietera MiG-29 fighters that do not carry precision-guided munitions necessary for targeted
strikes, and a general level of poor serviceability among the considerable number of
aircraft that have been grounded as unsafe for flight. Furthermore, Sharp (2015) argues
that it is difficult to see how the Yemeni Air Force could conduct operations against
remote targets without U.S. support.
The lack of effective Yemeni security sector structures was evident in the 2016
U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report on Yemen. In this report, numerous
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nonstate actors were able to commit significant violations of human rights while engaged
in fighting within the Yemeni borders. The report asserted that Houthi-Saleh rebels,
tribal militias, resistance forces, militant secessionist elements, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), and a local branch of ISIS, also known as Da-esh, committed abuses.
The Yemeni security structure was unable to prevent any of the abuses, nor to hold many
of the violators accountable. To make matters worse, in 2016 the report asserted that 69
percent of the Yemeni population required some form of humanitarian assistance as of
November. This suffering was compounded by denials by Yemeni Government
authorities for permits for commercial and aid shipments bound for rebel-held ports.
Later in 2016, the U.S. Dept of State Report observed that politically motivated killings
by Houthi-Saleh rebel forces and terrorist and insurgent groups claiming affiliation with
AQAP or ISIS increased significantly during the year. An August of 2016 report by the
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights claimed that AQAP ISIS, and
affiliated militants often targeted members of the Yemeni security forces, judicial
authorities, and civilians.
In 2016, the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) reported that in
2014, Yemen was ranked 9th of the top 10 states in the world experiencing battle related
deaths. Between March of 2015 and early January 2017, the United Nations estimated
that more than 10,000 people had been killed. The number of deaths increased by more
than 2,200 in 2017 as a result of the cholera epidemic and a lack of effective health care.
This number is in addition to the conflict related deaths. These health-related deaths
exacerbated the suffering caused specifically by the war by highlighting the depth of the
failure of state institutions.
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Tragically, the failure of the National Dialogue to deliver in its initial security
effectiveness objectives is still visible in October 2018. Evidence of the lack of an
effective Yemeni security force apparatus can be seen in continuous and unrelenting civil
unrest and in the disorganized and unified civilian and military structure.
8.2.7 Specific U.S. Military Assistance Provided
The U.S. has provided a limited variety of military assistance to Yemen. The
extent of the support provided to Yemen has been limited in large part due to the Yemeni
internal conflict. However, considering that Yemen hosts elements of the Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a top U.S. national security concern, U.S. legislators
have continued to allow military engagement in Yemen. The three main types of military
assistance provided to Yemen are Sections 1206 and 1207, which are counterterrorism
funding authorities managed by the Department of Defense, and the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) program managed by the Department of State. The 1206 and 1207
programs were set up as train and equip mechanisms to build Yemeni capacity to combat
terrorists, while the FMF program was used to maintain aging equipment already
provided to Yemen. Between fiscal years 2006 and 2015, Yemen received more than
$400 million in 1206 program assistance.
From 2007-2014, U.S. military assistance focused on developing the Yemeni
Counter Terrorism Unit and Special Operations Forces capabilities, building a viable
Coast Guard, and improving military capacity to conduct security missions. The main
recipient of this assistance is the Yemeni Special Operations Force, which is responsible
for Counter Terrorism and border security. The coastal patrol units were set up to
monitor the strategic Bab al Mandab Strait where the tip of the Red Sea meets the Gulf of
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Aden and the Indian Ocean. Beyond specific technical capacities, U.S. funds supported
professional education of military leaders to better understand U.S. practices, be
increasingly aware of international norms of human rights, and gain greater respect for
the principle of civilian control of the military (US State Department Foreign Military
Training Objectives, 2007-2014). The efforts to build the Ministry of the Interior’s
Counter Terrorism Unit reaped dividends in 2006 when the unit took down an Al Qaida
cell in Sana’s that was preparing an attack with more than 800 pounds of ammonium
nitrate (US State Department of Foreign Military Training Objectives, 2007).
Sharp and Blanchard (2017) argue that the United States’ role in supporting the
Saudi-led coalition’s military operations in Yemen has shifted over time. The Saudi-led
coalition had backing from the United Nations. In April of 2015, the United Nations
Security Council passed Resolution 2216, which required, among other things, member
states to impose an arms embargo against the Houthi-Saleh forces and demanded that the
Houthis withdraw from all areas seized during the conflict. However, as the engagement
went on, there were reports of errant coalition airstrikes that were causing civilian
casualties and damage to non-military related infrastructure. This led to a review by the
Obama Administration to ensure that the U.S. was not complicit in what some were
calling violations of the international laws of armed conflict. In summer 2016, the
Obama Administration withdrew the small number of U.S. military advisors in the Saudiled air campaign in Yemen. The effort to clarify the U.S. role received focused urgency
in October 2016 when a Saudi air-strike on a funeral hall in Sana’a killed 140 people.
The results of the review caused a planned sale of precision guided munitions to Saudi
Arabia to stall and placed more limits on the opportunities for intelligence sharing. What
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remained of the effort was a more general counterterrorism cooperation that provided for
refueling coalition aircraft. In October 2016, U.S. armed forces were allowed by the
Obama Administration to engage directly with the Houthi-Saleh forces after they
launched anti-ship missiles at U.S. Navy vessels on patrol off the coast of Yemen. In
response, the United States fired cruise missiles against Houthi-Saleh radar installations.
The cruise missile attacks were labeled by the Obama Administration as self-defense.
The Obama Administration also declared that the United States had no intent to become
more deeply involved in the conflict.
By contrast, the Trump Administration has indicated strong support for the Saudiled coalition’s efforts in Yemen. This support is manifested in the removal of the hold on
the sale of the precision guided munitions that had begun during the Obama
Administration, but has also been accompanied by a requirement for training the Saudi
Arabian Air Force in targeting and in the Law of Armed Conflict (Sharp and Blanchard,
2017).
8.2.8 Yemen Foreign Policy
Yemen has been in such a state of continuous fragility that it has not had any
legitimate or consistent foreign policy. One state that has continuously paid attention to
the political situation in Yemen is Saudi Arabia. In 1934, Saudi Arabia fought its first
war against the Kingdom of Yemen to secure the border shared by the two. At the end of
this war, a treaty was created to redraw the border and give three Yemeni border
provinces to Saudi Arabia. Orkaby (2017, p. 96) argues that since the war in 1934, Saudi
foreign policy toward Yemen has been driven by the need to maintain a weak central
government in Sanaa that does threaten Saudi security. Orkaby (2017) asserts that each
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time a popular movement or a strong central authority emerged in Yemen, the Saudi
government took military action and provided financial resources to pro-Saudi groups.
When the Houthis rose to power in 2014, they called for war with Saudi Arabia by citing
the three formerly Yemeni border provinces as a rallying cry for the movement.
8.2.9 Conclusion
U.S. military assistance in Yemen is an unsuccessful example of the allocation of
resources towards reduction of political development fragility in the Yemeni security
apparatus. The lack of success can be traced largely to the continued condition of state
failure in Yemen. During the years between 2006 and 2015, the level of security
apparatus fragility increased from a high of 9 to the worst possible rating of 10 on the
U.S. Fund for Peace Annual State Fragility Index. The political environment for the U.S.
contribution of military assistance suffers from several perspectives. These perspectives
are summarized as follows; 1) the state has been in a continuous condition of state failure
since the creation of the state in 1990, 2) Saudi Arabia, a major power in the Middle East,
has historically not had good relations with the Houthis, one of the major warring tribes,
and 3) the presence of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is an entrenched destabilizing
presence.
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Table 22 Evidence of Legitimacy of the State in Yemen
Strong

General

Ambiguous

Adherence Adherence

General lack
of adherence

Strong lack
of adherence

________________________________________________________________________
Confidence in Political Process

X

Political Opposition

X

Transparency

X

Openness & Fairness of Political Process

X

Political Violence

X

Yemen is an unsuccessful example of a state that adheres to the indicators for
having evidence of legitimacy of the state. Citizens do not have confidence in the
political process, thus driving the continued civil war. In 2004, the southern-based
Houthi family led an armed revolt against the central government.
Table 23 Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness in Yemen
Strong

General

Adherence Adherence

Ambiguous

General lack

Strong lack

of Adherence

of Adherence

_______________________________________________________________________
Monopoly of the Use of Force
Relationship Between Security & Citizenry

X
X

The Yemeni government has not had a monopoly of the use of force since the
creation of Yemen in 1990. This lack of capacity is evident in the continued existence of
the presence of Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula within Yemeni borders. Yemeni
citizens do not have confidence in the security sector apparatus because a capable one
does not exist.
8.3 Cross Case Comparison
The past twenty years have been transformative for the Middle East at large. The
United States has been working continuously to help create security solutions in the
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Middle East ever since Israel was created in May of 1948. This is a region with ancient
histories. The discovery of oil changed the political trajectory of some Middle Eastern
countries in a dramatic manner. Not all countries enjoyed the economic benefits that
came with oil.
Jordan and Yemen are two such countries that have grown on the periphery of the
oil producing countries. Neither country has a large supply of natural resources, but they
have adapted to their situations in different ways and with very different outcomes.
Jordan has capitalized on partnerships with donor nations to elevate its economic capacity
and the relative resilience of its society. By comparison, Yemen adhered to its tribal
tendencies. Both countries exist today in troubled regions. Their respective histories
have influenced their ability to repel international terrorist activities.
Contextually, Jordan is geographically adjacent to the burning civil war within
Syria and Iraq as the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) has capitalized on Syria and Iraq’s
inability to control large regions within their state borders. Jordan is on the receiving end
of mass exodus movements of tens of thousands of refugees, yet it has an enduring
partnership with the United States to help it overcome some of the limitations that it is
now facing in security sector capacity.
By contrast, Yemen has progressively deteriorated in its security situation. The
war with the Houthi group of the population has prevented the Yemeni government from
exerting any meaningful control over its population. This has also prevented it from
growing politically to higher stages of development. The current indicators assessed by
the World Bank, the United Nations Human Development Index, and the U.S. Fund for
Peace show Yemen as existing in a continued state of crisis. As long as there is no
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governmental ability to control violence among a population of minimally educated
people who are unable to create their own solutions, there is severe lack of both
legitimacy and capacity within the Yemeni security sector.
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CHAPTER IX – COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: UNITED STATES MILITARY
ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP TO RECIPIENT STATE POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT
The goal of this dissertation was to determine the context setting conditions under
which political development fragility is reduced after states have received U.S. military
assistance for a period of five or more years. Ten case studies were researched and
analyzed for relative adherence to selected variables in the foreign policy and political
development academic disciplines in five successful and five unsuccessful examples of
U.S. military assistance to states as a way to help reduce political development fragility.
The data revealed from these 10 case studies present a useful blend of context variety for
analysis of the relationship between U.S. military assistance and recipient state political
development. The selected case study states are Romania, Ukraine, Colombia,
Honduras, Indonesia, Philippines, Liberia, Kenya, Jordan and Yemen. Romania,
Colombia, Indonesia, Liberia and Jordan are examples of successful contribution of U.S.
military assistance in conditions that resulted in reduced political development fragility.
By contrast, Ukraine, Honduras, Philippines, Kenya, and Yemen are examples of
unsuccessful contribution of U.S. military assistance in conditions that did not result in a
reduction to political development fragility. At the beginning of 2002, all 10 either were
either emerging from the remnants of repressive past political regimes or still enduring
the effects of one. The human development capacity of these countries varied widely—
from Romania to Liberia at best in high human development with ranking of 52 and 177,
respectively, among the 188 states considered. High human development is not a
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guarantor of political development, as illustrated in Ukraine, nor an insurmountable
obstacle, as evidenced in Liberia.
9.1 Review of Selected Foreign Policy and Political Development Variables
The selected variables from the foreign policy and political development
scholarship deemed most germane to the dissertation are fivefold:
1) Recipient State Relationship with the United States (foreign policy)
2) Recipient State Political Order (political development/foreign policy)
3) Recipient State Security Sector Apparatus Legitimacy (political development)
4) Character of Recipient State Political Violence/Dissent (political development)
5) Recipient State Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness (political development)
Prior to presenting and interpreting the Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative
Analysis, it is essential to summarize the importance of these variables, along with the
methods that used to measure them.
9.1.1 Recipient State Relationship with the United States (Foreign Policy)
Since the donation of military assistance is a foreign policy decision by the donor
state, it was important to begin the data analysis with a review of why the United States
chose to provide military assistance to the 10 cases chosen. As only 6% of the total
number of recipient states of U.S. military assistance in 2015, these cases were carefully
chosen to represent five examples of political development fragility reduction and five
examples where political development fragility was not reduced. Each of the 10 received
military assistance from the United States for at least five years between 2002 and 2016.
Four of the 10 states are treaty allies of the United States: Romania is a member
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Philippines has a bilateral mutual
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protection treaty, and Colombia and Honduras are part of the Rio Treaty for Western
Hemispheric defense. Indonesia has a Strategic Partnership agreement with the United
States. Washington also has had significant engagement with Liberia since it was tasked
by the United Nations Mission in Liberia to rebuild the Liberian army after the Liberian
civil war ended in 2003. By comparison, Kenya is recognized as an anchor state in East
Africa and as a critical partner in counterterrorism in the region. As of 2018, the first of
five primary lines of effort by U.S. Africa Command is focused on East Africa.
Similarly, Jordan is a recipient state of significant U.S. policy focus since it was
designated as a major non-NATO ally in 1996. Jordan is viewed by the United States as
having a moderating leadership role in the U.S. Central Command region.
Ukraine and Yemen are the two examples among the case study states that do not
have a cooperative relationship with the U.S., despite each receiving more than five years
of continuing military assistance. There are striking differences in the relationships
between the U.S. and each state, but there are also striking similarities. The U.S. began a
concerted effort to cooperate with Ukraine after the end of the Cold War. When the Cold
War ended, the U.S. began military to military partnerships with Ukraine through the
Joint Contact Team Program in 1993 and also when it paired Ukraine with California in
the State Partner Program that same year. By 2015, the U.S. Department of State
declared that Russia’s occupation of Crimea was the most serious challenge facing the
U.S. since the end of the Cold War. The sensitive nature of that relationship caused the
U.S. to scale back and carefully monitor any type of military cooperation. Focus for U.S.
security assistance to Ukraine is placed on evolution of the cooperation between military
and police forces for border protection. U.S. military assistance to Ukraine since the
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incursion has been limited to capabilities of a non-coercive nature so as not to antagonize
Russia or empower illegitimate elements of the Ukrainian security sector apparatus. This
tension remains.
By contrast, the U.S. relationship to Yemen has never been as comprehensive as
was attempted with Ukraine after the end of the Cold War. A contributor to this lack of
cooperation was the open support by the Yemeni government in the early 1990s for
Saddam Hussein during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In 1994, a three-month civil war
broke out in Yemen following irreconcilable differences between elites from rival clans
from the north and the south. Enduring violence led to the closure of the U.S. diplomatic
mission in 1996. On 12 October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked in the southern port of
Aden, Yemen, killing 17 and enduring 39 members of the U.S. Navy while on a routine
refueling stop. The bombing was recognized as the first terrorist attack on a U.S. naval
warship. The attack was also significant because it demonstrated in dramatic fashion the
extent of the capabilities of Al Qaeda, an adversary group that had up until that point
been dismissed as largely inconsequential to the greater U.S. security posture. On 14
November 2000, the U.S. Department of State announced that it was working closely
with the Government of Yemen to see that those responsible for the attack would be
brought to justice. By 29 November 2000, a guidance document was signed between the
U.S. State Department and the Yemeni government setting protocols for questioning
witnesses and suspects. The U.S. Embassy reopened in 2003 in the Yemeni capital of
San’a as an attempt at greater collaboration. Subsequent U.S. policy towards engagement
in Yemen to counter the terrorist threat has been controversial. Yemen remains one of
the poorest, most developmentally fragile states in the world. Yemen descended into
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full-blown civil war again in 2015. The U.S. closed its Embassy and suspended its
development projects soon afterwards. Engagement continued after the war reignited
through United Nations sponsored humanitarian assistance programs.
9.1.2 Recipient State Political Order (Political Development)
Nine of the 10 case study states are identified as democracies. There is a wide
variation on the stability of democratic norms and institutions in these states. Among the
nine, Romania and Ukraine are categorized as semi-presidential republics. Both states
emerged from under the Soviet umbrella in 1990 with dramatically different levels of
success in adopting democratic norms.
9.1.2.1 U.S. European Command and Europe
Among the nine democracies in this study, Romania and Ukraine are the most
revealing for the complexities of transitioning to a democracy. With a history of
democratic preferences before being subsumed into the Soviet Union, Romania emerged
from the Cold War with a political will to create a more representative government and to
align with the West. By contrast, Ukraine emerged from the Cold War both lacking a
history of democracy and exhibiting ethnic and religious divisions undermining the
development and maintenance of a unified national state identity. Efforts to establish
each have proven equally complex and tragic.
9.1.2.2 U.S. Southern Command and Latin America
Colombia and Honduras both have formal constitutions that identify their
government as democratic. Each had legitimately recognized presidential elections
between 2002 and 2016. Honduras differed because there was a non-democratic transfer
of power in 2009, when President Manuel Zelaya issued an executive decree to
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unilaterally change the Constitution to alter presidential terms of office. He was
subsequently removed from office after the Honduran Supreme Court issued a mandate
for his arrest. The country has had peaceful transfer of executive power since that period
of tension.
9.1.2.3 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Asia/Pacific
Indonesia and the Philippines are formally considered to be democracies. The
democracy in Indonesia is newer than the one in the Philippines, having begun in earnest
barely 20 years ago, but has made significant progress in reducing its political order
stress through a concerted political will that is recognized across the Indonesian
population. However, both states continue to have significant weaknesses in their
political institutions and in the liberties that are afforded to their respective populations.
Between 2002 and 2016, Indonesia and Philippines experienced different trajectories in
their political development paths. Recognized as the world’s largest predominantly
Muslim democracy, Indonesia made strides to enable political rights to its population. In
2010, Indonesia was recognized by the Freedom House Freedom in the World Report as
‘Free.’ In that same report, Philippines was recognized as ‘Partly Free,’ due in large part
to declines in the rule of law and increasingly harsh penalties to insurgent areas of the
country with ethnic and religious tensions. Indonesia’s ‘Free’ designation did not hold
for long. In 2016, Indonesia was rated as ‘Partly Free.’ Philippines continued its ‘Partly
Free’ designation. Civil liberties in Asia are recognized by Freedom House as a
persistent challenge.
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9.1.2.4 U.S. Africa Command and Africa
Liberia is one of the most developmentally weak states on the continent, but it has
made marked progress since the end of its 14-year civil war in 2003 and the closure of
the United Nations Mission in Liberia in 2016. The closure is in recognition of improved
local capacity to self govern. By comparison, Kenya is more developmentally stable, but
has experienced stress in the creation of a fair and open election system that is
representative of the entire population. The establishment of a new constitution in 2010
marked the beginning of a formal process to institutionalize democratic norms, but the
implementation was met with political violence as it upset entrenched previous norms.
9.1.2.5 U.S. Central Command and the Middle East
Jordan and Yemen are vivid examples of different governance structures and
relative capacities. Jordan is a constitutional monarchy, while Yemen has been in a
condition of state failure since elected President Hadi was deposed and continues to live
in Saudi Arabia. No new legitimate president has replaced him. Though designated as a
monarchy, Jordan is recognized by Freedom House in 2016 as ‘Partly Free.’ The
Jordanian constitution was formalized in 1952 and amended in 2016. There is a
bicameral legislature, with a Chamber of Deputies that are proportionally elected and 12
seats set aside for the top vote-getting women and 12 reserved for Christian or Circassian
candidates and a Senate that has 75 seats that are appointed by the king. King Hussein
legalized political parties in 1992. Organized political activity is encouraged, but
constrained by government policy. There is evidence of a growing middle class in Jordan
to bridge gaps between different ethnic groups and social classes.
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By contrast, in 2020, Yemen is in a condition of state failure. When the state was
created in 1990 through the unification of North and South Yemen, the intended
governance structure was constitutional republic with a president, a parliament, and an
independent judiciary. In 2002, Freedom House rated Yemen as ‘Not Free.’ However, in
2003 the state experienced modest improvements to governance that caused Freedom
House to raise the rating to ‘Partly Free.’ This rating did not hold for long. In 2009,
Freedom House returned the assessment of Yemen to ‘Not Free’ and that rating continues
through 2020. Yemeni President Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia in 2015 when the state
returned to a condition of civil war. The Yemeni capital Sana’a was captured by the
Houthi insurgency in 2015. A result of the insurgency is that Yemen has experienced
severe humanitarian challenges, such as the world’s worst cholera outbreak, widespread
famine, and the erosion of infrastructure and financial systems.
9.1.3 Recipient State Security Sector Apparatus Legitimacy (Political Development)
Data from the 10 case studies revealed a wide range of security sector apparatus
legitimacy.
9.1.3.1 U.S. European Command and Europe
The most legitimate security sector apparatus among the case studies was
Romania, the citizens of which have historically demonstrated a robust respect for the
armed forces. The challenge in Romania is improving the police and justice sectors to
remove perceptions of corruption. However, per the Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index, Romania improved from 87th of 149 states in 2006 to 57th
of 176 states in 2016. Clearly, progress is being made. Ukraine is almost diametrically
opposite in its security sector apparatus legitimacy. Two factors in particular account for
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the deterioration in Ukraine: 1) The Orange Revolution in 2004 failed to bring about
changes to the government in reducing or eliminating egregious corruption on the part of
government officials and 2) The Ukrainian government has been unable or unwilling to
hold human rights abusers accountable in the Ukrainian military and police forces.
According to the 2016 iteration of the Transparency Corruption Perceptions Index,
Ukraine was rated 131 of 176 countries assessed, placing it in the bottom quarter of the
world for perception of corruption.
9.1.3.2 U.S. Southern Command and Latin America
In Latin America, Colombia and Honduras continue to struggle with perception of
widespread human rights abuses on the part of security sector apparatus forces. Both
states began the 20th century with recorded abuses by their militaries and police forces, as
evidenced by Amnesty International reports, Human Rights Watch Reports, and by U.S.
Department of State Human Rights Reports. Both states were challenged to provide
security services to their populations, in large part because of violence caused by virulent
narcotrafficking in the Western Hemisphere. Colombia’s security sector apparatus grew
in legitimacy between 2002 and 2016 as it gained capacity to protect its population and
the drug cartels demobilized. By contrast, Honduras has suffered from unremitting
violence, in large part to an inability of the Honduran government to overcome its own
security capacity limitations. In 2015, the U.S. Department of State Human Rights
Report recorded that corruption and impunity continued to be serious problems within the
Honduran security forces. There was evidence of members of the police committing
crimes, including crimes linked to local and international criminal organizations.
However, between 2012 and 2015, the Honduran Directorate General for the
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Investigation and Evaluation of the Police (DIECP) Career claimed to assess 9,000 police
officers, while the Honduran National Police dismissed 1,400 officers for cause,
including 71 who left the force between January and September 2015 after failing
polygraphs, testing positive on toxicology tests, or engaging in serious misconduct. The
DIECP is tasked with assessing current officials and potential police recruits by
conducting criminal background checks, psychological evaluations, financial
investigations, and toxicology and polygraph tests as an effort to root out criminal
behavior before admitting individuals with such tendencies to an already fragile force.
The scope and magnitude of this effort is considerable and ongoing.
9.1.3.3 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Asia/Pacific
Indonesia and the Philippines have different historical roots that affect legitimacy
of their respective security forces. In Indonesia, the military was conceptualized after
Indonesia’s independence from the Netherlands in 1945 as a protector of the people. In
this role, the military was afforded a deeper access to engagement with and participation
in government than is common in most militaries. For example, Indonesian military
leaders owned private, non-government owned or controlled businesses and had
guaranteed access to seats in the government, even while actively serving in the military.
However, this privileged role often resulted in a lack of accountability for human rights
abuses. Evidence of these abuses was still present in 2004, but the Indonesian
government has prioritized recognition of the professional development of its military
officers. In 2012, former Defense Minister Dr Juwono Sudarsono declared that military
officers form “a very important component to nation building and democracy building in
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Indonesia.” He argued that military education plays an essential role in strengthening the
national defense system because it helps to solidify the essence of democracy.
By contrast, the Philippine military culture was established during the reign of
President Ferdinand Marcos in large part to protect the coercive martial law apparatus in
the 1970s. The police force was integrated into the national security forces.
Unfortunately, the overarching security force apparatus was so large it was difficult to
control and difficult to professionalize. The Administration of President Benigno Aquino
published a policy in 2010 to prioritize security sector reform, but the objectives did not
take root. In 2014, Amnesty International published a report on Police Torture in the
Philippines as part of a global campaign to ‘Stop Torture.’ The report asserts that the
negative security environment continues to deteriorate under the Duterte Administration.
Since President Rodrigo Duterte took office in 2016, nongovernmental organizations and
media outlets estimate that more than 12,000 people have been killed in the Duterte
government’s campaign to rid Philippine society of illegal drug use and trafficking (Kine,
2017). The Human Rights Watch organization research asserts that the majority of the
deaths are among poor Filipino urban dwellers and constitute extrajudicial executions by
police and their agents.
9.1.3.4 U.S. Africa Command and Africa
In Africa, the legitimacy of the security sector apparatus in Liberia and Kenya is
clearly affected by developmental fragility, not just in the political context, but also
socially and economically. The U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report for 2003
notes that the security forces frequently acted independent of government authority,
particularly in rural areas, where they committed numerous and serious abuses. This is
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not surprising because 2003 is the year that Liberia concluded a violent civil war. As a
result of severe insecurity, the United Nations activated a Mission in Liberia to create an
international response to the human tragedy from the civil war. The efforts of the U.N.
mission increased security legitimacy considerably. In 2008, the Government of Liberia
established its first National Security Strategy. This document made tremendous strides
in expanding the definition of security from military interpretations to the inclusion of
human security concerns. Over 100,000 former combatants have been officially
disarmed and demobilized. Visible progress was made to enable the deactivation of the
U.N. mission in 2018. Further, Claes and Borzyskowki (2017) find that Liberian citizens
now consider the police a trustworthy security provider. However, Liberia remains
categorized as a Low Human Development state by the U.S. Human Development Index.
Improvements to legitimacy are being made, but the situation is precarious. By contrast,
Kenya is categorized as a Medium Development state by the U.N. Human Development
Index. It has suffered a degradation of its security sector apparatus legitimacy as it has
experienced severe governance fragility. In 1999, the annual U.S. Department of State
Human Rights report found that the Kenyan security sector apparatus committed
extrajudicial killings, tortured and beat detainees, used excessive force, rape and other
means to abuse persons.

The 2008 annual U.S. Department of State Human Rights

Report found that the Kenyan public perceived that the police often were complicit in
criminal activities. In 2016/2017, this record did not change. Amnesty International (AI)
authors asserted that Kenyan security forces carried out enforced disappearances,
extrajudicial executions and torture with impunity. In addition, that organization asserts
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that some abuses were committed by security agencies in the context of counter-terror
operations, others by unaccountable police officers and other security agencies.
9.1.3.5 U.S. Central Command and the Middle East
Jordan and Yemen also have followed dramatically different trajectories. As a
constitutional monarchy, the historic culture of the security force apparatus is committed
to the regime, so its legitimacy derives from that of the regime. The 2016 U.S.
Department of State Human Rights Report asserts that Jordanian civil authorities
maintain effective control over the security forces. Additionally, Tobin (2012) argues
that citizens find Jordan’s security apparatus preferable to the perceived ruthlessness of
neighboring Syria.

By contrast, Yemen has existed in a state of continuous political

fragility that is currently manifested by deposed President Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi
living in Saudi Arabia. The Yemeni capital city is under the control of the Houthis, an
insurgent group. Thus, there is no legitimate state security sector apparatus in Yemen.
9.1.4 Character of the Political Violence (Political Development)
When considering how to provide military assistance, it is important to consider
the character of the existing political violence in the recipient state, since military
assistance is a tool designed specifically to address physical security requirements.
Among the 10 case studies, all began the period of investigation in 2002 in varying
conditions of political fragility. Ironically, Ukraine, which has deteriorated more than
any other state examined in this study, was identified in 2002 by state fragility indicators
as being the least fragile among the 10 cases examined.
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9.1.4.1 U.S. European Command and Europe
Romania was considered more developmentally fragile than Ukraine after the
Cold War ended, but was not marked by outright visible violence once President
Ceaucescu was removed from power in 1989. By the late 1990s, efforts to counter
corruption were launched when Romanian President Emil Constantinescu announced a
full-scale offensive to remove this crime from government. In response, the government
moved to deliberately remove vestigial evidence of the Soviet era governance system.
The changes were not seamless, because the Romanian government fell twice between
2012 and 2017. In 2012, Amnesty International reported that Romanian security forces
used excessive force against protestors. However, the protests indicated an empowered
populace intent on uncovering corruption and holding government officials accountable.
By contrast, public dissent in Ukraine is characterized by an increasingly illegitimate
governance and security structure that is unable to control violence. The promise of
capitalism and a market economy did not delivery for Ukrainians after the end of the
Cold War. Between 1990 and 1991, the Ukrainian economy contracted 27% while
attempts were made to liberalize the communist system. It is estimated that during the
early to mid-1990s, nearly three quarters of Ukrainians lived below the poverty level
(Yekelchyk, 2007). As individual income plummeted and government corruption
continued unabated, the Ukraine public took to the streets in 2004 to demand changes
from the government. All through November and December 2004, hundreds of
thousands of Ukrainians from every occupation donned orange vests and protested in
Kyiv’s Independence Square. These protests became known as the Orange Revolution.
Unfortunately, such efforts by the public to force change were ineffective. On February
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14, 2014, Moscow had invaded Ukrainian Crimea on the grounds that it was a rightfully
Russian territory. By Feb 27, Russian seized the Crimean peninsula. On March 16, the
Crimean authorities held a referendum. 96.7% of the voters wanted annexation to Russia.
By March 2014, there were thousands of pro-Russian protesters in Crimea. In August
2014, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko declared that Ukraine would pursue the
needed reforms to become a credible candidate for eventual NATO membership. This
action triggered several actions from both Ukrainians in the eastern part of the state and
by Russians, who still maintained the Russian Black Fleet in Crimea.
9.1.4.2 U.S. Southern Command and Latin America
Public dissent in Colombia and Honduras derived primarily from the
narcotrafficking dynamic. Colombia has progressed through the disarmament of the
FARC and the ELN. The violence has not disappeared, but the government is
increasingly capable of mitigating the extent of lawlessness. By contrast, Honduras
endured a precipitous increase in the number of homicides to the point that in 2011 it
experienced a peak number of homicides that was considered one of the highest in the
world. To exacerbate the chaos, Honduras is one of the poorest countries in Latin
America. In 2013, Meyer (2017) assembled data from the International Monetary Fund
and the Inter-American Data Bank to characterize 73.3% of the Honduran population as
living in poverty, which was the highest rate in Central America at the time of
measurement.
9.1.4.3 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Asia/Pacific
Public dissent derives from rapid economic growth and other effects of
globalization. In 2001, Indonesia suffered from fragile domestic institutions that lacked
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capacity to adequately address the extent of the social service needs. At that time, it was
estimated that 23% of its 180 million population was living below the international
poverty line of $1.25 per day. Tensions were occurring because of major shifts in wealth
patterns following the discovery of potentially lucrative natural resources. Populations in
the regions where the resources were discovered were demanding greater regional
autonomy from the government, while citizens in urban centers called for political and
economic reform. There has been a collective political will to move the entire country
toward more inclusive political structures. Schneir (2016) finds that since 2010,
Indonesia’s extraordinary fragmentation has become more political, but less violent
because the government political party system increasingly enables representation by the
diverse interests.
By contrast, political dissent in the Philippines stems from a number of historical
political, social and economic challenges. In 2001, the administration of Philippine
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was plagued by political unrest starting only months
after she took office in 2001. Macapagal had taken office in an assumption of power
when President Joseph Estrada was removed from office amid charges of corruption.
Estrada’s supporters resisted the change through an attempted coup. In 2006, Macapagal
Arroyo declared a countrywide state of emergency after a second attempted military coup
was blocked. During the weeklong state of emergency, military personnel were confined
to their posts to keep them from joining protests against the administration by Macapagal
Arroyo (Alfano, 2006). The U.S. Agency for International Development Country
Development Cooperation Strategy for 2013-2019 asserts that prosperity and stability in
the Philippines are undermined by armed conflict throughout the country and by the
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threat of international terrorism. The strategy pinpoints the build of the conflict to be in
Mindanao, the Philippines largest, and potentially most productive region, but also it is
most insecure by political and social measures. In 2012, Aquino signed a framework
peace agreement between his government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),
which is the principal insurgent group on Mindanao. The agreement included a transition
process, wealth and power sharing, and disarmament of the rebels, but full acceptance by
the insurgent groups did not happen immediately. Fighting continued, which led to the
signing of a peace accord on March 27, 2014. That agreement is a framework for
change, but has not resulted in a deep change of political will across the country.
9.1.4.4 U.S. Africa Command and Africa
Public dissent manifested itself in very different ways in Liberia and Kenya.
Liberia was emerging from a devastating civil war in 2003. The Accra Accords were
signed in 2003 to officially end the civil war, but there was a large number of former
fighters that needed to be marshaled to play productive ways of contributing to society.
Post-conflict polls showed that 96 percent of respondents had some direct experience of
the conflict, and, of these, 90 percent were at one point or another displaced from their
homes (McFate, 2013, p. 27). The activation of the United Nations Mission in Liberia
effectively reduced additional public dissent through a concerted effort to disarm the
rebels and assist the battered state in creating a viable structure for the growth of an
effective government that was postured to support the needs of its people. Between 2004
and 2013, the Liberian economy expanded with GDP growth rates between 5 and 10%.
In March 2006, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan reported that 65,000 of 101,495
demobilized ex-combatants had benefitted from donor-financed reintegration and
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rehabilitation projects (Cook, 2010). By contrast, Kenya’s political challenges beginning
in 2002 are more closely related to three main causes: 1) demographic explosion since
1950; 2) limited opportunity to peacefully change its government; and 3) extended unrest
from state failure in neighboring Somalia. To begin, Kenya has realized exceptional
gains in its population as part of the fastest growth in human history due to reductions in
infant and child mortality. In particular, Kenya’s population has grown from
approximately four million in 1950 to nearly 47 million in 2016. This is a 1000%
growth. As the population has grown, state political leaders have been challenged to
provide adequate education, health care, and appropriate employment at the point in time
it was needed. Furthermore, Kenya is home to more than 32 separate ethnic groups.
Kenya does not have a history of a peaceful transfer of governance. The 2007 election is
a prime example of the recency of violence following elections. Riots following the
election resulted in more than 1,400 deaths and 500,000 people displaced from their
homes in the ensuing six weeks of violence. The establishment of an updated
Constitution in 2010 is a step in the right direction to clarify power-sharing arrangements
among the warring parties, but the Kenyan government has been challenged to hold
violators of the agreement accountable.
9.1.4.5 U.S. Central Command and the Middle East
Public dissent in Jordan and Yemen, respectively, has been markedly different.
Jordan has endured the residual effects of the power grab by Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria group, but there is a recognizable political will by a relatively legitimate central
government to maintain a monopoly on the use of violence in Jordan. By contrast,
Yemen remains in a state of failure. Though North and South Yemen were formally
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unified in 1990, they have not yet attained a peaceful coexistence as one state. Instead,
their coexistence has been marred by decades of brutal civil war and a failure of attempts
by the fragile governments to provide services to the Yemeni population. In 2014, the
U.S. Agency for International Development Country Development Cooperation Strategy
reports that poverty is estimated to have climbed from about 43 percent in 2009 to almost
55 percent in 2012 and that almost half of the state population lived without safe water
and sanitation, along with more than 10 million people in states of chronic hunger. Civil
war erupted again in 2015 and continues unabated.
9.1.5 Effectiveness of the Security Apparatus (Political Development)
9.1.5.1 United States European Command and Europe
The Romanian security apparatus has made significant strides forward in
effectiveness since the end of the Cold War, in large part due to its accession to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004. Prior to accession, Romania had to prove
its adherence to the minimum standards of conduct for peaceful resolution of conflicts,
the practical capacity, and political willingness to make a military contribution to NATO
operations, and a commitment to the cultivation and deepening of democratic civilmilitary relations and institutional structures.
Ukraine has been in a constant state of disadvantage for its state security since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Three conditions contributed to the lack of effectiveness
of its security sector apparatus. To begin, the most significant challenge for Ukraine at
independence was the lack of an immediately available manpower and material military
structure. With 47 million people in the early 1990s, Ukraine was the largest former
Soviet or Warsaw Pact states not to have inherited its own armed forces from the
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predecessor communist regime (Simon, 2009, p. 5). Second, the public administration
structure responsible for the creation and enforcement of a rule of law for the Ukrainian
security sector did not materialize in a meaningful way after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Third, the Ukrainian military has faced continuous and severe conflicts in the
eastern region of the country since 2014 following the Russian incursion into Crimea.
The conflict expanded into the rest of Ukraine and the unprepared Ukrainian security
sector structure is unable to counter the much better trained and equipped Russian force.
9.1.5.2 U.S. Southern Command and Latin America
Before 2002, the Colombian government had treated the growth of the
paramilitaries as separate from the drug trafficking problem. When Alvaro Uribe was
elected to the presidency, he campaigned on a promise to defeat the FARC militarily. In
2003, the Colombian security apparatus launched an invasion against the FARC called
Plan Patriota. By the end of Uribe’s second term in August 2010, the Colombian military
grew from 132,000 to 283,000, the national police increased to 159,000, the government
reformed its military’s command and control structures, upgraded equipment, extensively
increased training, in concert with the funding infusion from the United States under Plan
Colombia (Beittel, 2015). Violence indicators began decreasing consistently in Colombia
after 2006. By the end of 2011, homicides in Colombia were the lowest in 20 years,
kidnapping was down 90% from its peak in 2002, and terrorist acts declined by 69% in
that same period (Colombian Embassy to the United States public web site). By contrast,
in Honduras, between 2002 and 2016, crime was widespread and human rights abuses
were unpunished. Every report by the U.S. Department of State on Human Rights
between 2001 and 2016 in Honduras reported that corruption, intimidation, and
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institutional weakness of the justice system lead to widespread immunity, unlawful and
arbitrary killings and other criminal activities by members of the security forces.
However, in 2016, the U.S. Department of State Human Rights reported that pervasive
social violence persisted in Honduras, but the state made visible efforts to reduce it.
9.1.5.3 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Asia/Pacific
The Indonesian army faces the formidable task of defending an archipelago
consisting of more than 13,000 islands, with more than 1,000 of those inhabited and a
diverse group of major cultures and ethnic subgroups. The extent of this security
challenge has required the Government of Indonesia to clearly articulate its national
defense priorities. This was first done in an openly available format in 2008, with the
publication of Indonesia’s first National Defense White Paper. The document was
ground breaking in its articulation of not only the national concept of security and
defense, but in which resources would be dedicated to their protection. The 2009 Human
Rights Report by the U.S. Department of State found that the Indonesian national Police
created more effective policies for when the use of deadly force was appropriate and it
created mechanisms for holding violators accountable. By contrast, the Philippines did
not experience a similar trajectory from 2002 to 2016. The systemic weaknesses of the
Filipino security sector apparatus was documented in a 2014 Amnesty International
report on police violence. The report found that the police force is one of the world’s
smallest relative to the population that it is tasked to protect. The report also found that
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of common criminal suspects by
the police is underreported and almost undocumented. Furthermore, the U.S. Department
of State Bureau for International narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 2018
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International Narcotics Control Strategy report on the Philippines finds that systemic
poverty, public corruption, and porous national borders create an environment where
drug trafficking is very lucrative, with a relatively low risk of successful interdiction or
prosecution.
9.1.5.4 U.S. Africa Command and Africa
The Liberian security apparatus has undergone a dramatic transformation since
2002. After the civil war ended in 2003 and the Accra Peace Accords were signed, the
Liberian government was completely incapable of fielding a security sector apparatus, so
all services were performed by the United Nations forces until tasks could be turned over
to the Liberians. The United States was tasked to rebuild the Liberian army from the
ground up. In 2012, the International Monetary Fund found that 67 percent of the 94
tasks designed to enable Liberian security forces had been completed. Full completion
was achieved when the U.N. Mission in Liberia was deactivated in March of 2018.
By contrast, the Kenyan security apparatus has not experienced a reduction in
fragility. The 2004 U.S. Department of State (DoS) Human Rights Report for Kenya
reported that Kenyan security forces, particularly the police, continued to commit
unlawful killings, torture, and beat detainees, use excessive force, rape and otherwise
abuse persons. In 2008, the U.S. DoS Human Rights Report fund that ‘impunity was a
major problem—police officers were rarely arrested and prosecuted for criminal
activities, corruption, or using excessive force.’ In 2016, the DoS Human Rights report
found that Kenyan security sector forces may have been a bit heavy handed in their
counter-terrorism operations. In July 2016, the NGO Human Rights Watch released a
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report documenting cases of individuals disappearing or dead after allegedly being taken
into custody by Kenyan security forces during counterterrorism operations.
9.1.5.5 U.S. Central Command and the Middle East
Jordan relies considerably on assistance from regional Arab and Western partners.
However, through this assistance Jordan has been able to withstand threats posed by the
Islamic State organization, despite internal and external attacks. The U.S. DoS Human
Rights Report for 2016 asserts that civilian authorities in Jordan maintained effective
control over human rights forces.
By contrast, Yemen has never had a fully effective security apparatus. This lack
has had devastating effects on the functioning of the Yemeni society. Since the creation
of the unified Yemeni state in 1990, Yemen has experienced three separate civil wars and
tens of thousands of deaths. In 2007, Prados and Sharp (2007) found that the lack of
capable law enforcement structures made Yemen ripe for the growth of terrorist groups.
In 2016, the U.N. Human Development Index reported that Yemen was ranked 9th of the
top 10 states in the world experiencing battle related deaths.
9.2 Fuzzy Set QCA Tabular Data Presentation and Analysis
The data derived from the analysis of these variables informed the creation of
membership truth tables and fuzzy set data charts for each of the case studies to
determine and help explain the extent to which they adhered to the framework established
by the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index (FSI) variables for State Legitimacy and
Security Apparatus. State Legitimacy and Security Apparatus are selected as the best
representative FSI framework variables for political development and security sector
apparatus effectiveness, respectively. Samples of the types of data assessed for these
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two variables are attached as Annexes A and B. Tables have been created to depict
membership truth table assessments for the five case study states in which political
development fragility was reduced and for the five case study states in which political
development increased. These charts are presented as Table 24 and Table 25. Table 24
records the findings for the cases in which U.S. military assistance was provided in a
context where recipient state political development fragility was reduced as of 2016.
Table 25 records the findings for the cases in which U.S. military assistance was provided
in a context where recipient state political development increased as of 2016.
Table 24 Summary of Evidence of Political Legitimacy during Successful Reduction of
Political Development Fragility

Romania
Colombia
Indonesia
Liberia
Jordan

Confidence in
Political
Process

Political
Opposition

Transparency

Openness &
Fairness of
Political
Process

Political
Violence

Strong
adherence
General
adherence
General
adherence
General
adherence
Strong
adherence

Strong
adherence
General
adherence
General
adherence
General
adherence
Strong
adherence

Strong adherence

Strong
adherence
General lack of
adherence
General
adherence
General
adherence
General lack of
adherence

Strong
adherence
General lack
of adherence
General
adherence
General
adherence
Strong
adherence

General lack of
adherence
General lack of
adherence
General
adherence
General lack of
adherence

Among the five successful examples of reduction of political development
fragility when receiving U.S. military assistance, Colombia, Indonesia and Jordan
showed evidence of a lack of adherence to the state legitimacy framework established by
the U.S. Fund for Peace. Neither of these cases had less than a general lack of adherence
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to the requirements for state legitimacy. Colombia and Jordan reduced their state
legitimacy fragility between 2006 and 2015, but violence persisted for different reasons.
In Colombia, the political violence continued because of remaining friction associated
with the armed militias operating primarily within the Colombian borders. In 2015, the
Colombian government began a negotiation process with the FARC in an attempt to
create better representation for FARC leadership interests. The creation of a new
political power has its own separate risks from the challenges previously put forth by the
narco-traffickers. By contrast, Jordan had instances of a general lack of adherence to the
state legitimacy framework, largely due to the autocratic nature of the government.
Citizens are not permitted the opportunity to openly criticize the king or his senior
appointed staff. However, the king does allow his staff to communicate their perceptions
of public discontent. He changes out the government when he perceives excessive levels
of internal discord.
Among the five successful example states, U.S. military assistance was offered in
an environment that generally adhered to the state legitimacy framework presented by the
Fund for Peace. The leaders in each of these states made efforts to legitimize their roles
as political figures over the relevant populations.
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Table 25 Summary of Evidence of Political Legitimacy during Increase of Security Sector
Fragility When Receiving U.S. Military Assistance
Confidence
in Political
Process
Ukraine

Political
Opposition

Strong lack
Strong lack
of adherence of
adherence
Honduras
General lack General
of adherence lack of
adherence
Philippines General lack Strong lack
of adherence of
adherence
Kenya
Strong lack
General
of adherence lack of
adherence
Yemen
Strong lack
Strong lack
of adherence of
adherence

Transparency Openness
& Fairness
of Political
Process
Strong lack
Strong lack
of adherence of
adherence
General
General
adherence
adherence

Political
Violence

General lack
of adherence

Strong
lack of
adherence
Strong
lack of
adherence
Strong
lack of
adherence

General lack
of adherence
Strong lack
of adherence

General
lack of
adherence
Strong lack
of
adherence
Strong lack
of
adherence

Strong
lack of
adherence
General
adherence

Among the five unsuccessful examples of reduction of political development
fragility when receiving U.S. Military Assistance, all states had at least two categories
that exhibited a lack of adherence to state legitimacy characteristics as prioritized by the
Fund for Peace State Legitimacy variable framework. Only Honduras showed any
evidence of adherence to state legitimacy traits and those were in Transparency, Fairness
and Openness in the Political Process and in Political Violence. Though Honduras had a
non-democratic transfer of power in 2009, the event was not accompanied by political
violence. The cause of the transfer was that the sitting president was trying to unilaterally
change the existing constitution and he was held accountable for his actions. When the
414

United States created an investigation into the nature of the transfer, the circumstances
were provided in an ostensibly transparent manner for public review.
Neither Table 24 or 25 should be interpreted as showing causation. Instead, they
suggest a set theoretic relationship between aspects of state political legitimacy and a
reduction of political development fragility.

Table 26 Summary of Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness during
Reduction of Security Sector Fragility When Receiving U.S. Military Assistance
Monopoly of
the Use of
Violence
Romania
Colombia
Indonesia
Liberia
Jordan

Strong
adherence
General lack of
adherence
General
adherence
General lack of
adherence
Strong
adherence

Relationship
between
Security &
Citizenry
Strong
adherence
General lack of
adherence
General
adherence
General
adherence
General
adherence
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Table 27 Summary of Evidence of Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness during
Increase of Security Sector Fragility When Receiving U.S. Military Assistance
Monopoly of
the Use of
Violence
Ukraine
Honduras
Philippines
Kenya
Yemen

Strong lack of
adherence
General lack of
adherence
Strong lack of
adherence
Strong lack of
adherence
Strong lack of
adherence

Relationship
between
Security &
Citizenry
Strong lack of
adherence
General lack of
adherence
Strong lack of
adherence
Strong lack of
adherence
Strong lack of
adherence

Analysis of the political development variables in the case studies provides useful
data on the contexts that influence the assigned values for each of the unsuccessful cases.
Ukraine has a relatively well-educated population, but a rising poverty level and an
increasing doubt among the population about the government’s ability to provide for its
needs. The situation in Ukraine is exacerbated by growing tensions with Russia on its
border to the east, as the Russian government presents itself as a possible alternative in
capacity to promote economic opportunity and physical security. This is a very volatile
situation and one that must not be underestimated by an improper understanding of the
underlying development conditions that promote unrest. As long as the Ukraine
government is challenged to provide a legitimate security sector capacity, U.S. military
assistance could do more harm than good. This can be contrasted with Romania, which
also has high human development, but is making forward progress in its democratic
reforms. Romania has harnessed a national political will to embrace democracy along
416

with requesting military assistance from the United States to augment its security sector
capacity. This combination has enabled it to join both NATO and the EU, which
institutionalizes within a larger international structure the forward path of the political
development progress of Romania. Thus, Romania has progressed from a violent
communist dictatorship under the umbrella of the Soviet Union just 27 years ago to
become one of the most motivated nascent democracies to join NATO only 12 years ago
in 2004. Ultimately, Romania capitalized on a cultivated political legitimacy, while
admitting its capacity risks.
Questions of legitimacy and capacity weave through the remaining case studies,
as well. In Colombia, the government has been able to elevate its security sector through
increased capacity to a public that needed to see viable capacity in order to accept its
legitimacy. Colombia has enjoyed high levels of human development, so the government
has generally been able to provide for the social and economic needs of the population.
What it was lacking in 2002 was a capacity to deliver security sector services, so U.S.
military assistance in this context helped to educate and empower the security sector in
Colombia, which is slowly promoting the overall political development. Honduras is
beginning to make necessary changes in its institutional governance structure that will
improve its ability to create resilience against the drug lords. Without this recent political
will by the Honduran government to take a holistic approach to security sector
improvements, U.S. military assistance has a lower chance of facilitating political
development.
In Africa, Liberia and Kenya are two very different contextual examples of why
U.S. military assistance might have different outcomes. In 2003, Liberia was emerging
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from a horrific civil war that decimated all aspects of political, social, and economic
development. However, the crucial starting point for this assistance was physical security
was essential. The Liberian population could not make progress socially or economically
without an expectation of basic physical security, so the United States was tasked to set
up a process to disarm and demobilize the combatants and then rebuild a military that
was capable of defending Liberia’s basic development processes. The U.S. Department
of Defense hired the Dyncorps International Company to recruit and train, and equip the
new Liberian Army. This even included creating a basic charter for this organization that
put forward the essential tasks needed to defend a Liberian vision of national security.
The possibility of physical security enabled the creation of social and economic
institutions that have enabled Liberia to elect Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson as its first woman
president, which is dramatic considering Liberia’s troubled recent history. By contrast, in
2002, Kenya had much higher human development and economic capacity. In the next
10 years, Kenya suffered from transitions in political power as it struggled to overcome
outdated winner takes all mentalities.
The cases of Liberia and Yemen illustrate the effects of low human development
on evolving political development. Though Liberia is among the lowest 10% of world
states in human development, it has demonstrated one of the most promising paths of
political development since its civil war ended in 2003. Conversely, Yemen is also
among the lowest 10% and shows no promise of political development in the near future.
9.3 Fuzzy Set Calculations
The findings above were used to create three fuzzy set measurement tables.
Adherence to the key measurement areas for the Legitimacy of the State variable in the
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Fragile States Index was assessed on a scale of 0 to 1.0, with 1.0 representing the highest
score. The outcome variable is calibrated based on the reduction of the fragility to the
Security Apparatus of the Case study between 2006 and 2015 as presented in Table 1.
Table 28 Fuzzy Set for Characteristics of Political Development Fragility
State
Confidence
in the
Political
Process

Romania
Colombia
Indonesia
Liberia
Jordan
Ukraine
Honduras
Philippines
Kenya
Yemen

.8
.5
.6
.6
.7
.3
.5
.5
.3
.1

Political
Opposition

Transparency

.8
.4
.6
.6
.4
.3
.4
.4
.4
.1

.7
.4
.6
.6
.4
.3
.6
.4
.4
.1

Openness
and
Fairness
of
Political
Process

Political
Violence

Monopoly
of the Use
of Force

.8
.5
.6
.6
.5
.3
.6
.4
.3
.1

.8
.6
.6
.5
.8
.2
.4
.3
.3
.1

.8
.4
.6
.4
.7
.3
.4
.2
.2
.1

Relationship
Between
Security and
Citizenry

Reduction of
Political
Development
Fragility

.8
.5
.4
.6
.6
.3
.4
.2
.2
.1

9.3.1 Subset/Superset Analysis
Outcome Variable: Reduction of Political Development Fragility
Annex C shows the detailed list of combinations of the selected state legitimacy and
security sector apparatus indicator variables as they are relevant to the outcome variable
of reduction of political development fragility.
Variables:
State Legitimacy
Confidence in the Political Process= confpolpro
Political Opposition= polopp
Transparency= transp
Openness & Fairness of the Political Process= openfair
Political Violence= polviolence
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.8
.8
.8
.6
.8
0
.4
.2
.2
.2

Security Apparatus Effectiveness
Monopoly of the Use of Force= monopuseforce
Relationship Between Security & Citizens= relbetwsecandcit

The data revealed that all combinations of the variables ranged from a high of .91
to a low of .81 for consistency. The consistency rating for the combination of all seven
variables for relevance to the outcome was .894737. However, the coverage for this
combination was .708333. The highest individual consistency rating was for the political
violence variable alone. In turn, the coverage rating for the political violence variable
was .875. This rating supports the qualitative assessment derived from the case studies.
Notably, Colombia’s political development fragility was reduced as it gained greater
capacity to control political violence through disarmament actions and greater police
force professionalization. Individually, the selected variables were assessed as indicated
below by the fsQCA program.
Consistency

Coverage

Combined

Confidence in the Pol Process

.836735

.854167

.862047

Political Opposition

.840909

.770833

.823610

Transparency

.800000

.750000

.774597

Open and Fair Elections

.829787

.812500

.835913

Political Violence

.913043

.875000

.921276

Monopoly of Use of Force

.836636

.791667

.853425

.83333

.875595

Relations Security & Citizens .869565
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9.3.2 Analysis of Necessary Conditions
Outcome Variable: Reduction of Political Development Fragility
Conditions Tested:
Consistency

Coverage

Confidence in the Political Process

.854167

.83735

Political Opposition

.770833

.840909

Transparency

.750000

.80000

Open and Fair Elections

.812500

.829787

Political Violence

.875000

.913043

Monopoly of the Use of Force

.791667

.863636

Relationship between Security and Citizens

.83333

.869565

The Analysis of Conditions calculation further emphasizes the earlier finding that
political violence appears to be the most empirically relevant condition among the
selected variables when considering the reduction of political development fragility.
The Fuzzy Set Qualitative Analysis (fsQCA) of the 10 cases considered together
yielded interesting results that lent support to the initial hypotheses that control of
violence is an important factor for political development fragility to be reduced.
However, when the data is disaggregated for consideration along the lines of successful
reduction of political development fragility and unsuccessful reduction of political
development fragility, the fsQCA further amplified the earlier assumptions.
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Table 29 Fuzzy Set for Causal Conditions Relevant to Evidence of Successful Reduction
of Political Development Fragility in Recipient States of U.S. Military Assistance
State

Romania
Colombia
Indonesia
Liberia
Jordan

Confidence
in the
Political
Process
.8
.5
.6
.6
.7

Political
Opposition

Transparency

.8
.4
.6
.6
.4

.7
.4
.4
.6
.4

Openness
and
Fairness of
Political
Process
.8
.5
.6
.6
.5

Political
Violence

Monopoly
of the Use
of Force

.8
.6
.6
.5
.8

.8
.4
.6
.4
.7

Relationship
Between
Security and
Citizenry
.8
.5
.4
.6
.6

Reduction of
Political
Development
Fragility
.8
.8
.8
.6
.8

9.3.3 Analysis of Conditions
Outcome: Successful Reduction of Political Development Fragility
Consistency

Coverage

Confidence in the Political Process

.842105

1.0

Political Opposition

.736842

1.0

Transparency

.736842

1.0

Open and Fair Elections

.815789

1.0

Political Violence

.789474

1.0

Monopoly of the Use of Force

.710526

1.0

Relations between Security and Citizens

.815789

1.0

This analysis supports the hypothesis that political legitimacy must be in place for
a reduction in political development fragility to occur. All of the selected variables were
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assessed as being fully in the membership set for a relationship with the outcome
variable.

Table 30 Fuzzy Set for Causal Conditions Relevant to Unsuccessful Reduction of
Political Development Fragility in Recipient States of U.S. Military Assistance
State

Ukraine
Honduras
Philippines
Kenya
Yemen

Confidence
in the
Political
Process
.3
.5
.5
.3
.1

Political
Opposition

Transparency

.3
.4
.4
.4
.1

.3
.6
.4
.4
.1

Openness
and
Fairness of
Political
Process
.3
.6
.4
.3
.1

Political
Violence

Monopoly
of the Use
of Force

.2
.4
.3
.3
.1

.3
.4
.2
.2
.1

Relationship
Between
Security and
Citizenry
.3
.4
.2
.2
.1

Reduction in
Political
Development
Fragility

Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the cases in which political
development fragility was not reduced yielded the following results:
Outcome: Unsuccessful Reduction of Political Development Fragility
Consistency

Coverage

Confidence in the Political Process

.9

.529412

Political Opposition

.9

.562500

Transparency

.9

.500000

Open and Fair Elections

.9

.529412

Political Violence

.9

.692308

Monopoly of the Use of Force

.9

.642857

Relationship between Security and Citizens

.9

.750000

423

0
.4
.2
.2
.2

The data above is interesting because it implies that the variables above were not
as strongly connected empirically with the outcome. This result makes sense as revealed
by the detailed case studies of the unsuccessful states. In the case of Ukraine, economic
malaise and interference from Russia also played a part in the lack of a reduction in
political development fragility. Similarly, the severe condition of state failure in Yemen
must be considered as a reason why political development fragility was not reduced
during the time period in consideration. In 2015, Yemeni President Hadi fled to Saudi
Arabia and the state capital has been under control by insurgent forces since that time.
These two state examples show why U.S. military assistance delivered in this condition
of state fragility has a lower chance of being correlated with a reduction of political
development fragility.
The assessments, along with the case studies, relevant theory and associated
literature, and logical reasoning, and fsQCA calculations were also used to create a
preliminary model that rendered a hierarchy of the state legitimacy indicators when
assessing a reduction of political development fragility.
The case studies revealed that evidence of political violence is the most salient
factor in determining the degree to which state legitimacy affects the reduction of
political development fragility. Among the successful examples, all had a rating of 5 or
above, while the unsuccessful examples all had a 4 or below. Among the most fragile of
the successful examples, Liberia had a rating of 5, but it balanced that vulnerability with
relatively higher ratings on confidence in the political process. Liberia benefitted from
the ground up restructuring of the political order and also the security sector apparatus.
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Selection of the political violence variable is also supported by the data on
effectiveness of the security sector apparatus. Romania, Indonesia and Jordan clearly
support the need for an effective security sector apparatus. However, Colombia and
Liberia did not rate highly in the security sector apparatus arena. The evidence from the
case analysis reveals the cause of this disparity to be to the evolving security postures in
both states. In Colombia, the state began the 21st century with low political legitimacy
because it was unable to provide security to citizens threatened by the narcotraffickers.
When the United States began collaborating with Colombia to bolster security sector
capacities, the state was better able to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens for
capacity to provide security. Similarly, Liberia ended a brutal 14 year civil war in 2003.
After the civil war, the United Nations Mission in Liberia was created to completely
disarm the combatants and rebuild the country. The rebuilding process included the
creation of a new government, a new constitution, and a contracted arrangement with the
United States to rebuild the Liberian army from the ground up. The process included
careful selection of people for the security positions who were trustworthy and able
bodied. These people would be trained to meet the security objectives of the new
Liberian constitution. This constitution took on a completely different view of how it
prioritized its security risks from other major states. It began with a recognition of the
importance of human security—freedom from physical harm. The army received tasks to
help create that freedom from physical harm within the internal boundaries of Liberia.
Thus, political development occurred in Liberia when the governing authorities made
sovereign determination of how they wanted their national security structure to be
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focused. The army would be first and foremost focused on a principled approach to
human security for Liberians.
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CHAPTER X – CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
10.1 Purpose and Objectives
The intent of this dissertation was to develop a model for military assistance as it
is contributed to mitigate recipient state political development weakness for mutual
benefit. Specifically, it explores the degree to which American military assistance
supports, or does not support, the national interests of the United States in facilitating
international development, with a specific focus on recipient state political development
as it may or may not influence foreign policy outcomes. This study is designed to further
build and improve on the body of knowledge on the nature of the relationship between
U.S. military assistance and recipient state development because American foreign policy
makers and practitioners have increased focus on development to secure U.S. national
interests.
In response to the changing dynamic of international conflict, this study also tests
the theory of military assistance. The United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) defined military assistance in its 2015 Green Book Summary of
U.S. Foreign Assistance Loans and Obligations as “foreign aid programs primarily for the
benefit of recipient government armed forces, or aid which subsidizes or substantially
enhances military capability.” This study specifically challenges the theory that informs
this definition by elucidating how the United States approaches the use of its military
capacity to assist other states in reducing political development weakness.
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10.2 Analysis of Research Questions and Hypotheses
In particular, this study addresses two research questions. The first question asks
if there is a relationship between U.S. military assistance and recipient state political
development. The second question asks if there is a relationship between the provision of
U.S. military assistance and recipient state foreign policy outcomes that are beneficial to
U.S. national interests.

There were four primary hypotheses considered going into this

research, which are as follows:
1) U.S. military assistance reduces fragility in states with high legitimacy of the
existing political order among the relevant state population.
2) U.S. military assistance reduces fragility in states with low security apparatus
institutional effectiveness.
3) U.S. military assistance reduces fragility in states with high security apparatus
legitimacy.
4) U.S. military assistance does not reduce fragility in states without a cooperative
relationship between the United States and the recipient state executive leaders.
10.3 Hypothesis Validity
The method to assess the validity of the hypotheses named above was Fuzzy Set
Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the 10 case studies presented and analyzed in the
dissertation. Two case studies were chosen from five of the six U.S. Geographic
Combatant Commands. Each had received at least five years of military assistance from
the United States between 2002 and 2012. For each of those Commands, one case was
selected as an example of a state that exhibited a reduction of political development
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fragility following the assistance and another case study was selected that did not exhibit
a reduction of political development fragility following the assistance.
After extensive iterative review of the 10 case studies, data was collected that
reinforced the validity of the initial hypotheses, but also opened up several areas for
further research. This particular research examined U.S. military assistance to recipient
states in a condition of political development fragility. Focus was placed on recipient
state security apparatus structures and processes, since this is the most likely part of the
political institution that will benefit from a donor delivery of military assistance. The
Security Sector Apparatus of each recipient state was assessed by reviewing the relevant
literature, official government strategy documents developed and promulgated by both
the United States and the recipient states, along with review of a growing array of
annualized reports with fragility indicators from international government and
nongovernment organizations.
The research was useful in assessing the extent of the validity of the four
hypotheses as they informed the research questions. In order:

Hypothesis 1:
1) United States military assistance reduces fragility in states with high
legitimacy of the existing political order among the relevant state population.
To assess the extent of political legitimacy in recipient states of U.S. Military
Assistance, the Fragile States Index (FSI) category variable of State Legitimacy and its
subcategories were used for assessing the qualitative historical data from Romania,
Ukraine, Colombia, Honduras, Indonesia, Philippines, Liberia, Kenya, Jordan and
Yemen. According to the FSI for 2015, Romania, Colombia, Indonesia, Liberia and
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Jordan these exhibited a reduction in fragility of the Security Apparatus between 2006
and 2015, as indicated in Table 1.
Qualitative comparative analysis of each of the 10 case study states provided
amplifying data on the political order context situations in which U.S. military assistance
was provided. Among the five case study states in which political legitimacy was
reduced after receiving five years or more of U.S. Military Assistance, two states did not
have at least minimal adherence to all of the five characteristics of state legitimacy in
2015. Those states were Colombia and Jordan.
Colombia has endured over half a century of civil conflict and that internal
tension continues, even as the security sector grows more capable through a combination
of assistance from the United States and the disarmament of most of the paramilitaries.
In the late 1990s, the Colombian government was unable to maintain security over large
swaths of its own territories. This lack of a monopoly over the use of violence caused
citizens to arm themselves or be captured or co-opted by the narcotraffickers. It has been
estimated that as much as 40% of the Colombian territory was controlled by FARC forces
and the state had no presence in 16% of Colombia’s municipalities (Beittel, 2015). The
nature of the political dissent transformed significantly between 2003 and 2016.
President Alvaro Uribe began the difficult process of demobilizing the self-defense forces
in July 2003 when he negotiated a peace deal with the United Self Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC). It is estimated that more than 31,000 AUC members demobilized and
turned in more than 17,000 weapons (Beittel, 2015). Between 2012 and 2016, the
Colombian government engaged in formal peace talks with the FARC that led to the
approval of a peace accord in November 2016. However, transparency of governance did
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not improve measurably, nor did the political violence end completely. During the
election campaign for current Colombian President Ivan Duque, voters were most
concerned about corruption, citizen security and several other issues besides making
peace with the FARC. Though far from fully peaceful, the environment in 2016 was
dramatically different from the security condition experienced by Colombia in 2002. In
the early 2000s, the paramilitaries were at the height of their levels of destructiveness.
Between 2000 and 2008, the U.S. provided military assistance geared to increase the
Colombian mobility of its armed forces and national police to be better positioned to
respond quickly to the site of crises and restore order. Capacity of the Colombian
security apparatus improved along with its relative legitimacy in the eyes of the
population. This was an essential starting point for the Colombian government to turn
the tide on the self-defense paramilitaries and bring the FARC to the negotiation table.
The second example of a successful case for reduction of political development
fragility after receiving U.S. military assistance that did not exhibit minimal adherence to
the five characteristics of state legitimacy in 2015 in this dissertation is Jordan. Though
widely perceived by the population as legitimate for its relative openness to reform, there
is still a preference within the Jordanian government for reducing open criticism by the
citizenry. The king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that
allows provisional legislation to be issued by the Cabinet when parliament is not sitting
or has been dissolved. Jordanian citizens are prohibited from insulting the dignity of the
king and are subject to criminal penalties of one to three years in prison for violation of
the Jordanian penal code that was updated in 2011. The code also prohibits abasement of
public officials. The 2016 Report on Human Rights by the U.S. State Department asserts
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that Jordanian civil authorities maintain effective control over security forces. However,
the report also documents notes that Jordanian citizens are strictly controlled in their
freedom of expression. Jordanian journalists have very limited ability to criticize
government policies and officials. The report also asserts that proceedings for
investigations of security force abuses were not transparent and that information on
alleged abuses was not publicly available. Thus, Jordan is assessed for this research as
having a general lack of adherence to two of the five indicators for state legitimacy—
transparency and openness & fairness of the political process.
The cases where fragility was increased also exhibited some variation in their
adherence to the characteristics of state legitimacy. Among the five cases selected,
Ukraine, Honduras, Philippines, Kenya and Yemen, Honduras was the only state to have
exhibited any level of adherence to any of the five characteristics. Notably, Honduras is
assessed as having general adherence to three of the five characteristics—transparency,
openness and fairness of the political process and control of political violence. In spite of
these indicators for state legitimacy, Honduras suffered visibly when the indicators for
security sector fragility were assessed. Honduras suffers from the effects of unmitigated
and rampant crime associated with narcotrafficking, suffering one of the highest
homicide rates in the world.
An important insight that resulted from the in-depth case analysis is that provision
of military assistance in a condition of political development fragility is not a process that
can be specifically correlated with a reduction in fragility. Instead, it can be regarded as a
capability that is offered to willing recipients who vary in their capacity to optimize the
use of that capability. Recipient states in which the political development fragility was
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reduced were a subset of the total number of recipients of military assistance. The intent
of the set theoretical analysis was to uncover the combinations of political development
characteristics that are more likely to be present when recipients of military assistance
exhibit a reduction to fragility. For example, internal political will to change must be
present, as seen most clearly in Romania, Indonesia and Liberia. All three cases
represent different opportunities for reducing fragility related to the existing political
order. Romania was relatively high in human development, while Indonesia is improving
its human development to middle levels. Liberia is still recovering from the end of its
civil war in 2003, but a result of the United Nations Mission in Liberia was that the added
security capacity and monitoring by an outside agency enabled the Liberians to
deliberately create a new political order and to identify and prioritize the security risks
facing the fledgling government. The contribution of the United States in this context is
that it was appointed by the United Nations to rebuild the Liberian army to meet the
security obligations identified by the new Liberian government. This army was carefully
selected and trained to address security risks that are not within the realm that has
traditionally been considered to be military in nature. Instead, the Liberian national
security strategy prioritizes the reduction of human security risks. Certainly protection
from outside invasion is important, but the Liberian national military is being trained on
law enforcement and strategic security planning.
2) United States military assistance reduces fragility in states with a low security
sector apparatus institutional effectiveness.
The research revealed that U.S. military assistance varied in its ability to reduce
fragility in states with a low security sector institutional effectiveness. Among the 10
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case studies, there were notable variations between states that experienced reduction to
the security sector apparatus and those that did not. All 10 states began the specific
period of examination in 2002 with challenges to their security sector apparatus, but for a
variety of reasons. Some were nascent capabilities following the end of a given conflict,
others were degraded because of a lack of internal political will to strengthen the military
apparatus. In the case of Liberia, the country was in the final year of a brutal civil war.
Romania is the only state among the five that experienced a reduction in fragility that
began the period of examination with an existing and substantial military and national
police structure. Among the remaining four case states with a reduction in political
development fragility, only Jordan demonstrated the political will to build and maintain a
strong security sector presence, but that momentum came from an entrenched
authoritarian leader in King Abdullah. Jordan stands as a unique case among the 10 case
studies because it is the only government that exists as an autocracy. The difference
between the Jordanian autocracy and others is that the Jordanian leadership prioritizes its
relationship with the United States to ensure its security in a volatile region. There is a
robust and continuing relationship with the United States for military assistance.
Among the five case study states that began the period of examination with a low
security sector apparatus institutional effectiveness but did not experience a reduction in
fragility after receipt of U.S. military assistance, there was a variety of reasons for the
lack of improved capacity. In Ukraine, the political complexities related to Kiev’s
tenuous continued relationship with Russia and its uneven progression towards a
legitimate governance structure made collaboration with the United States in any sector a
challenge. Ukraine left the Soviet Union less than 30 years ago with no separate military
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of its own and no separate identity. It does not have a history of a unified national
existence and many of its citizens in the eastern part of the state still identify culturally as
Russian. In eastern Ukraine, Russian is still spoken by 30% of the population as their
daily language. Russian is the language used at home and in the workplace. The
existence of this cultural connection makes coalescence of a Ukrainian national identity
difficult, especially as the Ukrainian government works to legitimize itself through
painful lessons learned.
3) United States military assistance reduces fragility in states with a high security
sector apparatus legitimacy.
Among the 10 case studies, data from Romania, Colombia, Indonesia, Liberia,
and Jordan, supported the argument that the legitimacy of the security sector apparatus
facilitated the reduction of fragility. However, study of the five case study states in
which the security sector apparatus fragility was reduced revealed that maintenance of the
strengthened condition is not a linear path, nor a continued guarantee. Of the five states,
Colombia and Jordan have experienced an increase in their respective state fragility
levels since 2015, despite the continued military assistance relationship with the United
States. Those increases are due to separate causes. In Colombia, the state was politically
strengthened after the systematic disarmament of insurgent combatants, but the group
known as the FARC negotiated as part of the disarmament that they would be given
political power in the government as a condition to full disarmament. Though this
arrangement seemed feasible initially, the transition has not been without residual and
even additional violence when the exact extent of the negotiated political influence was
not delivered as originally expected. This is a situation in which military assistance from
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the United States has little impact to the final outcome to what amounts to be an internal
competition for political influence. On another note, Jordan has experienced stress from
the conflict with the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and also the civil war in Syria. The
continued flow of refugees has taxed the security sector apparatus in Jordan. As a result,
the US quadrupled its annual aid to Jordan from 2004 to 2019 (Sharp, 2019).
Additionally, as of December 4, 2019, Jordan hosts nearly 3,000 troops. Total bilateral
U.S. aid that is overseen by the Departments of State and Defense to Jordan through
Fiscal Year 2017 amounted to approximately $20.4 billion (Sharp, 2019, p. 2).
Though the Jordanian government has received a significant level of military
assistance from the United States, the monarchy faces continued political challenges from
its constituent citizenry on the declining state of the economy and also with respect to
changes in the U.S. policy toward Israel and the Palestinians. With over half of
Jordanians originating from Palestinian ancestry, the opportunities for open U.S.
collaboration ebb and flow because the topic is an emotional one for the region. In turn,
visible U.S. presence in the Jordanian security sector detracts from the legitimacy of the
security sector, but it also decreases the relative capacity of the Jordanians to counter
their security threats.
4) United States military assistance does not reduce fragility in states without a
cooperative relationship between the United States and the recipient state executive
leaders.
As a tool of foreign policy, the effectiveness of U.S. military assistance is often
tied to the existing political relationship between Washington and the recipient state for
military assistance. Among the five states in which political development fragility was
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reduced after receiving five years or more of U.S. military assistance, four have existing
strategic relationships with the United States, Romania treaty bound as part of NATO,
Colombia receives assistance under the Colombian Strategic Development Initiative,
Indonesia has a Comprehensive Partnership Agreement, and Jordan has a recently
updated Memorandum of Understanding on U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan that is cosigned by the U.S. Secretary of State and the Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs on
February 14, 2018. However, among the five states in which political development
fragility was not reduced, two states also have formal strategic relationships. Those
states are Honduras and the Philippines. According to both the FSI data and the case
study analysis, these states experienced different kinds of challenges to their respective
security sectors that varied in their ability to be influenced by assistance from the United
States. In the case of Honduras, the exceptionally low human development and high
poverty levels predisposes the citizenry to crime caused by transnational gangs. Military
assistance is limited in its ability to remedy security concerns that are rooted in
unrelenting poverty and rampant crime.
The chart below summarizes foreign policy outcomes that are evidence in
recipient states of U.S. military assistance:
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Table 31 Summary of U.S. Military Assistance Recipient State Foreign Policy Outcomes
Reduction in State Security Apparatus
Fragility
Romania—Access for Europe Military
Operations, Counter- Russian Aggression
Colombia—Counter Narco-trafficking
Indonesia—Assistance for Counter-ISIS
activities
Liberia—Pro-U.S. collaboration, but weak
institutional capacity to export security
Jordan—Collaboration against ISIS

Increase in State Security Apparatus
Fragility
Ukraine—Minimal collaboration with
U.S. or other states
Honduras—Hosts JTF-Bravo
Philippines—Collaboration against
Chinese expansionism
Kenya—Collaboration against Al Shabaab
Yemen—Minimal collaboration with U.S.
or other states

Among the 10 case studies, all but two exhibited foreign policies that were
conducive to U.S. interests after receiving U.S. military assistance for more than five
years.
This study finds that cases in which reductions to political fragility have occurred
exhibit specific characteristics that are evident prior to the dedication of U.S. military
resources. The most salient characteristic is that the recipient state has a security sector
that is considered legitimate in the eyes of the affected population. The second trait is
that this already legitimate security sector apparatus is not physically capable of meeting
the environmentally produced endogenous or exogenous threats to the security of that
state. Thus, when a legitimate state security sector apparatus is lacking in effectiveness,
U.S. military assistance has a higher chance of yielding results that benefit the U.S.
foreign policy objective of reducing political development fragility, which is in the U.S.
national interest.
These findings suggest that the application of international development
assessment tools on political development and the legitimacy and effectiveness of
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recipient state security sector apparatus may prove useful for future U.S. foreign policy
decisions on the use of U.S. military assistance.
As shown by the literature, there is a growing body of knowledge on the
conditions under which nations develop politically, but relatively little research dedicated
to the conditions under which military assistance from another sovereign state can be
effective in promoting political development that is legitimate in the eyes of the relevant
population. Military assistance acknowledges the vital role of the political institutions in
controlling violence. Without physical security, economic and social development
proceeds slowly, if at all. This research addresses the question that if the United States
offers military assistance to governments with emerging political institutions, can or
should this assistance be provided with sensitivity to the various forms of emerging
governance styles? To assess this possibility, the case studies were examined for
selected characteristics of political development and trends for reduction of fragility over
time, with an eye towards how, if at all, U.S. military assistance influences this process.
The Fuzzy Set QCA data analysis revealed that among the 10 case study states
that exhibited a reduction to political development fragility between 2006 and 2015, the
variable most relevant in the analysis of the reduction of that fragility was control of
political violence. This variable had a coverage rate of .875 and the highest level among
the seven variables assessed. While not specifically connecting military assistance with
the achievement of a reduction in political development fragility, it supports the
hypothesis that political development is enhanced when the state has a legitimate security
sector apparatus that is effective in controlling violence.
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10.4 Limitations of Dissertation and Areas in Need of Further Research
This dissertation has opened up several new opportunities for much needed
research in the realm of military security cooperation and specifically in how the United
States provides military assistance. A limitation of this research is that there are few
quantifiable measures available that reliably and consistently assess the success of U.S.
military assistance to recipient states. Success measures are most often subjective.
Additionally, international security cooperation is a very amorphous topic to
dissect because it has several key factors that contribute to outcomes. This quality lends
itself to fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis because there are rarely clear-cut
correlations. Instead, it is useful to search for set theoretic relations between among
certain types of conditions.
An opportunity to clarify the more comprehensive nature of U.S. security
cooperation is through the use of recently released U.S. Department of State annual
Integrated Country Strategies (ICS). These ICS replace the Country Development
Cooperation Strategies (CDCS) and are intended to synchronize all elements of U.S.
assistance to partner states. They are also designed to reflect the current U.S. National
Security Strategies. The requirement for the ICS began after the publication of the 2017
U.S. National Security Strategy. It would be useful to use the respective ICS for each of
the case countries named in this research to elucidate changes to security sector
assistance from a U.S. community of interest perspective. The requirement that these
publications be updated on an annual basis offers the chance for researchers to
qualitatively examine the changes over time and the connections, if any, with fragile
states indicators.
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10.5 Specification of Academic and Policy Significance of the Dissertation
This dissertation is significant for many reasons. To begin, there has never been
any other research focused on the measurable political development ramifications of the
provision of U.S. military assistance to recipient states. This study is ground breaking in
that respect. The only similar study was the research done by McNerney et al. (2014) to
address the concept of the “Preventive Hypothesis” for the use of U.S. security
cooperation to remedy recipient state development fragility. This study differs from that
study because the former was more interested development as a whole, rather than
specifically in the elements of political development that may be affected by U.S.
military assistance. This study fills this essential void by acknowledging that
development trajectories depend heavily on the quality of the political institutions to
provide services for the constituent population. Without basic security, all other forms of
development are difficult, if not impossible.
Since the end of the Cold War in the late 20th century, warfare has been
manifested primarily in internal conflicts. The vast majority of these conflicts stem from
a variety of internal development pathologies. However, the 2018 United States National
Defense Strategy acknowledges a return to Great Power Competition. This
acknowledgement in no way neutralizes the need for increased understanding of the
development trajectories of our partner states. On the contrary, it highlights an even
more urgent need to selectively engage partner states that are more likely to benefit from
the high cost of a military assistance investment.
This study finds that cases in which reductions to political fragility have occurred
exhibit specific characteristics that are evident prior to the dedication of U.S. military
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resources. The most salient characteristic is that the recipient state has a security sector
that is considered legitimate in the eyes of the affected population. The second trait is
that this already legitimate security sector apparatus is not physically capable of meeting
the environmentally produced endogenous or exogenous threats to the security of that
state. Thus, when a legitimate state security sector apparatus is lacking in effectiveness,
United States military assistance has a higher chance of yielding results that benefit the
U.S. foreign policy objective of reducing political development fragility, which is
beneficial to U.S. national interests.
Use of Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis is an important tool for
moving the state of knowledge forward on ways to optimize the use of military assistance
for development purposes. No two states are identical in their ability to receive military
assistance because they each have their own unique security structures, resources, and
leader preferences. Fuzzy set QCA enables identification of categories of conditions that
may be more or less relevant to the achievement of the outcome under examination.
10.6 Presentation of Closing Policy Recommendations
This dissertation supports the hypothesis that provision of U.S. military assistance
for the mitigation of recipient state political development fragility benefits from a
deliberate consideration of recipient state legitimacy and effectiveness context
parameters. Among the five successful case study states, all exhibited legitimacy of the
state security apparatus in the year 2015. Additionally, each of those five suffered to
some extent from a lack of security sector effectiveness that benefitted from U.S.
assistance. By contrast, the unsuccessful case study states demonstrated that U.S.
military assistance provided in circumstances in which the receiving state security sector
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apparatus is not legitimate in the eyes of the population, there is less chance of reduction
of political development fragility.
With 10 case studies, this dissertation begins the essential task of examining the
context of U.S. military assistance recipient states to determine how security is defined in
each case. Understanding of how best to apply military assistance is still too limited to
credibly attempt much larger-n study groups. No two states have the same definition of
national security and no two states have the same capacity to absorb assistance from a
donor state. However, there are opportunities for revelation of how different
combinations of conditions can produce different outcomes.

As argued by Ragin and

Amaroso (2011, p. 170), “From a comparative perspective, it is not a question of which
attributes covary most closely without a specific outcome, but of the different paths to
achieving that outcome.” The focus must be on diversity.
These findings support the hypothesis that there are four conditions for U.S.
military assistance to reduce political development fragility. They are:
1) Recipient states should already have evidence of legitimacy of the state. A lack of
legitimacy of the state means that there is a risk of empowering an insurgency.
2) Recipient states are more likely to benefit from the contribution of U.S. military
assistance toward reduction of political development fragility when there is a lack of an
effective security sector apparatus in an already legitimate state government.
3) Recipient states are more likely to benefit from the contribution of U.S. military
assistance toward the reduction of political development fragility when the state security
sector is considered to be legitimate in the eyes of the population.
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4) Recipient states are more likely to benefit from the contribution of U.S. military
assistance toward the reduction of political development fragility when the recipient state
has a cooperative relationship with the United States. Preferences of the recipient state
foreign policy executive can be pivotal, even when there is an existing treaty or formal
agreement with the United States.
This research also helps to identify various combinations of political development
and foreign policy conditions that may yield predictive opportunities for when U.S.
military assistance will be successful and unsuccessful in reducing recipient state political
development fragility.
The findings suggest that the application of international development assessment
tools on political development and the legitimacy and effectiveness of recipient state
security sector apparatus may prove useful for future United States foreign policy
decisions on the use of U.S. military assistance.
The need for analysis on how and when to use U.S. military assistance is urgent.
Any activity conducted in 155 different states warrants careful consideration of the
unique types of assistance that will be suited for the environment in which it is provided.
At a minimum, recipient state security sector legitimacy and capacity must be assessed
prior to any provision of assistance. Furthermore, providers of U.S. military assistance at
all levels ranging from the pertinent Security Cooperation Office at each U.S. Embassy to
the teams tasked with delivery of the assistance must be educated on recipient state
development parameters that may or may not be affected by the provision of the military
assistance. U.S. Joint Publication 3-22 on Foreign Internal Defense (FID), published in
2018, has a separate chapter for practitioners of Foreign Internal Defense capacities that
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discusses Internal Defense and Development. The chapter begins on page II-1 by
declaring “U.S. FID programs align U.S. Government diplomacy, development and
security efforts with a designated Host Nation that wishes to strengthen its own
instruments of national power and improve its institutions, economy, and security
conditions.” This paragraph describes a process that appears to be a formal arrangement
with recipient states, but as any practitioner of FID will confirm, there is rarely, if ever, a
written IDAD plan. This is not surprising because many states do not even have a formal
national security strategy. Some states have white papers for national defense, but there
are no uniform approaches. No two states have identical security priorities and no two
states have identical structures to meet those challenges. There are many different
security priorities that are influenced by history, economic resources, demographic stress,
cultural preferences, and relative maturity of the security institutions created to protect
the security priorities. This makes the need to educate U.S. personnel on the context in
which the military assistance that much more acute. This research describes aspects of
political development legitimacy and effectiveness that must be considered in advance of
the provision of U.S. military to recipient states. In conclusion, it is recommended that
U.S. policymakers and practitioners of U.S. military assistance work to more deliberately
create programs for providers of military assistance to increase understanding of recipient
state political, economic, and social development.
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APPENDIX A The Fund for Peace State Fragility Index State Legitimacy Indicator
The 2015 Fund for Peace State Fragility Index describes the State Legitimacy Indicator
as follows:
The State Legitimacy indicator considers the represe4ntativeness and openness of
government and its relationship with its citizenry. The indicator looks at the
population’s level of confidence in state institutions and processes, and assesses
the effects there if confidence is absent, manifested through mass public
demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed insurgencies.
Though the State Legitimacy indicator does not necessarily make a judgement on
democratic governance, it does consider the integrity of elections where they take
place (such as flawed or boycotted elections), the nature of political transitions,
and where there is an absence of democratic elections, the degree to which the
government is representative of the population which it governs. The indicator
takes into account openness of government, specifically the openness of ruling
elites to transparency, accountability and political representation, or conversely
the levels of corruption, profiteering, and marginalizing, persecuting, or
otherwise excluding opposition groups. The indicator also considers the ability of
a state to exercise basic functions that infer a population’s confidence in its
government and institutions, such as through the ability to collect taxes.
Questions to consider may include:
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Confidence in the Political Process
-

Confidence in Government: does the government have the confidence of the
people?

Political Opposition
-

Peaceful Demonstrations: Have peaceful demonstrations occurred?

-

Riots and Uprisings: Have riots occurred?

Transparency
-

Corruption of Federal Officials: Is there evidence of corruption on the part of
federal officials?

-

Accusation of Corruption of Officials: Are federal and/or local officials
considered to be corrupt?

Openness and Fairness of the Political Process
-

Political Rights: Do political rights for all parties exist?

-

Makeup of Government: Is the government representative of the population?

-

Leadership Transition: Have there been peaceful transitions of power?

-

History of Leadership Transitions: What is the longer term history of
transition of power?

-

Perception of Elections: Are elections perceived to be free and fair?

-

Monitoring of Elections: Have elections been monitored and reported as free
and fair?

Political Violence
-

Political Assassinations: Are there reports of politically motivated attacks
and assassinations?
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-

Armed Insurgents: Are there reports of armed insurgents and attacks?

-

Terrorism: Have there been terrorist attacks such as suicide attacks and how
likely are they?

SOURCE: http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/indicators/p1/, accessed 29 July 2017

448

APPENDIX B The Fund for Peace Fragility Index Security Apparatus Indicator
The Fund for Peace State Fragility Index describes the Security Apparatus
indicator as follows:
The Security Apparatus indicator considers the security threats to a state, such as
bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or
terrorism. The Security Apparatus also takes into account serious criminal
factors, such as organized crime and homicides, and perceived trust of citizens in
domestic security. In some instances, the security apparatus may extend beyond
traditional military or police forces to include state-sponsored private militias
that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be
sympathetic to the opposition. In other instances, the security apparatus of a
state can include a “deep state,” that may consist of secret intelligence units, or
other irregular security forces, that serve the interests of a political leader or
clique. As a counter example, the indicator will also take into account armed
resistance to a governing authority, particularly the manifestation of violent
uprisings and insurgencies, proliferation of independent militias, vigilantes, or
mercenary groups that challenge the state’s monopoly of the use of force.
Questions to consider may include:
Monopoly of the Use of Force
-

Military: Is the military under civilian control?

-

Militias: Do private militias exist against the state?

-

Paramilitary: Is there paramilitary activity?

-

Private Forces: Do private armies exist to protect assets?
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-

Guerillas: Are there guerilla forces operating in the state? Do they control
territory?

Relationship Between Security and Citizenry
-

Professionalization of Police: Are the police considered to be professional?

-

Political Violence: Is violence often state-sponsored and politically
motivated?

-

Government Response to Security Threats: Is the government dealing well
with any insurgency or security situation?

Force
-

Use of Force: Does the military and police maintain proper use of force?

-

Accusations of Police Brutality: Are there accusations of police brutality?

Arms
-

Arms Proliferation: Is there a high availability of weapons?

-

DDR Program: If in reconstruction, is there an adequate plan for
demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants?

SOURCE: http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/indiators/c1/, accessed 29 July 2017
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APPENDIX C Fuzzy Set Analysis

Outcome= Reduction of Political Development Fragility
Variables:
State Legitimacy
Confidence in the Political Process= confpolpro
Political Opposition= polopp
Transparency= transp
Openness & Fairness of the Political Process= openfair
Political Violence= polviolence
Security Sector Apparatus Effectiveness
Monopoly of the Use of Force= monopuseforce
Relationship Between Security & Citizens= relbetwsedandcit
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consistency

coverage

combined

*relbetwsecandcit

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

confpolpro*polopp*transp*openfair*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

confpolpro*polopp*polviolence*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

confpolpro*transp*polviolence*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

confpolpro*polopp*transp*openfair*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

transp*openfair*polviolence*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

polopp*openfair*polviolence*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

confpolpro*polopp*openfair*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.853658

0.729167

0.810093

polopp*transp*polviolence*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

0.9

0.75

0.848528

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

confpolpro*transp*openfair*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

confpolpro*polopp*transp*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

polopp*transp*openfair*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

confpolpro*polviolence*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.902439

0.770833

0.860233

confpolpro*polopp*openfair*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

confpolpro*transp*openfair*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

0.9

0.75

0.848528

polopp*transp*openfair*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

confpolpro*openfair*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.857143

.75

0.826136

confpolpro*polopp*transp*openfair*relbetwsecandcit

0.857143

0.75

0.826136

confpolpro*polopp*transp*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

transp*polviolence*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

polopp*polviolence*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

confpolpro*polopp*transp*openfair*polviolence*monopuseforce

confpolpro*transp*openfair*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

confpolpro*polopp*openfair*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit
confpolpro*polopp*transp*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

openfair*polviolence*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit
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confpolpro*polopp*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.853658

0.729167

0.810093

polopp*transp*openfair*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

confpolpro*transp*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

0.904762

0.791667

0.87178

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

0.9

0.75

0.848528

0.853658

0.729167

0.810093

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

0.9

0.75

0.848528

confpolpro*polopp*transp*openfair*polviolence

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

polopp*transp*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

0.9

0.75

0.848528

transp*openfair*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

confpolpro*polopp*openfair*relbetwsecandcit

0.860465

0.770833

0.837531

confpolpro*transp*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

confpolpro*polopp*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

confpolpro*transp*openfair*relbetwsecandcit

0.857143

0.75

0.826136

polopp*transp*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

polviolence*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.902439

0.770833

0.860233

polopp*openfair*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

confpolpro*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.860465

0.770833

0.837531

confpolpro*polopp*transp*relbetwsecandcit

0.857143

0.75

0.826136

transp*openfair*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

confpolpro*transp*openfair*monopuseforce

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

confpolpro*polopp*openfair*monopuseforce

0.853658

0.729167

0.810093

polopp*transp*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

openfair*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.857143

0.75

0.826136

confpolpro*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit

0.906977

0.8125

0.883176

polopp*transp*openfair*relbetwsecandcit

0.857143

0.75

0.826136

confpolpro*transp*openfair*polviolence

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

0.9

0.75

0.848528

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

0.904762

0.791667

0.87178

confpolpro*openfair*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit
confpolpro*polopp*transp*openfair*monopuseforce
confpolpro*polopp*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit
polopp*openfair*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit
transp*openfair*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit
confpolpro*transp*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit
confpolpro*openfair*polviolence*monopuseforce

polopp*openfair*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit

confpolpro*polopp*openfair*polviolence
confpolpro*polopp*transp*monopuseforce
openfair*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit
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transp*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

polopp*monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.853658

0.729167

0.810093

confpolpro*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.904762

0.791667

0.87178

confpolpro*polopp*transp*polviolence

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

confpolpro*openfair*relbetwsecandcit

0.866667

0.8125

0.864581

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

0.9

0.75

0.848528

transp*polviolence*relbetwsecandcit

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

polopp*transp*openfair*polviolence

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

0.9

0.75

0.848528

confpolpro*transp*relbetwsecandcit

0.857143

0.75

0.826136

confpolpro*polopp*relbetwsecandcit

0.860465

0.770833

0.837531

confpolpro*openfair*monopuseforce

0.857143

0.75

0.826136

confpolpro*polopp*transp*openfair

0.857143

0.75

0.826136

transp*openfair*relbetwsecandcit

0.857143

0.75

0.826136

polopp*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

polopp*openfair*relbetwsecandcit

0.860465

0.770833

0.837531

transp*polviolence*monopuseforce

0.894737

0.708333

0.820315

confpolpro*polopp*monopuseforce

0.853658

0.729167

0.810093

confpolpro*openfair*polviolence

0.904762

0.791667

0.87178

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

polopp*transp*relbetwsecandcit

0.857143

0.75

0.826136

monopuseforce*relbetwsecandcit

0.860465

0.770833

0.837531

confpolpro*transp*polviolence

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

polopp*openfair*monopuseforce

0.853658

0.729167

0.810093

confpolpro*polopp*polviolence

0.9

0.75

0.848528

transp*openfair*monopuseforce

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

polviolence*relbetwsecandcit

0.906977

0.8125

0.883176

confpolpro*relbetwsecandcit

0.869565

0.833333

0.875595

polopp*openfair*polviolence

0.9

0.75

0.848528

0.85

0.708333

0.798436

transp*openfair*polviolence

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

confpolpro*polopp*openfair
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polopp*transp*monopuseforce
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openfair*relbetwsecandcit

0.866667

0.8125

0.864581

polviolence*monopuseforce

0.904762

0.791667

0.87178

polopp*transp*polviolence

0.897436

0.729167

0.832291

confpolpro*polopp*transp

0.857143

0.75

0.826136

confpolpro*monopuseforce

0.863636

0.791667

0.853425

polopp*relbetwsecandcit

0.860465

0.770833

0.837531

transp*relbetwsecandcit

0.857143
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0.826136
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confpolpro*polviolence

0.909091
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0.708333

0.798436
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0.9
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confpolpro*polopp
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0.869565

0.833333
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polopp*openfair

0.860465
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0.837531

polopp*transp
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monopuseforce

0.863636

0.791667

0.853425

polviolence

0.913043

0.875

0.921276

confpolpro

0.836735

0.854167

0.862047

openfair

0.829787

0.8125

0.835913

0.8

0.75

0.774597

0.840909

0.770833

0.82361

transp*monopuseforce

transp
polopp
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APPENDIX D Security Apparatus Ratings
Ratings are derived from the Fund for Peace State Fragility Index 2015
Security Apparatus ratings are described by the Fund for Peace as follows:
Score

Nature of Fragility

Focus States (2015)

10

Monopoly on the use of violence by the state
is compromised by widespread proliferation of
private militias or praetorian guards loyal to a
dictatorial regime, creating a “state within a state,”
“no-go zones”, or an “army within an army.”

Yemen--10

9

Private militias are challenging the state or key
security forces are personally loyal to the dictator
bypassing the regular armed forces.

Philippines- 9.1

8

Security in some parts of the country is in the
hands of a party other than the state, which
uses violent force to maintain control or state
forces vie for control with praetorian guards.

Kenya- 8.4

7

Security in some parts of the country is in the
hands of a party other than the state that rules
without excessive use of force or praetorian
guard has some independent influence.

Ukraine- 7.9
Colombia- 7.3

6

Security in a small portion of the country is
in the hands of a party other than the state,
which uses sporadic violence or praetorian guard.

Liberia- 6.9
Honduras- 6.7
Indonesia- 6.2

5

Security in a small portion of the country is
in the hands of a party other than the state
but remains dominant.

Jordan- 5.5

4

The government is beginning to lose control
over security in small sections of the country.

3

Security is in the hands of government but
cases of the use of violent force are reported.

2

Security is under government control with
strong civilian oversight and rare cases of
violent force are reported.

1

Security is under government control with
civilian oversight. It does not use violence to
maintain domestic control.

0

There are little or no security forces and government
does not use violence to maintain control.
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Romania- 2.5
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